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A HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY 




JOHN PAUL JONES 

FROM THE ORIGINAL BUST BY HOUDON IN 
THE POSSESSION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
ACADEMY OF FINE ARTS PHILADELPHIA 



A HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

BY 
JOHN R. SPEARS 

ILLUSTRATED 



CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
NEW YORK :: :: 1908 



\ 



S1^ 



lUBRARYofCONciHESS, 
Two Copies Kecbivrf'J 

FEB 1 li^08 

CLASS /^ XAi;. Wu. 
'COPV a. 



Copyright 1908 by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published February, 1908 




PREFACE 

In preparing this volume the writer has been animated 
by a desire to tell, in one convenient volume, that might be 
sold at a moderate price, the whole story of our navy — to 
describe all the important naval battles, and to show how 
the nation has been affected at certain times by the work 
of its naval ships, and at other times by the want of such 
a force. 

All battles that have had any influence upon the wars in 
which the nation has been engaged, or upon the evolution of 
ships of war, or upon the character of our naval men, or of 
the nation, have been deemed important herein. Any con- 
sideration of the facts shows that our sailors were animated, 
in most of their battles, by the knowledge that they were 
fighting for the very life of the nation, and it is therefore 
not too much to say that a description of such a fight must 
be a hero story, however told. Frankly, it was in the be- 
lief that every history of our navy claims attention first of 
all as a hero story that this one was written. 

But while most of the space has been devoted to the 
battles, especial consideration has been given to the facts 
and conditions that have, from time to time, created public 
opinion in favor of, or against, the employment of a navy. 
In this point of view the building of the frigates early in the 
War of the Revolution, and the utter collapse of the young 
navy before the end of that war, have a new interest. Of 
still greater interest is the story of the navy building in the 



vi PREFACE 

days when we paid tribute to African princes, and, while 
singing " Hail, ye heroes, heaven-born band," hesitated to 
send our warships to sea for the protection of our mer- 
chantmen lest the swarming pirates be thereby made 
"more acrimonious than ever"! 

Still another story of the kind is that of the efforts to use 
"peaceable coercion" to compel the warring nations of 
Europe to treat us justly. The facts in that matter should 
be of particular interest to all who honestly believe that a 
strong navy incites a nation to go to war. For during a 
period of eleven years before the War of 1812 the American 
people strove with all their might to get on without a navy 
— with the result that they suffered every indignity, with 
enormous and even incalculable losses of property, and 
then were compelled to fight at last. That the influence of 
the American people has always been exerted for the pro- 
motion of peace is a statement that need not be supported 
by evidence, and that this influence has been effective in 
proportion to the strength of our navy is one of the propo- 
sitions which it is hoped has been made good in this volume. 

The work of our navy in the evolution of warships, 
though a matter of mechanics, is by no means devoid of 
popular interest. Thus the battle of the Constitution and 
the Guerriere, though it has been called elsewhere a mere 
naval duel, wrought a mighty change in the frigates of the 
world at the same time that it saved the American people 
from disasters that should never be forgotten. The battle of 
the Monitor and the Merrimac was of similar interest, for, 
in addition to its influence upon the war for the preserva- 
tion of the Union, it led to the evolution of the modern 
battleship. And as for the battleship, there are some who 
believe that it has been worth its cost aside from its politi- 
cal influence — as shall appear. 

Finally, a consideration of the effect of our naval battles 
upon character is a matter that brings us back again to 



PREFACE vii 

the hero stories, and makes such stories worth the teUing. 
It is worth while, is it not, to recall that John Paul Jones 
said while on a sinking ship, "I have not yet begun to 
fight," and that Commodore Perry, when going out to the 
battle of Lake Erie, said, "To windward or to leeward, 
they shall fight to-day" ? Though their names are nowhere 
recorded, we are not likely to forget the work of the men 
who, during the Civil War, deliberately met death in the 
"davids" at Charleston. The story of the cable-cutters 
of the War with Spain is inspiring far inland from the lit- 
toral. Indeed, this volume might very well have been 
dedicated to all who face the enemy — every enemy — with 
the spirit of the fighting men of our navy. 

J. R. S. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Organizing the First Navy .... 1 

II. The First Battle of Lake ChampluVIn 8 

III. With the Ranger and the Bonhomme 

Richard 13 

IV. At the End of the War 26 

V. The African Pirates and the French 

Spoliations 34 

VI. Battles of the War with France . . 44 

VII. Origin of the War of 1812 .... 53 

VIII. Learning the Art of Naval Warfare 74 

IX. The Decisive Battle of the War of 1812 80 

X. Victories that were Timely .... 88 

XI. Loss OF THE Chesapeake and the Argus 101 

XII. On the Great Lakes 110 

XIII. Minor Battles of the War .... 125 

XIV. The Loss of the Essex 136 

XV. On Lake Champlain 144 

XVI. Development of Ships and Guns in the 

Old Navy 155 

XVII. In the Beginning of the Civil War . . 164 

ix 



X CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVIII. At Cape Hatteras and Port Royal . 175 

XIX. The Monitor and the Merrimac . . 182 

XX. On the Upper Mississippi 196 

XXI. Farragut at New Orleans .... 205 

XXII. Privateers and Cruisers 217 

XXIII. The Mississippi Opened — Evolution of 

the Torpedo 234 

XXIV. Farkagut at Mobile Bay 243 

XXV. Building the White Squadron . . . 253 

XXVI. Beginning the War with Spain . . . 265 

XXVII. The Battle of Manila 274 

XXVIII. On to Santiago 280 

XXIX. Battle of Santiago 290 

XXX. Ten Years of Naval Development . 301 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

John Paul Jones Frontispiece 

From the original bust by Houdon in the possession of the 
Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia. 

FACING 
PAGF, 

Scene of Arnold's battle, October 11, 1776, and of 

Macdonough's victory, September 11, 1814 ... 10 / 

The Constitution escaping from a British squadron off 

the Capes of the Chesapeake, July, 1812 80 z' 

The fight between the Constitution and the Guerriere. . 84 /■ 

Captain Is.^ac Hull 102 

From an engraving, at the Navy Department, Washington, 
of the painting by Stuart. 

Oliver H. Perry 118 -' 

From a Portrait after John Wesley Jarvis in the Redwood 
Library at Newport, R. I. 

Commodore Thomas Macdonough 146 ^ 

From a painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the Century Club, 
New York. Reproduced by permission of the owner, 
Rodney Macdonough, Esq. 

The fight between the Monitor and Merrimac .... 190 . 

Deck view of Monitor and crew 194 

Commodore Worden and the oflBcers of the Monitor . 194 

Mississippi River type of gunboat: The Cairo . . 200 •' 

Blockade runner Teaser 200 

xi 



xii ILLUSTRATIONS 



FACING 
PAGE 



Admiral D. G. Farragut 206' 

Farragut's fleet passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip . 214 

The battleship Oregon under way 260 

The evolution of the six-inch gun 263 

Diagrams showing the position of the keel and bow of 

the battleship Maine after the explosion .... 268 

Aj>miral George Dewey 276 

The new 20,000-ton type of battleship 302 

A torpedo-boat destroyer under way 306 

The submarine Shark 306 

The Fulton 306 

Holland type of submarine boat, using her gasoline engine 
as propelling power. 



A HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY 



A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

CHAPTER I 
ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 

The destruction of the British war schooner Gaspe by a 
band of patriots under the lead of Captain Abraham Whip- 
ple, near Providence, R. I., before daylight in the morn- 
ing of June 10, 1772, was the first stroke afloat for Ameri- 
can liberty. The Gaspe, acting as a revenue cutter, had 
been destroying the commerce of the colony. 

The capture of the British war schooner Margaretta, 
off Machias, Me., on June 12, 1775, by patriots under 
Jeremiah O'Brien (they had been inspired by the story of 
Lexington), was the next, and it led to the destruction of 
Falmouth (now called Portland), Me., on October 18, 
1775. 

In the meantime the Rhode Island Assembly, moved, 
perhaps, by the men who had been connected with the 
Gaspe affair, had unanimously declared "that the building 
and equipping of an American fleet as soon as possible" 
would "greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation 
of the liberty " of the colonies. When this resolution came 
before the Congress of the Colonies, then in session at 
Philadelphia, although Washington had already been 
authorized to borrow armed ships from Massachusetts to 
capture supplies from the British transports, it was ridi- 
culed as "the maddest idea in the world," and it was 



2 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

with difficulty that "its friends procured the considera- 
tion of the question to be left open a little while." (John 
Adams ) On October 13, however; the navy builders got 
these resolutions adopted: 

"That a swift-sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns, and a 
proportionable number of swivels, with eighty men, be fitted, with 
all possible despatch, for a cruise of three months, and that the 
commander be instructed to cruise eastward for intercepting such 
transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies 
for our enemies. 

"That a committee of three be appointed ... to fit out the 
vessel. 

"That another vessel be fitted out for the same purpose." 

On October 30 the subject of a navy came up again. 
It was agreed that the second ship already ordered should 
carry fourteen guns, and then two more ships were ordered, 
one of which was to carry twenty guns and the other "not 
exceeding thirty-six." The committee provided for in the 
resolutions of the 13th included Deane, Langdon and 
Gadsden. To these were now added Hopkins, Hewes, R. 
H. Lee and John Adams. Then, on November 1, " a letter 
from General Washington by express, with an account of 
the burning of Falmouth, was read." Vice-Admiral 
Graves had thought to frighten the colonists into sub- 
mission by burning Falmouth, but the Congress imme- 
diately ordered copies of Washington's letter sent to all 
the colonies, and then adopted resolutions saying that it 
had been the deliberate intent of the British to disperse 
"at a late season of the year hundreds of helpless women 
and children, with a savage hope that those may perish 
under the approaching rigor of the season who may chance 
to escape destruction from fire and sword." And it was 
then declared that "these colonies . . . have determined 
to prevent as much as possible a repetition thereof, and 



ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 3 

to procure some reparation for the same, by fitting out 
armed vessels and ships of force." To this end the sum 
of $100,000 was immediately (November 2) appropriated. 

Thereafter the Congress proceeded rapidly with the 
work of providing "an American fleet." On November 25 
and 28 " Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United 
Colonies' were considered and adopted, and in this title 
the Congress used for the first time the term " Navy of the 
United Colonies." A remarkably large space in these 
rules is given to the provision of food, and to the care of 
the sick and wounded and to the property rights of the 
blue-jackets. And it was not for nothing that those grave 
legislators were concerned to provide that "a proportion 
of canvas for pudding bags, after the rate of one ell for 
every sixteen men" should be served out at proper 
intervals. 

In the meantime Washington had fitted out the Massa- 
chusetts cruiser Lee, Captain John Manly, on October 5. 
She carried '^ a flag with a white ground, a tree in the middle, 
the motto ' Appeal to Heaven ! ' " She was the first vessel 
to sail under the central authority, but her commission and 
that of Manly were signed by Washington, not by Con- 
gress. Moreover, she was not the property of the United 
Colonies. Her cruise proved exceedingly fortunate, for 
she captured the large transport Nancy, that had been 
loaded with material for the British army at Boston, and 
on her return to port "such universal joy ran through the 
whole camp as if each one grasped victory in his own 
hands." 

The joy spread to the hall of the Congress. The mes- 
senger sent by Washington to carry the news arrived at 
Philadelphia at a moment when the Congress was in secret 
session, considering how to secure the supplies needed to 
keep Washington's army together. When he knocked at 
the hall door the delegates ordered him to wait, but he was 



4 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

insistent and they let him in. They listened with breath- 
less interest while he told his story, and then John Adams 
arose and said with the solemnity of a prophet: 

"We must succeed — Providence is with us — we must 
succeed!" 

The delegates were at last awakened to an appreciation 
of what Ruskin first called sea power, and they resolved: 

"That a committee be appointed to devise ways and 
means for furnishing these colonies with a naval arma- 
ment, and report with all convenient speed." 

The committee appointed for this purpose (it was the 
second naval committee of the Congress) included Bart- 
lett, Samuel Adams, Hopkins, Deane, Lewis, Crane, Rob- 
ert Morris, Read, Paca, R. H. Lee, Hewes and Gadsden. 
They made haste, as directed, and in two days (on De- 
cember 13, 1775) reported: 

"That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight 
guns, three of twenty-four guns, making in the whole thir- 
teen, can be fitted for the sea probably by the last of March 
next (1776). 

"That the cost of these ships, so fitted, will not be more 
than 66,666f dollars each, on the average. 

" That the materials for fitting them may all be furnished 
in these colonies except the articles of canvas and gun 
powder." 

The Congress was advised to "direct the most speedy 
means of importing" the two articles needed — 7,500 pieces 
of canvas and 100 barrels of powder — and it was thereupon 
resolved "That a committee be appointed with full powers 
to carry this advice into execution with all possible expe- 
dition. " 

This, the third, naval committee included Bartlett, Han- 
cock, Hopkins, Deane, Lewis, Crane, Robert Morris, Read, 
Chase, R. H. Lee, Hewes, Gadsden, and Houston. 

Chase, of Maryland, who had led in the ridicule of the 



ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 5 

idea of "an American fleet," was now on a committee to 
aid in the fitting out of ships built for war purposes. On 
December 16 the sum of $500,000 was voted to pay for 
these warships. 

In the meantime the original naval committee (on which 
Deane was first named), appointed to fit out four armed 
ships, had selected four merchantmen from among those 
laid up in the Delaware, as follows: 

Two ships (large vessels rigged with three masts on 
which yards were crossed), one of which was named the 
Alfred, after Alfred the Great, and the other the Colum- 
bus, after the great explorer; two brigs, one of which 
was called the Andrew Doria, after one of the heroes of 
the battle of Lepanto, and the other the Cabot, after Se- 
bastian Cabot, the explorer who had sailed under the 
British flag. The two ships were rated as 24-gun frigates, 
but the Alfred carried thirty guns at that time, and the 
Columbus twenty-eight. The main deck battery on each 
was probably composed chiefly of 9-pounders, but there 
is some reason for supposing that a few 12-pounders were 
procured. (Force, IV, 964). On poop and forecastle they 
carried 6-pounders. European frigates of that day usu- 
ally carried 12-pounders on the main deck with 9-pounders 
on poop and forecastle. The Doria carried sixteen and 
the Cabot fourteen 4-pounders. 

On December 19, these vessels being "nearly ready to 
sail," the Congress borrowed four tons of powder and 
400 muskets of the Pennsylvania committee of safety. 
And now that they were fitted out the Congress, on Decem- 
ber 22, 1775, formally organized the first "American 
fleet" by ordering that commissions be granted to the fol- 
lowing officers who had been selected by the committee: 
Esek Hopkins, Esq., Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; 
Dudley Saltonstall, Captain of the Alfred; Abraham Whip- 
ple, Captain of the Columbus; Nicholas Biddle, Captain 



6 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

of the Andrew Doria; John Burroughs Hopkins, Captain 
of the Cabot. Thirteen lieutenants were also appointed, 
the first of whom was John Paul Jones. 

In addition to the vessels thus far named the naval com- 
mittee had purchased an 8-gun schooner — the Fly — used 
as a despatch boat, and they had secured and commissioned 
at Baltimore two other vessels, the sloop Hornet, of ten 
guns, and the schooner Wasp, of eight. 

Thus the first naval committee appointed had procured 
eight armed vessels for the use of the United Colonies. 
These were not all the armed vessels in the service; on 
November 16 the Congress had ordered " that two swift- 
sailing vessels be provided for packets." Robert Morris 
was directed to secure them, with Lynch and Franklin to 
aid him. By this committee two swift brigs were fitted 
out. One was named the Lexington and Captain John 
Barry, an Irish-American, noted in the annals of the navy, 
was appointed to command her. The other was named 
the Rep'isal and Captain Lambert Wickes was her master. 
Barry and Wickes were commissioned on December 7, 
1775, but their brigs were reserved for other uses when the 
first "American fleet" was organized. 

From first to last the salt-water navy of the Revolution 
included forty-seven vessels — ships, brigs, schooners and 
sloops. The first navy ships, properly so-called, were the 
thirteen frigates ordered on December 13, 1775. These 
ships were armed with 12-pounders, at best, on the gun 
deck, and with 9-pounders, 6-pounders or smaller yet, on 
poop and forecastle. In 1777 a frigate was built at Am- 
sterdam and called the Indien. She carried thirty 36- 
pounders and fourteen 9-pounders and was therefore a 
most formidable vessel of her class for that day. The 
Alliayice, built at Salisbury, Mass., during that year, was 
perhaps the best frigate built at home during the war. 
She carried at first twenty-six 12-pounders and ten smaller 



ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 7 

guns. Later she carried twenty-eight 18-pounders and 
twelve 9-pounders. In this year, moreover, two other 
frigates of thirty-two guns, one of twenty-eight, a sloop- 
of-war of twenty guns and two of eighteen were built. In 
1778 only one vessel, a sloop-of-war, was added to the 
navy. It was in this year that the French loaned a 
squadron to John Paul Jones. Finally, in 1782, a line-of- 
battle ship named America was built at Portsmouth, N. H. 
That was the end of the building, but several prizes cap- 
tured from the British were taken into the service. 

Of the ships thus provided, the frigate Randolph, the 
sloop Ranger and the converted merchantman Bonhomme 
Richard did the work of most interest to this history, but 
there was one fight on fresh water that had a great influ- 
ence on the course of the war. 

Of the work of the squadron organized under Esek 
Hopkins it need only be said that it went to the Bahamas, 
captured some stores and came back. Then it was dis- 
banded and the vessels were sent hunting British mer- 
chantmen with more or less success, but they did nothing 
of vital importance in the war. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 

As the reader remembers, an American army invaded 
Canada in September, 1775, and during the subsequent 
wmter they held Governor Guy Carleton cooped up in 
Quebec. The arrival of a British fleet with an army of 
13,357 men (including many Hessians) drove the Ameri- 
cans back. They reached Crown Point on July 3. The 
British, with Governor Carleton in command, followed, 
for "the design was," says the "Remembrancer," that 
this army and that of General Howe, then in New York, 
"should join about Albany and thereby cut off all com- 
munication between the northern and southern colonies." 
But when Carleton reached St. John's, a post standing 
at the foot of ship navigation of the lake, he found there 
was no road on either side of the lake, and that the lake 
route of travel was held by the Americans because General 
Arnold had taken and armed such vessels as he had found 
afloat there the year before. It was therefore necessary 
tor the British to construct a fleet suflSciently powerful to 
sweep the lake. 

The work of building the warships was assigned to Cap- 
tarn Charles Douglass, R.N., and the fact that he was able 
to set afloat a full-rigged ship carrying eighteen 12-pound- 
ers after only twenty-eight days of labor, indicates that the 
tacihti^ were satisfactory. The ship was named Meo;- 
ible. Two schooners, a huge scow called a radeau, an- 
other large scow that was called a gondola and was pro- 
pelled by sails, at least twenty gunboats and four long 



THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 9 

boats from the fleet were also provided and armed for the 
occasion. 

To meet the powerfid British fleet Arnold was able to 
muster a sloop, two little schooners, eight gondolas and 
four galleys. One of the galleys (the Congress) was chosen 
by Arnold for his flagship because it was on the whole the 
most efiicient vessel he had. This galley was built on 
"the Philadelphia model" — it was about fifty feet long on 
the keel by thirteen wide and four and one-half deep. It 
could bring into action at best an 18-pounder,a 12 and two 
6-pourtders. In short, the British ships engaged in the first 
day's battle could throw 546 pounds of shot to the Ameri- 
can's 265. They probably had two inches of wood in their 
walls to one inch in the American. For crews they had 
697 picked ofiicers and men from the British fleet, beside 
an unstated but large number of trained artillerymen from 
the army (Pausch's "Journal," p. 84), and "a large de- 
tachment of savages under Major [Thomas] Carleton." 
[Lieutenant Hadden's ' Journal,' p. 19]. Moreover, there 
were twenty-four transports in the British fleet from which 
supplies of men and ammunition could be drawn. 

To man his flotilla Arnold needed 936 men, but he had 
only 700, and these were made up for the most part of 
landsmen, the "refuse of the army." 

These details seem necessary in connection with this, 
the first squadron battle fought by Americans, in order to 
set forth the disparity between the two sides, for by any 
just comparison the British were three times as powerful 
as the Americans. 

In spite of this disparity, Arnold sailed down the lake 
to get as near the enemy as possible, and with a clear per- 
ception of what the enemy must do he took a position be- 
hind Valcour Island. Having square sails the British 
were sure to come with a fair (north) wind. Because the 
water was shoal at the north end of his channel Arnold was 



10 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

well assured that they would pass his island and then beat 
up to attack him, and in such a narrow channel they could 
not bring their full force to attack him in line. 

On October 11, 1776, the wind served and the enemy 
came snoring along with a full press of canvas and all eyes 
searching the eastern shores where Arnold was supposed 
to be in hiding. So they passed well alee of Valcour be- 
fore they saw the American flotilla. 

At the first alarm the ship and schooners tacked around 
to beat slowly up into the narrow channel, but the gun- 
boats cut close around the south end of the island. For 
the moment these gunboats were unsupported by the 
larger vessels, and Arnold with his four galleys and the 
schooner Royal Savage made a dash at them. The fight- 
ing began at eleven o'clock. The Royal Savage was driven 
ashore on Valcour Island and Arnold was compelled to re- 
turn to his original position where "at half -past twelve, 
the engagement became general and very warm. Some 
of the enemy's ships and all their gondolas beat and rowed 
up within musket shot of us." The schooner Carleton 
anchored there, and with springs on her cable trained her 
broadside on Arnold's galley. The shot fired point-blank 
struck home at every broadside, while the Indians that 
were with the British took post in the woods at each end of 
the American line, where they poured in a galling fire. 

At his first view of the enemy Arnold had seen that he 
could not win against such odds, but, aiming the guns on 
the Congress, with his own hands he fought as one who sees 
victory within his grasp. The schooner Carleton was 
silenced and the boats that were held in reserve towed her 
out of range. The Maria came up to take her place and 
was in turn driven off. Last of all came the Inflexible, a 
ship fit to sweep the lake, but, as Hessian Pausch says, 
" the Inflexible took her place only to retreat as the others 
had done." One galley, the Philadelphia, was now in- 




SCENE OI" ARNOLD'S BATTLE, OCTOBER 11, 1776. AND OF 
MACDONOUGH'S VICTORY, SEPTEMBER 11, ISU. 



THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 11 

jured so that, as Pausch says, she " began to careen over 
on one side, but in spite of this [she] continued her fire." 
("Journal," p. 83.) 

"They continued a very hot fire with round and grape- 
shot until five o'clock," wrote Arnold, "when they thought 
proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards and 
continue the fire until dark." To this Lieutenant Had- 
den, of the Royal Artillery adds in his "Journal": "It was 
found that the boats' advantage was not to come nearer 
than about 700 yards, as whenever they approached nearer 
they were greatly annoyed by grapeshot." 

In fact, one British boat that was driven by its Hessian 
commander, Lieutenant Dufais, to a closer range, was 
blown up. "The cannon of the Rebels were well served," 
says Pausch, "for, as I saw afterwards, our ships were 
pretty well mended and patched up with boards and stop- 
pers." 

In numbers and in concentration of gun power the 
British had three times the force of the Americans, but 
Arnold, with his scanty crews, fought them to a standstill. 
He had fought to delay the enemy, and he had succeeded, 
but he could not hope for victory over such a force, and 
that night when the usual fog spread over the lake, he 
slipped through the British line and pulled away toward 
Ticonderoga, sinking two of the gondolas as he went be- 
cause they were beyond saving, and making such repairs 
as he could to the others. The British followed, and on 
the 13th they overhauled the remnant of the American 
flotilla near Split Rock Point. The ship and the two 
schooners were in the lead with the radeau and the big 
sailing gondola within range. The gunboats were not far 
behind, but they were more modest this time, as Hadden 
says. At least two of them came into the fight, however. 
Arnold was to meet seven of the best of the British fleet, 
although the ship alone, or even the radeau, was now far 



12 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

more than a match for his shattered flotilla. Moreover, 
at the first broadside of the enemy, the galley Washington 
was so badly cut up that she had to surrender. 

But to surrender in time of battle was not in the heart of 
Benedict Arnold. In spite of overwhelming odds — un- 
daunted by the fire of the whole British fleet that was soon 
concentrated on his galley — Arnold fought them off for 
four hours. And even then, when the enemy had closed 
in around him so that escape was impossible; when a third 
of his crew had been shot down and his galley was a wreck 
barely able to float, he would not surrender. Directing 
the gondola captains who had stood by him to beach their 
vessels, he covered them as best he could as they made 
for the shore, and then, after driving his galley upon the 
rocks, he kept his guns working until all were set on fire. 
He remained on board his own vessel until the flames were 
climbing the rigging "lest the enemy should get possession 
and strike his flag, which was kept flying to the last." 

The American flotilla was destroyed, but the sacrifice 
was not in vain. No fight like that was ever made in vain. 
It was our battle of Bunker Hill afloat. Carleton sailed 
on until he came in view of Ticonderoga, but there he 
stopped. He had come intending to attack the American 
works at that point, but as Dodsley's "Annual Register" 
(London) says in reporting the affair, he had seen "the 
countenance of the enemy," and this with "other cogent 
reasons prevented this design from taking place." 

By fighting on against overwhelming odds — by fighting 
blindly until the last gasp — the American flotilla turned 
back the invader, and thus made straight the way that led 
to the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. 



CHAPTER III 
WITH THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 

With his name at the head of the register of lieutenants, 
John Paul Jones was made executive officer of the Alfred 
and he sailed with her to the Bahamas. Of his work after 
her return, and while in command of two other warships, 
nothing need be said here because, while it was well done, 
it had no influence on the war that is worth mention. 

On June 14, 1777, by resolution of the Congress, Jones 
was ordered to take command of the sloop-of-war Ranger, 
then building at Portsmouth, N. H., and take her to 
Europe. A coincidence that no biographer has failed 
to mention is found in the fact that on the same day the 
Congress adopted the Stars and Stripes, " a new constella- 
tion," as the flag of the United States. 

Hastening to Portsmouth, Jones hoisted on the Ranger 
the new flag and he claimed that she was the first ship so 
honored. Then with scanty, and in the matter of sails, 
unfit materials, he fitted her out, armed her with eighteen 
6-pounders, "all three diameters of the bore too short," 
and on November 1, 1777, he sailed for France bearing 
despatches to the American envoys in Paris, and the news 
of the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, which was to 
induce the French Government to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of the United States. 

In France, where he arrived on December 2, Jones strove 
to get command of a small squadron with which to cruise 
on the British coasts, "to surprise their defenceless places; 
and thereby divert their attention, and draw it from our 

13 



14 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

coasts." Being unable to secure a squadron, he fitted out 
the Ranger for the work he had proposed. In her he re- 
ceived, February 14, 1778, the first foreign salute ever given 
to the new flag. Then, on April 10, he sailed from Brest 
for the British coasts. Arriving off Whitehaven at mid- 
night on the 22d Jones landed, fired one ship in the harbor 
and frightened the wits out of half of the United Kingdom. 
He then sailed to the Isle of St. Mary, where he landed a 
force of men and surrounded the house of the Earl of Sel- 
kirk. It was the avowed object of this landing to carry 
away the earl, "and to have detained him until, through 
his means, a general and fair exchange of prisoners, as 
well in Europe as in America, had been effected." 

Finding that the earl was not at home " some officers," 
says Jones, observed that "in America no delicacy was 
shown by the English who took away all sorts of moveable 
property, setting fire not only to towns and to the houses 
of the rich, but not even sparing the wretched hamlets 
and milch cows of the poor and helpless at the approach 
of an inclement winter." Remembering these facts of 
British outrage the officers urged Jones to carry away at 
least the silverware of the earl, and he permitted them to 
do so, although he did not fully approve the act. 

The plate carried away was worth about £500. When 
it was sold as good prize in France Jones bought it with 
his own money, and at an expense of £1000 all told, re- 
turned it to the earl. The earl, to show how much he ap- 
preciated this sacrifice, wrote to Jones saying: "I have 
mentioned it to many people of fashion." 

It appears that the earl never mentioned the return of 
the plate to any of the British naval historians; at any rate 
not one of them mentions the fact that it was returned. 

Sailing north, Jones met the British sloop-of-war Drake, 
Captain G. Burden, off Belfast Lough. 

It is a curious fact, illustrative of the naval conditions 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 15 

prevailing during the Revolution that, while waiting for 
the Drake to come within range, the executive officer of 
the Ranger was telling the men before the mast that "being 
American citizens, fighting for liberty, the voice of the peo- 
ple should be taken before the captain's orders should be 
obeyed." "The people" were on the point of rising in 
open mutiny, and Jones's life was in real danger, when 
the approach of a boat from the Drake, that had come out 
for a look at the Ranger, showed that a battle was at hand, 
no matter what the "vote" might decide, and "the 
people" concluded to fight under Jones. 

Reaching off shore until there was plenty of room on 
deep water for a battle the Ranger wore around on the 
port bow of the Drake and opened the battle with a broad- 
side. Squaring away, the Drake replied and thereafter, 
for an hour and four minutes, the two ships drove along, 
firing as rapidly as the two crews could handle their guns. 
It was as fair a fight as is known to history, for, while the 
Drake had twenty guns (6-pounders, like the Ranger's), 
and was manned by 151 regularly enlisted men besides an 
unstated number of volunteers, where the Ranger carried 
only 123 (or possibly 126), the Americans had been taught 
to shoot — they were good New England Yankees. The 
Ranger remained almost unharmed, while the Drake lost 
three yards, her masts were all wounded and her hull was 
"very much galled." And just as the sun was sinking be- 
hind the Irish hills her captain fell mortally wounded. 
The first lieutenant also having been mortally hurt, her 
crew called for quarter. The Ranger lost three killed and 
five wounded and the Drake about forty-two killed and 
wounded. 

Small as were these two vessels the capture of the 
Drake made a great stir throughout Europe, because at 
that time no officer on the Continent thought it possible 
to win in a sea fight with the British where the forces were 



16 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

equal. Unhappily, however, Jones's success created envy 
and jealousy as well as admiration. When the French 
minister of marine would have put him in command of 
a squadron the opposition of French officers prevented his 
doing so, and Jones was kept waiting for months for the 
fulfilment of promises that never could be fulfilled. 

On February 4, 1779, Jones was ordered to an old East 
Indianman lying at L'Orient. She was rotten and slow 
but she would float and carry guns, and he began to fit her 
out. As built, this ship was fitted to carry guns on her 
main deck with a few more on poop and forecastle. To 
increase her gun power Jones cut six new ports, on each 
side, on a deck below the main. He thought to instal 
there twelve 18-pounders but he could obtain only con- 
demned guns, and he, therefore, mounted three of the best 
of them on each side. On the main deck he mounted 
twenty-eight "indifferent 12-pounders," or fourteen on a 
side. Four 9-pounders were mounted on the poop and 
as many on the forecastle. Wlien fitted out this ship, 
which Jones renamed the Bonhomme Richard, carried 
twenty-one guns on each side. A crew was procured 
" from among the English prisoners, and by enlisting raw 
French peasants as volunteers. Captain Jones had not 
more than thirty Americans among the crew" when he 
hoisted the flag. 

A number of other vessels were then ordered to join her 
and form a squadron. The American frigate Alliance 
had come to Europe under a Frenchman named Pierre 
Landais, a man who, after having been driven from the 
French navy for cause, went to America and obtained a com- 
mission by fraud. The Alliance, carrying thirty-six guns, 
was ordered to join Jones. The other ships of the squad- 
ron were the French frigate Pallas, of thirty-two 8-pound- 
ers, the brig Vengence, of twelve 3-pounders, and the cutter 
CerJ of eighteen similar guns. The five, considered as a 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 17 

war squadron, compared very well with the Bonhomme 
Richard, considered as a warship. 

To add to his troubles Jones was compelled to sign an 
agreement that "made of the squadron a confederacy 
rather than a military unit. . . . Every subordinate cap- 
tain had ground for questioning his particular orders." 
(Mahan). 

"There was neither secrecy nor subordination," as 
Jones wrote, but his "reputation being at stake," he "put 
all to the hazard." Then came one stroke of good luck. 
The British made an exchange of prisoners by which 199 
American seamen were released, and of these Jones shipped 
more than 100. Every man of them was needed in the 
work that followed. He also secured Lieut. Richard 
Dale, who had escaped from the British prison by walk- 
ing out dressed in a British uniform obtained by stealth. 

The squadron sailed from Groix Roads, outside of 
L'Orient, on August 14, 1779. On the 23d of the follow- 
ing month, while the Bonhomme Richard, the Alliance, 
the Pallas and the Vengence were off Flamborough Head, 
on the east coast of England, to which point Jones had 
come to cut off the Newcastle coal trade, the British 
Baltic fleet, laden with ship stores, appeared, coming with 
a fair breeze from the north. At that the Vengence was 
ordered out of danger, Landais, with the Alliance, fled, and 
John Paul Jones, together with the Pallas, stood up to 
meet the fleet. 

The most interesting battle of the Revolution — the most 
remarkable ship duel known to the annals of the sea — 
was at hand. The British fleet was in charge of the line- 
of-battle ship Serapis and the sloop-of-war Countess of 
Scarborough. Allen ("Battles of the British Navy," vol. I, 
p. 288) says that the battery of the Serapis "consisted of 
twenty long 18-pounders on the lower deck, twenty-two 
long 12-pounders on the main deck, and two long 



18 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

6-pounders on the forecastle." As Allen deliberately mis- 
represents the forces of British ships in describing British 
battles it is certain that the Serapis carried no smaller 
battery than that here given. She could therefore fire a 
broadside of at least 318 pounds of shot. 

As the Serapis tacked out in front of the merchantmen 
the Pallas went off in search of the Countess of Scar- 
borough, leaving the Bonhomme Richard to fight it out 
with the liner. The wind was light and the Richard was 
slow. The whole afternoon was passed in drifting to- 
gether. At 7 o'clock, after nightfall, Jones turned to the 
westward off the weather (it was the port bow) of the 
Serapis and only a pistol shot away. At that, Captain 
Richard Pearson, commanding the Serapis, hailed twice, 
and Jones replied to the second hail with a broadside. 

Jones had secured an excellent position for a cannon 
fight but, unhappily, this first broadside did the Richard 
more harm than it did the Serapis. Two of the con- 
demned 18-pounders on the lower deck burst, killing 
nearly every member of their crews and badly demoraliz- 
ing all the sailors on that deck. A few more shot were 
fired from the one 18-pounder that remained mounted, 
but in a few minutes it had to be abandoned on account 
of the flinching of the men. The Richard had gone into 
battle firing a broadside of 258 pounds, but she was now 
reduced to 204 against the 318 of the Serapis. Worse yet, 
when Jones thought to head across the bows of the Serapis, 
where he might rake her from end to end, he failed be- 
cause the Serapis was able to sail better. In fact she was 
then getting into a position to cross the bows of the Rich- 
ard, and to prevent that Jones brought the bow of the 
Richard toward the wind and threw her sails aback to 
send her astern, parallel with the enemy. 

By this movement the two ships were placed side by 
side and no more than sixty feet apart. It was a position 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 19 

where the preponderance of gun power on the Serapis 
would have its greatest effect. The 12-pounders of the 
Richard were well handled, but the shot from the 18- 
pounders on the Serapis were a half heavier, and they 
simply cut the Richard's rotten old timbers into dust. 
Jones had been thinking of trying to cross the stern of 
the Serapis to rake her, but the effect of the broadsides 
showed him that his only hope lay in getting alongside 
and boarding. He therefore filled away his sails and 
headed for the enemy's waist, only to fail once more be- 
cause the Richard was so sluggish that she merely bumped 
into the stern of the Serapis. 

As the two vessels then lay (bow to stern), no shot was 
fired on either side because no gun could be brought to 
bear. For a time, too, not a voice was heard on either 
side. As he was looking for boarders to come. Captain 
Pearson called his men aft to repel the Americans, but 
when none came to be repelled he began to think they 
had given up the fight altogether — a natural thought, for 
he had seen the work of his own guns — and he shouted : 

"Has your ship struck?'* 

The fight had lasted for nearly an hour. In that time 
Jones had twice failed in efforts to gain a position that 
would be decisive. The battery of the Richard had been 
reduced not only by the loss of the 18-pounders but by a 
number of 12-pounders that had been dismounted. Nor 
was that the worst, for, as the Richard had rolled to the 
long swell of the sea; several shot had penetrated below 
the water-line. She was already wounded beyond hope 
and sinking, but John Paul Jones replied: 

"I have not yet begun to fight!" 

Jones found it impossible to board the Serapis in the 
position in which the ships lay, because his men would 
have to run out on the bowsprit and drop in a thin line 
down on the quarterdeck of the Serapis, where the British 



20 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

stood in a well-ordered mass to receive them. So he 
backed his sails once more and drifted clear to look for 
another opening. To prevent the Richard crossing her 
stern, the Serapis now backed her sails and began to 
drift astern, turning stern first away to the north. On 
seeing this, Jones immediately filled his sails, intending to 
lay the Richard across the bows of the Serapis in a position 
like the cross-mark on the letter T, where he could use 
his guns to rake her while she could not bring a gun to 
bear. It was his last hope, perhaps, and it succeeded in 
an unexpected way. The bowsprit of the Serapis was 
brought in "over the poop by the mizzen-mast," and 
then "Captain Jones with his own hands made fast to 
the mizzen-mast of the Bonhomme Richard the ropes that 
hung from the enemy's bowsprit." The time to begin the 
fight had come. 

As the two ships now drifted with the wind, the stern of 
the Serapis swung in against the bow of the Richard, 
bringing the two ships together with their starboard sides 
rubbing each other. In some places the ports were oppo- 
site each other, and in others the ports lay opposite the 
blank side of the enemy. In the matter of gun power the 
Serapis now had a great advantage because her starboard 
battery was entirely fresh, while that of the Richard had 
been greatly weakened by the previous firing. Crossing 
over, the men of the Serapis fired the guns and blew their 
ports open. 

"A novelty was now presented to many witnesses but 
few admirers," as Lieutenant Dale said. Neither crew 
could load their guns without poking the ends of their 
long-handled rammers through the ports of the enemy, 
and in a spirit of fair play this was allowed on both sides. 

While the play was fair it was so unequal that in a 
short time all the guns on the Richard's broadside except 
the two on the poop were put out of action. She had only 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 21 

two 9-pounders against the entire broadside of the British 
hner. In a brief time the side of the Richard from the 
mainmast aft was entirely cut away save for a timber here 
and there between the muzzles of the British guns. But 
for these the upper deck of the Richard would have fallen 
on the lower. The shot that worked such havoc on her 
fighting side cut away the further side also until there was 
a clean sweep across her deck and the shot fired thereafter 
from some of the guns of the Serapis flew clear of all and 
fell into the water beyond. In the meantime the water 
had come in through the shot holes below the water-line 
until it was five feet deep in the hold, and burning wads 
from the guns of the Serapis set the Richard on fire in a 
number of places, including one close to the magazine. 
Jones in his place on the quarter-deck was cheering on 
his men and using his two guns to clear the enemy's 
deck of men, but down below despair seized upon all. 
The surgeon first lost his nerve. The water rose until 
he found the operating table, on which he placed the 
wounded, floating from under his hands with the motion 
of the ship, and running on deck he begged Jones to sur- 
render before they were all drowned. But Jones replied: 

"What, Doctor? Would you have me surrender to a 
drop of water? Here, help me get this gun over to the 
other side." 

The doctor ran below, and Jones, with some of his men, 
brought one of the 9-pounders from the off to the fighting 
side of the deck, so that he had three with which to fight on. 

Then the Alliance came along, ostensibly to join in the 
attack on the Serapis; but Landais, taking advantage of 
the smoke and confusion of battle, and of the fact that 
his gunners were under decks, where they could not see 
what they were doing, fired two broadsides into the Rich- 
ard. At the first broadside the crew of the Richard cried 
out to tell the Alliance that they were attacking friends, 



22 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 'NAVY 

and as soon as possible signal lights were set on that side 
of the ship. But when the second broadside was fired 
from her the Richard's crew began to cry that the British 
had taken the Alliance. At that the gunner of the Rich- 
ard, crazed by fear, ran aft to haul down her flag, and on 
finding that it had been shot away he began to bawl for 
quarter, Jones instantly hurled a pistol at the gunner, 
hitting him in the head, fracturing his skull and knocking 
him down a hatch. That ended the appeal for quarter, 
but Captain Pearson had heard the cry, and he shouted 
to ask Jones if quarter was demanded. He got no satis- 
factory reply, and concluding that the Richard's crew 
were in a bad way, he ordered his men to board her. 
They started with a shout, but as they came to the rail, 
Jones leaped from the quarter-deck and with a pike in 
hand met them. And on seeing him "they imagined he 
had, as they said, a large corps " in reserve. So they fled. 
As Carlyle said of certain Austrian officers who once fled 
from the presence of Frederick the Great, they were over- 
awed by the divinity that hedges about the person of such 
a sea king. One sees from the British portraits of Jones 
how these sailors thought he looked. 

On returning to his 9-pounders, Jones found that the 
supply of cartridges had ceased to come. Dale was sent 
below to learn the trouble. He found enough. At a 
glance he saw that the water was swelling to the hatches 
in the lower hold, that flames near the magazine might 
cause an explosion at any moment, and that the master- 
at-arms, frightened into supposing that the ship was sink- 
ing, had liberated the 300 prisoners that had been taken 
from prizes. These men were now swarming up the 
hatch. Instead of quailing. Dale shouted that the Serapis 
was sinking and that the only hope of life was in keeping 
the Richard afloat. Then he sent part of the prisoners to 
the pumps, where they worked in relays until they fell 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 23 

exhausted, while others were put to fighting the flames 
near the magazine. 

But now the end was at hand. With his 9-pounders 
and with the aid of musketry Jones succeeded in clearing 
the men off the upper deck of the Serapis. A man in the 
maintop of the Richard (one account says it was Midship- 
man Nathaniel Fanning), took a bucket full of hand- 
grenades — small shells — out on the mainyard of the 
Richard, where it extended above the deck of the Serapis, 
and reaching a convenient point for the purpose began to 
throw the grenades down an open hatch to the next deck. 
In a moment one of the shells exploded on a pile of cart- 
ridges that had been placed there for the use of the gun- 
ners, a pile that extended from the mainmast well aft. 

"The effect was tremendous. More than twenty of the 
enemy were blown to pieces, and many stood with only 
the collars of their shirts upon their bodies." (Dale.) 

It was about 9 o'clock when this explosion occurred. 
The flames set the ship on fire in a dozen places and dis- 
heartened captain and crew alike. They fought, how- 
ever, until 10 o'clock, when the Alliance came back once 
more. This time Landais did not dare to attack the 
Richard openly, but according to his own statement, made 
next day, he loaded his guns with grape shot, "which I 
knew would scatter," and then fired a broadside into the 
stem of the Serapis and the bow of the Richard. 

On receiving this broadside. Captain Pearson, as he says 
in his report, "found it in vain, and, in short, impracticable, 
from the situation we were in, to stand out any longer, 
with the least prospect of success. I therefore struck (our 
mainmast at the same time went by the board)." ("An- 
nual Register," vol. XXII, p. 311.) 

Lieutenant Dale at once boarded the Serapis, followed 
(Converse, p. 193) by acting-Lieutenant John Mayrant 
and a number of men. Captain Pearson and a British 



24 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

lieutenant were escorted to the Richard, and then the firing 
from the Serapis was stopped. 

John Paul Jones with his rotten old Indiaman had 
beaten a British liner just off the stocks. The spectacle 
there afforded was the most remarkable known to the 
annals of the sea, for, as Buell has pointed out with em- 
phasis, while the Bonhomme Richard was steadily sink- 
ing — was destroyed beyond hope — as Jones stood on her 
deck he could yet command, and did command, the ship 
that had shot her to pieces. 

And this spectacle was seen in the moonlight by 1,500 
people who gathered on Flamborough Head to witness the 
fight. 

At 9 o'clock in the forenoon of the next day the last boat 
left the side of the Richard. Her masts and sails were in 
good order and her flag was left flying from her mizzen 
truck. Thereafter the people on the other ships watched 
her in silence as she rolled and pitched heavily over the 
long waves, sinking steadily as they gazed, until at 10 
o'clock her bow dipped under a wave, failed to rise with 
the next, and then down she sank, and the last that was 
seen of the Bonhomme Richard was her flag, the Stars 
and Stripes, trailing out, triumphant, from her mizzen 
truck. 

In the course of a speech which the British Minister of 
Colonial Affairs made before Parliament, as reported in 
the "Annual Register," 1778, on pages 46 and 47, he said: 
"If America should grow into a separate empire it must 
of course cause such a revolution in the political system 
of the world that a bare apprehension of the unknown 
consequences which might proceed from so untried a 
state of public affairs would be sufficient to stagger the 
resolution of our most determined enemies." To this a 
member of Parliament added that "the contest now was 
not whether America should be dependent on the British 



THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 25 

legislature, but whether Great Britain or America should 
be independent. Both could not exist in that state to- 
gether. For such were the sources of wealth and power 
in that vast Continent . . . that this small island would 
be so cramped in its peculiar resources that it must in a 
few years sink to nothing, and perhaps be reduced to that 
most degrading and calamitous of all possible situations, 
the becoming of a vassal to our own rebellious colonies 
if they were once permitted to establish their independence 
and their power," 

It was in those words that the fear of the "American 
Peril" first found expression, and in those words may be 
seen the condition of mind created by the appearance of 
American ships of war upon the coasts of an enemy. 

Of the subsequent career of John Paul Jones it need 
only be said here that he was all but overwhelmed with 
praise at Paris. The king gave him a sword, and, with 
the consent of the Congress, the Grand Cross of the Order 
of Military Merit. He arrived in America once more in 
February, 1781. Instigated by his personal enemies (and 
John Paul Jones was a man whom we may "love for the 
enemies he has made"), the Congress investigated his 
career. Instead of censuring him, however, the Congress, 
on April 14, 1781, tendered him a vote of thanks "for the 
zeal, prudence and intrepidity with which he has sup- 
ported the American flag; for his bold and successful 
enterprises to redeem from captivity the citizens of the 
States . . . and in general for the good conduct and 
eminent services by which he has added lustre to his 
character and to the American arms." He was then 
placed at the head of the navy. In 1787 the Congress 
voted him a gold medal. No other naval officer of the 
Revolution was thus honored. 



CHAPTER IV 
AT THE END OF THE WAR 

Although brief space can be given to the other cap- 
tains of the Revolution because their work on the whole 
had no decisive influence on the war, some account must 
be given of Nicholas Biddle and John Barry. 

Riddle's first command was the Pennsylvania galley 
Franklin. From her he was promoted to the Doria, as 
noted, and his good work in her as a commerce destroyer 
led to his transfer to the Randolph, one of the 32-gun frigates 
that the Congress was building. She proved to be an 
unlucky ship. Sailors left her in the Delaware to ship on 
privateers. She was dismasted soon after leaving port in 
February, 1777, and then British renegades in her crew 
tried to carry her to Halifax. Finally, at 8 o'clock at night, 
on March 7, 1778, she was found in the West Indies under 
the guns of the British liner Yarmouth, rated as a sixty-four 
but carrying seventy guns. (Charnock, vol. Ill, p. 167.) 

Biddle had waited for her. It is said that he had often 
talked with John Paul Jones of the results that would fol- 
low if "by exceedingly desperate fighting one of our 
ships" should "conquer one of theirs of markedly supe- 
rior force"; he had hoped that he might be the captain 
upon whom Fortune was thus to confer the honor of fight- 
ing such a battle; he had always been ready for the chance, 
and now the hour was at hand. 

As the liner, with her men at quarters, ranged along 
the weather side of the Randolph and hailed her, one 
of the Randolph's lieutenants shouted: 

26 



AT THE END OF THE WAR 27 

"This is the Randolph." At the same moment he flung 
the Stars and Stripes to the breeze and then Biddle fired a 
broadside into the enemy. Because of the thickness of her 
timbers, the size and number of her guns — her main deck 
guns were 24-pounders, while the Randolph's best were 
12-pounders — and the number of her crew, the Yarmouth 
was of more than four times the force of the Randolph, but 
Biddle began the battle. He was soon shot down — a bullet 
pierced his thigh — ^yet, seated in a chair at the forward end 
of the quarterdeck, he cheered on his men, who fired three 
broadsides to the British one until it was seen that neither 
speed of firing nor accuracy of aim could win in such a 
contest. At that Biddle ordered the helm down, and he 
was lufiing up in order to grapple the enemy and fight it 
out on her deck by boarding — 315 men against 500 — when 
fire reached the magazine beneath his feet and blew the 
Randolph out of water. 

So near was the Randolph at this moment that splintered 
pieces of her wrecked hull fell upon the deck of the Yar- 
mouth, and with them was an American ensign, rolled up 
ready for hoisting in case the one then flying should be 
shot away. It fell on the Yarmouth's forecastle, unsinged. 
The Yarmouth passed on with her carpenters and riggers 
busy. She had lost five men killed and twelve wounded. 
Four days later she happened to sail over the ground of 
the brief battle when she found four men afloat on a piece 
of the Randolph — the sole survivors out of her crew of 315. 

"Nick Biddle — poor, brave Nick — was the kind of 
naval captain that the god of battles makes." 

Captain John Barry was the first officer sailing under 
the "union" flag to capture an enemy's warship. The 
"union" flag was made of thirteen stripes with the British 
union in the upper left hand corner. He left port in the 
Lexington, one of the two ships Morris was to provide, 
and on April 7, 1776, captured the British sloop Edward, 



28 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

a tender of the frigate Liverpool. Barry was then pro- 
moted to the frigate Efpngham, but she was destroyed in 
the Delaware and for a time he helped "Mad" Anthony 
Wayne raid the British foragers who came from Phila- 
delphia while Washington's army was at Valley Forge. 
Finally he was sent to the frigate Raleigh and he sailed 
from Boston on September 25, 1778. The next day he 
fell in with the 50-gun ship Experiment and the frigate 
Unicorn, of the enemy's navy, and for nearly two days 
gave them the race of a lifetime. Then the wind failed 
and after a blood-stirring fight he ran his ship ashore on 
the coast of Maine and abandoned her. Barry was one 
of the men who would not surrender. While in command 
of the frigate Alliance in May, 1781, he captured two 
British brigs that had the temerity to attack him, and then, 
while on his way to Havana, in 1782, fought the last naval 
battle of the war by attacking the frigate Sibyl, one of a 
British squadron which he encountered. Of course, with 
the other ships to help her, the Sibyl was able to escape, 
but the affair is worth mention if only to show the enter- 
prise of this fighting Irishman. 

The most important proposition that was brought to 
the attention of the Congress in connection with the navy 
was that made by Silas Deane. On November 1, 1778, 
Deane, who had been one of the American envoys in 
France, submitted certain "proposals for equipping such 
a fleet as will be sufficient to defend the coasts and com- 
merce of the United States against any force which Great 
Britain will be able to send to America." (Wharton, vol. 
II, p. 824.) 

In these proposals Deane pointed out that in order to 
obtain a foreign loan (for which negotiations were then 
in hand), it was necessary to set "on foot a naval force," 
because, "without a naval force sufficient to protect in 
some degree our commerce as it revives, it will be very 



AT THE END OF THE WAR 29 

difficult if not impossible to pay either the principal or the 
interest of the money we may borrow." To this end Mr. 
Deane proposed that the Congress build twenty large 
ships "of a new construction, carrying forty-two to forty- 
eight cannon, being equal to sixty-four and even seventy- 
four line-of-battle ships." That was the first public state- 
ment of what has since been the American idea of a war- 
ship. For here were to be built twenty ships on the frigate 
model, carrying from thirty to thirty-six guns of the 
heaviest calibre on one deck, with the remaining guns 
of a somewhat lighter calibre on the quarter-deck and 
forecastle. The size of the timbers, the thickness 
of the planks and the spread of sails on these frigates 
were to be equal to what could be found on the 74-gun 
liners. 

The last feature of the Revolution, and perhaps the most 
important, is the work of the privateers. On December 
25, 1775, the Congress provided for commissions to be 
issued to privateers "which the good people of these col- 
onies" wished to fit out in pursuit of the merchantmen 
of Great Britain. Franklin and a few others of the time 
realized that privateering was merely legalized piracy, but 
the people of the country as a whole were in a state of 
civilization (as, indeed, were the people of Europe), where 
the use of privateers seemed not only permissible but 
praiseworthy. 

The growth of the fleet thus set afloat was prodigious. 
A volume issued by the Librarian of Congress shows that 
the Continental Congress bonded 1,699 privateers during 
this war. They varied in force from the fishing smack 
Wasp, having no cannon and a crew of but nine men, to 
the Deane, of Connecticut, carrying thirty guns and a crew 
of 210 men. Forty-five of these privateers were ships of 
twenty guns and a hundred men or better. The list con- 
tains many duplicates, of course, but on the other hand 



30 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

there were not a few privateers afloat early in the war that 
were not bonded by the Congress. 

In estimating the total American privateer force of the 
whole war Hale says (Winsor's "History of America," vol. 
VI, p. 587): "Between the beginning and end of the war 
the Salem vessels alone numbered nearly 150. The Massa- 
chusetts Archives give a list of 365 as commissioned and 
belonging in Boston." The total number of Massachusetts 
privateers is estimated at "more than 600." In the course 
of the war, according to Hale, "Massachusetts alone sent 
60,000 men" afloat as privateers — an estimate probably 
too high. Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Connecti- 
cut probably sent 20,000 more. After these came the 
fleets of the Delaware and the Chesapeake and other 
more southern waters. 

It is, therefore, certain that more than a thousand differ- 
ent privateers, manned with nearly 80,000 men, sailed from 
the American ports to hunt for British merchantmen. 
The most liberal estimate of the number of vessels cap- 
tured is found in the "American Antiquarian Society 
Proceedings," dated October, 1888, p. 394. There Hale 
says : " It will also appear that more than 3,000 prizes from 
the British merchant marine were captured by the Ameri- 
can navy and privateersmen." That "this loss crippled 
very severely the mercantile prosperity of England" is be- 
yond question. 

There is another side of the matter, however, now to be 
examined. First, such damage as was done by privateers 
might have been done at less expense by well-fitted naval 
ships. Then, at the time that it was recorded "that the 
American armed ships" had captured all told 773 of the 
British merchantmen and had sent into port 559 of them, 
the British armed ships had taken and sent into port 904 
American ships of all kinds. Many of the privateers 
carried crews and armaments so small that even armed 



AT THE END OF THE WAR 31 

merchantmen took some of them, and only in rare cases 
was an American privateer able to beat off an English 
man-o'-war of anywhere near its own force. When we 
come to set the 904 ships captured from us against the 559 
we captured from the British the much-lauded work of 
the privateers is seen in its proper light. 

The ship owners in their greed for "easy money" went 
mad. "Ships that were deemed worth £1000 twelve 
months ago now sell for £3000," wrote Robert Morris in 
December, 1776, and this increase in price was wholly due 
to the insistent demand for privateers. The builders of 
two of the frigates the Congress had laid down in Rhode 
Island stole Government materials and used them in build- 
ing privateers. 

The demoralization of the ship owners spread to the 
sailors. Wages rose to $30 and $40, and finally to 
$60 a month, on the privateers. At the same time the 
prospect of shares in fat prizes was held out to them. 
The Congress paid only $8 a month and the shares of 
naval prizes were less. The consequences of this con- 
dition of affairs were far-reaching. The naval oflBcers 
were unable to man their ships. The spirit of the occa- 
sion led many men to enlist in the naval ships, draw their 
advance pay, and then "jump the bounty" and ship in 
a privateer. The demoralization spread to the army. 
"Many of the Continental troops now in our service pant 
for the expiration of their enlistments in order that they 
may partake of the spoils of the West Indies," wrote Ben- 
jamin Rush. "At a moderate estimate there are now 
not less than 10,000 men belonging to New England on 
board privateers. New England and the Continent can- 
not spare them." 

The number of men in the army, including militia called 
out for a service of a few weeks, was at best 90,000. With 
the exception of a few brief intervals, the number of men 



32 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

afloat in the privateers was as great as the number serving 
in the army, and at some times the number afloat was far 
greater. The largest number of men employed in the 
British navy at any time was 87,000. We sent afloat in 
privateers almost as many men as the British navy em- 
ployed on all stations, ineluding the East Indies. The 
number of men in our privateers was at all times at least 
twice as great as the number of British sailors kept on the 
American station. 

These facts are most important. For if our privateer 
forces could have been properly concentrated and handled 
on battleships they would have swept the enemy from the 
American coast and then from the Seven Seas. Greed 
blinded patriotism and statesmanship. There is no in- 
stance on record where such a splendid power was wasted 
as was the sea power of the United States in the War of the 
Revolution. The consideration of these facts is not 
wholly academic; their bearing on modem naval policy 
is obvious. They demonstrate the importance of build- 
ing the most powerful ships possible. 

Even that is not all to be said of the evil of that priva- 
teering. The stories of the successes of the few were told 
and retold as time passed, while the losses of the many 
were forgotten. Our histories took up and emphasized 
the tales. The work of the privateers was, therefore, 
lauded higher and higher from year to year, and the 
stories of the victories of the untrained militia (which 
were, in fact, very few indeed) were added. So the people 
came to believe not only that poorly armed privateers, 
aided by untrained militia, had won our liberties, but they 
became well assured that such forces were adequate to 
defend the nation from every kind of aggression. They 
literally believed that the interest of our merchants in 
legalized piracy would prove sufficient to protect the grow- 
ing high-seas commerce of the nation in all parts of the 



AT THE END OF THE WAR 33 

world. And when to this faith was added the hatred of a 
standing army that had had so large a part in developing 
the revolutionary spirit, the mass of the people concluded 
that the maintenance of a navy would be a menace to 
American liberty. 

When the War of the Revolution ended we had left as 
a nucleus of a navy our best frigate, the Alliance. To 
preserve the liberties of the young republic from the threat- 
ening dangers of a standing navy this frigate was ordered 
sold on June 3, 1785, as a merchantman. The vote in 
favor of the sale was 18 to 4. She was eventually thrown 
back into the hands of the Government and then was set 
ashore on Pellet's Island, in the Delaware, where she 
gradually sank in the mud. And there her bones lie to 
this day. 

While the Alliance was allowed to lie there rotting, 
a gang of pirates on the north coast of Africa captured and 
enslaved a number of American seamen. We owe much 
to those African pirates, for while we paid them more than 
two million of dollars in tribute money to hire them to let 
our merchantmen trade in the Mediterranean Sea in peace, 
they compelled our legislators at last to build and maintain 
naval ships, and thus made it possible not only to fight suc- 
cessfully a second war for liberty, but what was of equal 
benefit, to escape from the dominion of a detestable national 
ideal and from a national reputation the memory of which 
is still humiliating. 



CHAPTER V 

THE AFRICAN PIRATES AND THE FRENCH 
SPOLIATIONS 

Any consideration of the history of the period just after 
the Revolution shows that the nation was Uke a young 
robin just from the nest — it was blatant, and for safety 
depended not at all on beak or claws. Nature provides 
the young robin with a speckled breast for its concealment, 
and nature had provided "the broad Atlantic" to protect 
the fledgling republic. How far the protective coloring 
serves the bird is known to all naturalists; the extent of 
the protection afforded the nation by "the broad Atlantic" 
shall now be set forth. 

On July 25, 1785, the schooner Maria, Captain Isaac 
Stephenson, of Boston, was captured by Algerine pirates 
off Cape St. Vincent, and five days later the ship Dauphin, 
Captain Richard O'Brien, of Philadelphia, was taken by 
the same pirates at a point fifty leagues west of Lisbon. 
These vessels, with their crews, numbering twenty-one 
all told, were carried to Algiers, where the crews were en- 
slaved and the property appropriated. 

Fully to appreciate this assault upon American com- 
merce it should be recalled that for many years thereto- 
fore the rulers of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, 
though tributary to the Sultan of Turkey, were yet so far 
independent that they made war on whom, and when, 
they pleased. Their armed ships cruised through the 
Mediterranean and as far as the Azores and the English 

34 



AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 35 

Channel in search of the merchant ships of the nations 
that had not made treaties with them. 

The naval power of these little countries was insignifi- 
cant. Algiers, the most powerful, had nine ships ranging 
in force from sixteen to thirty-two guns each, with fifty 
gunboats carrying a 12-pounder each, for harbor defence. 
Yet every maritime nation of Europe had suffered from 
the depredations of these pirates, and the leading nations 
had purchased peace with them at an expense so great that 
the account seems incredible. Indeed, the whole story of 
the Barbary pirates, as told in the documents to be found in 
the "Foreign Relations" volumes of the "American State 
Papers," is now well-nigh unbelievable. Thus Great Britain 
is said to have paid an annual tribute of $280,000. France 
paid $100,000 a year with " presents " every ten years. Spain, 
by a cash payment estimated at a sum above $3,000,000, 
obtained a treaty of peace with no annual tribute. 

The reason for paying these enormous sums is remark- 
able. In the state of civilization then prevailing in Eu- 
rope each nation preferred to buy a peace for itself rather 
than to wipe out the pirates, because, when a peace was 
purchased, the pirates were left free to prey on the com- 
merce of competing nations that had not made such a peace. 
The pirates were urgently encouraged to raid the ships of 
other nations. The most civilized nations of Europe 
held and openly avowed the theory that the best way to 
promote their own mercantile interests was found in de- 
stroying the commerce of competing nations. And that 
theory was practiced, if not openly avowed, as late as our 
Civil War, as shall appear. 

After our War of the Revolution came to an end, and 
our merchants attempted to trade in the Mediterranean, 
the Algiers agent of the British Government called the 
attention of the Corsairs to the fact that the ships under 
the new flag were good prize. 



36 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

"By , we must put a check to these people, they are 

ruining our commerce here," said the British consul at 
Tunis, on hearing that American ships had entered the 
Mediterranean. ("Life of General Eaton," p. 105.) 

"America has three powerful enemies in Algiers, viz.: 
French and Spanish and the most inveterate is the Eng- 
lish," wrote Captain O'Brien after his capture. 

These quotations are made to show the ways of com- 
merce, and more especially to show that the Americans 
knew very well the disposition of the European govern- 
ments in such matters. 

Ministers to conclude treaties with the Barbary powers 
were appointed on May 12, 1784, and on March 12, 1785, 
it was determined to send agents directly to the pirate cities. 
The expense then provided for was S80,000. 

A treaty, ratified by the Congress on July 18, 1787, was 
secured with Morocco at a cost of about $9,500, but before 
the American agents had reached Algiers the ships men- 
tioned had been taken, and the Dey demanded a ransom 
of $59,496 for the captives as a preliminary step in the ne- 
gotiation of a treaty. At that the Congress balked. 

Then, to cause the pirate chief to reduce his price, our 
Government broke off all negotiations, and even refused 
to repay the money which a charitable resident of Algiers 
had advanced to keep the captives from actual hunger. 
In due time the plague carried off six of the unfortunates 
and one was ransomed by his relatives. There the mat- 
ter rested until a constitution was adopted and Washington 
was elected President. 

On May 14, 1790, a petition from the enslaved Amer- 
icans was presented to the House of Representatives, which 
referred it to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. Mr. 
JefPerson reported that "it rests with Congress to decide 
between war, tribute and ransom." Congress, "counting 
their interest more than their honor" (as Jefferson had 



AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 37 

said in speaking of European tribute-paying), preferred 
"tribute and ransom." On February 22, 1792, the Sen- 
ate resolved that it would ratify a treaty, if one could be 
made, paying $100,000 for peace with Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli, $40,000 for the ransom of the captives and an 
annual tribute of $24,000 a year to Algiers. 

In the meantime a new emperor having ascended the 
throne in Morocco his favor was purchased at an expense 
of $25,000, which was counted a fine bargain. 

Negotiations were now opened with Algiers, but the 
European agents living there at once made active oppo- 
sition. They had learned through some traitor at Phila- 
delphia what Congress, in secret session, had agreed to pay, 
and when they told the Dey about the sums voted he readily 
acceded to their request to raise his demands to a larger 
sum. And then, lest the American agents, on arriving, 
should meet the Dey's new demands, the British agent, Mr. 
Charles Logic, planned a new raid on American commerce. 

The Portuguese (they had refused to make peace with 
the pirates), for the sake of protecting ships trading to 
their ports, had been affording convoy to such American 
merchantmen as had ventured into the waters near Gib- 
raltar since 1786. The protection thus afforded had 
served to keep the Algerine corsairs within the Mediter- 
ranean. Consul Logic arranged a truce between Algiers 
and Portugal, under which the Dey had permission to 
send his corsairs to cruise for American ships on the At- 
lantic. During October and November, 1793, eleven 
American merchantmen were taken and the number of 
enslaved Americans was raised to 115. 

" It is needless for me, who have suffered much, to touch 
on the distress of these unfortunate men," said Captain 
Richard O'Brien, in reporting the arrival of the new cap- 
tives. " I have known my country — nine years' captivity 
— by her cruelty." 



38 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Stung by this reproach.. Colonel David Humphreys, 
American Minister to Portugal, wrote to the Secretary of 
State, underscoring some of his words: "// we are to have 
a commerce we must have a naval force (to a certain ex- 
tent) to defend it." 

With all his indignation the Colonel felt obliged to say, 
"to a certain extent." Good politician that he was, he 
knew that if he were to advocate an efficient navy he 
would arouse instant opposition at home. 

The Colonel's appeal had some effect. The whole cor- 
respondence was submitted to Congress (the student of 
history can find it in the "American State Papers," vol. I), 
and after it had been considered in secret session for two 
days Congress 

"Resolved, That a naval force . . . ought to be pro- 
vided for the protection of the commerce of the United 
States against Algerine cruisers." 

This resolution prevailed in the House by a vote of 43 
to 41, and it should be noted that James Madison, who was 
to be the President in a most critical period of the coming 
century, was of those who voted in the negative. 

Out of this resolution grew a law providing for four 
44-gun frigates and two 36-gun frigates. The law was 
approved on March 27, 1794. While the carpenters 
stretched the keels of the new warships the negotiations 
with the pirates were continued to a successful issue. The 
exact cost of this treaty was never made public, but in a 
report of the Secretary of the Treasury, dated January 4, 
1797, the total expense of ransoming the prisoners 
and buying a treaty is placed at $992,463.25. In this 
sum is included the cost of a fine frigate which was given 
to the pirates as a part of the inducement to preserve the 
peace. Whatever conscientious scruples the people had 
about building a navy for their own defence they had 
none about supplying the pirates with the best possible 



AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 39 

means of making further aggressions. That, however, is 
not all the expense. The treaty provided for an annual 
tribute of "12,000 sequins in maritime stores" to be de- 
livered in Algiers. The cost of the stores given for the 
first two years under this agreement, including the freight 
from the United States to Algiers, amounted to $144,- 
246.63. Blackmail to the extent of $34,500 had been 
paid already to Morocco, and peace was yet to be pur- 
chased of Tunis and Tripoli. 

The American people had preferred "tribute and ran- 
som" to "war," chiefly because they supposed that course 
would be the cheaper. But "tribute and ransom" had 
cost not less than $1,171,209.88, down to January 4, 1797, 
and, to paraphrase John Paul Jones, they might well have 
said "we have not yet begun to pay blackmail." And yet 
they had been told ("Naval Affairs," vol. I, p. 20), that 
the cost of the six frigates which would have saved their 
honor would be but $1,141,160, armed and equipped for 
service. 

The worst feature of this story, however, is yet to be 
considered, for, in thus choosing to pay tribute rather than 
fight, the American people made public proclamation of 
their ideal of national life — they thus announced that 
they would save money at a sacrifice of honor. How the 
reputation which we thus began to acquire was after- 
wards cultivated, during the period just before the War 
of 1812, is a story to be told further on. 

In the meantime Washington had gone on with the 
work of navy building as rapidly as possible. Joshua 
Humphreys, a notable shipbuilder of Philadelphia, had 
taken up Deane's idea of "a new construction," and he 
was now employed to elaborate it in the models of the new 
ships. Taking the Constitution, which was laid down at 
Boston, as the type of the 44-gun frigates, it is seen that 
she had a gun-deck that was 174 feet 10.5 inches long, and 



40 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

on this she carried thirty long 24-pounders, and that, too, 
although Congress had contemplated 18-pounders and' 
9-pounders only. That gun-deck was longer than the gun- 
deck on any line-of-battle ship of less than seventy-four 
guns in the world at that time (see Charnock), and there 
were some 74's with shorter gun-decks. The battery was 
that commonly used on the main deck of the ordinary 
74-gun ship. As the Constitution was designed to carry 
twenty guns of smaller size (12-pounders at first) on her 
upper deck, it was believed that she could not only over- 
power any frigate in the world, but that she would be able 
to give a good account of herself in an engagement with 
the smaller liners. 

Next to gun-power the designers placed speed. "It is 
expected that the commanders will have it in their power 
to engage or not," wrote Humphreys. This expectation 
was not realized— the ships were not especially speedy— 
but it is notable that to thickness of walls not a thought 
was given. They depended on gun-power, not thick walls, 
for protection. 

Before the ships could be completed the treaty with 
Algiers was ratified— March 2, 1796. Congress had pro- 
vided that the work on the ships should be suspended as 
soon as peace with blackmail was secure. Washington 
was then President. He saw and said that a navy might 
"prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging 
belligerent powers from committing such violations of the 
rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no 
other option." He therefore urged the completion of the 
Constitution, the United States and the Constellation, which 
were already well under way. 

Few people now read the "Annals of Congress," and 
that is a pity, for they are most instructive, however de- 
pressing to American vanity. The discussions over the 
completion of these frigates ran on almost interminably. 



AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 41 

During the time of these discussions, a French privateer 
looted an English merchantman within sight of Charles- 
ton, S. C, and the story was promptly told in Congress. 
In the West Indies 1-gun picaroons under the French 
flag and even rowboats without guns captured and looted 
merchantmen under the American flag. More than three 
hundred American ships were looted in one year, by 
privateers and pirates fitted out from French ports, and a 
West India governor boasted that he and his people were 
growing rich on the spoils. 

And yet Congressmen — especially members of the 
House — talked and haggled. Thus Gabriel Christie said 
he would much rather the three frigates were " burnt than 
manned." John Page asserted that "commercial retalia- 
tion" would serve better than frigates in bringing France 
to do us justice. Another pointed to China as a nation 
that enjoyed a profitable commerce in spite of the fact 
that it had neither merchantmen nor warships. He was 
sure that China was thus far an example to the United 
States. The name of this statesman is not given in the 
"Annals," but Albert Gallatin, who was Secretary of the 
Treasury under Jefferson, approved and defended the 
unnamed. ("Annals of Congress," February, 1797, p. 
2129.) John Swan wick, in discussing the use of frigates 
as convoys of merchantmen bound to the West Indies 
opposed the measure on the ground that "when the 
privateers and cruisers in those seas learnt that we had 
frigates out they would become more acrimonious than 
ever." 

It was in those days that "Hail Columbia" was written. 
People sang "Hail ye heroes, heaven-born band," while 
their representatives, with their approval, voted against 
using the frigates as convoys lest such use make the 
privateers "more acrimonious than ever." 

However, the aggressions at last forced the nation to 



42 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

fight. John Adams had become President meantime, 
and he had an adequate faith in guns afloat. Congress 
not only consented to complete the frigates, but on April 
20, 1798, the sum of $950,000 was voted for the purchase 
and equipment of an additional naval force. 

Thereafter those who saw that submission did but add 
to the aggressions and spoliations, and that a nation rcust 
compel respect before it can hope for peace — those 
members of Congress who saw this, and advocated the 
use of a navy, moved on rapidly. By the act of April 
30, 1798, the Navy Department was established. On 
May 4 the President was authorized to procure cannon 
and build foundries and armories. At the same time the 
sum of $80,000 was voted for galleys to be used as porcu- 
pine quills. Jefferson was then Vice-President and the 
bill originated in the Senate. Jefferson's ideas of war 
were plagiarized from the sfhingurinoe. 

In June the President was authorized to accept, if 
offered by private citizens, six frigates and six sloops-of- 
war, and pay for them with Government bonds. On July 
7 the old treaties, nominally yet in force, were abrogated. 
On the 1 1th a marine corps of 881 officers and men was 
provided for, and, on the 16th, a law was signed that not 
only authorized the President to complete the three 
frigates that had been contemplated when first the Alge- 
rine aggressions roused the nation to resistance, but it 
permitted the building of three more frigates of " not less 
than thirty-two guns." 

In the meantime, by the Act of May, 1798, the President 
was authorized "to instruct and direct the commanders 
of the armed vessels of the United States to seize, take 
and bring in" any "armed vessel found hovering on the 
coast of the United States for the purpose of committing 
depredations"; and this was supplemented by the Act of 
July 9 which authorized the naval ships to " subdue, seize 



AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 43 

and take any armed French vessel which shall be found 
within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or 
elsewhere on the high seas." 

In some respects this was the most important naval act 
ever passed by Congress. For it became a law at the 
beginning of the work of the new navy, and it declared 
that if we were to compel an enemy to do us justice we 
must not depend on harbor defence galleys, but must 
send ships fit to keep the sea in search of the enemy in his 
own waters. 

The new American navy— three frigates and twelve 
converted merchantmen — was ordered forth to fight for 
the honor of the flag. For thirteen years the American 
people, "counting their interest more than their honor," 
had preferred "tribute and ransom" to "war." In the 
hope of peace they had submitted to every outrage upon 
the life and the liberty as well as the property of their 
citizens. They had believed that submission would soften 
the hearts of their oppressors, but they had seen the num- 
ber of outrages steadily increase instead of diminish. Now 
like hunted beasts driven to a corner they had turned and 
shown their teeth. 



CHAPTER VI 
BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 

The sloop-of-war Delaware, Captain S. Decatur, Sr., 
had the luck to make the first stroke of the war. She fell 
in with a French privateer near the coast. As her papers 
showed, the privateer had captured a number of American 
vessels. She was sent in and bought for service in the 
navy under the name of Retaliation. 

On February 9, 1799, the Constellation, Captain 
Thomas Truxton, was cruising at a point five leagues to 
the north and east of Nevis Island, in the West Indies. 
At noon a sail was seen in the southeast, and Truxton 
squared away before the northeast trades to head her 
off. The stranger— it was the French frigate Insurgent, 
Captain Barreaut — at first made no effort to escape, but 
while awaiting the coming of the Coristellation she had the 
misfortune to lose her maintopmast. She then tried to 
reach a nearby port, but the Constellation overhauled her, 
and then she came to the wind on the port tack with her 
guns out. 

Swinging down under easy sail the Constellation came to 
the wind on the weather quarter of the enemy. Captain 
Barreaut then hailed several times, but Truxton made no 
reply until he was in a position where every gun would 
bear, and then he answered with a broadside. It was the 
first opportunity that a frigate of the new navy had had 
to shoot for the honor of the flag, and every gun was 
aimed to strike home in the hull. The broadside showed 
the French captain that he was no match for the Yankee 

44 



BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 45 

in gun fire, yet undismayed, he shouted "Stand by to 
board!" and put his helm down to bring the Insurgent to 
the side of the Constellation, only to find that the loss of his 
topmast was against him. The attempt to luff, in fact, 
gave the Constellation opportunity to reach ahead, cross 
the Insurgent's bows and rake her fore and aft. This 
done, the Constellation reached on until well on the star- 
board bow of the enemy, where she maintained her posi- 
tion for nearly an hour, firing with the greatest advantage 
and receiving in return but a partial broadside at any 
round from the French guns. Then she crossed the In- 
surgent's bows once more, raked her, and worked aft along 
the port side again. 

It was a most vigorous conflict, for both crews were ani- 
mated by a sense of national injury. The Frenchmen 
felt that they were fighting for human freedom against all 
the world, and that the American people ought to have 
sided with them in the conflict, especially as the treaty of 
alliance of 1778 had guaranteed to the French king "the 
present possessions of the crown of France in America." 
The Americans, on the other hand, had in mind the loot- 
ings of American ships by the French privateers and 
pirates from the French ports together with the outrages 
that had been perpetrated upon crews during the loot- 
ings. But while each was filled with animosity the results 
of the fire differed greatly. On the Constellation a shot cut 
through the foretopmast and it was in immediate danger 
of falling from the pressure of the sail, when Midshipman 
David Porter climbed the rigging and cut away the yards, 
relieving the pressure. It was a narrow escape from 
serious injury, but the fact that a shot from a main-deck 
gun should have flown that high showed that the French- 
men were not aiming their guns. On the Constellation 
the gunners were aiming at the Insurgent' s hull, and 
within an hour after the first broadside every gun in 



46 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the Frenchman's main deck broadside was put out of 
action. 

On seeing how the enemy's fire had decreased, Truxton 
wore down across the Insurgent's stern to rake her for the 
third time, and at that, at 4:30 o'clock — after a fight of 
an hour and a quarter — the French flag was hauled down. 

The Insurgent was much inferior in force, but it was the 
superior gunnery, not the superior battery, of the Con- 
stellation that won the fight, as is shown by the fact that 
the Insurgent lost twenty-nine killed and forty-one 
wounded, while the Constellation lost by the enemy's 
fire but one killed and two wounded. 

One story of this affair portrays graphically the char- 
acter of the officers of the young navy. When the Insur- 
gent had surrendered. Lieutenant John Rodgers, Midship- 
man David Porter and eleven seamen were sent to take 
charge of her. They found that the Frenchmen had 
thrown overboard all the handcuffs and shackles com- 
monly used to secure prisoners, and had also disposed of 
gratings used to cover the hatches when prisoners were to 
be confined in the lower hold. It was plainly seen, there- 
fore, that they contemplated rising on their captors if 
opportunity offered. Accordingly, Rogers began to trans- 
fer the Frenchmen to the Constellation as rapidly as possi- 
ble, although in the meantime a gale had come on and the 
sea was getting rough. Moreover, the wrecked condition 
of the tophamper of the ships interfered with their naviga- 
tion. As a result of these conditions there were yet 173 
prisoners on board the Insurgent when night came on, and 
a little later the ships lost sight of each other in the gloom. 

Lieutenant Rodgers with one young midshipman 
(Porter was eighteen years old), and eleven men were 
obliged not only to guard 173 prisoners but to handle a 
badly wrecked ship in a West India gale, with the rocks 
of Nevis Island alee. Nevertheless John Rodgers, David 



BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 47 

Porter and the eleven unnamed bluejackets were equal to 
the occasion. One determined man, well armed, was 
placed at each hatch with orders to shoot any prisoner 
making any attempt to escape. The others cleared away 
the wreckage and handled the ship. Though they were 
for three nights and two days without sleep or rest, they 
brought her into St. Kitts. 

An opportunity to make more than one good fight sel- 
dom comes to a naval captain, but Truxton was the excep- 
tion. Having returned to the United States to secure a 
new crew (Congress refused to allow crews to be enlisted 
for more than one year), the Constellation was fitted with 
a new battery because the first one was too heavy. She 
received 18-pounders on her main deck, and the ten long 
12's on the quarter-deck were replaced with ten 24- 
pounder carronades, a short gun using a large shot and a 
small (about one-third the usual) charge of powder. Ac- 
cording to Cooper, this was the first use of carronades in 
the American navy. Being of light weight they could be 
fired rapidly, and later they became very popular, although 
they were utterly absurd, as was proved in the next war. 

Thus armed, the Constellation returned to the West 
Indies, and at 7 o'clock a. m., on February 1, 1800, while 
cruising five leagues west of Bassaterre Roads, Guada- 
loupe, a sail was seen off to to south'ard. On running 
down for a look it was seen that the stranger was a frigate 
carrying at least four more guns than the Constellation. 
Truxton had left a station to which he had been regularly 
assigned, and in leaving it he was giving the French pri- 
vateers opportunity to get away in search of American 
merchantmen. Nevertheless, on seeing that the enemy 
was somewhat superior in force, he could not resist the 
temptation to continue the chase. Accordingly through- 
out that day, the night following and all the next day the 
Constellation stretched every sail, and, finally, as the next 



48 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

night came on, a growing breeze carried her well down on 
the enemy's weather quarter. With that the battle lan- 
terns were lighted and word was sent to the guns' crews 
that they were not to fire a shot until orders were given 
by the captain. Truxton then climbed on the rail of his 
ship to hail the enemy. He was answered by a round of 
shot from her quarter-deck before he had said a word. 
At that Truxton climbed down again and once more 
ordered his gunners not to fire until he told them to do so, 
adding that when the word did come they were "not to 
throw away a single charge of powder and shot, but to 
take good aim, and to fire directly into the hull of the enemy." 

In perfect silence thereafter, save as the water splashed 
under her bows, the Constellation reached ahead with her 
sails flashing white in reflecting the fire of the enemy's guns 
until a position was reached to "enable us to return 
effectually his salute," as Truxton said. Then the whole 
broadside was fired. 

It was a little past 8 o'clock when the Constellation's 
broadside was fired. With both crews loading and firing 
as swiftly as possible both ships reached away, side by 
side, through the gloom, until 1 o'clock the next morning. 
At that hour the Frenchman's guns were silenced. Her 
flag had been lowered twice, meantime, but as the act was 
not seen on the Constellation, the fire was continued, and 
the Frenchmen returned each time to their guns out of 
sheer despair. But in the moment of final victory, when 
Truxton would have gone alongside to take possession 
of his prize, word was brought him that every shroud and 
stay supporting the mainmast had been shot away and 
that the mast must soon fall if it were not secured imme- 
diately. Truxton and his men had been so intent on 
shooting the enemy to pieces that they had failed to ob- 
serve how their ship had been cut up — a most commenda- 
ble error, if any error is ever to be commended. 



BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 49 

Truxton at once called all hands on deck to save the 
mast by means of preventer stays, but before one could be 
put in place the roll of the sea threw the spar over the rail. 
In the meantime the enemy was drifting away, so that she 
now escaped altogether. 

Midshipman Jarvis and several men were in the top at 
the time it fell, and all but one man were lost. Jarvis had 
been warned by an old sailor, but he refused to leave his 
post, saying: 

"If the mast goes we must go with it!" 

Some time later it was learned that the French ship was 
the frigate Vengence, Captain Pitot. Her main-deck 
battery was like that of the Constellation. Above she 
carried sixteen long 12-pounders and eight short 42's. 
The Vengence went to Cura9ao to repair damages. A 
man named Howe, who was a prisoner on the Vengence 
at the time of the action, reported that 186 round shot 
from the Constellation had pierced her hull, and that she 
was also somewhat cut up in the rigging. Out of her 
crew that, with some passengers who helped at the guns, 
numbered under 400, she lost 160 in killed and wounded. 
The Constellation lost twenty-five killed, including those 
who died of their wounds, and fourteen wounded. 

No other officer had anything like as good an opportu- 
nity as Truxton, nevertheless there were a number of 
minor actions that are memorable because of their bearing 
upon the results of the war. For instance, two schooners 
were built at Baltimore that were the first light cruisers of 
the new navy. To a sailor's eye there never was a more 
beautiful class of naval ships than the old-time schooners, 
and their crews lived literally in touch with the sea — with 
their ears down to "the unfathomable dialogue of the 
ever-moaning brine." Each of these schooners was 
armed with twelve long 6-pounders. One was named the 
Enterprise and the other the Experiment. 



50 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

In March, 1800, the Enterprise, under Lieutenant-Com- 
mandant John Shaw, while in the Mona passage fell in 
with a Spanish brig armed with eighteen 9-pounders — a 
vessel of double her force. The Spaniard opened fire. 
The Enterprise had already shown superiority in speed — 
it would have been easy for her to escape from the brig — 
but Shaw preferred to fight, and at the end of twenty 
minutes the brig made sail for a far country, to which the 
Enterprise let her go because Spain and the United States 
were not at war. In the course of the next eight months 
the Enterprise was in five different conflicts, none of which 
need be described here because all the vessels of the enemy 
were of inferior force and merely served to give the Amer- 
ican crew a little target practice. Then while cruising in 
the lee of St. Kitts she fell in with the French brig Flam- 
beau, carrying twelve 9-pounders and a crew of 110, where 
the Ejiterprise was armed with 6's and had but 83 men on 
board. The Frenchman had the windward position, also, 
but Shaw drove the Enterprise alongside to leeward and 
opened fire. 

The two hulls were only twelve yards or so apart — no 
more than the width of a narrow street — but the French- 
men on the Flambeau, like those on the other French ships 
already described, had never learned to aim their guns, 
and at the end of twenty minutes they tacked around and 
fled for their lives. This, too, proved in vain. Shaw 
tacked in pursuit, and although he stopped to pick up six 
men who accidentally fell into the sea from the Flambeau, 
he soon overhauled her and then her flag came down. She 
had lost forty killed and wounded out of 110. The En- 
terprise lost tfen all told. 

The Experiment had fewer opportunities, but on Janu- 
ary 1, 1800, under Lieutenant-Commandant Maley, she 
made one good fight. With a number of merchantmen 
she was lying becalmed in the Bight of'Leogane. To the 



BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 51 

people on shore the h"ttle fleet seemed to offer a most 
pleasing opportunity for plunder. The natives there had 
often taken American merchantmen with rowboats only, 
therefore ten barges manned by from thirty-five to forty 
men each, went afloat. 

No more determined band of pirates was ever seen in 
the West Indies than these. Twice they were driven away 
by the broadside of the Experiment, but on each occasion 
they landed their dead and wounded, took on fresh men 
and came agam. When they came the third time they 
were divided into three flotillas of three boats each, which 
made a dash at the Experiment from three different 
directions at once. In the barges were 270 pirates against 
a crew of seventy men on the schooner; it was the last and 
most desperate assault of all, but flesh and blood could not 
stand up against the fire of the Yankee crew, and the 
attack failed. 

The conflict from first to last was seven hours long. 
The Experiment had two men wounded. Two or three 
of the pirate barges were sunk with all hands. 

On September 13 of this year the Experiment, under 
Lieutenant Charles Stewart, fell in with an 18-gun brig 
and a 14-gun schooner belonging to the enemy. Stewart's 
seamanship w^as to give him lasting fame in the navy. 
On this occasion he manoeuvred the Experiment in a way 
that separated the two French vessels, and then he swooped 
down and took the schooner. After placing Midshipman 
David Porter in command of the prize, Stewart went in 
pursuit of the big brig, but the French captain had seen 
enough of the whirlwind tactics of the flying "Yankee," 
and he set studding sails and so escaped. 

Since much was said in Congress about the enormous 
expense of fighting for our rights, here is the reckoning: 
Our cruisers captured eighty-three ships, carjying 46fi 
guns and 3,150 men. Other ships were sunk and driven 



52 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

ashore. Several flotillas of picaroons were destroyed. A 
great number of American merchantmen that had been 
captured by the enemy were retaken. The pirates and 
piratical cruisers were driven from the sea; the spoliation 
of American commerce by the French was brought to an 
end. 

In all this time the French took just one armed American 
ship — Le Croyable — and she was lost because her com- 
mander (Lieutenant William Bainbridge) showed too 
eager gallantry in chasing strange sails, for he got under 
the guns of two French frigates. To use the only argu- 
ment that will appeal to those who count a loss of "values" 
on the stock market as a matter of more importance than 
a loss of national honor, it was worth while to employ the 
navy, because by what it captured and by what it actually 
protected it paid for itself several times over. 

Yet this financial return was the smallest of the results 
achieved. For all efforts of the United States to make a 
lasting treaty failed until after the work of the American 
cruisers — especially the Constellation — had been described 
in the French papers. Then — on March 30, 1800 — 
Napoleon, First Consul, graciously received the American 
envoys. By good fighting the navy saved the nation from 
war. 



CHAPTER VII 
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 

In every adequate account of the War of 1812 two 
statements of fact stand forth prominently: 

The British aggressions leading to that war grew out of 
that fear of the "American peril" which first found ex- 
pression in the Parliament during the Revolution. 

Our lack of a navy led, as Washington had foreseen, 
to "such violation of the rights of the neutral party" as 
at last made war inevitable.^ 

In connection with what was said in Parliament about 
the "American Peril," it is to be noted that as soon 
as the Revolution was ended the American ship owner 
made strenuous attacks upon those "peculiar resources" 
the expected "cramping" of which had filled the British 
Member of Parliament with fear. He began, that is to 
say, an effort to wrest the supremacy of the seas from the 
British merchantman, and the extent of his success aston- 
ishes the student of history to this day. The registered 
ships of the United States in 1789 had a tonnage of 123,- 
893. Twelve years later, in 1801, the tonnage had in- 
creased, in spite of French spoliations (the French pirates 
had captured 300 ships in a single year), and in spite of 
violent British opposition meantime, to 632,907. This 

^In his eighth Annual Address Washington said: "To secure re- 
spect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to 
vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the 
necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from 
committing such violation of the rights of the neutral party as may, 
first or last, leave no other option." 

53 



54 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

increase was due to the one fact that the American ships 
and the American crews were the best afloat. 

While the " American peril " was thus sweeping the Seven 
Seas the British war upon Napoleon was begun on April 
29, 1803. The British navy was supreme. The French 
merchant ships were unable to leave port. The trade be- 
tween the French colonies and France was stopped be- 
cause, under French law, this trade was confined to French 
ships. In this emergency Napoleon opened the trade 
of the colonies to all " neutrals," and the one neutral worth 
consideration was the United States. 

Through the aid of American ships French colonial 
produce found a ready market, and even supplanted that 
of the British colonies. This trade still further increased 
the profits of the American ship owner at the very time 
when French privateers and the few French warships that 
were able to leave port were increasing the perils and 
decreasing the profits of the British ship merchant. 

The British merchants and the British colonists appealed 
to their Government for help, and to that appeal was 
added one from the British navy. The most interesting 
British book printed at that period ("War in Disguise," 
by James Stephens), sets forth the motive of the British 
naval officer in this matter in a way that is frank and sat- 
isfactory. For it draws (pp. 125-127) a picture of a 
British Admiral growing old and full of honors in the 
service of his country, who was yet unable "to wrest 
[from the enemy] the means of comfortably sustaining 
those honors," because, so long as American ships were 
allowed to do the work from which the war excluded 
French ships, he must " look out in vain for any subject 
of safe and uncontested capture." That is to say, while 
the right of neutrals to the freedom of the sea was con- 
ceded the British naval officer would not be able to capt- 
ure any prizes. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 55 

The times were barbarous, and ten years of war pre- 
viously waged for the suppression of repubUcan institu- 
tions on the Continent had intensified the barbarism of 
England. The British Government promptly found a 
way to provide the aging admirals with subjects of safe 
capture, and at the same time strike the "American peril" 
a staggering blow. British sailors, for time out of mind, 
had sung "Not a sail but by permission spreads"; 
the theory that British naval supremacy gave the British 
Government the full right, as a belligerent, to dictate to all 
neutrals the terms on which their ships might sail the seas 
was little doubted in England. In accordance with this 
theory it had been declared that neutrals should not enter 
a trade, in time of war, from which they were excluded in 
time of peace. Thus, American ships having been ex- 
cluded by French law from the trade between France and 
her colonies in time of peace, it was declared by the Brit- 
ish that such ships should not enter the trade in war time 
when France was willing to relax her laws. As a " special 
concession" the British agreed that the American ship 
might carry goods from the French colonies to the United 
States and after landing the cargo there, and paying all 
American duties there on it, it might be reloaded and car- 
ried to a French port. 

To this British regulation of American carrying trade 
the American Government submitted, but the superiority 
of American ships and sailors was so great that American 
shipping yet competed successfully with the British for the 
European trade. Thereat the British prize court assumed 
the right to dictate the terms on which the colonial prod- 
uce should be landed in the United States — to declare, 
for instance, that if the American Government allowed the 
exporter any rebate on the tariff paid when landing the 
goods, that rebate should warrant condemning the ship. 
Subjects of "safe capture" for the benefit of aging Brit- 



56 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

ish admirals were now provided in abundance; for Ameri- 
can ships covered the seas, and the British rules were en- 
forced without adequate previous notice. 

The British method of carrying on their search for sub- 
jects of safe capture is also memorable, for British frigates 
literally blockaded American ports. Captain Basil Hall, 
R. N., who, in the spring of 1806, was a midshipman on 
the frigate Leander, described the blockade as his ship 
maintained it at Sandy Hook ("Fragments of Voyages 
and Travels"): 

"Every morning at daybreak we set about arresting the 
progress of all the vessels we saw, firing off guns to the 
right and left to make every ship heave to ... I have 
frequently known a dozen, and sometimes a couple dozen, 
ships losing their fair wind, their tide, and worse than all, 
their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day, 
before our search was completed." 

Any informality in the papers, or any chance expression 
in the private letters (which were all .read), exciting the 
slightest suspicion that French property was on board 
led to the seizure of the ship, and she was at once sent to 
Halifax for trial before a court that was financially inter- 
ested in the condemnation of prizes. 

So runs the beginning of the story of the British attacks 
upon American ships and shipowners. Because the War 
of 1812 was fought for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" 
with "trade" placed ahead of human rights, the sufferings 
of the shipowners have been described thus far ahead of 
"sailors' rights." The sailors shall now be considered. 

From the days of Cromwell the British naval captains, 
when in want of men had sent gangs of sailors ashore, or 
to the decks of British merchantmen, where they took by 
force any man found fit for the service. The system 
seems now utterly inhuman, but in the state of civilization 
prevailing at the beginning of the nineteenth century it 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 57 

was commonly practised. After the end of the War of 
the Revolution the British naval oflScer found in the 
practice of impressment a safe and satisfactory way for 
expressing his contempt and hatred for republican in- 
stitutions, and incidentally, a way of crippling, more or 
less, the "American peril." Boarding American ships 
ostensibly in search of the British subjects often to be found 
in American crews, the British press gangs jeeringly car- 
ried off the best men on board, knowing them, usually, to 
be American citizens. 

Captain A. T. Mahan, whose work on the " War of 1812 " 
is the latest, says the British made "no crude claim" to 
any "right" to impress American native-born citizens. It 
is true that they never wrote a public document in which 
such a claim was made directly, but the extent of the claim 
of the British may fairly be inferred from their practice. 
For impressment of American citizens was carried on, with 
the full knowledge of the British Government, for nearly 
thirty years. Nor is that all. While they did not openly 
assert the justice of their practice they insisted that no Brit- 
ish citizen who had become a naturalized American should 
be exempt. Worse yet, they insisted, after a time, that 
no American citizen should be exempt from impressment 
unless he had with him, at the time he was seized, a paper 
called a "protection," signed and sealed by customs 
officials of the United States, certifying that he was Ameri- 
can born. That is to say, the British claimed the right to 
impress all Americans who through the perils and mis- 
haps of the sea might lose their "protections." The 
American Government submitted to this claim of the 
British. 

No sooner were "protections" provided for, however, 
than the British repudiated them on the plea that all 
American customs officials were in the habit of issuing the 
papers to British citizens for the sake of the fees exacted; 



58 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

incidentally it was declared that the whole list of American 
customs oificials were professional perjurers. The im- 
pressing of American seamen went on merrily and, when 
impressed, the American was compelled to serve without 
pay unless he condoned the crime by "voluntarily" en- 
listing. To escape from his bondage the American sailor 
was obliged to secure evidence of his birth that would be 
satisfactory to the British Admiralty, and this evidence 
had to be transmitted through the American Secretary of 
State to London. 

Moreover, when the impressed American had the good 
luck to run away from the ship on which he was held he 
was proclaimed a "deserter," and the claim that he was 
a deserter was enforced with broadsides. In one case 
where Americans, admitted to be Americans, were retaken 
after "desertion" they were flogged with 500 blows each 
from the boatswain's cat^a punishment little short of 
death by torture. 

In following the custom of impressing American sea- 
men the British officers often boarded American ships at 
sea and took away so many men that the ships were left 
dangerously short-handed. In fact some ships thus robbed 
failed to reach port. The impressment of their crews 
amounted to murder. Impressment often amounted to 
murder, too, when some sturdy American, asserting his 
rights, refused to do duty. For some of those patriots were 
shipped off to serve on the coasts of Africa and India, 
where they died of fevers. Others were tortured under 
the lash. Others were chained in the bilge-water of the 
lower hold and fed on even less and worse food than was 
served to the underfed crew. 

While it is true that in a few cases Americans succeeded 
in securing evidence of their nativity that satisfied the 
Admiralty the release came only after two or three years 
of service without pay; and it is not to be forgotten that 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 59 

not one British officer was ever so much as reprimanded for 
enslaving these men who were admitted to be Americans. 

Finally, the fact that the British stubbornly refused, 
when making the treaty of peace after the war, to consider 
any concession in the matter of impressing Americans, 
seems to have some bearing on the character of the 
"Claim" — whether "crude" or not — which they had 
made theretofore. 

The actual number of American sailors impressed is, of 
course, a matter of no moment in a discussion of the right 
of the practice. But since the number affected the issue 
it may be noted that, in replying to the request of Congress 
for information in the matter, Mr. Madison reported, under 
date of March 5, 1806, that papers filed in his office showed 
that 2,273 had been impressed since the beginning of the 
war between England and Napoleon. It was admitted in 
Parliament after the fighting began that more than 3,000 
Americans were in the navy. Of course that was but a 
fraction of the number actually impressed, for the friends 
and relatives of foremast hands were usually too poor or 
ignorant to make an appeal to the American Secretary of 
State. It is estimated that, first and last, as many as 20,000 
Americans were thus enslaved. 

The nearest approach to an adequate apology for the 
practice that one could find in British literature, until 
recent years, is the assertion that Great Britain was fight- 
ing the Great Oppressor of the World ; it was a war for 
Human Liberty; that she was in straits where she could 
man her ships only by impressment; that Americans were 
so much like Englishmen in speech and appearance that 
mistakes were really unavoidable. Captain Mahan, in his 
"War of 1812" (Scribner's Magazine, January, 1904), 
supports that British view, as proclaimed at the period 
of the war. He says: "It maybe said that Great Britain 
could have desisted. She could not." The London Spec- 



60 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

tutor, however (December 23, 1905), in reviewing the work 
of this American naval captain, says emphatically, if un- 
kindly: 

"While we agree [with Mahan] that many of the meas- 
ures we took were forced upon us by that necessity which 
knows no law, impressment from foreign ships was not 
one of them." 

It is seen now that the British sailors left their ships 
not because they lacked patriotism but because of the con- 
ditions in the British service that created the bloody 
mutinies of 1797. Starvation, ill-treatment not easily de- 
scribed and scant wages drove British seamen to serve 
under a flag they despised (they called it in derision the 
"gridiron" flag). For under that flag they received good 
pay and ample food. The concern which the Congress 
of the Revolution had shown in connection with the pud- 
ding bags was bearing fruit. By raising the pay and giv- 
ing a satisfactory ration the British could have filled their 
ships. The Earl of Galloway, in the House of Lords, 
on May 13, 1813, in referring to "the propensity of our 
seamen to desert," said that this "propensity" might be 
"obviated by an increase of petty officers, and by more 
liberal remuneration." (Annual Reg.) No one in the 
House disputed his assertion. 

Impressment was preferred through parsimony chiefly; 
it would have cost some money to give the seamen enough 
to eat, with fair pay. 

This is not to scold the British for what they did. Ever 
since the days when danger taught primitive man to walk 
erect the evolution of the race has been the result of suc- 
cessful conflicts with aggressive and domineering enemies. 
The British then taught the Americans a needed lesson — 
if only we might fully understand and remember it. 

We now come to the attitude of the American people 
while subject to these outrages and aggressions. When 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 61 

the war upon Napoleon began, Thomas Jefferson was 
President of the United States. He had seen in the work 
of President Adams an effective method of ending such 
troubles. He had also read a report to the House of Rep- 
resentatives, written by Secretary of the Navy Stoddert, 
under date of January 12, 1801, which said: 

"When the United States own twelve ships of seventy- 
four guns, and double the number of strong frigates . . . 
confidence may be indulged that we may then avoid those 
wars in which we have no interest, and without submit- 
ting to be plundered." 

The experience of the American people ever since the 
Declaration of Independence had demonstrated that what- 
ever the merits of other methods of dealing with the spoil- 
ers might possibly be, it was certain that good fighting 
would serve. But Mr. Jefferson, on taking office, had a 
new scheme in mind, and to help him carry it out he called 
to his cabinet James Madison and Albert Gallatin, the 
two men who had, as members of the House, most effec- 
tively opposed the building of a navy. 

Jefferson, in his "Virginia Notes" (p. 258), had said 
that "the sea is the field on which we should meet an 
European enemy," and he even suggested a fleet of 
eighteen ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates as a force 
adequate to American needs. His new policy was never 
set forth in public documents, but it was very fully de- 
scribed in private letters. Thus in a letter to Thomas 
Paine he said: 

"Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the' 
energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall 
avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers of Europe, 
even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. 
We believe we can enforce these principles as to ourselves 
by peaceable means." 

To a celebrated Pennsylvania peacemaker, Dr. Logan, 



62 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

he explained how he was to use peaceable means to compel 
the compliance of foreign nations. He said: 

" Our commerce is so valuable to them that they will be 
glad to purchase it, when the only price we ask is to do us 
justice. I believe that we have in our own hands the 
means of peaceable coercion; and that the moment they 
see our Government so united as that we can make use of 
it, they will for their own interest be disposed to do us 
justice." 

In the year that Jefferson was inaugurated the exports 
of the United States amounted to $94,115,925, while the 
imports reached the sum of $111,363,511. Jefferson be- 
lieved that the profits of the foreign peoples on this trade — 
particularly the profits of the manufacturers who pro- 
duced our imports — were so great that we had only to 
withdraw our trade from an aggressing nation to compel 
it to do us justice. 

An appeal to trade "interest" — bluntly, an appeal to 
greed — was Jefferson's means of "peaceable coercion." 
It was a policy particularly pleasing to those American 
Congressmen who had voted to pay blackmail — an annual 
tribute to the African pirates rather than build a navy. 

Mr. Jefferson intended to coerce, but never with guns 
afloat. "That a navy caused more ills than it prevented 
or corrected was one of the deepest convictions that under- 
lay the policy of Mr. Jefferson" after he became President. 
"Sound principles," said he, "will not justify our taxing 
the industries of our fellow-citizens to accumulate treasures 
for wars to happen we know not when." (Quoted by 
H. Adams, "History of the United States," vol. I, p. 222.) 

To avoid, as far as possible, taxing the industry of his 
fellow citizens for the support of a navy Jefferson laid up 
five of the frigates-in-ordinary at Washington. The work 
on six ships-of-the-line, which Congress had authorized, 
was suspended. Mr. Adams had expended $3,448,716 on 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 63 

the navy in 1800. In 1802 Mr. Jefferson expended but 
$915,562. To reduce naval expenditures still further he 
proposed in his message, dated December 15, 1802, "to 
add to our navy-yard here a dock within which our present 
vessels may be laid up dry and under cover from the sun." 
"Beautiful and appropriate drawings of the dock and its 
locks" were laid before Congress, and nothing but the 
size of the estimated cost prevented Congress adopting the 
plan of laying up our navy "dry and under cover from the 
sun" at a time when British frigates were plundering 
American ships and impressing native-bom American sea- 
men in American waters at Sandy Hook. 

This is not to doubt Mr. Jefferson's sincerity of purpose. 
He intended to promote peace and the financial growth of 
the country. First of all he intended to pay the public 
debt, and in this he succeeded astonishingly well. In 
1801 the debt amounted to $83,038,051. Just before the 
War of 1812 it had been reduced, under the Jeffersonian 
policy, which Madison continued, to $45,209,738. 

What with the blockading of New York and the im- 
pressment of American seamen, the country was aroused 
to a pitch where Jefferson saw a wished-for opportunity 
to bring into use his one sure weapon — "peaceable coer- 
cion " — for compelling the oppressor to do us justice. He 
accordingly instructed Congress to pass the non-inter- 
course bill that became a law April 18, 1806. The im- 
portation of beer, millinery goods, playing cards and some 
other things of British manufacture was absolutely pro- 
hibited "from and after the 15th day of November next." 

So confident was Mr. Jefferson in the success of "peace- 
able coercion" that he wrote: 

"We begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole 
Gulf Stream as our waters, in which hostilities are to be 
frowned on at present, and prohibited" later. "We shall 
never permit another privateer to cruise within it," he added. 



64 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

It has been asserted that the non-intercourse law was 
"vindictive retaUation." John Randolph, who, although 
the greatest of American blatherskites, saw some things 
clearly, said it was "a dose of chicken broth to be taken 
nine months hence." 

Jefferson's "dose of chicken broth" was mixed to cure 
all ills. A week after it was signed the frigate Leander was 
still at Sandy Hook firing off guns to the right and left as 
before. In the course of the day, while firing on a coaster, 
the shot killed the coaster's master. For this murder the 
captain of the Leander was recalled — and sent to a more 
comfortable station. 

As an official reply to Jefferson's effort at "peaceable 
coercion," the British proclaimed a paper blockade of 
the coast of Europe from Brest to the Elbe, though it 
should be said that the measure was decided on while yet 
non-intercourse was under discussion in Congress. The 
coast thus "blockaded" contained the ports most fre- 
quented by American shipping, but if forces had been 
stationed to make an actual blockade the United States 
would have had no cause of complaint. The injury done 
American shipping was found in the confiscation of ships 
for the violation of a blockade that did not exist. The 
position then assumed by the American Government in 
regard to paper blockades has now no firmer supporter 
than the British nation, and British writers on international 
law admit that in the matter of the obligations of neutrals 
the United States "represented by far the most advanced 
existing opinions." But no American protest then 
availed. 

This adoption of the scheme of paper blockades (May 
16, 1806) led Napoleon to issue his "Berlin Decree" (No- 
vember 21, 1806). Of the general attitude of Napoleon 
toward the United States it need only be said here that it 
was imperious and insulting, and that he did what he could 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 65 

to rob the people that were counting their interest more 
than their honor. It was at one time suggested in Con- 
gress that the United States should declare war against 
both England and France, and that ought to have been 
done. 

The Berlin Decree stated the undisputable fact that the 
blockade declared by the British was designed to destroy 
all neutral commerce for the benefit of British shipping 
and commerce. From this Napoleon argued that who- 
ever had any part in British commerce was but aiding the 
nefarious British plan. He therefore decreed that the 
British Islands were in a state of blockade; all intercourse 
with these islands was prohibited; all merchandise com- 
ing from them was declared good prize; it was ordered 
that no ship coming from the British Islands should be 
allowed to enter any continental port. 

The American people were now literally between the 
devil and the deep sea, if that expression may be allowed, 
and that, too, when they had not yet learned that " when 
you clinch with the devil you must use your claws." Yet 
worse was to come. Two American commissioners had 
been negotiating a treaty with the British when the Berlin 
Decree was issued. The treaty was all ready for signa- 
tures when a copy of the decree reached London. There- 
upon the British negotiators declared they would not sign 
the treaty " unless our Government should engage to sup- 
port its rights against the measures of France" ("Foreign 
Relations," vol. Ill, p. 147). They demanded that the 
United States declare war on France as the price of the 
treaty, and it was a treaty that ignored impressment. The 
treaty was eventually forwarded to Washington, where it 
was laid aside. Manifestly the refusal to buy her playing 
cards and beer had not yet peaceably coerced Great 
Britain to any extent. 

The refusal to make a definite treaty was followed by 



66 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

an Order in Council, dated January 7, 1807, forbidding 
to neutrals all participation in the continental coasting 
trade as far south and east as Italy. An American ship 
that found a poor market in one port was confiscated if she 
attempted to go to another. 

Then came the attack on the frigate Chesapeake. In 
shipping a crew at Norfolk for a voyage to Europe, early 
in 1807, four of the men secured were claimed by British 
naval officers as deserters from the British ships that were 
at that time lying in the Chesapeake Bay for the purpose 
of examining all shipping, as the Leopard had done at 
Sandy Hook. That the four had fled from British 
ships is undisputed. They were the kind of deserters al- 
ready mentioned — impressed American seamen seeking 
liberty. Three of them were known on all hands to be 
Americans born; it is possible that the fourth was British 
born. The three were also negroes, a fact of interest in 
connection with the oft-repeated British assertion that it 
was impossible to tell an American from an Englishman, 
and that the British made "no crude claim to impress 
American-born citizens." This case was not singular, 
either, for red Indians were impressed as native-born 
Englishmen ! 

When a demand for the "deserters" was refused the 
vice-admiral commanding the station ordered his ships to 
take them from the Chesapeake by force whenever they 
should find her at sea. 

The Chesapeake sailed early on June 22, 1807, and 
when well off shore she found the British frigate Leopard 
awaiting her. The Leopard demanded the four men. 
Captain James Barron, commanding the Chesapeake, re- 
fused, but did not at once order his men to quarters. 
When he did send them there he told them to go quietly, 
so that the British should not learn what they were doing. 
The gun-deck was lumbered up with all sorts of baggage 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 67 

and stores. The guns were not in order. Many of the 
guns had been suppUed with rammers too large for the 
bore. There were no matches for firing the guns. The 
bHght of "peaceable coercion" was over the whole ship 
and her crew. While Barron fumbled, the British opened 
fire — at 4:30 o'clock — and continued it for fifteen minutes, 
when Barron hauled down the flag. The four " deserters " 
were then carried to Halifax, where they were convicted of 
the crime of deserting. The three Americans known to be 
Americans received 500 lashes; the one who may have 
been British-born was hanged. The Chesapeake had three 
men killed and eighteen wounded. She was somewhat, 
but not much, cut up by the Leopard's safe target practice. 

President Jefferson at once issued a proclamation order- 
ing all British ships from American waters and forbidding 
them to enter again. A similar measure of "vindictive 
retaliation" was issued by the Mayor of Norfolk, who 
forbade his people to hold any communication with the 
British ships (by the way, the ships ignored the President's 
proclamation), and when the British senior captain 
threatened to take supplies by force, all the mounted 
militia of the region were called out. 

Jefferson, bending to the blast of "popular clamor," 
talked much of war and summoned an extra session of 
Congress. Then, on December 18, in a message that is, 
perhaps, the most remarkable document in the American 
archives, he recommended that full revenge be taken for 
the intolerable outrage upon the honor of the nation — by 
laying an embargo on all American shipping! At one 
stroke all British profit on American commerce — the very 
last cent — was to be cut off. Now he would demonstrate 
that our "commerce is so valuable to them that they will 
be glad to purchase it when the only price we ask is to do 
us justice." 

Following this a bill was introduced to authorize the 



68 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

President to sink "blocks" — worthless ship hulls — in a 
line across the Hudson to prevent British insults to New 
York. It was also proposed to stretch a chain across the 
Narrows for the same purpose. The building of some 
gunboats — rowboats fit to carry one 24-pounder each — was 
authorized ostensibly as an extreme war measure, but 
really because it was well known to Jefferson that such 
boats were worthless for any war purpose. 

But more sorrowful than these bills were the arguments 
used to resist those who called for war. "Had not Den- 
mark a navy?" asked Representative Fisk. "What be- 
came of it ? It fell . . . and that will be the fate of our 
navy, if we erect one." Burwell called attention to the 
fact that England's naval "resources were infinitely be- 
yond those of our infant country." John Randolph said 
that the navy had been "for years a moth on the public 
purse." The mere sight of a member of the marine corps 
made his gorge rise, and as for resisting the British by 
means of the navy, " a straight- jacket and depletion" were 
the only remedies for one wild enough to suggest it. 
Smilie, who had not always opposed a naval force, said 
that "prudence required a temperate course." It was 
even asserted that members of the House ought to be 
moderate in their choice of words lest the British Minister 
of Foreign Affairs be offended to a point where "he would 
put forth his strength and make us feel it." 

With few exceptions the members of Congress diligently 
cultivated the fears — the cowardice of the nation. In all 
that weary period there was but one gleam of light. 

"Sir!" said Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, with his 
lip curling in scorn, "if I can help it the old women of 
this country shall not be frightened by the talk of war 
any longer. I have been a close observer of what has 
been done and said by the majority of this House, and I 
am convinced that no insult, however gross, could force 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 69 

this majority into the declaration of war. To use a strong 
but common expression, it could not be kicked into such 
a declaration." 

The Embargo Act became a law on December 22, 1807. 

The nation was then young, and the American people 
were developing their national ideals. It was at this 
critical period that Congress "counted their interest more 
than their honor." 

It is asserted by the apologist for the British aggressions 
that "the British Government at once disowned" the as- 
sault upon the Chesapeake. The assertion is a half truth. 
On August 3 Minister Canning wrote to Monroe saying 
that " His Majesty neither does nor has at any time main- 
tained the pretension of a right to search ships of war in the 
national service of any State for deserters." He thereby 
asserted that the men taken from the Chesapeake were 
deserters, at least. He had previously asked Monroe if 
the "deserters" were Americans or British, and had main- 
tained that their nationality was a matter of importance. 
He did recall Vice-Admiral Berkeley, but a better com- 
mand was soon given him. More than that the British 
positively refused to do, unless Jefferson would first with- 
draw his proclamation depriving British ships of the right 
of using American ports. 

The real attitude of the British Government on this 
matter is seen in the editorials of the Government news- 
papers. In them there was no whine about "imminence 
of national peril" and England's death struggle for the 
liberty of the world. Said the Morning Post: 

"A war of a very few months, without creating to us the 
expense of a single additional ship, would be sufiicient to 
convince her [America] of her folly by a necessary chastise- 
ment of her insolence and audacity. " This was the real 
attitude of the British, and it was only when it was seen, in 
1811, that the American people would fight at last, that a 



70 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

full disavowal of the Chesapeake affair was made by 
a return of the "deserters" to the deck of the assaulted 
ship. 

While the American Congress talked about embargo and 
the impossibility of meeting Great Britain upon the high 
seas the British Government, by Orders in Council dated 
November 11, 1807, extended the paper blockade through- 
out the world. Every port from which British ships were 
excluded by Napoleon, even in the colonies, was declared 
"blockaded" to neutral ships. While the apologist for 
the British speaks of this as a " measure of just and neces- 
sary retaliation" for the Berlin Decree, the order itself 
shows that it was not either a matter of retaliation or for 
keeping West India products out of the realms of Napoleon. 
For it was expressly provided in the order that American 
ships might continue to trade to the forbidden ports if they 
would first call at an English port, land their cargoes, pay 
certain specified duties, procure a permit called a license, 
and then reship and get away on their voyage. The 
British sailor had been singing " No sail but by permission 
spreads." The British Government now said "no trade 
except through Great Britain." 

And that is to say that when it was seen that the Ameri- 
can ships were able to carry on trade, in spite of all the 
ills imposed theretofore by British jealousy, this last Order 
in Council was devised to compel the triumphant "Yankee" 
shipowner to give up a share of his profits. In fact the 
membcEs of the British Government in time openly avowed 
that the object was a mere grab, a trick of commerce for 
which war gave opportunity, and not a war measure at 
all. In a debate in Parliament, March 3, 1812, Spencer 
Percival frankly declared : 

"The object of the Orders in Council was not to destroy 
the trade of the Continent, but to force the Continent to 
trade with us." 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 71 

Lord Erskine, being of the opposition, said of the 
Orders as a matter of "retaliation": 

"It is, indeed, quite astonishing to hear the word *re- 
taUation' twisted and perverted in a manner equally re- 
pugnant to grammar and common sense, . . . It is a new 
application of the term, that if A strike me, I may retaliate 
by striking B. I cannot, my Lords, conceive of any- 
thing more preposterous." 

Unbelievable as it now seems, it was at the moment 
when the British were making this last stroke for levying 
tribute on American commerce that the American Con- 
gress passed the embargo act. During the ensuing year 
— 1807 and 1808 — the embargo was so rigorously enforced 
that American ships disappeared entirely from the ports 
of Europe. 

The time for which President Jefferson had looked — 
the time when the British merchant and manufacturer 
should be wholly deprived of the profits on the American 
trade — had come. England was now to become glad to 
buy back that, trade, especially as the only price we asked 
was that she do us justice! But when the "peaceable co- 
ercionists" looked eagerly for offers to "dicker" for this 
trade, they saw nothing but looks of contempt. And the 
British contempt was shared by every other people in 
Europe. The French Minister to the United States, in a 
letter dated September 4, 1807, spoke feelingly of "the 
sentiments of fear and servile deference with which the 
inhabitants of the American Union are penetrated." He 
added that the Americans were "a people that conceives 
no idea of glory, of grandeur, of justice . . . and that is 
disposed to suffer every kind of humiliation provided it 
can satisfy its sordid avarice." (Quoted by Henry Adams, 
"History of the United States," vol. IV, p. 149.) 

But while the work of "peaceable coercion" was thus 
leading the American Nation to a depth of degradation 



72 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

not now quite comprehensible, the people — they whom 
Lincoln trusted — were slowly coming to an understanding 
of the conditions that prevailed. In spite of the misin- 
formation of party newspapers, and of the speeches in, 
and the acts of, Congress deliberately made with the in- 
tention of deceiving, the truth became known. Once the 
facts were fully known the people decided for themselves 
what course to pursue; and they made the decision with- 
out counting their interest. 

For the attitude of the people in ignoring "interest" at 
the last we may thank the British naval officers, for it was 
the impressment of American citizens that led to it. Wives 
and children and aged parents of impressed Americans 
were found in every port. Congressmen ignored them, 
but their neighbors, and the people of the countryside 
round about, could not and would not. What the honest 
indignation of the "jingoes" in Congress could not ac- 
complish, the tears of woman did do. And those tears still 
reach the heart of every patriot. 

The whisperings of voters who had for years cowert<i 
under the party lash finally changed to a growl that was 
unmistakable. The one fact in the history of this whole 
period, outside of the deeds of our naval men, that can 
now arouse the enthusiasm of a patriot is this, that at a 
moment when everybody knew that the nation was wholly 
unprepared for war — when the ships in the British navy 
numbered 1,042 and those in the American 17; when every 
shivering fibre of "interest" said truthfully that great 
losses were inevitable, and the utter destruction of the na- 
tion was really to be feared — it was then, in the face of su- 
preme danger, that the American people brushed aside 
every sordid appeal and demanded a war for the vindica- 
tion of Right. 

The last act of "peaceable coercion" by self -strangu- 
lation was passed by Congress on March 1, 1809, and 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 73 

amended in June. It provided that for a specified period 
no trade should be carried on between the United States 
and either England or France. It was provided also that 
in case either party to the offensive measures should re- 
lent, after the expiration of the limit, the embargo should 
be revived against the unrelenting power. By deliberate 
falsehood Napoleon led the Administration, Madison be- 
ing then President, to believe for a time that his decrees 
had been revoked, and Madison proclaimed that com- 
merce with Great Britain must cease on February 2, 1811. 
In answer to this a British squadron once more ap- 
peared off New York, and the President, driven on by the 
war party, ordered an American squadron to sea to pro- 
tect the flag. The time when the American people would 
find themselves was at hand. 



CHAPTER VIII 
LEARNING THE ART OF NAVAL WARFARE 

Before describing the work of the navy in the War of 
1812 it is important to tell how it happened that we had 
a navy after Jefferson had declared in his second annual 
message a wish to build a dock at Washington "within 
which our present vessels may be laid up dry and under 
cover from the sun." Fortunately for the navy, and 
therefore most fortunately for the country, the Barbary 
pirates began to make trouble. The Bashaw of Tripoli 
learned that the tribute paid him amounted to but little, 
if any, more than what was given to a minister of the court 
of Tunis, the minister having received $40,000, "besides 
presents." As the American representative at Tripoli was 
unable to increase the tribute war was declared against 
the United States on May 14, 1801. The Dey of Tunis, 
not being satisfied with the tribute paid him according to 
treaty, demanded 10,000 stand of arms at about this time 
under penalty of war. In May, 1800, the American war- 
ship George Washington arrived in Algiers with the annual 
tribute due to the Dey. When the tribute had been de- 
livered, the Dey ordered the Washington, as the ship of a 
vassal nation, to carry his tribute to the Sultan of Turkey, 
of whom he was a vassal, and the Washington was obliged 
to do it. And she was obliged to fly the Algerine flag 
above the American while on the voyage. 

The Tripolitans, having declared war, it was necessary 
to send a squadron to the Mediterranean or else abandon 
all commerce in that region, for there was no way of ap- 

74 



LEARNING THE ART OF NAVAL WARFARE 75 

plying "peaceable coercion" to the Bashaw. Fifteen of 
the vessels that had been employed in the war with France 
had been retained in the navy, and of these the frigates 
President, Philadelphia and Essex, and the schooner En- 
terprise were sent to overawe the pirates. Two Tripolitan 
corsairs were found at Gibraltar and effectually blockaded 
there. On August 1, 1801, the Enterprise fell in with the 
corsair Tripoli. The pirate fought such a desperate battle 
that it was only after he had lost twenty men killed and 
thirty wounded, out of a crew of eighty, that he surren- 
dered. For gallant conduct in this battle Lieutenant Ster- 
ett, commanding the Enterprise, was so highly praised by 
the people of his country that Congress felt obliged to vote 
him a sword. 

When it came to an attack upon Tripoli, however, it 
was found that the ships lacked the necessary force. We 
had no ships-of-the-line, and nothing could be done beyond 
maintaining a blockade. Moreover, the frigates were of too 
deep draught for such work and, as the pirates could not 
be left free without the destruction of all American com- 
merce in that sea. Congress was induced to build two brigs, 
the Siren and Argus, that mounted sixteen 24-pounder 
carronades and two long 12-pounders, and the schooners 
Nautilus and Vixen, mounting twelve 18-pound carron- 
ades and two long 6-pounders. This was done in 1803. In 
the course of this year (October 30) the frigate Philadel- 
phia was lost. Under Captain William Bainbridge she 
was chasing a corsair among the reefs off Tripoli when she 
ran aground and could not be extricated. Here the Tri- 
politans boarded her, making her entire crew of 315 men, 
all told, prisoners. She was then floated and moored in the 
harbor close under the guns of the forts. A court-mar- 
tial decided that " Captain William Bainbridge acted with 
fortitude and conduct in the loss of his ship . . . and that 
no degree of censure should attach itself to him." 



76 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

A fine ship was lost from our little navy and her crew 
were enslaved. It was an appalling accident, but it gave 
some men of the navy opportunity for a deed that strength- 
ened the grip of all naval men upon the hearts of their coun- 
trymen. In December Bainbridge sent a message to the 
blockading squadron suggesting that an expedition be sent 
into the harbor to destroy the Philadelphia. 

No more dangerous expedition, apparently, had ever 
been proposed to American seamen. The Philadelphia 
was moored within range of a hundred guns, and she was 
surrounded by well-armed and well-manned gunboats. 
Her crew far outnumbered any volunteer crew that could 
be sent against her. But when the matter was proposed 
in the blockading squadron there was instantly a strong 
competition among all the available officers for the honor 
of going in. Stephen Decatur, Jr., won. A little ketch 
had been captured. Under Decatur a crew that numbered 
eighty men was selected from the host of volunteers. 
Among them were Lieutenant James Lawrence and Mid- 
shipman Thomas Macdonough. 

On the night of February 16, 1804, the little ketch ap- 
peared off Tripoli. She was piloted by a man who knew 
the harbor and talked the Tripolitan language. In her 
hold were quantities of combustibles and her crew were 
under such an order as that which inspired the men who 
stormed Stony Point under "Mad" Anthony Wayne — they 
were told to use cold steel only. Near midnight, as the 
ketch drifted slowly under the bows of the Philadelphia, a 
sentinel hailed her. The pilot replied that the ketch was 
a merchantman from Malta, and that, having lost her an- 
chors in a gale, he wanted to make fast to the frigate until 
morning. Then he began to give a list of goods with 
which he said the ketch was loaded, and that proved so 
attractive to every barbarian within hearing that the de- 
sired permission was given. For, with the exception of 



LEARNING THE ART OF NAVAL WARFARE 77 

half a dozen men well disguised, the crew of the ketch 
were stowed well out of sight. Just then a breeze took the 
ketch aback, and she began drifting away; but Decatur, 
with not a tremor in his voice, sent two men in a yawl with 
a line to the frigate's fore chains. With a line to the frigate 
the crew of the ketch began hauling in and warping her 
to the frigate's side, but while yet far away a pirate, who 
was leaning out from a port, saw some of her crew that 
were in uniform, and began to shout: 

"Americanos! Americanos!" 

At that another pirate cut the rope that connected the 
ketch to the frigate, but before he had done this the Ameri- 
can seamen had given a pull that brought their vessel 
alongside, and then, shouting "Boarders away!" Decatur 
leaped into the Philadelphia's rigging. Cutlasses in hand 
his men swarmed over the rail, and in through the ports. 
On deck they formed in squads and charged fore and aft, 
hewing down all opposition. Not a word did they utter 
and the only sounds they made were the stroke and thud 
of steel, while the pirates fell to the deck or leaped in wild 
haste into the sea. Within ten minutes Decatur stood 
upon the quarter-deck, master for the moment of a 
frigate. 

Then swiftly, but not hurriedly, the combustibles were 
passed up from the ketch, placed in nooks previously des- 
ignated and fired. So thoroughly was the work done that 
the party that had been sent to the berth-deck with diffi- 
culty escaped the flames that had been kindled above. In 
twenty-five minutes from the moment when the ketch ar- 
rived Decatur returned to her, leaving the frigate doomed 
beyond hope. His crew had all escaped injury of every 
kind so far, but now new dangers surrounded them. The 
flames might at any moment reach the magazine and hurl 
the Philadelphia in fragments upon them, while every 
pirate gun within range was now aimed and fired at them 



78 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

by the light of the flames they had kindled. The enemy's 
shot splashed water over them as if it were spray from a 
growing surf while they bent to their oars, and as time 
passed even the guns of the Philadelphia, heated by the 
fire, began to throw shot at them. 

And yet in the midst of the infernal fire that roared 
about them that crew, seeing that their work was well 
done, ceased rowing and gave three cheers. Not a man 
was lost in the expedition. Decatur was promoted to the 
rank of Captain, and Congress gave him a sword. 

A little later it was determined to try and destroy the 
shipping in the harbor of Tripoli by exploding a floating 
mine in the midst of the anchorage. The ketch with which 
Decatur had destroyed the Philadelphia, and which had 
been renamed the Intrepid, was loaded with a hundred 
barrels of powder and an immense quantity of projectiles. 
Master Commandant Richard Somers was selected to com- 
mand this expedition, and his lieutenant was Henry Long- 
fellow, an uncle of the poet. With them went Midshipman 
Joseph Israel as a stowaway, and ten sailors selected from 
a host of volunteers. 

On the night of September 4, 1804, when a misty fog 
hung low over the waters, Somers headed into the harbor. 
The men of the squadron watched while the little ketch 
faded slowly into the fog, and then waited in painful silence 
for signal or sound to tell what she was doing. Finally a 
light that was travelling in a waving line, as if a man were 
running along the deck with it, was seen where the ketch 
was supposed to be. It disappeared almost as soon as 
seen, but the next instant a mighty flame shot high in air, 
burning shells were hurled far through the night, followed 
by a heavy shock and a deafening roar. The ketch had 
grounded on a reef, and while held there was attacked by 
three gunboats. And when the pirates, in overwhelming 
numbers, came swarming over her rail, Somers fired the 



LEARNING THE ART OF NAVAL WARFARE 79 

powder in her hold. He had declared that he would not 
be taken alive, and he kept his word. 

These old tales of the navy are memorable chiefly be- 
cause they show how the American sailors carried them- 
selves, and how they were trained in the arts of war in the 
days when the Administration was anxious to build a dock 
at Washington in which to lay up all our naval vessels, 
"dry and under cover from the sun." While the Admin- 
istration frowned ; while John Randolph, the leading orator 
of Congress, was saying that the mere sight of a marine 
made his gorge rise; in spite of the fact the Bashaw re- 
ceived tribute amounting to $60,000 when he finally made 
peace; the men of the navy fought well and the people ap- 
plauded their deeds. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR OF 1812 

War was declared on June 18, 1812. President Mad- 
ison, who had supposed that sending our frigates to the West 
Indies in 1798 would make the French pirates more acri- 
monious, was determined to keep our navy under the pro- 
tecting guns of our forts until the militia should sweep the 
British out of Canada, but Captain William Bainbridge 
and Captain Charles Stewart, by an indignant protest, 
stiffened his limp backbone so far that permission for some 
little naval effort was obtained. Under this permission 
the Constitution sailed from the Chesapeake for New 
York, on July 12, 1812, under Captain Isaac Hull. 

Late in the afternoon on July 17, when off Barnegat, on 
the New Jersey coast, the Constitution met a British squad- 
ron of four frigates and a 64-gun liner. One of the frigates 
was the Shannon, Captain P. B. V. Broke, that was to 
astonish an American crew, some time later, while another 
was the Gv£rriere, Captain James Richard Dacres, with 
which the Constitution was to meet again under different 
circumstances. 

The British squadron made sail in chase. The weather 
was like that in which so many races for the America's cup 
have been sailed — there were light and variable breezes, 
with dead calms between. By every art of the seaman 
(and no man knew the sailor arts better than Captain 
Hull) the Constitution was coaxed along. Her sails 
were trimmed to the faintest airs, they were stretched till 
the bolt ropes creaked and they were wet down to make sure 

80 




i 



ii 



THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR OF 1812 81 

that not a breath escaped them. While the wind served, 
though never so faint, the Constitution gained. When the 
zephyrs failed the small })oats were used for towing and, 
at the suggestion of Lieutenant Charles Morris, k(;dge 
anchors, with lines attached, were carried out and droppcid 
a half mile ahead. By hauling in on the lines the ship 
was warped ahead rapidly. But the enemy proved good 
imitators — they got out boats and kedges, and because 
they had the crews of a sc|uadron to concentrate on two 
frigates they were abh^ to work up on the Constitution 
during the dead calms. 

For more than forty-eight hours the mf;n of the Consti- 
tution handled the braces, rowed the; boats and haule(J in 
the kedge lines. They slept on deck a few moments at 
a stretch when they might, and ate food that was brought 
by the cooks to them as they stood at the ropes. The; re- 
sourcefulness and grip of that crew give heart to the patriot 
to this day. 

During the afternoon of the second day, the 10th, the 
breeze slowly hard(!ned and then at 7 o'clock a heavy rain- 
squall came. Hull hekl fast until the squall was upon him 
and then let go all and shortenerj sail as if he feared th(; 
ship would be dismasted. Seeing such haste the captains 
of the other ships shortened sail without waiting for tlie 
squall to reach t}i<;m. A moment later, wh(;n the Consti- 
tution was well enshrouded by the murk of the squall. 
Captain Hull marie sail again and stood away with his 
sails rap full and the old ship logging eleven knots. '^I'hiit 
Hull was a better seaman than any in the British squadron 
was acknowledgec] the next morning. Though several of 
the British ships had the Constitution within view from 
their royal yards they abandoned the chase. 

The Constitution arrived at Boston on July 20. She 
anchored in the outer harbor. Hull foresaw that the 
narrow margin by which he had escaped the British would 



82 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

turn the heart of the President to water once more, and 
that orders would be sent to keep the Constitution in port. 
Hoping against hope for an opportunity to strike one blow 
for the flag — caring nothing for the fact that the British 
had at that time in commission 102 ships-of-the-line be- 
sides 482 frigates and smaller vessels, and that Halifax 
was the home port of the ships on the American station — 
Hull determined to sail without orders, though he knew 
that if he lost the ship under such circumstances he might 
be shot. 

The Constitution sailed from Boston on August 2, and 
went cruising away through the waters haunted by the 
Halifax ships. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th, 
when about 800 miles east of Boston, the British frigate 
Guerriere, Captain James Richard Dacres, was seen alee. 
The decisive battle of the War of 1812 was at hand. 

It was a cloudy day, with the wind from the northwest. 
The Constitution squared away for the enemy, shortening 
sail the while. The Guerriere prepared for the battle in 
like manner and laid her main to the mast to wait for the 
Constitution. 

Before the ships were within range the Guerriere began 
to wear around first one way and then the other, firing a 
broadside each time. The Constitution replied with a 
few guns, but it was all a waste of ammunition because 
not a shot reached home on either side. During all this 
time, however, the Constitution was drawing nearer and 
at 6 o'clock the Guerriere squared away before the wind 
in a way that was a plain challenge to a combat yard-arm 
to yard-arm. 

At that Hull made sail and as the Constitution swept 
down within pistol range (say the breadth of a country 
road), off the Guerriere's port beam, the British crew began 
to cheer and work their guns. 

On the Constitution the sailors stood at their posts erect 



THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR OF 1812 83 

and silent, but manifestly impatient. They were so eager 
to return the fire, especially after a shot from the Guerriere 
happened to strike the bulwarks and kill two men, that 
Lieutenant Morris went to the Captain three times and 
asked permission to fire. But Hull, with his eyes on the 
enemy, refused, while the Constitution forged ahead until 
every gun in her broadside would bear. Then he stooped 
until he split his knee breeches from waist band to buckle, 
leaped erect and shouted, 

"Now boys, pour it into them!" 

The broadside sounded like a single explosion, and the 
crash of the shot piercing the plank and timbers of the 
Giierriere came back like an echo. The gunners of the 
Constitution had aimed their guns — they had aimed to 
avenge the wrongs that had been inflicted on 20,000 Ameri- 
cans by British press gangs, and every shot struck home. 
So plainly seen was the havoc wrought by the broadside 
that Hull exclaimed exultingly: 

"By , that vessel is ours!" 

It was so. In a few minutes the mizzen mast of the 
Gu£rriere fell into the sea where it acted as a drag, bring- 
ing her head around to the wind. The Constitution ranged 
ahead and, luffing across her bows, raked her. Then turn- 
ing back, the Constitution raked her again. This time the 
Constitution was so close that she fouled the Gverriere's 
bow, and Lieutenant Morris, seeing a loose rope hanging 
from the Guerriere's bowsprit, used it to lash the two ves- 
sels together, bow to stern. 

The British broadside guns would not now bear, but 
they worked their bow chasers with such good effect that 
the splintered woodwork of the Constitution's cabin was 
set afire. Then Captain Dacres called his men to board 
the Constitution, and they obeyed with cheers, but when 
Dacres saw the host of Yankees awaiting him he changed 
his mind. It was while the crews were thus massed that 



84 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the chief part of the losses on the Constitution were suf- 
fered. Lieutenant WiUiam Bush of the marines was shot 
dead; Lieutenant Morris and Master John C. Alwyn were 
wounded. Captain Dacres of the Guerriere was also 
wounded at this time. 

Then the rope holding the two ships together broke and 
as they were drifting apart the foremast and mainmast 
of the Guerriere fell over the rail. The Guerriere was left 
a mastless hulk in the trough of the sea with the muzzles 
of her guns dipping into the waves at every roll. She had 
received thirty shot through her hull at points far below 
the water line ("five sheets of copper down"), besides many 
in the hull at points higher up. She was not only helpless, 
but sinking. It was just 6:22. After replacing a few 
ropes that had been cut the Constitution was as fit for 
battle as when she left Boston. Seeing this, the Guerriere 
at 7 o'clock hauled down her flag. 

Nearly two hours had elapsed between the firing of the 
first gun and the last, but the fighting— the actual work of 
destruction — was all done "in the short space of 30 min- 
utes" (Hull's report). The Guerriere was burned next 
morning. 

The Guerriere had twenty-three men killed and mortally 
wounded and fifty-six more or less seriously hurt. The 
Constitution lost seven killed and seven wounded. The 
Constitution's crew numbered 456, that of the Guerriere 
272, not counting ten American citizens that had been im- 
pressed and were not required to fight. The Constitution 
was able to fire twenty-seven guns in a broadside, the 
Guerriere twenty-five. The Constitution's maindeck battery 
consisted of 24-pounders and the Guerriere' s of 18- 
pounders. 

After a century of consideration of this battle everyone 
now sees the absurdity of an appeal to a mathematical 
calculation, such as the British made in other days, to learn 



i 



i^ 



THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR OF 1812 85 

whether the crew of the Constitution or the Guerriere were 
the better men-o'-warsmen. It was not the size or the 
number of the Constitution's guns, or the number of her 
crew, that gave her the victory. It was the number of her 
shot that struck home. If the crews could have changed 
ships, the Americans, being the better marksmen, would 
yet have won the battle. 

The effect of the battle upon the American people was 
marvellous. The flames of the Constitution's guns burned 
away the prejudices and false doctrines that had been so 
carefully cultivated for more than ten years. Hull had 
been obliged to steal away to sea in the "awful stillness of 
a New-England Sabbath morning" because the Govern- 
ment was afraid to trust a naval crew beyond the protect- 
ing guns of forts. The idea of our naval ships being able 
to meet those of Great Britain seemed too ludicrous for 
serious argument! 

The Constitution changed all that. It did more. The 
American Government — even Henry Clay, leader of the 
war party in Congress — had looked to the valorous militia 
to sweep the British out of Canada. But the newspapers, 
which told the people of the Constitution's victory, told in 
other columns how General William Hull had surrendered 
Detroit to an inferior force of invading British. Imagine 
the effect upon the nation if Commodore Rodgers, who 
had sailed some time before, with a small American 
squadron, had come into Boston with his story of failure 
to add to the story of General Hull's surrender, and it 
will be seen that the Constitution had not only won a 
victory but a most timely victory — a victory that was 
imperatively needed. 

Observe further that the whole War of 1812 as fought 
on land was a failure throughout. The good fighting at 
the Niagara River accomplished little or nothing, and the 
battle of New Orleans was fought after the treaty of peace 



86 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

was signed. The battle between the Constitution and the 
Guerriere was the important and even the decisive battle of 
that war because through it the American sailor received 
permission to continue fighting for the flag, and because the 
victories that were won by our sailors, and those victories 
alone, saved the nation from most humiliating losses when 
peace was made. From the capture of the Macedonian 
in the sunlit ^eas south of the Azores to the crowing of the 
rooster in Macdonough's rigging under the evergreen 
slopes of the Adirondacks, every triumph of the "gridiron 
flag" was made possible by the victory of the Constitution. 

Even that is not all to be said of the effect of this battle 
upon the American people. When the war was declared. 
New England — Massachusetts especially — was full of 
traitors. The secession of New England from the Union 
was openly advocated by men of influence. Direct com- 
munications were held with the enemy. Indeed, during 
the early part of the war the forces of the enemy in the 
field in Canada would have been unable to keep the field 
but for the food supplies that were purchased of the 
traitorous merchants of Boston and elsewhere in New 
England. The proposed movements of American forces 
were betrayed to the enemy. In return for the favors 
thus received the British left the northern part of the 
American coast unblockaded, and Admiral Sir John B. 
Warren, commanding the American station, had orders 
to encourage the secessionists by all means possible. 
While the nation was just beginning to struggle from under 
the incubus of "peaceable coercion" these men rose up 
with their threat of secession, and they were so powerful 
that the Government did not dare to use force to repress 
them lest a civil war be precipitated. 

But when the Constitution came into port with her flags 
flying from every mast and yard-arm, the exultant shouts 
that arose alongshore swelled to a mighty roar that was 



THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR OF 1812 87 

heard and felt to the uttermost parts of the nation. Nothing 
could alter the state of mind of the New England leaders, 
but the innate love of country among the people as a whole, 
as distinguished from a love of a section, was stirred as in 
the days of the Revolution. A candid reading of the his- 
tory of the country before the War of 1812 ^hows that the 
ablest men of the North as well as of the South believed 
in the right of secession under the Constitution. In the 
rejoicing of the people over the naval victories of the War 
of 1812, however, was born that national spirit which 
made possible the success of the War for the Union fifty 
years later. The battle between the Constitution and the 
Guerriere was only a " naval duel," but it saved the navy 
and it saved the nation. 



CHAPTER X 

VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 

The blow for liberty which Captain Hull delivered in 
August was repeated four times within six months there- 
after. 

On October 13 the sloop-of-war Wasp, Captain Jacob 
Jones, sailed from Delaware Bay on a search for British 
merchantmen homeward bound from the West Indies. 
Three days later he ran into a gale and lost his jibboom 
and two men that were at work upon it when it dipped 
into the sea. Then at 11 : 30 o'clock at night, while the 
gale was still blowing, he fell in with a small fleet of mer- 
chantmen under the convoy of the British sloop-of-war 
Frolic, Captain Thomas Whinyates. 

The Wasp and the Frolic were as near on an equality as 
ships of war were likely to be. The Frolic carried sixteen 
32-pounder carronades and four 12-pounders on the main 
deck, with two short 12-pounders on the topgallant fore- 
castle (Report of Captain Jones). She could, therefore, 
fire eleven guns throwing 292 pounds of metal at a broad- 
side, where the Wasp carried sixteen short 32's and two 
long 12's, thus throwing nominally 268 pounds of metal 
at a broadside, but really only 250 on account of the Amer- 
ican shot being of light weight, not only in this battle but 
throughout the whole war. In guns the British ship was 
much more powerful. On the other hand, the Frolic car- 
ried a crew of 110, where the Wasp, being equipped with 
men for manning the merchantmen she expected to take, 
had 135. 

88 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 89 

Being unable to make out the force of the convoy at 
night, Captain Jones stood by well to windward until day- 
light, when he ran down for a look. The Frolic hoisted 
Spanish colors as a decoy, and the Wasp came within sixty 
yards and hailed. Then the Frolic set her own ensign and, 
with her crew cheering, began the battle. The Wasp crew 
cheered and returned the fire. 

The wind was from the southwest and both vessels were 
heading to the north, the Wasp being on the west side of 
the Frolic. The two were about due east of Albemarle 
Sound and a little west of north from the Bermudas. As 
both were running well before the wind they both rolled 
heavily. The British, following the plan of battle which 
Nelson had given his men, loaded and fired as rapidly as 
possible. According to the testimony of Captain Whin- 
yates the British fire was "superior" (meaning that it was 
delivered more rapidly), a fact worth note in connection 
with the British complaint about the small number of men 
on board, and Captain Jones confirmed the report by 
saying that the Frolic fired three broadsides to the Wasp's 
two. After loading their guns, the Americans waited until 
the Wasp was on the crest of a wave and just starting to 
roll toward the enemy; then they fired. The British shot, 
almost without exception, flew high above the deck of the 
Wasp, while the shot of the Wasp struck home in the 
Frolic's hull. 

The first gun was fired at 1 1 : 32 in the morning. Four 
minutes later the Wasp's maintopmast was shot away, and 
it fell on the foreyards, rendering them unmanageable. 
Ten minutes later still the mizzen topgallant mast and the 
gaff were shot down. In the meantime her braces and 
rigging were so badly cut that by 11 : 52 the Wasp was a 
wreck aloft. But she could yet run before the wind, and 
with helm aport could draw in steadily to a shorter range. 
At the last, when the Americans were loading their guns, 



90 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

their rammers reached out and struck the sides of the 
Frolic. Then, with the Wasp drawing across the bows of 
the enemy, the two hulls came together, the bow of the 
Frolic sawing up and down against the broadside of the 
Wasp. A raking broadside was now fired into the Frolic, 
and then, with a New Jersey sailor named Jack Lang in 
the lead, the crew of the Wasp boarded. 

They found the battle was already ended. Not a man 
opposed them, and Lieutenant James Biddie, of the Wasp, 
hauled down the British flag. Captain Whinyates re- 
ported that out of 110 men only twenty escaped unhurt. 
About thirty were killed outright or died of their wounds. 
The Wasp had five killed and five wounded. Three 
of the killed were aloft when hit; they were shot out 
of the rigging like squirrels from a tree. The hull of 
the Wasp was hit by four shot; that of the Frolic was 
riddled. 

Here, even more noticeably than in the fight between 
the Guerriere and the Constitution, the man behind the gun 
won the victory. Still, the fighting on the Frolic was not 
altogether in vain, for it inflicted so much damage on the 
spars of the Wasp that she was delayed in getting ready to 
sail away, and while she was yet making repairs the Brit- 
ish liner Poictiers, Captain J. P. Beresford, came on the 
scene and carried both sloops to the Bermudas. 

The British Admiralty took the Wasp into their service 
under the name of Loup Cervier. The Frolic they broke 
up, though she was not an old vessel, just as they would 
have cashiered an ofiicer that had disgraced himself. 

The story of the Macedonian is of special interest be- 
cause she was the only British frigate that was brought 
into port. She was captured by the frigate United States, 
Captain Stephen Decatur. On Sunday, October 25, 
when south of the Azores and west of the Canary Islands, 
the lookout on the United States saw the British frigate 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 91 

Macedonian, Captain John Surman Garden, about twelve 
miles away and dead to windward. 

The Macedonian was called a "crack ship." She was 
only about two years old, and had recently been in dock for 
a cleaning. She was much swifter than the United States. 
Her executive officer, Lieutenant David Hope, wrote of 
her that "the state of discipline on board was excellent; in 
no British ship was more attention paid to gunnery . . . 
the crew were constantly exercised at the great guns." 
Her battery consisted of twenty-eight long 18-pounders, 
two long 12-pounders, two long 8-pounders, sixteen short 
32-pounders and a short 18-pounder that was shifted from 
side to side on the forecastle. Her crew numbered 301, 
of whom, as the British historian is careful to note, 35 were 
boys. The United States carried twenty-seven guns in a 
broadside — sixteen long 24's, one long twelve and eight 
short 42's. The actual weights of metal thrown were about 
786 pounds from the American to 547 from the British 
ship. 

When the Macedonian was first seen both ships were 
heading about southwest. The Macedonian at once put up 
her helm and turning around squared away in a course 
that, if held, would have taken her across the bows of the 
United States at short range. But Captain Carden sup- 
posed (James says) that the American ship was the frigate 
Essex, which, as he knew, was armed chiefly with short 
guns, and at 8:30 o'clock, while yet a long way out of 
range, he shortened sail and changed his course so as to 
take a position within the range of his own long guns, but 
out of range of the short guns of the supposed Essex. 

The two ships then passed each other at a range of 
perhaps a mile. Decatur fired a broadside, but most of 
the shot fell short. The Macedonian did not reply, but 
she turned round and headed back toward the southwest 
on a course about parallel with that of the United States. 



92 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

The Macedonian now drew near, and at a range of half 
a mile the firing became general. Only the long guns 
could reach. Captain Garden was taking advantage, as 
he supposed, of his long-range battery as against the short 
guns of the supposed Essex. But he soon saw his mistake. 
The crew of the United States worked their long guns with 
a speed that sheeted the ship with flames until the British 
thought she was on fire, and cheered accordingly. But 
the flames were shot-laden, and, in spite of the speed of 
firing the shot were striking home in the hull of the Mace- 
donian. After a time Decatur ceased firing and made 
sail ahead until clear of his own smoke. Then he again 
opened fire, and was able to rake the Macedonian diag- 
onally. 

It was now plain to Captain Carden that his ship would 
be shot to pieces at that range and, with good pluck but 
exceedingly bad judgment, he headed his ship down end-on 
toward the United States, intending to try to board her. 
However, it was all in vain, for Decatur laid the United 
States across the course of the Macedonian and, backing 
his mizzen sails to prevent forging ahead, he worked his 
guns with more deadly effect than ever. The carronades 
now became effective. The Macedonian's mizzen mast 
was shot away. Her mainyard was cut in two at the 
mast. All the short guns on her fighting side except two 
were disabled, and two of her long guns were put out of 
action. More than a hundred round shot pierced her 
hull, and instead of swooping down alongside, as had been 
intended, she was simply beaten to a standstill — cut up 
until she drifted away with the wind. At 11:15 o'clock 
the British flag was hauled down. 

The actual fighting had lasted an hour and a half, and 
Decatur, in his official report, felt obliged to apologize for 
the great length of time required. He said: 

"The enemy being to windward had the advantage of 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 93 

engaging us at his own distance, which was so great that 
for the first half hour we did not use our carronades, and 
at no moment was he within the complete effect of our 
musketry or grape — to this circumstance and a heavy 
swell I ascribe the unusual length of the action." 

On the United States seven men were killed or mortally 
wounded and five others were more or less hurt. On the 
Macedonian forty-three lost their lives and sixty-one were 
wounded. The United States was hit in the hull by only 
three shot; the Macedonian by "more than a hundred." 
The Macedonian was dismasted; the United States lost 
her mizzen topgallant mast only. Of course her rigging 
was cut up somewhat, but not to an extent that would pre- 
vent her meeting another ship within an hour. 

The captured ship was brought to Newport, R. I. The 
United States made port at New London. Decatur saw 
that bringing in an English frigate would be of more value 
to the country, especially in the way of rousing national 
sentiment, than anything he could do by continuing the 
cruise after destroying her. A most delightful story is 
told of the arrival at Washington of the news of the vic- 
tory. The society people were giving a grand ball to the 
naval officers in the city, including Hull, Stewart and 
Morris, who had been Hull's executive officer. The 
ball-room was decorated with the flags of the Guerriere 
and the sloop Alert, the capture of which will be described 
further on. While all were thrilled by these tokens of 
victory Lieutenant Archibald Hamilton, from the frigate 
United States, was announced, and the next moment he 
strode into the room with the flag of the Macedonian across 
his shoulders. 

The dancing ceased instantly; the men gave one look 
and then, gathering around the young man, as by a single 
impulse picked him up on their shoulders and cheered 
till the welkin rang. 



94 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

The Macedonian was taken into the service. She never 
had the luck to show what an American crew could 
do with her, but she served a good purpose for many 
years as a practice ship at the Naval Academy at An- 
napolis. 

On October 26, the day after Decatur's victory over 
the Macedonian, the Constitution sailed from Boston under 
the command of Commodore William Bainbridge. The 
sloop-of-war Hornet sailed with her, and the Essex, Cap- 
tain David Porter, was under orders to sail from the Dela- 
ware and join her at the Cape de Verde Islands. The 
Essex failed to join, and, on December 13, the Constitution 
and the Hornet arrived at San Salvador (now called 
Bahia), Brazil. They found a British sloop-of-war, the 
Bonne Citoyenne, Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene, in port, 
and as she was of exactly the same force in guns and men 
as the Hornet, Captain James Lawrence, commanding 
the Hornet, strove urgently to arrange for a fight outside. 
But this the Englishman declined to do even after the 
Constitution had left the coast to go home. The Hornet 
blockaded the port until near the end of January, 1813, 
when a British liner came up from Rio Janeiro to protect 
the Bonne Citoyenne. 

The Constitution was more fortunate. At 9 o'clock 
A. M., on December 29, 1812, while cruising about thirty 
miles off the coast near Bahia, she met the British frigate 
Java, Captain Henry Lambert. 

The Java was a good ship, which was manned in an 
extraordinary manner. She was bound to the East Indies, 
and was carrying a hundred seamen for the ships already 
on that station, besides a number of extra officers of the 
navy, and a lieutenant-general for the army. She had on 
board in all 426 fighting sailors to the Constitution's 475. 
Her guns were about like those of the Guerriere and the 
Macedonian, but the preponderance of gun power in favor 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 95 

of the Constitution was larger than that in either of the 
other frigate actions. 

Being well to windward the Java headed down in chase 
of the Constitution, and at 2 o'clock the Constitution fired 
the first shot. At this time the two ships were headed 
easterly with the Java to the north of the Constitution. 
Being swifter the Java forereached, and after a time she 
put up her helm to sail down across the bow of the Con- 
stitution to rake her. To avoid this, Bainbridge wore 
around and headed the Constitution to the west, with the 
Java following and still holding a position to the north of 
the Constitution — that is, the weatherly position. Once 
more she forereached, but the Constitution now set more 
sail and luffed up to a shorter range and thus gave full 
effect to her battery of short 42-pounders. The Consti- 
tution's fire now became much more deadly, while that of 
the Java grew less effective. Just before 3 o'clock the 
Java's bowsprit was shot away and while she was thus 
hampered somewhat in her manoeuvres the Constitution 
was able to get in position to rake her. Thereupon the 
British strove to close in alongside to fight it out by board- 
ing, but before they could get their ship headed in the 
right direction the Constitution shot away their foremast 
(it was at 3:05). Then crossing the Java's bow the Con- 
stitution raked her once more, and at 3:15 shot away her 
maintopmast. At this moment Captain Henry Lambert 
was killed, but Lieutenant H. D. Chads maintained the 
fight. At 3:55 o'clock the Java's mizzenmast was shot 
away, and at 4:05 her fire ceased. 

Since the Java was now a helpless hulk Bainbridge 
sailed the Constitution up to windward to repair her rig- 
ging; for it must be remembered that throughout this war 
the Americans were obliged to keep constantly in mind the 
fact that the British had a thousand ships where the 
Americans had a score — that other ships belonging to the 



96 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

enemy were likely to appear at any moment, as the liner 
Poictiers appeared to the triumphant Wasp. Having 
beaten the Java to a "standstill" it was the duty of Com- 
modore Bainbridge to put his ship in order for another 
fight as soon as possible. 

While repairing the rigging of the Constitution Bain- 
bridge saw the mainmast of the Java fall; she was now as 
bare as the Guerriere had been, and when the Constitution 
returned the British flag was at once hauled down. The 
fight had lasted a little more than two hours. 

The injury done to the Constitution was repaired well 
enough in an hour. In all, twelve ofiicers and enlisted 
men were mortally hurt while the wounded numbered 
twenty-two. Bainbridge was one of the wounded. The 
Java was shot to pieces in hull and rigging, and on the 
31st she was burned. At least forty-eight of the British 
crew died of their wounds. A letter written by Lieutenant 
H. D. Corneck of the Java and printed in Niles's Register 
on February 27, 1813, said that sixty were killed on the 
Java and 170 wounded. Bainbridge, however, reported 
but 102 wounded and it is likely that Corneck was mistaken 
also as to the number killed. 

The Constitution sailed from Bahia for the United States 
on January 6, 1813, and arrived at Boston on February 
27. In connection with what has been said about the in- 
fluence of the War of 1812 upon the American people the 
following quotation from W\\e&'s Register maybe of interest: 

"Commodore Bainbridge, on landing at Boston, was 
received with a salute of cannon, and the loud acclama- 
tions of thousands; many instruments of sweet music play- 
ing the good old tune of 'Yankee Doodle' — the jstreets 
were filled xdih. a delighted populace, and the house and 
chimney tops covered with people. Party feeling was 
prostrated in national glory. The Legislature of Massa- 
chusetts being in session passed a vote of thanks." 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 97 

This legislature, spurred on by party rancor, was to re- 
solve, later, that the war was "waged without justifiable 
cause." The Federalists of Massachusetts were unable 
to think that the rights of common sailors were worth fight- 
ing for; but they could not repress a shout of joy over the 
victory of the Constitution, and the influence of that shout 
was to endure until they were all well ashamed of the spirit 
that had prompted the resolution mentioned. 

On leaving Bahia Captain Lawrence headed the Hornet 
northerly along the South American coast, and on Febru- 
ary 24, while crossing from Surinam toward Demerara, 
he fell in with the British sloop-of-war Peacock, Captain 
William Peake. The Peacock was of the same class of 
warships as the Frolic, that had been captured by the 
Wasp, but she was armed with short 24-pounders instead 
of 32-pounders, and her effective crew (seven men were on 
the sick list) numbered 122. The Hornet carried 135 
men at this time. 

At 4 : 20 o'clock in the afternoon the two vessels sent their 
men to quarters. Both vessels were on the port tack at 
this time but at the end of a race lasting fifty minutes the 
Hornet turned to the starboard tack with room enough 
to cross the bows of the enemy. As the two drew close 
together the Peacock veered off a little to avoid being 
raked, and at 5:25 o'clock they passed at half pistol 
range and opened fire. 

There was time for only one broadside as they passed, 
but the Peacock at once wore around while the Hornet 
veered off so that the two were soon side by side again and 
the firing became fiercer than before. The crew of the 
Hornet now worked so swiftly that they were obliged to 
dip up water from the sea and dash it over their guns to 
cool them off. Meantime, while the two vessels were so 
close together that it would seem impossible for any shot 
to go wide of the mark, the shot of the British did scarcely 



98 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

any damage. The first shot from the Peacock cut away 
the pennant that was flying from the highest point of the 
Hornet's mizzenmast; and that shot was fired when the 
two vessels were but half a pistol shot apart! How the 
Americans handled their guns is shown by the fact that at 
5:39 o'clock, just fourteen minutes after the firing of the 
first shot, the Peacock not only surrendered but she hoisted 
a signal of distress, and a moment later her mainmast fell 
over the side. 

The American sailors responded and did all they could 
to keep the British ship afloat, but in spite of pumps and 
bailing, she sank so suddenly that three of the Americans 
and nine of the British were drowned. One man was 
killed and two were wounded on the Hornet. All three 
were aloft. On the Peacock eight were killed, including 
the captain, and thirty wounded. 

The Peacock was a pretty thing, so pretty that she was 
called "the yacht." Her metal work was polished daily 
until it shone in the sun. Her paint work was immaculate. 
Even the breechings of her guns were done up in painted 
canvas. It is manifest that Captain Peake had mistaken 
his calling. 

The meeting between the frigate President and the Brit- 
ish sloop Little Belt, before the war began (May 16, 1811), 
has features of special interest. After Madison laid the 
final embargo, preceding the war, the British cruisers were 
sent along the American coast to make a demonstration of 
power and overawe the republic. The Guerriere was then 
under the command of Captain G. R. Pechell. Pechell 
impressed an /ijnerican seaman within American waters 
and then painted the name of his ship on her foretopsail 
and went swooping up and down the American coast in- 
viting the whole Yankee navy to come to get their man. 

Commodore John Rodgers, in the frigate President, 
who was then cruising on the coast, went hunting the 



». * 



k 



VICTORIES THAT WERE TIMELY 99 

Guerriere and had the bad luck to fall in with the sloop-of- 
war Little Belt, Captain Arthur B. Bingham, instead. 
Thinking her the Guerriere, Rodgers came alongside at 
8 : 30 o'clock at night when thirty miles off Cape Charles. 

After a bit of unsatisfactory hailing the Little Belt fired 
a gun the shot from which struck the mainmast of the 
President. Rodgers fired one shot in return and then the 
firing became general. At the end of eighteen minutes 
at most the Little Belt was rolling in the trough of the sea, 
unmanageable. Her firing having ceased, Rodgers stopped 
his fire and then lay by until morning when he sent an 
offer of help, which was declined. The Little Belt had 
lost twelve killed and twenty-one wounded. 

The affair is of interest partly because this was really the 
first encounter of the war, but chiefly because Captain 
Bingham reported that after the first broadside from the 
President "the action then became general and continued 
so for three-quarters of an hour when he ceased firing" 
and "stood from us." The British naval officers in 1811 
fully believed that their little sloop-of-war had compelled 
the frigate President, the ship afterwards called a battle- 
ship in disguise, to haul out of the fight. 

The story of the capture of the sloop-of-war Alert, 
Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, by the frigate Essex, Cap- 
tain David Porter, is of similar interest. Porter sailed 
from New York on July 3, 1812, and on August 13 saw 
the Alert to windward. Drags were put out behind the 
Essex and then she made sail as if to escape. The Alert 
came down swiftly and when she fired a gun the Essex 
hove to, as a merchantman would have done. Then the 
Alert passed down across the stern of the Essex so close 
at hand that her crew saw that she was a frigate instead 
of a merchantman. Nevertheless, while the British ves- 
sel carried only twenty short 18-pounders and the Essex 
carried forty short 32-pounders and six long 12-pounders, 

Lorc 



100 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the British gave three cheers and began the battle with a 
broadside. Of course they surrendered after a broadside 
from the Essex. 

These two tales of the war are commonly told in the 
United States to illustrate British arrogance at that time. 
If rightly seen, however, they show merely that the British 
naval officer had taken the American people at the esti- 
mate which the American Congress had placed upon 
them. Congress, and many people outside of Congress, 
had affirmed that the idea of American warships meeting 
those of Great Britain on any terms was too ridiculous for 
sober argument. It is when one considers the meaning of 
our early victories upon public opinion at home and 
abroad that the importance of even such minor operations 
as ship duels is appreciated. If the effect which this 
change of opinion had upon the character of the American 
people be also considered it will not be too much to com- 
pare these random operations with the fleet actions fought 
by the admirals of the Old World. 



CHAPTER XI 

LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND THE ARGUS 

It is a curious fact that the histories of the War of 1812, 
almost without exception, discuss the fighting at sea with 
scarcely any reference to the relative number of ships in 
the two navies. The sizes and forces of the individual 
ships in combat are given in minute detail and the handling 
of each ship is then discussed as if the two ships engaged 
were the only ones afloat — as if there was no occasion for 
either captain to consider the number of ships in the navy 
of his opponent. Even as late as 1860 Sir Howard Doug- 
las, the most noted British authority on gunnery, intimated 
that Captain Hull showed cowardice in approaching the 
Guerriere; the fact that Hull used caution in approaching 
because he was alone upon a sea where the British might 
bring a score of frigates against him was wholly ignored by 
the British writer. If the work of our navy is to be under- 
stood the one most important fact to be kept in mind is 
that our captains went to sea singly as well as in squad- 
rons of a frigate or two, with a sloop, when it was very well 
known that the British force on the American station was 
ten times that of any force the Americans sent to sea. 

In the spring of 1813 Admiral Warren, commanding 
at Halifax, had a total of eleven line-of-battle ships, thirty- 
four of the best frigates in the British navy, and thirty- 
eight sloops, not to more than mention the brigs and smaller 
vessels. In addition to those under his immediate com- 
mand there were squadrons in the West Indies, at the 
Azores, and elsewhere, all stationed with special reference 

101 



102 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

to war with the United States — they were all on guard to 
intercept the American ships. Against all these liners 
and frigates the American navy had ready for service two 
or three frigates and half a dozen smaller vessels. The 
other American ships, few in number at best, were either 
blockaded in port or were in the hands of ship carpenters. 
Yet, few as were the number of American ships available, 
and small as was their force as compared with the huge 
liners that were detailed to hunt them, they went to sea. 
And, as time passed, the American sailor became posi- 
tively foolhardy and thus brought disaster upon the navy. 

First on the list of the foolhardy stands Captain James 
Lawrence, who had blockaded the Bonne Citoyenne at 
Bahia and had sunk the Peacock a few days after leaving 
Bahia. On returning to the United States Lawrence was 
promoted and ordered to the Chesapeake, then lying at 
Boston. As his letters show Lawrence did not want this 
ship, and he hoped that another would come to take her 
even after he was on board. Whether he was affected 
by the common sailor superstition about an unlucky ship, 
or not, is not told in the records. That the sailors shunned 
the Chesapeake, however, is a fact well known. 

The Chesapeake had recently returned from an un- 
successful cruise when Lawrence took her. Only a few 
of her old crew remained in her. To recruit a new crew 
was difficult not only because she was an unlucky ship 
but because the privateers offered better chances for prize 
money. However, a few veterans from the Constitution 
were secured, and the remainder of the crew was made 
up from the sweepings of the alongshore boarding-houses. 
Indeed the crew of the Chesapeake was much like that of 
the ordinary British frigate of the day. To match the 
fact that the British crews were impressed was the fact 
that the Chesapeake's crew had thirty or forty British 
renegades and a lot of Portuguese, a boatswain's mate (a 



II 




CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL. 

FROM AN ENGRAVING AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, 

OF THE PAINTING BY STUART. 



,1 



LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND THE ARGUS 103 

leading petty officer) belonging to the latter treacherous 
gang. 

Bad as this "scrub" crew was, it might have been 
whipped into shape with a few weeks of drill, but of this 
they never got an hour. To add to the disorder on board 
four of her regular officers were on shore sick. Third 
Lieutenant A. C. Ludlow, a youth of twenty-one years, 
had to take the place of the executive officer. Lieutenant 
George Budd, another youth, was made second lieuten- 
ant, and the third and fourth officers were two midship- 
men, W. S. Cox and J. Ballard, who had never had rank 
of that grade before. The officers were unacquainted 
with each other and they were unacquainted with the crew. 
The crew were, for the most part, without uniform, and they 
did not know each other or their officers. Many of the crew 
came on board just as the Chesapeake was on the point 
of sailing; the boats that brought them were hoisted in and 
put in place with the clothing of the sailors lying under 
the thwarts. There was not even a station bill to tell the 
sailors where they were to stand in time of battle. It is 
important to note, however, in connection with this fact 
that the experienced men of the crew were naturally placed 
at the long guns on the main or lower fighting deck while 
the unknown and untrustworthy were placed on deck to 
handle the sails. 

All of this is of importance, not so much for the purpose 
of excusing the defeat that followed upon the battle, as for 
the purpose of showing the utter recklessness — in fact the 
criminal folly — of the captain who would take out such an 
crew to meet a ship of equal force manned by seasoned 
sailors. 

And yet, while pointing out the utter folly of the young 
captain (he was only thirty-two years old), it should be 
noted that he was to a remarkable degree a type of his 
people. In the long period of humiliation and peril be- 



104 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

fore the War of 1812 they made no more preparation for 
the war that was coming than Lawrence made to meet the 
Shannon. It was as a typical American that Captain 
Lawrence got up his anchor and, wholly unprepared, sailed 
out to meet the enemy, on June 1, 1813. In record force 
the ships were almost equal. The actual weight of metal 
thrown from the Chesapeake at a broadside was 542 pounds 
to 550 from the Shannon. The Chesapeake carried 379 
men; the Shannon carried 330. 

While the Chesapeake sailed out of the harbor Lawrence 
called all hands aft to listen to a little speech. As he ceased 
talking the Portuguese boatswain's mate stepped from the 
crowd of seamen and said insolently that if he and thirty 
of his mates were not paid some prize-money, alleged to 
be due, they would not fight when the enemy was overtaken. 
Here was a mutiny with the enemy in sight. Because of a 
mutiny on board the British liner Plantagenet, during the 
course of the war. Captain Lloyd commanding her, actu- 
ally ran away from the frigate President. He was, of 
course, fully justified in doing so. Lawrence, however, 
knowing well that the Shannon was a ship of equal force, 
kept on. He did not even kill the mutineer to restore dis- 
cipline; on the contrary he yielded to the demand and 
calling the mutineers to the cabin gave them the money 
claimed. 

When Lawrence arrived within battle range of the Shan- 
non, the wind was in his favor and he was able to reach 
down on her starboard quarter to a place where he had 
it in his power to cross her stern and open the battle by 
raking her from aft forward without receiving in return 
any fire of importance. But, listening to the promptings 
of chivalry, Lawrence refused to rake the Shannon. In- 
stead he reached up along her starboard side so that she 
had at least an equal chance in the gun fire. 

As the bow of the Chesapeake forged slowly along, the 



LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND THE ARGUS 105 

gunner behind the aftermost 18-pounder on the Shannon's 
main deck took good aim, waited until the second port of 
the American was abreast and then fired. It was then 
5:50 o'clock. The gunners in succession forward along 
the Shannon's decks fired as this one had done, and every 
shot struck the Chesapeake. 

Captain Lawrence waited until he was fairly abreast 
of the Shannon before he fired a broadside. Then, on 
seeing that he was forging ahead to a position from 
which he could cross the Shannon's bow and rake her. 
Captain Lawrence deliberately squared his mainyards — 
set the mainsails shivering to check the speed of his ship 
and keep her broadside to that of the enemy. Indeed, 
when at 5:53 o'clock he saw that the Chesapeake was still 
gaining a little on the Shannon he deliberately luffed up 
into the wind and thus threw his mainsails aback. That 
threw the stern of the Chesapeake alee and toward the 
Shannon. Thus the guns of the Chesapeake were made 
to bear less effectively on the enemy, while the guns of the 
Shannon were able to rake the Chesapeake diagonally and 
inflict greater damage. 

As we can now see clearly, Lawrence thus threw away 
his last chance of victory. The Chesapeake was soon drift- 
ing stern first toward the Shannon. The broadside which 
the Shannon at once fired — the British were not animated 
by any of the folly of chivalry — beat in the stern ports of 
the Chesapeake and swept her deck. Lawrence had been 
wounded already but had kept the deck. He was now 
shot down, mortally hurt, and was carried below. Lieu- 
tenant Cox assisting him. The chief officer was also 
wounded and carried down. Then the boatswain was 
killed. With not an officer on the upper deck to lead the 
men who were there; with the quarterdeck bare of men 
and with the ship wholly out of control, the Chesapeake's 
stern struck the Shannon just forward of the main rigging. 



106 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Seeing the conditions on the deck of the Chesapeake, the 
alert captain of the Shannon called for boarders, and him- 
self led the way. The afterpart of the Chesapeake was his 
for the taking. To secure the forward part he had to fight. 
As he charged forward the Portuguese boatswain's mate 
and the other foreigners fled below, and hid in the hold. 
Even then it was no easy work to get control of the fore- 
castle, for the Americans who remained fought so well that 
thirty out of the fifty men who boarded the Chesapeake 
were killed or wounded. Nevertheless it was in vain that 
Lieutenant Budd, who had been stationed below, strove 
to bring his men up the hatches to drive the British over- 
board, it was in vain that Ludlow, although already mor- 
tally wounded, came on deck once more and it was all 
in vain that Lawrence shouted, as he saw the British 
standing over the hatches: 

"Don't give up the ship! Blow her up!" 

At 6:05 resistance ceased. The Chesapeake was capt- 
ured in just fifteen minutes. On the Shannon thirty- 
three were killed and fifty more or less wounded; on the 
Chesapeake sixty-one were killed and eighty-five wounded. 

Overconfidence and chivalry lost the Chesapeake ; hap- 
pily for his reputation Captain Lawrence lost his life at 
the same time, and died saying " Don't give up the ship ! " 
For no explanation could have saved him from the sever- 
est censure if he had lived to face the court-martial that 
cashiered Lieutenant Cox for helping the wounded cap- 
tain down the hatchway when he was needed on deck. 

The most interesting, as distinguished from the most im- 
portant, feature of the battle between the Chesapeake and 
the Shannon is found in the effect of the victory upon the 
British people. In Parliament, on July 8, John Wilson 
Croker, secretary to the Admiralty, said : 

"The action with the Chesapeake was in every respect 
unexampled. It was not — and he knew it was a bold as- 



I 



LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAI^ AND THE ARGUS 107 

sertion which he made — to be surpassed by any engage- 
ment which graced the naval annals of Great Britain." 
=1 (Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 294.) This 
ij statement was cheered enthusiastically. The work of 
Broke in whipping an American frigate of equal force is 
thus ranked with the work of Nelson in his fleet combats 
with the French and Spaniards. Broke was promoted, 
of course. He was also made a baronet and a "knight 
commander of the most honourable Military Order of the 
Bath." The Admiralty struck a gold medal in his honor. 
The victory was celebrated in the British navy by a song 
that is yet popular: 

Now alongside they range, 

And broadsides they exchange; 
But the Yankees soon flinch from their cannon, 

When captain and crew 

Without further ado 
Are attacked, sword in hand, from the Shannon, 
And the tight httle tars from the Shannon 
Fired a friendly salute 
Just to end the dispute, 
And the Chesapeake struck to the Shannon. 

Better yet, a British work called " Deeds that Won the 
Empire," published in 1898, and a popular work it is, too, 
tells the story of the Chesapeake and Shannon along with 
those of Waterloo and Trafalgar. It was a memorable 
day when a "Yankee" frigate was captured, for that was 
the only battle of the war, with possibly one exception, 
of which an Englishman can speak without making ex- 
planations. 

The effect of this battle upon the American people is 
also of great interest. The American navy had won five 
victories in uninterrupted succession; the American 
patriots were in a state of mind where victories were ex- 
pected as a matter of course, regardless of conditions. 



108 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Accordingly they did not consider the conditions under 
which the battle between the Chesapeake and the Shannon 
was fought, and it is only within recent years that our his- 
torians have given any material consideration to the errors, 
decisive in their character, which Lawrence made. The 
people found consolation only in the valor of the dead 
captain — in repeating his heroic words,, "Don't give up 
the ship!" So Lawrence has been enshrined as a hero 
when he should have been held up as a type, in at least one 
important respect, of what a naval oiSficer should not be. 

When the effect of the whole war upon the evolution of 
the American people is considered in connection with the 
loss of the Chesapeake, however, the patriot may note with 
some pride that the depression of 1813 was not due to the 
extent of the loss. Indeed, the extent of the loss was not 
discussed by the press of the day, and as for the cost of the 
lost frigate it is fair to suppose that no one gave or has given 
a thought to it. The whole American people were de- 
pressed by the fact that an American ship had been de- 
feated. Manifestly some change had come over public 
opinion in the United States since the days when the idea 
of the American navy being able to meet the British was 
openly ridiculed in Congress. 

The other battle mentioned above, of which an English- 
man may speak without making an explanation, was that 
between the American brig Argus and the British brig 
Pelican. The Argus, Captain W. H. Allen, went cruising 
off the coast of England and Wales. Allen was an officer 
on the Chesapeake when she was assaulted by the Leopard, 
in 1807, and it was he who brought a coal from the galley 
in his bare hands and fired the one gun that spoke for 
American honor in that encounter. He was also the ex- 
ecutive officer of the frigate United States when she capt- 
ured the Macedonian, and the good work of the American 
crew was due to his training. But, like Lawrence, Allen 



LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND THE ARGUS 109 

had grown reckless. Off the coast of Wales he burned a 
British merchantman that was carrying a cargo of wine 
from Oporto, Portugal, and before he burned it he allowed 
his crew to get drunk. The light of this fire brought the 
British brig Pelican, Captain John Fordyce Maples, to 
the scene, and after a fair fight she captured the Argus. 
Allen was among the ten men killed on the Argits. 



CHAPTER XII 

ON THE GREAT LAKES 

Most instructive and interesting are the stories of the 
War of 1812 as fought out along the great lakes. It was 
in the great lake region that the American militia, the 
natural defenders of a republic, were to show what valor 
without training could do. No patriot doubted that the 
flight of the British would be made instantaneously, and 
with haste, and that, too, although the British had a 
squadron of six ships carrying eighty guns on Lake On- 
tario, where the Americans had the little sloop-of-war 
Oneida, carrying sixteen short 24-pounders only. The 
largest British ship, called the Royal George, mounted 
twenty-two guns, of which three were long 18-pounders, 
two were short 68-pounders and sixteen were short 32- 
pounders. One of the 18-pounders was on a pivot. She 
alone had twice the force of the Oneida and the squadron 
was stationed opposite Kingston, just across the lake from 
Sacket Harbor, where the Oneida lay when the war began. 

What the American militia failed to do occupies large 
space in the histories of the war. What the men of the 
navy did shall now be told. 

On July 19, 1812, the British squadron came to Sacket 
Harbor to destroy the Oneida and the naval station there. 
A fort, armed with one gun, was manned by Lieutenant 
M. T. Woolsey, of the navy, and the squadron was driven 
away. Then Woolsey, favored by the incompetent Brit- 
ish commodore, went out with the Oneida and took a num- 
ber of British merchantmen. One of these vessels, when 

110 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 111 

fitted with three guns, met and drove off two British cruis- 
ers, the Moira of fourteen and the Gloucester of ten guns. 
Lieutenant Henry Wells commanded the American vessel. 

On October 6 Commodore Isaac Chauncey arrived at 
Sacket Harbor to take charge of the naval war on the 
lakes. He laid the keel of a ship called the Madison, 
which carried twenty-four short 32-pounders, and he im- 
provised a flotilla of schooners that were armed with a 
variety of long and short guns. On November 8 he sailed 
with his flotilla, found the Royal George off the False Duck 
Islands and chased her into Kingston. Then he set his 
smaller vessels to bombarding the forts while he with the 
Oneida (the Madison was yet on the stocks) sailed boldly 
into the harbor and drove the Royal George close in against 
the dock, where she was well protected by the fire of some 
hundreds of soldiers. Thereafter, the British remained 
in port till ice came. 

On Lake Erie the British had captured a small brig 
called the Detroit^ which was armed with 6-pounders. 
They already had a brig called the Caledonia that carried 
two 4-pounders. With these they controlled the lake. 
This control was most important because it enabled them 
to carry supplies to their army in Michigan and the north- 
ern Ohio and Indiana regions, and keep in touch with the 
friendly Indians as well. The Indians were used in raid- 
ing the American home-makers. At the same time they 
carried all their furs to the thrifty traders at the British 
camps. 

The value of the fur trade is seen in the fact that the 
Caledonia was loaded with pelts worth $200,000 and sent 
from Detroit to Fort Erie, opposite Buffalo. The brig 
Detroit went with her. In the meantime Commodore 
Chauncey had sent Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliott up to 
Erie, Pa., to start the work of building a fleet with which to 
regain control of Lake Erie, and when the two British 



112 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

brigs arrived in the Niagara River he happened to be in 
the village of Black Rock, now a part of Buffalo, Organ- 
izing a force of 170 odd sailors and soldiers Elliott went 
afloat in two big row boats and captured both brigs. 
The Caledonia was brought to the American bank but 'j 
the Detroit grounded on Squaw Island, where she was de- 
stroyed. 

Chauncey put the Madison in commission and started 
work on another ship called the General Pike, which was 
named after General Zebulon Pike, the explorer who dis- 
covered Pike's Peak and did other good work in the wilds 
of America. Pike at that time was at Sacket Harbor with a ' 
force of American soldiers who were destined to invade '^ 
Canada. On April 25, 1813, Chauncey sailed with the 
Madison, the Oneida and the schooners, taking 1,700 of 
the soldiers to York, the city now called Toronto. There 
Pike landed with the soldiers while Chauncey's vessel at- 
tacked the forts and the place was soon captured; for it 
was garrisoned by only 700 men, a part of whom were un- 
trained militia. A 24-gun ship that was on the stocks was 
burned and the 10-gun brig Gloucester was captured and 
sent to Sacket Harbor. 

The losses on both sides, but especially on the American 
side, were extraordinary, because a powder magazine was 
exploded in one of the forts after the Americans entered 
it. The total American loss was 288 killed and wounded, 
of whom fifty-two were killed and 180 wounded by the ex- 
plosion. General Pike was among the killed. The Brit- 
ish lost 180 killed and wounded, of whom forty were hurt 
in the explosion. 

Some public buildings, including the House of Parlia- 
ment, were burned by indignant American soldiers acting 
without authority, because in the House of Parliament 
they found a human scalp hanging beside the mace. They 
thought the presence of the scalp beside the mace (the em- 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 113 

blem of power) was truly symbolical of the British power 
in Canada at that time. 

From Toronto Chauncey sailed to the Niagara River, 
to take part in an attack upon Fort George. Colonel 
I Winfield Scott commanded the American soldiers that 
■ crossed the river and Chauncey placed Captain Oliver 
j Hazard Perry in charge of the boats that carried the soldiers 
i across. Perry had previously been sent to Erie, Pa., to 
take charge of the ship-building operations for the re- 
I covery of the command of Lake Erie, but he had heard of 
j the prospect of a fight, and had come to take a hand in it. 
! The fort was taken on May 27, 1813. The British were 
I: outnumbered and their forts were not fit to withstand the 
|l assaults of the naval ships. 

I, This victory drove the British away from the entire line, 
I of the Niagara. It also gave Perry a chance to take the 
j brig Caledonia and four merchant schooners that had been 
,* purchased for naval uses from Black Rock up the lake to 
j Erie, 

I While Chauncey was thus at work at the west end of the 
: lake Sacket Harbor had been left with such poor de- 
I fences that General Sir George Prevost, commanding the 
J land forces at Kingston, and Captain Sir James Lucas 
J Yeo, who now commanded the British ships there, de- 
i termined to cross and destroy the station. They had, in 
j' the meantime, launched a 24-gun ship called the Wolfe, 
j and their fleet included six war vessels. The soldiers, 
under Sir George Prevost, numbered 1,200, and included 
800 regulars. In addition to the white soldiers were a 
': horde of Indians who were looking for "Yankee" scalps 
|j and plunder. General Jacob Brown, commanding the 
Americans at Sacket Harbor had 400 regulars, 200 vol- 
unteers from Albany who were good men, and 400 militia- 
men gathered from the neighborhood and commanded, of 
course, by the most able politicians of northern New York, 



114 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

On the 29th Sir George landed his men and at the first 
gun the entire 400 mihtia fled in a senseless panic. Hear- 
ing from the flying militiamen that all was lost, an officer 
stationed at the naval storehouses set them on fire. He 
also fired the new 28-gun ship General Pike and the capt- 
ured brig Gloucester. The rising smoke filled the Ameri- 
can regulars with dismay, but having some of the John- 
Paul-Jones pluck they held their ground until messengers 
sent after the flying militiamen were able to rally 200. 
When Sir George saw these 200 returning flunkers he 
hastened away. 

The Americans lost their stores but the vessels were 
saved. It was a tidy little victory which attracted no at- 
tention at the time because of the loss of the Chesapeake, 
on June 1. 

On August 7 the hostile fleets (or squadrons, one hardly 
knows how to designate such aggregations of vessels) met 
for the first time. The American vessels were superior in 
gun power at long range, if the water were smooth. The 
British were superior at short range or at any range if the 
water were rough. The Americans had more long guns 
than the enemy but many of these long guns were mounted 
on vessels so small that nothing could be done with them 
in a seaway. The quality of these schooners was seen 
when two of them foundered that night. 

During the 7th the British failed to take advantage of 
the weather gauge which they held; they did not close. 
Thereafter both fleets manuoevred as if they wished to 
get together for a fight, but it was not until the 11th, when 
a fresh wind was blowing, that any shooting was done. 
With the British to windward, "at 11:15 the action be- 
came general and harmless," says Roosevelt, and that de- 
scribes the situation exactly. 

The British fleet was strung out in one line on the 
port tack heading westerly. Chauncey's ships were on 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 115 

the lee side in two lines, the smaller and worthless vessels 
in a line nearer the enemy and the large ones in a paral- 
lel line further away. He had given orders to the small 
vessels to wear away and pass to leeward of his main line 
as soon as the British fire grew too heavy for them, but 
two of the little vessels disobeyed orders and tacked up 
across the British line. It is fair to suppose that the cap- 
tains of these vessels were in hopes that Chauncey would 
tack up and force the fighting to protect them. But 
Chauncey veered off "to lead the enemy down," as he 
wrote. Sir James Yeo, however, on seeing two vessels 
within his power, headed up and captured them. With 
this measure of success he remained satisfied. Chauncey 
declared that he was not satisfied, but he did not force 
the fighting as he should have done. If his conduct be 
judged by that of Perry on Lake Erie, a month later (" To 
windward or to leeward they shall fight to-day!"), then he 
was a poor specimen of a naval officer. 

On September 11 the fleets got within range again and 
each captain showed himself well able to keep out of de- 
cisive action. On September 28 there was something of 
a fight. The ship Pike and two schooners only were 
actually engaged. They met the Wolfe, the Royal George, 
two brigs and two schooners. The big-gunned Pike soon 
shot away the main and mizzen topmasts and the main 
yard of the Wolfe, the British flagship, and inflicted so 
much damage on the hull that Sir James made all sail 
possible and fled into Burlington Bay. 

Now, Burlington Bay was an undefended roadstead, 
Chauncey had only to form his ships in line and sail in to 
find the British at a disadvantage so great that he might 
easily have captured them all. But he sailed away. He 
said in his report that a storm was brewing and he was 
afraid he would be unable to ride it out on a lee shore, 
after having beaten the British. The British fleet rode 



116 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

out the gale, however, and then went to Kingston, where 
they remained until the ice closed the season. 

Of the work on Lake Ontario during the remainder of 
the war it need only be said that it was done in the ship- 
yards on both sides of the lake. Each commander strove 
hard to outbuild the fleet of the other, each in turn had a 
preponderance of force and at such times each said he was 
much disgusted because the other persistently refused to 
stand up and fight. The attitude of these commanders 
is yet of real interest to students of naval warfare; for their 
type persists. If they were alive now we should find them 
among those officers who are most earnest in advocating 
the use of thick armor plate on battleships and most in- 
dignant in denouncing all arguments in favor of speedy 
ships as a craze. 

From Ontario the narrative goes to Lake Erie. To re- 
gain the control of Lake Erie was to drive the British forces 
from the northwestern part of the United States and even 
the western part of Canada. To this end two brig-rigged 
sloops-of-war and three gunboats were laid down at Erie, 
Pa., in 1812. In February, 1813, Commander Oliver 
Hazard Perry, who had been in command of a flotilla of 
gunboats at Newport, R. I., was ordered to Erie. The road 
from Buffalo lay across the ice on the lake, a fact worth 
noting because supplies for the vessels building at Erie 
had to be transported to the shipyard by means of teams 
traversing such highways, or worse, as the ice then afforded. 

However, on July 23, 1813, Perry reported the five 
vessels ready for sea. One brig was named the Lawrence 
after the optimistic and much-lamented captain of the 
Chesapeake. The other was named Niagara. The three 
gunboats were named the Ariel, the Scorpion and the 
Porcupine — and if the Porcupine method of warfare be 
considered it will appear that no better name for a Jeffer- 
sonian warship than that could be imagined. 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 117 

In addition to these Perry had the brig Caledonia, to- 
gether with the merchant schooners Somers and Tigress and 
the sloop Trippe which he had brought up from Black 
Rock, all of which were in the fight to come. 

The vessels thus prepared were of ample force, but 
where Commodore Chauncey had agreed that 740 sailors 
were needed to man the fleet he had provided less than 
200. And as he was having trouble on Lake Ontario he 
was naturally loath to send more. However, he sent up 
two small squads, "a motley set," large enough to bring 
Perry's force up to 300, and with these Perry had to be 
content. 

In the meantime Captain Robert Heriot Barclay, a 
veteran who had served under Nelson, had been appointed 
to command the British forces that had been collected 
at the Detroit end of the lake. Barclay was building a 
ship somewhat larger than Perry's sloops-of-war, but when 
Perry reported ready she was not yet launched. Barclay 
had, however, five good vessels in commission, and, learn- 
ing that Perry's fleet was in a forward state, he came, on 
July 20, to blockade the port of Erie. 

For ten days the British remained in the offing, and 
then, on July 30, they disappeared. The time for Perry 
to go to sea had come, but the task was formidable. For 
across the mouth of the harbor lay a sand-bar on which 
the water varied in depth from four to six feet, and the 
distance from deep water to deep water was nearly a mile. 
Some of Perry's schooners, while loaded, were found to 
draw too much water for the bar, but all the fleet, except 
the two brigs, crossed without much diflSculty, and then 
all hands turned to the Lawrence. A huge barge, made 
for the purpose and fitted to the shape of the brig, was 
secured on each side of her. Both had been filled with 
water before being thus attached, and when the water 
was pumped out of them they lifted the brig well up. It 



118 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

was then possible to float the Lawrence on her way until 
she reached the shoalest part of the bar — where the water 
was but four feet deep — when the barges were again 
filled, the masts were renewed and the brig lifted once 
more, when she crossed over all and was free. 

Of course preparations had been made meantime to 
resist the enemy should he appear. The smaller vessels 
were all cleared for action and a battery was built on the 
beach where the guns would protect the Lawrence. These 
precautions were needed. For while working to get the 
Niagara across on the morning of August 4, Barclay and 
his fleet came back — just " one day after the fair." On 
seeing how well Perry was prepared he sailed away to 
wait for a larger force before fighting. 

Though less than half manned. Perry followed Barclay 
to the mouth of the Detroit River, where he had a look at 
Amherstburg and saw that the new ship Detroit, which 
Barclay was building, was already launched. Then he 
sailed back to a roadstead among the Bass Islands that 
is called Put-in-Bay — near the modern town of Sandusky, 
Ohio. It was a point from which he could see the enemy, 
should they leave port, and while lying there on the morn- 
ing of September 10, 1813, the enemy came. 

Perry had nine vessels where the British had six. The 
British had sixty-three or sixty-four guns where Perry had 
fifty-four, but some of the British guns were very small, 
and at close range Perry had an effective broadside of 
936 pounds to 459 of the enemy. Perry had 416 men, the 
British 440. The British ships were of better build in the 
matter of bulwarks, which in those days supplied to some 
extent the place of modern armor. The bulwarks pro- 
tected men from musketry and grape shot. Then the 
Detroit, the British flagship, was provided with seventeen 
long guns, of which sLx were long 12-pounders, two were 
long 24-pounders and one was an 18-pounder. Perry's 




OLIVER H. PERRY. 

FROM A PORTRAIT AFTER JOHN WESLEY JARVIS IN THE 
REDWOOD LIBRARY AT NEWPORT, R. I. 



J 



( 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 119 

flagship carried only two long guns — 12-pounders. The 
long guns of Perry's fleet, save for the four on the two brigs, 
were carried on open-decked merchantmen. In these 
modern days of all-big-gun battleships the advantages of 
the concentration of force as found in the British ship 
Detroit are understood better than they were in the old 
days, and under the conditions that prevailed in the bat- 
tle this concentration had a notable influence on the 
event. 

When Perry's lookout saw the enemy a light breeze was 
blowing from the southwest. The British ships were off 
to the westward and after Perry got his fleet under way 
his sailing master called his attention to the fact that as 
the wind was blowing the British would have the advantage 
of the weather gauge. The reply that Perry made is worth 
all the more consideration because of the attention created 
by his first brief report of the victory that followed. On 
the statue that ornaments Perry Square at Newport, R. I., 
for instance, we see in prominent letters the oft-repeated 
message, "We have met the enemy and they are ours." 
The vaunt of victory is screamed aloud forever, but the 
most important words that Perry ever uttered were those 
of his reply to his sailing master. For when his sailing 
master said the British would have the weather gauge 
he replied " To windward or to leeward, they shall fight 
to-day." Perry would make a spoon or spoil a horn. 

Then a huge burgee was brought on deck and displayed 
so that the sailors could see the words of the last order of 
the ill-fated Lawrence upon it. " Don't Give Up the Ship ! " 

"Shall I hoist it ?" said Perry. 

"Aye, aye, sir," replied the crew with tremendous em- 
phasis, and that is a fact worth recalling because of the 
great influence of sentiment upon the minds of men in 
time of battle — in all kinds of battles. 

The wind now backed to the southeast and came steadily, 



120 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

though very gently, from that quarter thereafter. Perry 
was to have the weather gauge after all. 

On seeing Perry come from port Barclay put his ships 
in line on the port tack — all heading southwesterly and 
with sails trimmed so that they made little if any head- 
way, though, of course, they drifted with the wind a little. 
At the head of the British line was the little schooner Chip- 
pawa, carrying one 9-pounder. Then came the big 
Detroit, heavily armed as already explained. Astern of her 
was the little brig Hunter, carrying eight guns, 6-pounders 
and under, and then came the ship Queen Charlotte, carry- 
ing seventeen guns, of which one (on a pivot) was a long 
12-pounder, two were long 9-pounders and the others were 
short 24-pounders. Astern of the Queen was the schooner 
Lady Prevost, carrying three long guns, a 9-pounder and 
two 6-pounders, with ten short 12-pounders, while the 
sloop Little Belt, with three long guns, ended the line. It 
is important to note that in the light airs prevailing the 
British captain was able to place his vessels in a compact 
line — where each could support the others without in any- 
way interfering with any other. 

To attack this line Perry formed his ships in line, placing 
the gunboats Scorpion and Ariel in the van where their 
long guns, the water being smooth, would be available. 
The Lawrence was placed next and her two long 12- 
pounders were moved over to fire from the starboard bow. 
Then came the Caledonia, carrying two long 24-pounders 
and a short 32-pounder, which was a good battery for such 
a day. The Niagara followed the Caledonia, being armed 
as was the Lawrence, and she was commanded by Captain 
Jesse D. Elliott, the officer who had captured the Caledonia. 
The Somers, the Tigress, the Porcupine and the Trippe 
were strung out behind the Niagara. Before going into 
battle Perry had impressed upon the subordinate cap- 
tains the importance of Nelson's famous saying that no 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 121 

man could do wrong who laid his ship alongside of one of 
the enemy, and when the line was formed he headed it for 
the British flagship, with which he was to engage, aided 
by the two little vessels ahead. The Caledonia was ex- 
pected to crush the little brig Hunter and the Niagara 
was to engage the Queen Charlotte at close range so as to 
crush her. As for the smaller vessels astern of the Niagara 
they were expected to come up as rapidly as possible and 
join in where most convenient. 

With this understanding the American line fanned 
slowly along, with the intervals between its vessels length- 
ening out steadily because of the inevitable differences in 
speed, a condition which Perry could not remedy. 

At 11 :45, when Perry's ship was more than a mile away, 
a gun from the British flagship opened the battle. The 
shot fell short, but one fired at 11 :50 struck the Laiorence. 
Perry replied, and then by word passed from vessel to 
vessel, ordered all the captains astern of him to close up 
as rapidly as possible and attack the vessels to which they 
were assigned. 

The American line was pointed diagonally toward the 
flagship of the enemy, and as it drew near every long gun 
on the British ships was brought to bear on the Lawrence. 
For more than half an hour the British were able to use 
from twelve to fourteen long guns with deadly effect upon 
Perry's flagship while Perry had only two long 12-pounders 
and the three long guns on the gunboats ahead for a return 
fire. Of course the Caledonia's long guns began to reach 
after a time, but she was assigned to the Hunter. For 
at least half an hour the British fire outweighed the Ameri- 
can in ratio of perhaps two to one. 

At 12:35 the Laurence arrived where her carronades 
would reach, though the range — 250 yards — was very 
great for that kind of a gun — and Perry turned her so that 
her full broadside was used for the first time. His fire 



122 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

now became destructive and adequate, and if Elliott had 
placed the Niagara alongside the Queen Charlotte, as he 
was in duty bound to do, the battle would have been de- 
cided quickly and with relatively small loss of life, although 
the Lawrence had already suffered severely from the fire 
she had received. But Elliott held the Niagara well out 
of range, and the captain of the Charlotte, on seeing that 
the Niagara was not to attack him, left his place in the 
British line and, making sail ahead, took a position where 
his full battery could unite with that of his flagship in 
destroying the Lawrence. Thus the two most powerful 
vessels in the British line were concentrated on the Ameri- 
can flagship while the captain of the Niagara held aloof 
deliberately. 

It was under such circumstances that Perry's appeal to 
the sentiment of his crew proved useful. They were fight- 
ing under a battle flag on which was written " Don't Give 
Up the Ship," and they never for a moment forgot it. 
Gun after gun was dismounted. Whole gun crews were 
swept away by the storm of grape. Of 103 men fit for 
duty when the fight began eighty-three were shot down. 
The rigging was torn to shreds. The hull was cut up so 
badly that men were killed on the operating table while 
under the surgeon's hands. Finally a time came when 
Perry, who was working one of the after guns, found that 
he had not enough men left to point it. Going to the 
hatch he asked if there was anyone below who could come 
on deck, and at that call three of the wounded crawled up 
the ladder on their hands and knees, and, manning the 
tackles, hauled the gun out so that it could be fired effec- 
tively. 

The Lawrence was now a beaten ship, drifting helpless, 
with the breeze. Elliott, who was looking on from a safe 
distance, then "realized that his commander-in-chief 
would be destroyed under his eyes, unless he went to his ^^ 



ON THE GREAT LAKES 123 

support, and he himself rest under the imputation of an 
inefficient spectator" (Mahan). His conduct, as described 
with his approval in his biography, in later years, was 
disgraceful, if not criminal. He now made sail ahead, 
but he was careful yet to keep well up to windward clear 
of the British short-gun fire. Indeed, as he sailed along 
the British supposed he was making off to escape from 
their clutches. On seeing the Niagara under increased 
sail Perry took fresh courage. Dropping a boat over the 
rail he got into it with four sailors and pulled away to the 
unharmed brig. As the men rowed a shot passed through 
the boat, but Perry plugged the hole and the men rowed 
on until he climbed aboard the Niagara. When there he 
sent Elliott to hasten the movements of the little vessels 
astern, none of which had yet been under fire, and then 
turned the Niagara around and drove her with her fresh 
crew and battery into the thick of the battle. 

The British ships had succeeded in beating the Lawrence 
— her flag was hauled down after Perry reached the Ni- 
agara — but they had by no means escaped punishment. 
The British flagship was but little less hurt than the Law- 
rence, and the Queen Charlotte was also well cut up. As 
the Detroit lay almost helpless the Niagara sailed across 
her bows. To avoid the raking an effort was made to 
wear her around, but as she turned away from the wind 
she fouled the Queen Charlotte, a disaster neither was able 
to avoid. When these two vessels came together, broad- 
side to broadside. Perry raked them both again and again. 
To this fire neither was able to answer a gun, and with 
that, at 3 o'clock, the British surrendered. 

Under Perry thirty were killed or mortally wounded 
and ninety-three were hurt more or less. Of these twenty- 
two were killed and sixty-one were wounded on the Law- 
rence. The British lost forty-one killed and ninety-four 
wounded. 



124 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

It may be worth noting that most curious ideas pre- 
vailed among gunners in those days. They really sup- 
posed that placing two projectiles in a gun would make 
it more effective at long range. Some of Perry's short 
guns were loaded with two 32-pound shot and a round 
of grape which weighed but little less than a solid shot, 
over one cartridge of powder that weighed two and a quar- 
ter pounds. The ablest tacticians of modern days have 
expressed approval of Perry's plan of battle but every one 
smiles at the lack of " horse sense " in the gunners of his day. 

By the capture of the entire British fleet the control of 
the lake was regained beyond dispute. The control of 
the lake rendered the British occupation of Detroit no 
longer possible. The British had been operating in 
northwestern Ohio. They were now driven out of the 
country and they were followed into Canada, where, on 
October 5, at a place called Moravian Town, they were 
routed and dispersed, and their great Indian ally, Tecum- 
seh, was killed. The scalping knife was used no more in 
Ohio. The guns of the navy brought safety to the women 
and children — the helpless ones who had been the chief 
victims of the British invasion — and for fifty years there- 
after the people of the region celebrated the 10th of Sep- 
tember by picnics and festivals at which they sang with 
hearty enthusiasm a song that told how 

He pulled off his coat, 

And he plugged up the boat, 

And away he went rowing thro' fire and smoke. 

And they listened with a feeling not to be easily described 
while one of their number read the words of Perry's re- 
port to the Navy Department: 

"It has pleased the Almighty to give to the arms of the 
United States a signal victory over their enemies on this 
lake." 



CHAPTER XIII 
MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 

On September 5, 1813, the brig Enterprise, Lieutenant 
William Burrows, captured the British brig Boxer, Cap- 
tain Samuel Blyth, off Penguin Point, near Portland, 
Maine. 

On April 28, 1814, the new sloop-of-war Peacock, Cap- 
tain L. Warrington, captured the British sloop Epervier, 
Captain R. W. Wales, off the coast of Florida. The fights 
are of small interest for the reason that the American ves- 
sels were the more powerful. The Enterprise was the 
lucky little schooner that had done good work in the war 
with France, but she had been rebuilt and pretty well 
spoiled. The Epervier was taken into the service, but while 
returning from the Mediterranean, after the war, she dis- 
appeared with all hands. 

As the reader will remember. Napoleon was crushed at 
the battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1814. The British 
were then free to send their whole navy and their veteran 
troops to the United States, The American people — 
especially the American navy — had been fighting against 
great odds from the first, but now the enemy became 
overwhelming. After augmenting the force operating 
in the Chesapeake the British army under Major-General 
Ross and with a naval contingent under Rear-Admiral 
Cockburn (the whole force numbered 5,000 men) moved 
against Washington. The land force came by way of the 
Patuxent. At Bladensburg were posted 7,000 militia- 
men with 370 sailors and seventy-eight marines. As the 

125 



126 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

British arrived the miUtia fled, but the naval men, under 
Commodore Joshua Barney, a veteran of the Revolution, 
stood their ground fighting with determination until some 
of them were bayonetted at the battery they were serving. 
They inflicted a loss of 216 killed and wounded on the 
enemy and suffered a loss of 100 in return. But they were, 
of course, overwhelmed. Having entered Washington, 
the British, under orders from Rear-Admiral Cockburn, 
burned the public buildings, together with the newspaper 
offices and many private buildings. Even the national 
library, with its records and documents, was burned with 
the rest. The deed which Omar, the Mohammedan, 
perpetrated at Alexandria, A. D. 640, was repeated by 
Rear-Admiral George Cockburn, with Major-General 
Ross and Vice-Admiral Cochrane consenting. Cockburn 
was knighted a little later. 

The assault made on Baltimore, on September 12-14, 
which failed, is notable because it inspired Francis S. 
Key to write the "Star-Spangled Banner." 

Memorable in the history of the navy is the story of the 
Wasp^ which was built to take the place of the little Wasp 
that was captured after she had beaten the life out of the 
British sloop Frolic. The new Wasp sailed from Ports- 
mouth, N. H., under Captain Johnston Blakely, with a 
crew of 173 men, "almost exclusively New Englanders." 
She was the only one of our ships afloat in the War of 
1812 that carried a picked crew. 

On June 28, 1814, while cruising to the southwest of 
Ireland the Wasp met the British brig sloop Reindeer, 
Captain William Manners, a vessel carrying eighteen 
short 24-pounders, a 12-pounder swivel and two long 
6-pounders. The Wasp carried two long 12-pounders 
and twenty short 32-pounders. It is worth noting, to show 
the difference between the American and the British prac- 
tice in arming ships in those days, that when an American 



MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 127 

ship mounted a swivel-gun it was always a "long Tom" 
of the largest calibre, while the British used a carronade of 
the 12-pound or 18-pound size. The modern practice of 
mounting the heaviest possible guns in turrets has grown 
out of the American practice of the old days. 

Blakely tried to work up and take the weather gauge, 
but Manners handled the Reindeer so well that at 3:17 
o'clock p. M he placed her on the weather quarter of 
the Wasp where he opened fire with his 12-pounder 
swivel. And there he hung until he had fired five times. 
At 3 : 26 the Wasp was luffed and for ten minutes the broad- 
sides of both ships were worked at the utmost speed, when 
the superior battery of the Wasp and the superior skill of 
the American gunners proved decisive as usual. The 
Reindeer was shot to pieces so badly that Captain Man- 
ners in desperation (he was already mortally wounded) 
ran his brig alongside the Wasp and called for boarders. 
The men responded, but Captain Manners was shot through 
the head as he strove to lead his crew, and then the men 
of the Wasp swarmed on board the Reindeer and carried 
her. It was a bloody fight. Of the 173 Americans eleven 
were killed and fifteen wounded while thirty-three were 
killed and thirty-four wounded out of 118 on the Reindeer. 

On September 1 the Wasp cut a merchantman out of a 
fleet of ten ships under the convoy of the British liner 
Armada — a ship too slow for the Wasp. At 6 : 30 o'clock 
that evening, being then 260 or 270 miles westerly from 
Brest, Captain Blakely saw four ships ahead of him and 
made sail in chase of the most weatherly one, which 
proved to be the brig sloop Avon, Captain the Honourable 
James Arbuthnot. At 7 p. m. the Avon began signalling 
her consorts, while the Wasp kept on in chase until the 
Avon opened fire at 8:38. Then she luffed out on the 
Avon's weather quarter and ordered her to heave to. 
When she refused to do this Blakely ran down under her 



128 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

lee and opened fire at such short range that a gun wad at 
one time proved to be an efiicient missile. In a brief time 
the two masts of the Avon were shot away and her hull 
was riddled. But just after she had surrendered, one of 
her consorts, the sloop CastilUan, Captain Braimer, came 
to the rescue, followed by the other two vessels, one of 
which was the 20-gun sloop Tartarus. To prepare for her 
battle with these fresh ships the Was'p now wore around 
before the wind and began reeving off new braces in place 
of some that had been cut by the fire of the Avon. The 
CastilUan fired one broadside at her, but in the meantime 
the Avon was making urgent signals of distress and the 
CastilUan went to give her aid. The aid came just in time, 
for as the last man was taken from her the ^'yon went down. 

The Was'p had one man wounded — struck by a wad 
from the Avon — and two killed. The Avon had ten killed 
and thirty-two wounded, showing the usual superiority of 
the American gunner. The three British vessels, after 
seeing the destruction of the Avon, allowed the Wasp to 
depart in peace. 

On October 9 the Wasp fell in with the Swedish brig 
Adonis and took off two American naval officers who had 
been on the frigate Essex and were now passengers. The 
Wasp was then between 200 and 300 miles west by north 
from the Cape de Verde group. The Adonis alone re- 
ported these facts. When the Wasp faded from the view 
of those Swedes she disappeared forever. 

During her last cruise in that war the Constitution was 
caught by a hurricane that wrenched her until the carpenter 
reported to the officer of the deck. Lieutenant William 
B. Shubrick, that she was sinking. 

"Well, sir," replied Shubrick, "as everything in our 
power is made tight we must patiently submit to the fate 
of sailors and all of us sink or swim together." 

The Constitution did not sink, but the words of the gal- 



MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 129 

lant Shubrick show how the men of the Wasp met their 

fate. 

It was Constitution luck to escape the hurricane. There 
never was a luckier ship than Old Ironsides. At 1 o'clock 
on February 20, 1815, the Constitution, being then under 
Captain Charles Stewart, while running with an easterly 
breeze well off to the east and north of Madeira, met two 
British warships that proved to be the light little frigate 
Cyane, Captain Gordon T. Falcon, and the sloop Levant, 
Captain the Honorable George Douglass. The Consti- 
tution went in pursuit and at 6 :10 o'clock that evening came 
to the wind at a point where she had the Levant under her 
lee bow and the Cyane under her lee quarter, and opened 
fire. For the British captains had determined to fight, 
and had formed in line to await the Constitution. After 
the battle had raged for fifteen minutes the Constitution 
ceased firing because the enemy were fogged in by the 
smoke. When smoke cleared away it was seen that the 
Constitution had forged ahead until abreast of the Levant 
while the Cyane was luflBng up to cross astern and rake. 
At that Stewart gave the Levant a broadside and then 
backing the main and the mizzen sails of the Constitution 
he drove her stern first back across the course of the Cyane 
and gave her the raking she had intended for the Consti- 
tution. A little later the Levant, which was then out of 
position for firing, was seen wearing around to come back 
to the aid of the Cyane, but as she turned from the wind 
Stewart drove the Constitution ahead and raked the un- 
fortunate sloop twice. This sent the Levant out of the 
battle to reeve new rigging. As she turned away the 
Cyane also squared away before the wind, as if to escape, 
when the Constitution, being both handier and swifter, 
was able to turn around more quickly and crossing astern 
Stewart raked from aft forward and then ranged up on 
her port quarter, when the British flag was hauled down. 



130 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Placing a prize crew in charge of the captured ship, 
Stewart went in pursuit of the Levant and found her com- 
ing back to aid the Cyane! Of course she was soon com- 
pelled to surrender. The Cyane lost twelve killed 
and twenty-six wounded. The Levant lost seven killed 
and sixteen wounded. The Constitution lost six killed and 
nine wounded. The two British ships together threw 763 
pounds of metal at a broadside where the Constitution 
threw 704, but the British guns were nearly all carro- 
nades; moreover, the division of the British forces between 
two ships was a disadvantage that is understood much 
better now than it was then. 

Stewart took his prizes to Porto Praya, in the Cape de 
Verdes. \ATiile there, on March 11, during a low-lying 
fog, the 50-gun frigate Leander, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, 
the 50-gun frigate Newcastle, Captain Lord George Stuart, 
and the 40-gun frigate Acasta, Captain Robert Kerr, came 
into the harbor. The Newcastle had been designed to 
meet the 44-gun American ships and the three frigates 
had been in search of the Constitution for some time. 
The cables of the American ships were slipped and, fa- 
vored by the wind and fog, they were able to stand out of 
the harbor a long gunshot to windward of the British 
ships, though the latter soon tacked in pursuit. The 
breeze was fresh from northeast by north. The Consti- 
tution led in the race with the Levant next and the Cyane 
following. The British Newcastle was just out of range 
on the Constitution's lee quarter with the Leander astern 
of her and the Acasta last of all but working out to wind- 
ward of the wake of the Constitution. In a little time it 
was seen that the Cyane was dropping astern where the 
British would surely get her and Stewart ordered her to 
tack — turn away to the northwest. She did so and was 
allowed to go unpursued. Then the Levant was seen to be 
in a dangerous position and she was ordered to tack. 



MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 131 

This she did and then to the astonishment of all the 
Americans the three huge British frigates tacked after her 
and allowed the Constitution to sail away unmolested. 

No adequate explanation of this singular movement was 
ever made. \Vhen Captain Collier was twitted about it 
ten years later he killed himself. It is not unlikely that 
the report which Captain Collier made to the Admiralty 
would clear up the mystery, but beginning in 1813 — at 
about the time they ordered the British frigates to cruise 
in company, and never to attack an American frigate 
singly — the Admiralty ceased publishing the reports of 
captains. 

In the meantime the frigate President was lost. She 
went to sea from New York in a gale of wind on February 
14, 1815, but struck on a bar on the way out and twisted 
her hull out of shape and sprung her masts. Then she 
encountered the British blockading squadron of four 
frigates on the 15th and led them a race in which she lost. 
The Endymion, a 24-pounder frigate, was the first to get 
within range. Captain Stephen Decatur, commanding 
the President, made a good running fight. Indeed, he at 
first tried to get alongside this ship, but she was too swift 
for him. Then he dismantled her (the " sails were all cut 
from her yards"), and she was silenced. The delay in 
doing this, however, enabled the frigates Pomone and 
Tenedos to overhaul the President, and when these two 
had arrived within close range Decatur surrendered. A 
court-martial decided that Decatur was fully justified in 
doing so, yet it seems certain that John Paul Jones would 
have fought somewhat longer, in spite of odds. 

It is worth noting that after the President had been taken 
to England all stores and other needless weights were re- 
moved so that she would float as high as possible out of 
water. Then she was moored beside an old 74-gun liner 
that was weighed down to a point where the President 



132 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

would seem to be rather the larger ship. This was done 
in order that the yokels who came to the navy yard would 
go away fully convinced that the "Yankee" frigate was 
really "a line-of-battle ship in disguise." 

The sloops-of-war Hornet, Captain James Biddle, and 
the Peacock, Captain Lewis Warrington, sailed from New 
York on January 22, 1815, to join the President at Tristan 
d'Cunha, not knowing that the President had been capt- 
ured. The Hornet arrived at the island on March 23 
and found the British sloop Penguin, Captain James 
Dickinson, there, looking for a "Yankee" privateer that 
had been doing much damage to Indiamen. The Penguin 
was a new vessel. She carried sixteen short 32-pounders, 
two long 12-pounders fitted so that both could be fired 
from either side, and a short 12-pounder on a pivot. 
(Report of Captain Biddle who carefully measured her). 
The Hornet carried eighteen short 32-pounders and two 
long 12-pounders, only one of which could be fired on a 
side. The crew of the Penguin numbered 132; that on the 
Hornet, according to her muster roll, was 121. 

The battle began at 1:40 p. m., while both ships sailed 
along side by side, perhaps sixty yards apart. At the end 
of fifteen minutes Captain Dickinson, who had the weather 
gauge, ran down to board the Hornet because the Penguin 
was too badly cut up to fight longer in any other way. 
The ships bumped together, but in the meantime Dickin- 
son had been killed and no serious effort was made to 
board. When the ships separated the Penguin's foremast 
fell over the rail, and at 2:02 she surrendered. She had 
lost fourteen killed and twenty-eight wounded, her hull 
was leaking like a basket and the mainmast was soon to 
fall. Not a round shot struck the Hornet's hull or masts. 
She lost two killed and ten wounded. The Penguin, after 
a careful survey, was sunk. 

The Peacock went on to the Straits of Sunda, where she 



MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 133 

fell in with the Httle cruiser Nautilus, Lieutenant C. 
Boyce. Boyce announced that peace had been declared, 
but Warrington thought that statement a mere ruse to en- 
able the little vessel to get under the guns of a nearby fort, 
and ordered the flag of the Nautilus down. Boyce re- 
fused and a broadside was exchanged. The Peacock was 
unhurt, the Nautilus lost seven killed and eight wounded. 

Peace had been made, but Warrington was justified, of 
course, in refusing to take the word of the British officer 
under the circumstances. As the British oflficial histories 
lay much stress on Warrington's "inhumanity," it is worth 
noting that Captain Bartholomew, of the British ship 
Erebus, fired a broadside and a number of muskets at an 
American gunboat, off the coast of Georgia, three weeks 
after he had received official notice that the war was ended. 

Of the work of the privateers in the War of 1812 it must 
be said that when the balance sheet was struck, it was 
much more disastrous to the country than that of the 
Revolution. Very few profitable voyages were made and 
owners sustained very great losses. The most celebrated 
voyage of the war was that of the Rossie, Captain Joshua 
Barney — it was celebrated because of the number of ships 
taken. In a run from Baltimore to Newport she " captured 
four ships, eight brigs, three schooners and three sloops, 
valued at over $1,500,000." (McClay's "American Priv- 
ateers.") Mary Barney, in her biographical memoir of 
the late Commodore Joshua Barney, says (p. 283) that 
the cruise "was but little profitable to the numerous 
individuals who had united to fit her out," and that the 
Commodore's share of the prize money was only a little 
more than $1,000. 

A few good fights were made by privateers during the 
War of 1812, of which two should have mention here. 
On October 11, 1814, the brig Prince de NeucJmtel, Cap- 
tain J. Ordronaux, of New York, while at anchor off Nan- 



134 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

tucket was attacked by five barges, containing at least 111 
men from the British 40-gun frigate Endymion, Captain 
Henry Hope. The privateer had only thirty-eight men on 
board, but these resisted so desperately that at the end of 
twenty minutes one barge was sunk, three drifted away 
with not a man at an oar, while the fifth was captured with 
its crew of thirty-six men, of whom, however, eight were 
dead and twenty wounded. From the barge that sank 
two men were rescued. They reported that she had 
carried forty-three men, of whom all the others were lost. 
The British, to minimize their defeat, would admit a loss of 
only twenty-eight killed and ninety-three wounded. The 
privateer lost seven killed and twenty-four wounded. 

The privateer schooner General Armstrong, having 
anchored in Fayal Harbor, was attacked during the night 
of September 26, 1814, by 400 men who came from a 
British squadron that arrived soon after she did. Every 
boat carried a carronade and these guns were fired as the 
boats dashed in. The privateer replied with a long 24- 
pounder and four long 9-pounders, for perhaps two rounds, 
and then the British swarmed to the rail. There, as an 
English eye-witness wrote (quoted in "American Priva- 
teers"): "The Americans fought more like bloodthirsty 
savages than anything else. They rushed into the boats 
sword in hand and put every soul to death as far as came 
within their power. Some of the boats were left without 
a single man to row them, others with three or four. The 
most that any returned with was about ten. Several 
boats floated ashore full of dead bodies." 

To call American seamen who were defending their 
ship "bloodthirsty savages" is characteristic of British 
histories of conflicts with Americans, especially when, as 
in this case, the Americans won against great odds. The 
privateersmen numbered only ninety. The British ad- 
mitted a loss of but thirty-four killed and eighty-sLx 



MINOR BATTLES OF THE WAR 135 

wounded. It was, of course, very much larger. The 
Armstrong lost two killed and seven wounded. The 
British ships finally came within range and then Captain 
Samuel Reid, commanding, burned the privateer. 



CHAPTER XIV 
THE LOSS OF THE ESSEX 

The story of the frigate Essex goes back to the war with 
France, for the Essex was built by the people of Salem, 
Mass., for use against the hated French, and especially 
the hated Napoleon. It is said that when first com- 
missioned she was the swiftest, and for her battery (then 
long 12-pounders) the best frigate afloat. While lying 
in the Delaware, late in 1812, the Essex, under Captain 
David Porter, was ordered to join the Constitution for the 
cruise in which the Java was captured. Failing to find 
the Constitution at the various places of rendezvous ap- 
pointed. Porter was left off the Brazil coast to cruise as 
he pleased, and he determined to round the Horn to de- 
stroy British commerce in the South Sea. In the course 
of the year 1813 the British whalers there were all capt- 
ured or driven into port, and as some of the whalers were 
armed as letters-of-marque the American ships were saved 
from British aggressions. Our first admiral — Farragut — 
served under Porter on this cruise, and was at one time 
placed in command of a captured ship, though but twelve 
years old. 

Having learned that the British had sent a squadron 
of three ships to capture the Essex, Porter went to a safe 
harbor where he refitted his ship, and then, instead of 
sailing for home, as he would have been fully justified in 
doing, he went hunting the enemy. 

Valparaiso was reached early in January, 1814, and on 
the 8th of that month the British frigate Phoebe, Captain 

136 



THE LOSS OF THE ESSEX 137 

James Hillyar, and the sloop Cherub, Captain T. T. 
Tucker, appeared in the offing just after dayhght. Cap- 
tain Porter had entertained the society people of the town 
the night before, a third of his crew were on shore, and the 
gun deck was lumbered up with decorations. Knowing 
these facts some British sailors rowed off to the Phoebe 
and told Captain Hillyar that the Essex was at that mo- 
ment "safe booty." 

Clearing his ship for action Captain Hillyar reached 
into the harbor and steered within fifteen feet of the 
weather rail of the anchored Essex. He intended to attack 
the Essex, because he believed he had surprised her in an 
unprepared condition, and as all now agree his coming in 
beside her in such circumstances was an actual attack. 
Hillyar had violated the neutrality of the port by doing this. 
He did not find Porter unprepared, however. As the 
Phoebe steered alongside, kedge anchors were hoisted 
to the ends of the lower yards of the Essex whence they 
could be dropped upon the Phoebe to haul her in closer 
still, while the men at the guns stood ready to fire, and a 
well-trained host of boarders mounted to the rail ready to 
jump to the deck of the enemy under the smoke of the first 
broadside. 

Hillyar had no relish for such a battle. With much agi- 
tation he told Porter that nothing hostile was meant by 
coming in so close, and then he backed his yards and 
drifted away astern. Although the Phoebe had made an 
attack that not only justified but demanded a fight, Porter 
let her go, and all that has ever been said in excuse of 
his doing so was that he "was the very pink of chivalry." 

When the two captains met on shore later Hillyar 
promised faithfully that because of Porter's forbearance 
no attack should be made upon the Essex while in neutral 
waters. Porter invited Hillyar to meet the Essex with the 
Phoebe alone in the offing, but Hillyar declined. 



138 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

After a time Porter learned that three more British 
frigates were coming to the coast, and a stiff wind having 
carried away his cable, on March 28, 1814, he determined 
to sail at once. Standing out under a press of canvas 
the Essex was struck by a squall of wind off the cape at 
the south side of the harbor, the topmast was broken 
short off, and Porter turned back to the harbor to make 
repairs. Knowing in his heart that he would have kept 
a promise freely made, he believed that Hillyar would do 
so, and that the Essex would be unmolested when in neu- 
tral waters. Farragut ("Life and Letters") says Porter 
should have squared away before the wind to make re- 
pairs, fighting if necessary until this was done. On seeing 
the Essex was crippled and returning to neutral waters 
Hillyar set all flags on both of his ships and at once went 
in chase. 

The Essex at this time was armed with six long 12- 
pounders and forty short 32-pounders. The Phoebe, ac- 
cording to James, carried twenty-six long 18-pounders, 
four long 9-pounders, fourteen short 32-pounders, with a 
short 18-pounder and a short 12-pounder that could be 
fired from either side. The Phoebe could fire from her 
long guns at long range 252 pounds of shot at a broadside. 
The Essex could fire only three of her long 12-pounders in 
the broadside, but at one time she was able to use the other 
three from stern ports, so at best, and for a half hour at 
most, she used all of the six long guns. She opposed a 
round of sixty-six pounds of shot to the Phoebe's 252. At 
short range the Phoebe fired 506 pounds of metal to which 
the Chervh added 342, making a total of 848, while the 
Essex had a broadside weight of 628 pounds by the scales, 
all American shot being under the nominal weight. These 
figures are given to show that while the Essex had a good 
enough fighting chance at short range she was at an over- 
whelming disadvantage when at long range. 



THE LOSS OF THE ESSEX 139 

The Essex having anchored near the beach (the wind 
had moderated), the Chervb sailed in to a point off the 
starboard bow while the Phoebe took a position off the star- 
board quarter of the American. Both were within car- 
ronade range at this time. At 3 : 54 o'clock (Essex time) 
the enemy opened fire. At that time not one of Porter's 
guns would bear on the Phoebe, but he made it hot for 
the Cherub and within a brief time he got the three long 
12-pounders from the off side of the bow back to his cabin 
where he worked them through stern ports. Thus for 
ten minutes, according to Hillyar's account, and half an 
hour, according to Porter, the Essex opposed three guns 
and no more to the entire broadside of the Phoebe. At the 
end of that time, Hillyar wrote, " appearances were a little 
inauspicious." In spite of the odds in their favor both 
British ships were obliged to haul off to make repairs. 

However, with new rigging in place, Hillyar returned 
to the battle. The Phoebe was once more placed on the 
starboard quarter of the Essex, but she was further for- 
ward so that the long 12-pounders in the stern ports of 
the Essex could not be brought to bear, and at the same 
time she was so far off that the short guns on the Essex 
could not reach. The Cherub then approached near 
enough to fire a few shot from her long 9-pounders, but 
her work was of little moment from this time on. The 
gunners of the Phoebe, however, worked as if at target 
practice, for they were unannoyed by a return fire. The 
first lieutenant of the Phoebe protested that shooting the 
Essex to pieces in that way was sheer murder, but Hillyar 
replied that he was there to capture the Essex with the least 
risk possible. 

Many of the guns on the Essex were dismounted, 
and the gun's crews were slaughtered. Three crews 
— fifteen men — were killed at one gun alone. The rig- 
ging was cut aloft until the only running rope remaining 



140 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

was the halliard of the flying jib. The hull was hit more 
frequently than any other American hull in any salt-water 
battle of that war, except the Chesapeake. Seeing, at last, 
that the Phoebe had anchored, Porter in his desperation 
slipped his cable. He had but one sail that he could con- 
trol — the flying jib — and that he hoisted, while the others 
were left dangling in shreds from the yards. The Phoebe 
at that moment had not less than 289 fighting men, while 
the Essex had no more than 150 fit to handle the cutlass, 
but with the American crew — even those who were dying 
under the surgeon's knife shouting "Don't give her up, 
I.ogan!" and "Hurrah for Liberty!" — Porter headed for 
the enemy determined to lead his men to her decks. In 
the meantime his whole broadside did for a few minutes 
reach out with effect. 

Hillyar had been trained in the school of Nelson wherein 
it was taught that "No captain can do wrong if he places 
his ship alongside an enemy." But when he saw the Essex 
coming with her rags flapping in the air, and the blood 
flowing from her scuppers, he slipped his cable and fled 
from the cripple. His first lieutenant had been killed; 
there was no one to protest. 

In the early days of the war (August 13, 1812) when 
the British sloop Alert fell in with the Essex, the crew of 
the British ship cheered for joy at the thought of fighting 
an American frigate. When the Constitution was sailing 
down on the Guerriere, Captain Dacres at first refused to 
believe that shft was an American ship, because, as he 
said, she came down too boldly for a ship manned by 
such people. The captain of the sloop Little Belt supposed 
that he had compelled the frigate President to "stand 
away" from his little vessel. But after less than two years 
of sea fighting a British captain was found declining a 
yard-arm encounter, though the Americans were then of 
much less than half his force. 



THE LOSS OF THE ESSEX 141 

This is not to say, however, that Hillyar did wrong. 
It was his imperative duty to capture the Essex with the 
least possible loss. He showed common sense but neither 
the "chivalry" nor the " uncircumspect gallantry" of 
which it was the habit of British writers to make boast. 

While the Phoebe fled she kept her long guns working, 
and Porter, seeing that he could not close, turned back 
intending to run his ship ashore and burn her. Here 
again he was foiled, for the wind bafiled him. Then, as 
he anchored again the Essex took fire, and hope fled. 
Those who could swim were told that they might try to 
reach the shore, and many took advantage of the oppor- 
tunity. Those who remained put out the fire and then 
at 6:20 o'clock the flag was hauled down. 

Out of 255 men on the Essex when the battle began 
fifty-eight were killed, sixty-six were wounded and thirt}^- 
one were drowned in trying to swim ashore. The British 
lost five killed (including Lieutenant William Ingram, 
of the Phoebe) and ten wounded. 

For the good of the service it is necessary to point out 
that Porter and Lawrence were guilty of making most 
serious errors. Inspired by "chivalry," Lawrence re- 
fused to rake the Shannon when he had opportunity, while 
Porter, animated by the same idea, allowed the Phoebe to 
escape from his grasp in the harbor of Valparaiso. Very 
likely the Shannon would have captured the Chesapeake 
even had Lawrence raked her, but it was a serious error 
to fail to take any advantage. In like manner the error 
of Porter cost him his ship, many of his crew lost their 
lives and others endured untold suffering. If any Ameri- 
can naval ofiicer is ever again guilty of such "chivalry," 
a court-martial should inflict on him the just penalty for 
neglect of duty in the presence of the enemy. 

Nevertheless, when we consider the effect of the battles 
of these two oflBcers upon the country — especially the 



142 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

effect upon the standing of the nation among the other 
Powers of the world — it appears that the "chivalry" was, 
perhaps, worth its price. For, as has already been pointed 
out, the nation had been dominated by the policy of 
"peaceable coercion" until the people of Europe looked 
upon all Americans as contemptible cowards. Worse yet, 
that policy had actually developed among our people a 
habit of thought through which they would weigh "in- 
terest "—commercial gains— against honor. Men had 
been taught to think they might do anything, however dis- 
honest or contemptible, or endure anything, however dis- 
graceful, if they could thereby serve their "interest." It 
was through this habit of thought that, when they came 
to fight, they put "free trade" ahead of "sailors' rights" 
in the slogan of the war. Nothing less than a war could 
raise the nation out of that slough. While they fought a 
second war for liberty they were also creating a character 
as a people. For the sake of a standing in the community 
of nations it was necessary to prove that Americans were 
not cowards; for the sake of the future of the country it 
was necessary to set up some other national idea than one 
founded on "interest" only. In this point of view it ap- 
pears that the combat between the Chesapeake and the 
Shannon was something more than a display of battle 
tactics, and that Porter's work at Valparaiso was mem- 
orable in the annals of our navy. 

There was one other feature of the battle of Valparaiso 
that needs special emphasis. When Porter wished to get 
alongside of the enemy he was unable to do so because 
his ship had not enough power to give her the needed 
speed. In modern days a naval officer is heard to say, 
here and there, that the popular demand for speed in 
American warships is a "craze," and that the quality most 
needed in a fighting ship is the ability "to stay in the bat- 
tle line. Porter had plenty of guns with which to "stay 



THE LOSS OF THE ESSEX 143 

In the battle line"; what troubled him was that he couldn't 
get into the battle line. If we are to invite the enemy to 
come to our harbors to do the fighting, in our next war, 
and, when there, to choose his range and time of fighting, 
then speed is a matter of no consequence. But the men 
of the navy who can be trusted to force the fighting in 
time of battle are a unit in demanding ships that will .have 
power to reach the fighting line, and when there, will have 
guns to demonstrate the truth of the words of Farragut: 
"The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well- 
directed fire from our own guns." 



CHAPTER XV 
ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 

Brief consideration will show the vast importance to 
the nation of the victory on Lake Champlain, obtained on 
September 11, 1814. As already noted, Napoleon had 
fallen and the victories of the allied armies in Europe had 
released the British in overwhelming force for service in 
America. More than 18,000 men were concentrated in 
Canada, and 11,000 of these soldiers, with "a proportion- 
ate and most excellent train of artillery," were ordered 
to invade the United States by the way of Lake Champlain, 
the old Northern Gateway. 

The character of the men in this army is worth recall- 
ing. Said Wellington, who had commanded but failed to 
restrain them in Europe: "It is impossible to describe to 
you the irregularities and outrages committed by the 
troops. . . . There is not an outrage of any description 
that has not been committed on a people who have uni- 
formly received them as friends." And Napier in describ- 
ing the sacking of Badajos by these veterans says: "Shame- 
less rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and 
murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, 
imprecations, . . . resounded for two days and nights in 
the streets of Badajos." 

These veterans, who as Napier says, " shamed the most 
ferocious barbarians of antiquity," were come to subjugate 
the American people who had been driven to war by long 
years of oppression — an oppression made possible by the 
might of a great navy that was unopposed. Washington 

144 



ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 145 

had already been captured, and its prominent buildings, 
including the National Library, had been burned. The 
Chesapeake was open to the enemy. The territory of 
Maine as far as the Penobscot had been occupied by the 
British. Another great British army was on the way to 
New Orleans. The two invasions were planned to hold 
so much of the territory of the United States as had been 
occupied in the East, and to add the whole valley of the 
Mississippi in the West. Rarely has a battle been fought 
for so great a stake as that of Lake Champlain in the War 
of 1812. And yet as the British force, more than 11,000 
strong, advanced toward Lake Champlain, the American 
Secretary of War ordered the general in command at 
Plattsburg to take the major part of the troops there to 
Sacket Harbor for operations against Kingston, leaving 
1,500 "effectives" under Brigadier-General Alexander 
Macomb to meet the British hosts that were advancing 
under Sir George Prevost, 

In the meantime, however. Commander Thomas Mac- 
donough had been sent (1813) to the lake to create a 
naval force with which to defend the old route of the in- 
vader. He had built a fleet which, when ready for battle, 
included the ship-rigged corvette Saratoga of 734 tons, 
the brig Eagle of 500 tons (she was built in nineteen days), 
the schooner Ticonderoga of 350 tons and the sloop Preble 
of 80 tons. There were also ten gunboats that were of no 
great use in the battle, making a flotilla of 2,244 tons 
that carried eighty-six guns able to throw 1,194 pounds of 
shot at a broadside of which 480 were from long guns and 
714 from short. 

To meet this the British provided a frigate of more than 
1,200 tons, named the Con fiance, the brig Linnet of 350 
tons, the sloops Chubh and Finch of 112 and 110 tons 
respectively, besides twelve gunboats. In all there were 
sixteen vessels of 2,402 tons, throwing 1,192 pounds of shot 



146 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

at a broadside, of which 660 pounds were from long guns 
and 532 from short. The advantage from the long guns 
was very greatly increased by the fact that the frigate car- 
ried thirty long 24-pounders in the broadside and another 
on a pivot. She also carried six short guns that were 
either 32-pounder,s or 42-pounders. The long-gun broad- 
side of the British frigate was but ninety-six pounds short 
of the entire long-gun broadside of the entire American 
fleet, and this lack was exactly made up by the long-gun 
broadside of the British brig Linnet, that carried sixteen 
long 12-pounders. 

Even these figures do not adequately set forth the su- 
periority of the British fleet, for the superior broadside of 
the Confiance was a matter of the greatest importance be- 
cause the battle was fought at a range where the short 
guns were ineffective even if they could reach. When 
the British frigate and brig concentrated their fire on the 
Saratoga they were throwing 480 pounds of long-gun metal 
where the Saratoga could send but ninety-six in return. 
It was under those odds that Macdonough fought a con- 
siderable part of the battle, the Eagle and the Ticonderoga 
being kept busy by the smaller British vessels. 

This concentration of force is well understood in these 
modern days of battleships, and it was well enough under- 
stood by Captain George Downie to induce him to say 
that the Confiance was alone a match for the whole Ameri- 
can squadron. And so she should have been, if properly 
handled. 

Thomas Macdonough, when the British came to Lake 
Champlain, was thirty years old. The daring of youth 
was still in his heart, but it was "the intelligent fore- 
thought with which he provided for the chances of battle" 
that made him great. In the gorge where Lake Cham- 
plain lies the wind always comes from the north or the 
south. Macdonough saw that the British ships, being 




COMMODORE THOMAS MACDONOUGH. 

FROM A PAINTING BY GILBERT STUART, IN THE CENTURY CLUB, NEW YORK. 

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE OWNER, 

RODNEY MACDONOUGH, ESQ. 



ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 147 

square-rigged, could not beat up from the Sorel River 
against a wind from the south; they would have to come 
with a fair wind. 

With this fact in mind Macdonough placed his fleet in 
line from Crab Island northward into Plattsburg Bay. 
The Eagle was at the north end of the line and just within 
or west of the point of Cumberland Head. South of the 
Eagle and a hundred yards from her was the Saratoga, 
with the Ticonderoga next and the little sloop Preble last 
of all. The gunboats were scattered between the larger 
vessels, the smaller ones lying at the south end of the line 
and the larger at the north where the weight of the attack 
was expected. These vessels were lying with their heads 
to the north, for the wind was northerly, but each had 
springs (extra hawsers) leading from stern to cable in 
such a way that the broadside might be turned to and fro 
as occasion might demand. On the Saratoga Macdon- 
ough arranged anchors at bow and stern, with kedges off 
both bow and stern in such fashion that in case of need he 
could turn her clear around, regardless of sails or wind, 
and present a fresh battery to the enemy. 

On September 6 Sir George Prevost, with his Wel- 
lington " Invincibles," came to the Saranac River. The 
American army there had been increased by volunteers 
and militia, but it still numbered only about one-third as 
many as the British force; and it was at best but a scrub 
army against the veterans from Badajos. Without the 
navy to support them they would have been swept away 
like the leaves of the mountains before an Adirondack gale. 
But with Macdonough's ships in the offing Sir George sat 
down and waited five days for Captain Downie and the 
British fleet. 

Sunday, September 11, 1814, was a most beautiful day 
in the most delightful season of the Adirondack year. 
The warm sun was tempered by a north-east breeze that 



148 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

made mere existence a pleasure, and the forest-clad moun- 
tains were just beginning to show the colors of the 
autumn foliage. It was a day when the people of the 
region would naturally leave their homes to wander over 
the hills, and on this day, without exception, save the sick 
and their nurses, every non-combatant in all that region 
did go out to the hilltops. 

Never in the history of the region — not even in the days 
of Indian and Tory raids — was there a day of more in- 
tense anxiety than this beautiful Sabbath morning. For 
the northerly breeze was sure to bring the British fleet. 
While the sailors on the ships thought most of defending 
the "gridiron flag," the militia, crouching behind the forts 
and within the stone walls of the old mill on the banks of 
the river, knew they were to fight for their homes and their 
wives and daughters. "They well knew that the men 
they were to face were very brave in battle, and very cruel 
in victory. They feared not for themselves; but in the 
hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a dull 
terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved." 

Off the point of Cumberland Head lay a "Yankee" cut- 
ter, well manned, and with its bow pointed toward the 
"Yankee" flagship — a lookout waiting for the enemy. As 
eight o'clock drew nigh, the people on the hills saw its sea- 
men bend to their oars and drive it with signals flying into 
the bay. The enemy were coming. The long roll of the 
drums called to quarters on the anchored squadron, and 
then the white new sails of the British frigate appeared 
over the lower parts of Cumberland Head. 

Below the point of Cumberland Head the British fleet 
turned around to head to the north, and lay there, for a 
time, while Captain Downie examined the American line 
and sent orders to his own ships. Then he placed his 
ships in line abreast— side by side— and about as far apart 
as those under Macdonough, with the little sloop Chubb 



ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 149 

and the brig Linnet at the north side of the Confiance, and 
the sloop Finch and the twelve gunboats at the south. 
The Chvhh and the Linnet were to attack the Eagle, the 
Confiance was to lie athwart the bow of the Saratoga 
while the Finch and the gunboats were to turn the south 
end of the American line and as they did so dispose of the 
Preble and Ticonderoga. 

When everything was ready the British filled their sails, 
and with the wind abeam, or perhaps a little abaft the beam, 
they reached in — heading a little north of west, for the 
American line. 

As the enemy advanced, Macdonough, "who feared his 
foes not at all, and his God a great deal, knelt for a mo- 
ment with his officers on the quarter-deck." Thereafter 
the men of the American squadron awaited in perfect 
silence while the enemy came on, cheering in anticipation 
of victory, until a chance shot from the British brig Linnet 
came on board the Saratoga. A sailor on this ship "had 
obtained by hook or crook" a fighting cock of great repute 
in Plattsburg, and this shot knocked to pieces the coop in 
which the bird was confined. Undismayed, the rooster 
flew into the rigging, flapped its wings with tremendous 
vigor and then crowed loud and long. At that the crew 
of the Saratoga whooped, laughed, shouted and cheered. 
The rooster prepared them well for the fight. 

The Eagle fired the first gun, but it was while the enemy 
were yet out of range. Then Macdonough carefully 
aimed one of his long 24-pounders and fired it. The shot 
struck the Confiance in the bow and ranged aft along the 
main deck, killing and wounding several men. The Con- 
fiance at this was heading directly towards the broadside 
of the Saratoga. Then the other long guns in the Ameri- 
can fleet were brought into play, and in a short time Cap- 
tain Downie concluded to anchor where he would not be 
within the zone of any more guns. Captain Bring, com- 



150 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

manding the Linnet, said that Downie was unable to sail 
in further because of the failure of the wind, but the fact 
is that the Linnet, though further under the lee of Cumber- 
land Head, was able to sail on without material difficulty. 
Downie anchored at a range estimated by Macdonough 
at 300 yards and by Pring at 400 yards. He had seen that 
Macdonough had only four long 24-pounders in a broad- 
side, and knowing his own superiority in that respect he 
seems to have determined to take advantage of it, as it was 
his duty to do. Having laid his ship with her side toward 
the Saratoga, he had every gun carefully aimed, and then 
at 9 o'clock fired a broadside, every shot of which hit the 
hull of the American flagship. The blow shook her vio- 
lently and laid 100 men on deck, of whom forty were killed 
or badly wounded. Only a few more such broadsides 
were needed to sink the Saratoga, but Downie was so sure 
of his prey that he turned a number of the guns upon the 
Eagle, which had put the sloop Chubb out of the fight with 
a single broadside — had utterly disabled her so that she 
hauled down her flag. Turning on the Eagle was an error. 
Another error was a failure to note that at the first discharge 
of the broadside of the Confiance the shock of the recoil 
lowered the breech of every gun down the wedge support- 
ing it. The muzzle was elevated and the next round 
struck the upper part of the bulwarks of the Saratoga. 
On the American ships the guns were secured so that the 
recoil did not affect the aim. Of course the British gun- 
ners rectified their error in some cases, but only in a few. 

While the chief weight of the fighting was done at the 
north end of the line the British sloop Finch and the gun- 
boats swarmed in around the little Preble and soon drove 
her away, together with the gunboats that were supposed 
to support her. Then the Finch got under the broadside 
of the Ticonderoga and was so badly disabled that she 
drifted ashore on Crab Island, where she surrendered. 



ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 151 

The flight of the Preble was thus balanced, but in the mean- 
time the crews of the British gunboats had been gaining in 
confidence, and in spite of the distress of the Finch they 
made a most determined attack upon the Ticonderoga, 
not only firing their twelve long guns into her at short 
range but dashing in alongside, intending to carry her by 
boarding. 

By this time (10 o'clock) the combined guns of the 
Confiance and the Linnet had proved too much for the 
Eagle and she was obliged to make sail and reach down 
to a place just to the south of and behind the Saratoga, 
where she anchored once more and opened on the Con- 
fiance with a fresh battery. The entire battery of the 
Confiance was then turned upon the Saratoga, and the 
Linnet, having the Eagle no longer within range, also 
turned on the Saratoga, and for this purpose took a station 
whence she could rake the unfortunate American without 
receiving a shot in return. 

Macdonough had been firing deliberately and with pre- 
cision at the Confiance, but under the cross fire of the two 
ships of the enemy every gun on the fighting side of the 
Saratoga was disabled and she was set on fire by red-hot 
shot that the Confiance was fitted to use. It was when 
the guns of the Saratoga had been all disabled that the 
British gunboat crews dashed in against the Ticonderoga 
in their most determined effort to capture her. The 
supreme moment of the battle had come. 

With sword in hand Captain Cassin stormed to and fro 
along the taffrail of the Ticonderoga, directing his crew 
in the work that held the enemy's flotilla in check, while 
Macdonough called his men from their useless guns, slipped 
his anchor, manned the ropes that led to the kedges and, 
turning his ship around, brought the fresh battery to bear. 
Captain Downie had been killed, meantime, but as the 
Saratoga was wound around, the first lieutenant of the 



152 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Confiance tried to wind her in like fashion. But he had 
no kedges out and the wind had now died away entirely. 
He was able to swing her until she lay end on toward the 
Saratoga and there she hung, unable to bring a gun to 
bear while Macdonough's men raked her from end to 
end as if she were a target. No crew, for any length of 
time, could stand such a fire, and at about 11 o'clock the 
British flag was hauled down. The gunboats had already 
been driven from the Ticonderoga by the work of Captain 
Cassin. The guns of the Saratoga were therefore turned 
upon the Linnet and at 11:20 she, too, surrendered. 

As the battle was growing, the wind, as said, died down 
entirely, and the smoke of the guns arose in the still air 
until every ship was fogged from the view of the non-com- 
batants who had flocked to the hills. Thereafter they 
looked on in silent awe, hearing the thunderous reports of 
the guns, but seeing only the faint glow of the flames 
through the growing cloud until the time came when the 
last shot was fired. The silence that followed was harder 
to bear even than the sounds of battle, for none could tell 
how the fight had gone, and with bated breath they gazed 
while the smoke drifted from around the ships, revealing 
the tops of such spars as were yet standing. Then a wide- 
eyed patriot, standing on Cumberland Head, saw that the 
Stars and Stripes only floated in the smoke-laden air, and 
with a shout that was heard all over the hill proclaimed the 
news of the " Yankee " triumph. A hundred throats about 
him took up the cry. It was echoed by a thousand voices 
from the hills across the bay and beyond the lake. The 
troops down in the vaUey of the Saranac took up the shout 
with such savage cries as were not to be misunderstood. 
They had withstood the onslaught that had been made 
upon them by Weflington's " Invincibles," and victory was 
now assured to them. Sir George Prevost, the commander 
of the British army, also heard, and "with extreme morti- 



ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 153 

fication," too, the "shout of victory from the American 
works." To his mind the "farther prosecution of the ser- 
vice was become impracticable," and when night came on, 
thick and dark with an Adirondack storm, the British 
army fled. 

The British gunboats escaped; the British ships were 
captured. The Americans lost fifty-two killed and wound- 
ed. The number of lost on the British side was concealed. 
The Americans found 270 killed and wounded on the capt- 
ured ships. The British total loss was therefore certainly 
above 300. As showing the relative skill of the gunners it 
was found that the Saratoga had fifty-five shot holes in her 
hull and the British frigate 105. As Roosevelt .says: 
"Macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any 
other commander of the war. He had a decidedly superior 
force to- contend with ; and it was solely owing to his fore- 
sight and resource that he won the victory. His personal 
prowess had already been shown at the cost of the rovers 
of Tripoli, and in this action he helped to fight the guns as 
ably as the best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick eye, 
readiness of resource and indomitable pluck are beyond 
all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is the 
greatest figure in our naval history." 

The battle of Lake Champlain was fought at an oppor- 
tune time. The American Administration had been eager 
to make peace, commissioners had been sent to Europe 
for that purpose, and they had been instructed to "omit 
any stipulation on the subject of impressment," if they 
thought it necessary to do so in order to obtain peace. 
The whole attitude of the Administration was one of sup- 
plication for peace. The British naturally reached out 
to claim the territory they already occupied in Maine 
as well as land that they expected to occupy. But when 
the story of the battle of Lake Champlain reached Europe 
the British contention was dropped. The battle of Lake 



154 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Champlain preserved the integrity of the national do- 
main. 

To sum up the whole story of the war, one sees now that 
it proved to be worth its cost. Since the guns of the 
Constitution splintered the wooden walls of the Guerriere 
no American has ever flinched at the sight of a foreign 
warship — no Congressman has ever dared insult his people 
by asserting that "the idea of our meeting Great Britain 
on the ocean is too ludicrous to be repelled by serious argu- 
ment." Moreover, it was necessary that the theory of 
"peaceable coercion" should have full trial, that its ab- 
surdity, and the detestable ideal upon which it was based, 
might be fully exposed. We lost much, but we obtained 
peace with honor, and we did it in such fashion upon the 
sea as to compel all nations to respect the "gridiron flag," 
even through a civil war. 



CHAPTER XVI 

DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPS AND GUNS IN THE OLD 

NAVY 

After the War of 1812 the navy saw little real fighting 
until the Civil War. There was an expedition to the Med- 
iterranean on account of trouble with Algiers, but the pres- 
ence of the American fleet inclined the barbarian to peace 
after two of his warships had been captured. Then, while 
the Spanish-Americans were fighting for freedom from 
Spanish rule, the waters of the West Indies became in- 
fested with pirates. Fifteen small vessels, including one 
steamer called the Sea Gull, were added to the navy for 
use in hunting these pirates. It was most thankless work. 
Moreover, a fourth of all the men who were on the station 
at one time died of the yellow fever. It was not until 
1826, when the independence of the Spanish-Americans 
had been fully attained, that the trouble ended. As for 
the War with Mexico, the navy lost its only opportunity 
for real distinction when the commanding officer in the 
Gulf failed to attack and capture the castle at Vera Cruz. 
The most interesting feature of our naval history in the 
period between 1815 and 1861 is the story of the develop- 
ment of the ships and guns. 

The naval battles of the War of 1812 were fought be- 
tween ships of the sail, but a battle between a steamer and 
a fleet of blockaders was missed by only a narrow margin 
of time. The fact that the British with their preponder- 
ance of sea forces were able to blockade the Atlantic coast 

165 



156 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

of the United States at will, and the further fact that New 
York suffered continually, led to the building of the first 
steam warship in any navy. Late in 1813 Robert Fulton, 
who had, as early as 1807, demonstrated the commercial 
success of steam navigation in the merchant marine, pro- 
posed to build a steam warship, and Congress, on March 
9, 1814, authorized the construction of " one or more float- 
ing batteries," fit to "destroy any of the ships of the enemy 
that may approach the shores or enter the waters of the 
United States." 

Considering the state of the mechanical arts a very 
good battleship was built, for she had timber walls so 
thick that no gun could penetrate them; a single paddle 
wheel, concealed within the hull, drove her at five and 
one-half knots an hour, and she had a battery that was fit 
for a fight with a squadron. Fulton named her the 
Demologos, but she is known to the navy list as Fulton 
the First. 

Unhappily for the development of naval power this 
steamer was not completed in time to take any part in the 
war; and after having been kept as a receiving ship at the 
Brooklyn navy yard until July 4, 1829, she was destroyed 
by the explosion of her magazine. 

That no other steamers were built for the navy in the 
years immediately following the War of 1812 is explained 
in part by the conservatism of the naval men, and in part 
by the confidence in ships of the sail which the battles of 
that war had created among the people of the nation. 
The men of the navy loved their ships — particularly those 
that, like the Constitution, had done good service — with an 
affection that no landsman can comprehend. They asked 
for no higher opportunity for glory than to command one 
of them in a battle with an enemy. Accordingly, battle- 
ships of eighty guns or more and a few frigates were 
launched at intervals — three battleships were sent afloat 



SHIPS AND GUNS IN THE OLD NAVY 157 

in 1820, for instance, and as late as 1848 the old Vermont 
was added to the navy. 

The use that was made of the little 100-ton steamer 
Sea Gvll by Commodore Porter in the pirate war did not 
change the prevailing opinion in the matter of steamers, 
though Porter was one of the unusually progressive men 
who saw the advantages that steam would give to a fight- 
ing ship, and it was he that commanded the Fulton the 
First in her trial trips. 

However, in 1835 Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dick- 
erson observ'ed that an act of Congress in the year 1816, 
long forgotten by most men, authorized the construction 
of a steam warship, and he wrote to the Board of Naval 
Commissioners requesting them to begin work on such a 
vessel immediately. On May 18, 1837, the hull for this 
steamer was launched at the Brooklyn navy yard. Then 
engines that developed 625 horse-power and drove her at 
a sustained speed of twelve knots an hour were installed. 
WTien tested in a race with the British transatlantic steamer 
Great Western, the new warship won. This, properly 
speaking, was the first ship of the steam navy of the United 
States. That is to say, because of the success attained in 
her the naval list has contained steamers ever since. More- 
over, new classes of men were added to the personnel of 
the navy — the engineers and firemen. Captain INIatthew 
C. Perr}% a brother of the hero of Lake Erie, superintended 
the building of this ship, and he also hired, and arranged 
for the standing, of the engine-room force among the other 
officers and men of her crew. ]\Ir. Charles H. Haswell, of 
New York, was her chief engineer, and the first engineer 
of our steam navy. 

Then Congress, by the act of March 3, 1839, authorized 
"the construction of three steam vessels-of-war, on models 
that shall be most approved." The side-wheel steamers 
Mississippi and Missouri, sister ships, each displacing 



158 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

3,220 tons, were constructed under this act. They were 
completed in 1842. The Missouri was destroyed by an 
accidental fire at Gibraltar on August 26, 1843. The 
Mississippi had a long and brilliant career. She was the 
flagship of the naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico during 
the war with Mexico, and she was Captain M. C. Perry's 
flagship when he was negotiating his famous treaty with 
Japan. But, like the Missouri, she was at last destroyed 
by fire, though it was in battle — when with Farragut she 
was trying to pass the Confederate batteries at Port Hud- 
son, on the Mississippi River. 

In the meantime the screw propeller had begun to 
work as great a revolution in warships as steam was work- 
ing in the old methods of driving such vessels. John 
Ericsson had tried a screw-driven steamer on the Thames 
River, England, but the Lords of the Admiralty who saw it 
were convinced that even if a large ship could be driven by 
such a contrivance, the rudder would not steer her. Then 
Ericsson came to America, under the influence of Captain 
Robert F. Stockton, of the navy, and here the steam sloop- 
of-war Princeton, with a screw propeller instead of paddle 
wheels, and with her engines entirely below the water-line, 
was built after his plans. This was the first screw war- 
ship ever built, as the Fulton the First was the first steam 
warship. 

But while our navy thus led the way in the evolution 
of the modern ship nothing was done toward the evolution 
of a navy, properly speaking. The development of a per- 
sonnel for the coming steam navy — a matter of more im- 
portance than the building of ships — was apparently un- 
thought of. The Mexican war had no influence on the 
development of steam warships; for Mexico had no navy, 
and sailing ships with such few steamers as we had, and 
were able to improvise, served well enough. 

To Congress and the people the navy seemed to be of 



SHIPS AND GUNS IN THE OLD NAVY 159 

ample strength, and it was therefore neglected. In the 
meantime, however, the British Government was unceas- 
ingly reaching out for more possessions on the American 
Continent. The Mosquito Territory in Nicaragua was 
claimed as a part of British Honduras. The weakness of 
our navy made any assertion of the Monroe Doctrine ab- 
surd in European eyes. The discovery of gold in Cali- 
fornia, and the consequent enormous increase of trade and 
travel across the narrow parts of the Continent, developed 
a rivalry of interests in Central America to a degree that 
threatened war. San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua (called 
Greytown by the British), on the San Juan River, was oc- 
cupied by British forces. Tigre Island, in the Gulf of 
Fonseca, Honduras, a point that commanded the Pacific 
end of a proposed canal, was seized on the pretense that 
Honduras had refused to pay a debt. British warships 
were always found where needed to enforce British pre- 
tensions. 

Another source of trouble was found in the attempt of 
John F. T. Crampton, the British minister to the United 
States, to carry on recruiting for the British forces during 
the Crimean War. Crampton was assisted by British 
consuls in New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati. Al- 
though he was personally very popular among the American 
officials at Washington he showed a contempt for the laws 
of the United States that was characteristic of his class 
in former times, and the Secretary of State required him 
to leave the country. "The incident created much ex- 
citement in England," says Foster (" A Century of Ameri- 
can Diplomacy"), "and its press demanded the dismissal 
of the American minister at London." 

Moreover, during all the years following the War of 1812 
the British vn-iters who referred to the American people 
invariably did so in terms presumably chosen to keep alive 
international animosities. The fact that a historian like 



160 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

James, or a traveller like Dickens, or a hundred others, 
expressed prejudice, or even malice, v^as, of course, a 
matter of no consequence. But the plainly seen fact (it 
is not yet altogether lost to viev^^, unhappily) that books 
about Americans were popular v\^ith all British readers in 
the exact measure in which "Yankee" peculiarities were 
denounced or ridiculed, was serious because it showed a 
state of feeling among the people of Great Britain which, 
under the stimulation of some such incident as the Cramp- 
ton affair, might easily have led to war. 

The need of an American navy, able not only for harbor 
defence but for the protection of American interests at 
least as far away as the coasts of Nicaragua, was apparent. 

In consequence of this need Congress, by the act of 
April 6, 1854, provided for the construction, "at as early 
a day as practical," of " six first-class steam frigates, to be 
provided with screw propellers, and armed and equipped 
for service." There was an ominous sound in the last 
sentence quoted, for "service" meant "war." Later five 
steam sloops were ordered in much the same terms, and 
then, as the trouble was not settled, seven more steam 
sloops were provided for, "which ships shall combine the 
heaviest armament and greatest speed compatible with 
their character and tonnage." 

The discussions in Congress, particularly that in the 
Senate on March 3, 1856, show that these warships were 
ordered because war was impending, and that war im- 
pended because we did not have an adequate navy. 

The ships were built "at as early a day as practical," 
they were armed with the best guns in the world, and (when 
ready) they were the ablest fighting ships in the world. 
Because of the building of these most efiicient ships the 
war was avoided. 

Before describing these new frigates and sloops the story 
of the navy gun must be told. 



SHIPS AND GUNS IN THE OLD NAVY 161 

We fought the War of 1812 with ships that carried for 
their most effective guns a smooth-bore cannon with a bore 
between five and six inches in diameter, throwing a spher- 
ical cast-iron ball that weighed nominally twenty-four 
pounds. The use of a 24-pounder on a frigate was a dis- 
tinct advance in efficiency on the practice of the day. After 
the war we substituted 32-pounders — guns with a bore six 
inches, or a trifle more, in diameter — for the 24-pounders, 
and even our smallest sloops-of-war carried guns of this 
calibre. Ships-of-the-line were armed with 42-pounders, 
but these were not strikingly more efficient than the 32- 
pounders. 

In 1837 the French adopted a gun that threw a shell 
twenty-two centimetres (8.7 inches) in diameter in place 
of solid shot. Mortars throwing shells had been in use for 
many years, but these guns threw shells horizontally. The 
use of shell guns then spread to the British navy, and an 
eight-inch gun that weighed from fifty-three hundred- 
weight to sixty-five hundred-weight became very popular, 
while a ten-inch gun of eighty-two hundred-weight was 
introduced later. Following this European lead an eight- 
inch gun was introduced into the American navy in 1841, 
but the 32-pounder remained the chief reliance of our 
service even when, some time later, a ten-inch gun, on the 
British pattern, was made. Happily for the peace of the 
country these guns that were but imitations proved un- 
satisfactory, and experiments were made which led to real 
improvements during the years when the need of superior 
weapons for the preservation of peace became indisputably 
apparent. 

Beginning in 1841 Colonel George Bomford sought to 
determine the rending power of the powder in a cannon 
by boring holes through the metal at intervals from muzzle 
to breech and placing pistol balls in these holes as made. 
The force with which each pistol ball was expelled, when 



162 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the cannon was fired, was measured by half-inch boards 
secured within range of the ball. Having learned by this 
method and an improvement on it the force of the powder 
gases at many points in the bore, it was assumed that the 
thickness of the gun metal at that point should be in pro- 
portion to this power. But no guns were designed on that 
theory until 1850, when Lieutenant John A. Dahlgren sub- 
mitted plans (January 9) for one that was immediately 
cast. It had a calibre of nine inches. An eleven-inch gun 
was ordered on April 30, 1851. 

The 9-inch gun, made on this symmetrical model, used 
a solid shot weighing ninety pounds or a shell weighing 
seventy-four pounds, with a powder charge of thirteen 
pounds. The initial velocity of the shell was 1,320 feet per 
second and the muzzle energy was 847 foot-tons. The gun 
weighed 9,000 pounds. To this the carriage added 1,300 
pounds, and it was supposed by the conservative naval 
men of the world that 10,300 pounds was too great a weight 
for a gun's crew to handle. But it was found when the 
guns had been in use for a time that even the 11 -inch gun 
that weighed 16,000 pounds and fired a shot weighing 166 
pounds, and a shell of 136, was not too much for the 
strength of our naval men. 

A type of the frigates that were built during the days 
of impending trouble with England was the Merrimac. 
When completed (1856) she was sent, under Captain E. 
J. Pendergrast, over to England, and was examined by 
the naval officers at Southampton. They found her (as 
described by Sir Howard Douglas) a ship of 3,197 tons, 
"pierced for sixty guns," though carrying but forty. The 
forty included two 10-inch pivot guns, sixteen 8-inch shell 
guns of the old European pattern and twenty-four 9-inch 
Dahlgrens. The next year the Niagara, a much larger 
ship, appeared in the Thames, where " the beautiful lines 
of her dark hull showed to great vantage." She was fitted 



SHIPS AND GUNS IN THE OLD NAVY 163 

for a battery of twelve 11-inch Dahlgrens, and the British 
supposed these guns to have an effective range of 7,000 
yards. 

The type of the sloops built was the Hartford, a ship of 
1,990 tons, carrying twenty-two 9-inch Dahlgrens in her 
broadside batteries. 

In all four 40-gun frigates that looked as if pierced for 
sixty guns, and fourteen smaller ships that were also armed 
with the Dahlgren guns, were constructed between 1854 
and 1858. It was in the days when steam was considered 
an auxiliary power — they had full sail areas and could 
make from eight to twelve knots an hour only under steam. 

Great Britain had, during those days of trouble, many 
more armed ships by count than we had. Her naval list 
showed thirty-six screw liners rated from 70 to 131 guns, 
nineteen screw frigates, rated from twenty-five to fifty-one 
guns; forty-six sloops and corvettes, rated from four to 
twenty-two guns, and seventy-six paddle-wheel ships rated 
from one to twenty-eight guns. The whole naval list, how- 
ever, was armed chiefly with the 32-pounder. The best 
gun in the British navy fired a solid shot weighing only 
sixty-eight pounds. For work in the battle line those ships 
were only a little better than those used by Nelson fifty 
years earlier. 

As the Merrimac lay off Southampton she was seen to 
be the most efllicient fighting ship in the world. Because 
this fact was seen — because it was seen that we were pre- 
pared to make a good fight — we had 'peace. By preparing 
to repel the French aggressions at the end of the eighteenth 
century we escaped a war with France. By refusing to re- 
pel with force the British aggressions at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century we were at last driven into the War 
of 1812 with its indescribable sufferings and losses. By 
preparing, in the middle of the nineteenth century, to re- 
pel aggressions, we escaped a war. 



CHAPTER XVII 
IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 

While adequate preparation had saved the nation from 
two foreign wars and a lack of it had made the War of 1812 
inevitable, there was nothing in these experiences that 
could aid our statesmen when internal troubles precipi- 
tated the Civil War. It has been asserted that this war 
was definitely foreseen and provided for by certain South- 
ern leaders, and in proof of this assertion is quoted the fact 
that Secretary of War Floyd, a Southern man, ordered 
117,000 muskets sent from Northern arsenals to those in 
the South a short time before the States began to secede. 
The ships of the navy, it is also said, were deliberately 
scattered all over the world by Secretary of the Navy 
Isaac Toucey in order to weaken the power of the general 
government. 

A little examination of the facts, however, shows that 
the ships were not as badly scattered in 1860 as they had 
been in previous years. The home squadron consisted of 
twelve ships, which was a greater number than usual; in 
1851 there were but five in the home squadron. Further 
than that. Secretary of the Navy Toucey (he was a Con- 
necticut man) had for two years urged upon Congress the 
building of a squadron of seven sloops-of-war of a draught 
of fourteen feet, and Congress, by the act of February 21, 
1861, voted to build them. They were admirably adapted 
for service in the Southern waters, as was pointed out 
by various members of Congress, but several of the men 
of the South voted for the bill. Manifestly these men, 

164 



IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 165 

at least, were not in the secret, if there was a "con- 
spiracy." 

The transfer of the muskets has a more warHke look, 
but the order was issued on December 30, 1859, a long 
time before any one could tell how the elections were to go. 

As the States declared themselves independent they took 
possession of the national forts, guns, revenue cutters, coast 
survey vessels and other means of making war that hap- 
pened to be within their limits. The navy yard at Pen- 
sacola was seized on January 12, 1861, by Florida forces. 
The navy yard at Norfolk, with 2,000 cannon, an excel- 
lent dry dock and shops fitted for ship building as well as 
repairing, was captured by Virginians on April 20. Ten 
small coast survey vessels and revenue cutters were seized 
at various points. 

Having seceded as individuals the States met by dele- 
gates at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4, 1861, and 
united on March 1 1 under a " Constitution for the Provi- 
sional Government of the Confederate States of America." 
In the meantime, as the various States seceded, many of 
the naval oflBcers who had been appointed from those 
States resigned their commissions and went home. As a 
rule they were then taken into the service of their States. 
It appears that out of 1,563 officers of various grades in 
the navy there were 671 from Southern States. Of these 
322 followed their States and the others remained faithful 
to the old flag. 

When Mr. Jefferson Davis was inaugurated President of 
the new Confederacy a number of the naval officers who 
had resigned reported to him for service, among others 
Commander Raphael Semmes. On February 21 Davis 
sent Semmes to the North "to gather together with as 
much haste as possible such persons and material of war 
as might be of most pressing necessity." ("Memoirs of 
Service Afloat.") Guns, ammunition and machines for 



166 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

making both, were purchased, and some men to work the 
machines were employed. It was an important mission, 
but the letter of instructions to this naval commander did 
not say a word about the purchase of ships for war pur- 
poses. 

The Confederate Navy Department was established on 
February 21, and S. R. Mallory, formerly a Senator from 
Florida, was made Secretary, but it was not until March 
15 that the Confederate Congress authorized their Presi- 
dent "to buy or build ten steam gunboats for coast de- 
fences." They were faithful to the true Jeffersonian ideas 
of warfare. They determined to prepare for "coast de- 
fences" and thus invited the Union forces to carry on the 
war in Southern waters. 

Even the providing of gunboats was not pushed; on the 
contrary, officers from the old navy were sent into the 
Confederate army. A company of Confederate ma- 
rines was ordered from Pensacola to the army in Virginia, 
and General Bragg, commanding the Confederate forces 
at Pensacola, who had managed to fit out a couple of 
armed vessels, appealed repeatedly but in vain for officers 
to take charge of them. 

There is, of course, only one substantial reason for lay- 
ing stress upon these minor facts, and that is to portray 
the attitude of the Confederate leaders towards a naval 
force. 

At the North Mr. Gideon Welles became the Secretary 
of the Navy in the cabinet of President Lincoln, and Mr. 
Gustavus V. Fox, who had served fourteen years in the 
navy, was made Assistant-Secretary of the Navy. The 
technical knowledge of Mr. Fox was used to the greatest 
advantage by Mr. Welles, and that was a fortunate thing 
for the Union cause since the national navy was at first in 
no condition for an aggressive war. The law provided 
for 7,600 enlisted men in the navy, but on March 10, 1861, 



IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 167 

only 210 of them were to be found in the ports of the At- 
lantic. The list of officers was heavy with old men, the 
commanders ranging up to sixty years of age. 

Out of ninety vessels on the naval list fifty were ships 
of the sail, of which some were yet on the stocks. Two 
of the forty steamers were also on the stocks, two were 
tugs and one was on Lake Erie. Several of the others 
were nearly useless for want of repairs. In all there were 
twenty-four serviceable steamers, of which seven were in 
the home squadron. Of the seven, however, only three 
were in northern ports and at the immediate command 
of Secretary Welles. 

It is obvious, however, that while the national navy 
was inadequate for any kind of a war, the Federal admin- 
istration was much better off than the Confederate with 
its ten small revenue and coast survey vessels. And that 
is to note only a small part of the Union naval predomi- 
nance, for the Confederates had no merchant fleet from 
which to improvise cruisers, nor had they any shops fitted 
to provide a warship with machinery or other necessary 
outfit. The North had many shops and many men skilled 
in the work of shipbuilding, besides a considerable number 
of merchantmen that could be utilized for some purposes 
of war. Moreover, the New England coast could furnish 
hosts of able seamen, while the South had scarcely a man 
of the kind. 

The war began when the Confederates attacked Fort 
Sumter on April 12. The first aggressive naval work of 
the Federal Administration was laid out when on April 19 
and 27 proclamations were issued blockading the Con- 
federate ports. 

The Confederate coast had, all told, 185 harbor and 
river openings. In fine weather, goods could be landed 
from shoal-draught ships at almost any point on the entire 
coast, and many cargoes were landed during the war 



168 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

where no harbor existed. The continental Hne from Alex- 
andria, Va., to Matamoras, Mexico, was 3,549 miles long. 
The shore line, including bays and sounds, was 6,789 miles 
long, and the entire beach line, including islands, was 
11,953 miles long. 

The principal Confederate ports on the Atlantic were 
Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah; on the gulf, 
Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston. But 
while these were the points to be most carefully guarded 
the whole line of beaches had to be watched. 

This work was begun with three steamers and sixteen 
ships of the sail. In due time 600 armed ships were em- 
ployed alongshore and there were many steam cruisers 
on the high seas intercepting the ships that were carrying 
supplies to Confederate ports. 

Naturally, from closing a harbor by stationing ships at 
its entrance, the national navy was next employed in taking 
possession of such ports as could be secured. But before 
describing any of this aggressive work a review of that done 
by the blockaders and the blockade runners must be given. 

As all know, cotton was the chief product of the South. 
The marketed crop of 1860 was estimated at 5,200,754 
bales, of which 750,000 remained in the cotton States in 
the spring of 1861. The crop of 1861 was 2,750,000 bales, 
and that of 1862 was 1,000,000. The reduction was due 
to the exigencies of war — chiefly to the loss of market 
through the blockade. " The quantity actually sent abroad 
up to July or August, 1862, was reckoned not to exceed 
50,000 bales," says Bernard's "Neutrality of Great Brit- 
ain," an English authority issued in 1870. A* million 
bales had been burned by the owners, meantime, to keep 
it out of the hands of the Federal forces. A cotton famine 
had been created in England. Actual starvation came 
upon the working people, and a half million of them were 
supported by charity. The Confederate leaders had hoped 



IN THE BEGINNINGt OF THE CIVIL WAR 169 

that this famine would drive the British to intervention, 
but the fact is (and it is an important fact as showing the 
influence of naval power), the very efficiency of the block- 
ade was a warning to foreigners to keep their hands off. 

Because little cotton was going to market the price in- 
creased. It was twenty-six cents a pound in May, 1862, 
and in September it had increased to sixty in gold. In the 
Confederate States it could be bought for eight. Thus 
a bale (500 pounds at this time) costing $40 could be sold 
for $300, if it were transported through the blockade to 
market. 

At the same time the stocks of certain goods had been 
exhausted in the South. Clothing, especially the finer 
sort, luxuries, such as wines, spices and salt, were scarce or 
unobtainable. The demand for military supplies was 
urgent. The prices the Confederates would pay for goods 
brought in afforded nearly as much profit on imported 
cargoes as could be obtained on cotton carried out. 

Where such profits as these were offered, traders flocked 
in, regardless of the risks. The blockade runners were 
nearly all English. At first, goods were sent to the Ber- 
mudas, the Bahamas, or to Havana, in order that they 
might be safe that far on their journey. Nassau, a village 
of wreckers, suddenly grew into a commercial emporium 
that was ruled by men whose instincts accorded well with 
those of the natives. When the United States courts held 
that the ultimate destination of cargoes determined their 
character, the goods were nominally sold to merchants in 
the ports mentioned. Men on barren coral reefs began 
importing ship-loads of military supplies, if one could be- 
lieve the papers on ships trading to the Atlantic reefs. 
Of course the papers were made as a blind ; every blockade 
runner found perjury easy. Big merchantmen carried the 
cargoes to the reefs whence swift little runners took the 
goods to the Confederate ports. When the court declared 



170 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the unity of the voyage in spite of the ostensible sale of 
goods to Nassau merchants, the goods were shipped to 
New York and forwarded thence to Nassau. This balked 
the courts, but the customs officials soon refused to clear 
out vessels with such goods to such ports. Thereafter 
the goods were sent direct to Nassau in vessels that took 
chances of eluding the cruisers. 

Meantime, it had been noted that the use of soft coal 
on the blockade runners often made a smoke that betrayed 
them to the cruisers. To avoid this smoke hard coal was 
purchased in the North until the export of it was pro- 
hibited. 

After New Orleans and Pensacola came into the Federal 
possession the blockade breakers established houses in 
those ports and did a smuggling business thence to agents 
in the Confederacy. 

Lest the reader think that the moral character of the 
blockade breaker has been too harshly described, the story 
which Thomas E. Taylor tells, in his "Running the 
Blockade," about his sale of the Will-o'-the-Wisp may be 
given. He says (p. 110): 

As I found her a constant source of delay and expenditure I de- 
cided to sell her. After having cobbled her up with plenty of putty 
and paint, I was fortunate enough to open negotiations with some 
Jews with a view to her purchase. . . . We arranged a trial trip, 
and after a very sumptuous lunch I proceeded to run her over a 
measured mile for the benefit of the would-be purchasers. I need 
scarcely mention that we subjected her machinery to the utmost strain, 
bottling up steam to a pressure of which our present Board of Trade, 
with its motherly care for our lives, would express strong disap- 
proval. The log line was whisked merrily over the stern of the 
Will-o'-the-Wisp with the satisfactory result that she logged 17^ 
knots. The Jews were delighted, so was I; and the bargain was 
clinched. I fear, however, that their joy was short-lived. 

It must be remembered, in connection with the blockade 



IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 171 

runners, however, that some of them were Confederate 
citizens who engaged in the business for the good of their 
cause as well as for profit, and that the pilots were usually 
running risks for principle. 

The captain of a blockade runner commonly received 
$5,000 for a round trip, the mate and the engineer $1,000 
each, while the deck hand got $40. The Banshee, a noted 
runner, received $250 per ton freight in her first voyage. 
Taylor says he was allowed to carry a private venture 
which usually added some thousands to his gains. 

Old, inexpensive vessels were used for running the block- 
ade in the early days of the war, in order to reduce losses 
in case of capture, but as the conditions prevailing on the 
coast became known the business was systematized, and 
steamers of the lightest frames and most powerful engines 
were built for the trade. These were loaded to the last 
gasp and then set toward the Confederate port. Every 
sail and every trail of smoke seen on the horizon was 
avoided when possible and the runner was so handled that 
she arrived off her destined port at night. The lone light 
always displayed on the flagship of the blockading squad- 
ron was as good as a lighthouse to the enterprising skipper 
and the runner was driven through the line or around its 
end as seemed most convenient. Sometimes a dash was 
made through the blockading lines in broad daylight. 

Apparently the first steamer built for the trade was the 
Nicolai I, that was captured by the blockading squadron 
off Little River Inlet, N. C, on March 21, 1863. 

No exact account of the blockade runners and their 
voyages was ever kept or made, but reports from various 
authentic sources give a very good idea of the extent of 
the business that was carried on in this way, as well as of 
the character of the goods run in. Fraser, Trenholm & 
Co., of Liverpool, according to a letter written by a member 
of the firm, and printed in "Neutrality of Great Britain," 



172 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

had kept seven steamers plying regularly between Nassau 
and Confederate ports, chiefly Charleston, for more than a 
year previous to July 3, 1863. In all thirty-two round 
voyages had been made by these runners and they had 
carried out 21,000 bales of cotton. One of the fleet, the 
Margaret and Jessie, had made five voyages in five months, 
carrying out 3,714 bales of cotton and bringing in full 
loads of goods. This runner was captured on November 
5, 1863, but it is said she had made fifteen voyages before 
she was taken. These seven steamers were really Con- 
federate transports, for the Confederate Government used 
two-thirds of the space each way, but they were registered 
as private British ships. 

Between April 1 and July 6, 1863, fifty runners cleared 
out from Havana, but there is no record to show how many 
made a good voyage. 

Matamoras, Mexico, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, 
enjoyed a great trade on account of its location. It was 
a long and expensive route, but the trade was large. 

The following from the Richmond Despatch, January 
3, 1865, gives an idea of the extent of which goods were im- 
ported on the Atlantic coast, late in the war, and the char- 
acter of the goods as well : 

The special report of the Secretary of the Treasury in relation to 
the matter shows that there have been imported into the Confederacy 
at the ports of Charleston and Wilmington, since October 26, 1864, 
8,632,000 pounds of meat, 1,507,000 pounds of lead, 1,933,000 pounds 
of saltpetre, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of blankets, 520,000 
pounds of coffee, 69,000 rifles, 97 packages of revolvers, 2,639 pack- 
ages of medicine, 43 cannon, with a large quantity of other articles. 
The shipments of cotton on Government account since March 1, 
1864, amount to $5,296,000 in specie. Of this, cotton to the value 
of $1,500,000 has been shipped since the first of July and up to 
December 1. 

The fact that millions of pounds of meat were imported 



IN THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 173 

was most significant. The Confederacy was starving to 
death, and yet the fight was continued. 

By taking advantage of stormy nights the runners built 
for the purpose were able to make many voyages, and 
individual adventurers were enriched. Nevertheless, in 
view of the fact that it was only in such special boats and 
under exceptional circumstances that the guarding ves- 
sels could be passed, it is unnecessary to argue that the 
blockade was the most eflficient that had ever been set 
before hostile ports. Every story told by the runners in the 
years after the war proves the eflBciency of the work done. 

Of the blockade as seen from the national ships it may 
be said that to lie, month after month, doing nothing but 
keep a bright lookout was trying to the soul. Food spoiled. 
The water was never fresh. The heat of the stoke-hole 
varied from 110° to 150°. Many vessels were built by con- 
tractors who were thieves at heart, and were constantly 
out of repair. The opportunities to incur disgrace through 
the escape of a runner were abundant; the opportunities to 
win renown were almost wholly lacking. 

Withal, the blockade was dangerous work. The thievish 
contractors built vessels that were liable to drown all 
hands, or to scald all the stoke-hole force with steam from 
defective boilers. Because the runners were swift vessels 
and sly, the blockaders found it necessary to anchor close 
in on the bars of the various ports, and steam in among 
shoals that were constantly shifting. They rode out gales 
where no sane merchant captain would have dared to 
anchor in the days before the war, and they chased run- 
ners bound in until the guns of the Confederate forts were 
within half range. It is impossible to do justice to the 
men who served faithfully on the blockade. 

The runners captured and sent in numbered 1,149, in 
addition to which 355 were destroyed in various ways, 
thus 1,504 runners were put out of commission. Of those 



174 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

captured fifty sold for more than $100,000 after condem- 
nation, sixteen brought more than S300,000 and two more 
than $500,000. The total sum brought by the sale of 
captured runners was more than $31,000,000. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
AT CAPE HATTERAS AND PORT ROYAL 

The expedition to capture the forts the Confederates 
had erected at Hatteras Inlet was the first important work 
in which the navy was engaged. It was organized by 
Flag-Officer S. H. Stringham, the senior officer of the 
North Atlantic blockading squadron. 

The use of the appellation "flag-officer" was a curious 
indication of the attitude of Congress toward the navy 
in those days. Our legislators thought it would never do 
to give the chief officer of a squadron the actual rank of 
commodore or of admiral; that would be following too 
closely the aristocratic tendencies of monarchical Europe. 
So it was enacted (Act of December 21, 1861) that the 
senior captain should be called "flag-officer." 

Flag-Officer Stringham's fleet consisted of the steamers 
Minnesota, Captain G. J. Van Brunt; Wabash, Captain 
Samuel Mercer; Monticello, Commander J. P. Gillis, and 
Pawnee, Commander S. C. Rowan, with the revenue cutter 
Harriet Lane, Captain John Faunce, R.M., and a number 
of transports carrying 860 soldiers under Major-General 
B. F. Butler. For landing these soldiers through the surf 
the life-saving stations previously established on Long 
Island and New Jersey coasts were stripped of their life- 
boats. 

The expedition reached the inlet on August 27, 1861, 
and during the next two days the Confederates were shelled 
out of the forts, which were under the command of Flag- 
OflBcer Samuel Barron (the Confederates had adopted 

175 



176 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

this title also), of the Confederate navy. The total number 
of men carried as prisoners to New York was 678. The 
Confederates reported " two killed and twenty-five or thirty 
wounded," part of the latter escaping to a flotilla of small 
boats that were lying in the sound. There were no losses 
on the ships; the garrisons were composed of untrained 
men. 

The capture of these forts was the first victory obtained 
by the Union forces in the course of the war, and it was a 
matter of no small importance for the reason that the Union 
army had been disastrously defeated at Bull Run, Va., 
on July 21. Another view of the importance of this 
victory is found in the fact that, within two months pre- 
ceding it, the Confederates had sent sixteen prizes, taken 
by their cruisers and privateers, through the inlet to a safe 
port. Of course the inlet was now definitely closed for 
such uses. Further than that it was a permanent advance 
in the recovery of seceded territory. 

To follow up the success attained at the inlet a shoal- 
draught fleet was sent into the North Carolina sounds. 

Flag-Ofiicer L. M. Goldsborough took command of the 
naval end of the expedition at Hatteras Inlet on January 
13, 1862. General A. E. Burnside was in command of 
the 12,000 soldiers that accompanied the expedition. 
On February 7 the Union forces arrived in the sound be- 
tween Roanoke Island and the mainland, and found the 
Confederates awaiting them. Three forts had been built 
on the island from Pork Point to Weir's. The guns num- 
bered eight, four and twelve respectively. To prevent 
the Union fleet passing to the north of the island a pile 
barrier had been made from Red Stone Point, almost to 
Pork Point, and this was strengthened by sunken hulks. 
The engineering works of defence were well made; the 
guns had only twenty-eight rounds of powder each, while 
the soldiers on the island were inadequate in number. 



AT CAPE HATTERAS AND PORT ROYAL 177 

The Confederate flotilla consisted of eight steamers, of 
which two were of the usual light inland side-wheel class 
and the others were tugs built for use in the canal. There 
was also a schooner. Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch command- 
ed the flotilla. The vessels carried two or three guns each, 
most of them small. Goldsborough had nineteen vessels, 
all small, but well armed. The Confederate supply of 
ammunition afloat was almost as scanty as was that on 
shore. The sailors on the Confederate fleet were nearly 
all foreigners, recruited from the prizes mentioned above. 
Captain W. H. Parker, who commanded the Beaufort, 
says he had but one American on her. 

On February 7 Burnside began landing his soldiers at 
Ashby's Harbor on Roanoke Island, and at 11:30 o'clock, 
or thereabouts, the Union fleet opened on the Confederate 
fleet and forts. The firing was continuous and rapid on 
the Union side, interrupted and slow on the Confederate, 
and on both sides wretched in aim. After three hours' 
work one Union gunner got the range — presumably, though 
it may have been an accident— and sank the Curlew, the 
largest of the Confederate steamers, with a single shot. 
At the same moment the Union steamer Hetzel was "struck 
below water" and had to "haul off and repair." The 
wooden buildings in the fort on Pork Point were set on 
fire at about the same time. 

Toward night the Confederate vessels made a brave 
dash to shorten the range, but they were driven back, and 
then, when they were covered by the darkness, they steamed 
away to Elizabeth City, hoping to replenish their ammu- 
nition. 

Next day (February 8) Burnside made a successful 
attack on the Confederate soldiers on the island and the 
forts were evacuated. Leaving Burnside in possession 
of Roanoke, Goldsborough pushed on to Elizabeth City 
with his fleet, and on the 10th captured one of the Confed- 



178 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

erate vessels and destroyed or caused to be destroyed four 
of the others. Three escaped to Norfolk. As a result of 
the expedition the Union forces gained complete control 
of the sounds, and were able to threaten Norfolk from 
the rear. 

The Port Royal expedition followed that to Cape Hat- 
teras. It was seen early in the fall of 1861 that the vessels 
on blockade duty off the Altantic coast, south of Hatteras, 
were in need of a quiet rendezvous where they could make 
repairs and take on coal. The success at Hatteras de- 
termined the Union Navy Department to secure Port 
Royal Sound, South Carolina. Flag-Officer S. F. Du 
Pont was ordered to lead the naval expedition and General 
T. W. Sherman was placed in command of 12,000 soldiers 
to hold the territory to be seized. The expedition sailed 
from Hampton Roads on October 29, 1861, and the anch- 
orage off Port Royal Sound was reached on November 4. 
The channel was buoyed the same day, and during the 
next the fleet anchored within the shoals. Four gun- 
boats were then sent in to draw the fire of the forts in order 
to see how they were armed. 

Perhaps it ought to be pointed out here that the use of 
these steam gunboats for aggressive war within the shoal 
waters of the Confederate coast was a very different matter 
from building big rowboats to compel the British to do 
the country justice in the days before the War of 1812. 
For while the Union gunboats were small (usually about 
500 tons), and were armed with one 11-inch gun and a 
smaller one, much on the Jeffersonian plan, they were 
not only fit for aggressive war but they were the largest 
vessels that could be sent into the waters for which they 
were designed. 

By sending in the four gunboats it was learned that the 
Confederates had a large earthwork (Fort Walker) on 
Hilton Head, on the south side of the channel, in which 



AT CAPE HATTERAS AND PORT ROYAL 179 

were mounted twenty-three guns. A smaller fort stood 
near with one gun in it. Fort Walker faced the channel 
and was, naturally, built to resist assault from the side of 
the sea. On the north side of the channel, two and five- 
eighth miles away, was Fort Beauregard, with twenty guns, 
while a smaller fort of five guns stood near it. Nearly all 
the guns in the forts were 32-povmders, but there were three 
or four of larger and more effective calibre, and there 
were two British siege guns that were marked with the 
Queen's broad arrow. Brigadier-General Thomas F. 
Drayton, commanding, reported that he had 255 men in 
Fort Walker and a total of 622 on Hilton Head Island. 
On the other side of the sound he had 640 all told, with 
149 in Fort Beauregard. 

As a further defence of the sound the Confederates had 
a flotilla of five steamers under Flag-Oflicer Josiah Tatt- 
nall. As a midshipman Tattnall had led in the American 
dash at the British flotilla that tried to take Craney Island 
by storm, during the War of 1812. In the war with Mex- 
ico he went under the wall of the castle at Vera Cruz and 
remained under the fire until he was dragged out, so to 
speak, by an oflficer sent after him. It was he that went 
to the rescue of a British ship in Chinese waters during the 
opium war, using the celebrated expression "Blood is 
thicker than water." He was one of the ablest fighters 
of the old navy. But now he was in command of mer- 
chant steamers built for inland water navigation and car- 
rying their powder as well as their boilers unprotected 
above the water line. 

There is nothing in the documents to show that Du 
Pont gave much heed to the Confederate flotilla. For 
the attack on Fort Walker he selected the frigates Wabash 
(flag). Commander C. P. R. Rodgers, and Susquehanna, 
Captain J. L. Lardner; the sloops Mohican, Commander 
S. W. Godon; Seminole, Commander J. R. Gillis, and 



180 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Pawnee, Lieutenant-Commander R. H. Wyman; the gun- 
boats Unadilla, Lieutenant-Commander N. Collins; Ot- 
tawa, Lieutenant-Commander T. H. Stevens, and Pem- 
bina, Lieutenant-Commander J. P. Bankhead, with the 
sailing sloop Vandalia, Commander F. S. Hagerty, in tow 
of a tug. This was the main battle line. A second line 
that was ordered to form on the northerly or Fort Beaure- 
gard side of the main line was composed of the gunboats 
Bienville, Commander Charles Steedman; Seneca, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Daniel Ammen; Curlew, Lieutenant- 
Commander P. G. Watmough; Penguin-, Lieutenant- 
Commander T. A. Budd, and Augusta, Commander 
E. S. Parrott. These were to give especial, if long-ranged, 
attention to Fort Beauregard. 

With a flood tide on the morning of November 7, 1861, 
Du Pont formed his lines and headed into the sound. 
Fort Walker opened fire at 9:26 o'clock. Beauregard 
followed instantly and Tattnall's flotilla joined in. But 
with the Wabash leading, the Union ships steamed ahead 
and returned the fire steadily until they were so far up 
the sound that their guns would no longer bear on either 
fort. Then the ships turned around. They had passed 
up at a range of 800 yards from Fort Walker, they returned 
within 600 yards and they now found thfeir fire unob- 
structed by traverses in the fort. The Confederates 
had not prepared to resist an attack from the upper or 
northern side. 

After steaming once over the route he had laid out in 
front of Fort Walker a second time, Du Pont started up 
for a third round; but while his ships were yet before the 
fort, at 1:15 o'clock, the Confederates abandoned their 
guns. The untrained garrison had supposed their guns 
would sink any ship that tried to pass them, but so far as 
they could see (and as a matter of fact, too) they had been 
able to do no material damage to any one of the fleet, 



AT CAPE HATTERAS AND PORT ROYAL 181 

The ships, however, were dismounting the guns of the fort 
and killing some of the garrison at every round, therefore 
the garrison would not face a third enfilading fire. Com- 
mander C. R. P. Rodgers hoisted the Stars and Stripes 
over Fort Walker at 2:20 o'clock. Fort Beauregard was 
abandoned at about the same time and the Union forces 
took possession next morning. 

The fleet lost only eight killed and twenty-three wounded. 
Fort Walker lost ten killed and twenty wounded, and the 
entire loss in and around both Fort Walker and Fort 
Beauregard was but fifty-nine. 

One incident of the battle received much attention 
among naval men in later days. After the attack was be- 
gun the steamer Pocahontas came in from a station on 
blockade and joined in the attack. She was commanded 
by Commander Percival Drayton, a brother of the com- 
mander of the Confederate forces, and she did effective 
work in enfilading Fort Walker. 

Having secured control of Port Royal Sound the Union 
gunboats ranged through the waters of the coast from 
Stone Inlet to Fernandina, Florida. St. Augustine was 
also occupied. Many harbors were thus closed against 
blockade runners at the same time that a convenient place 
of resort was provided for the permanent use of the Union 
ships along the Southern coast. 



CHAPTER XIX 
THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 

The usual attitude of the Confederate authorities 
towards a navy during the days when their Government 
was first organized having already been described, it shall 
now be told how for a brief time the idea of using a naval 
force was exceedingly popular not only in the Confederate 
seat of government but throughout the whole Confeder- 
acy. This change of feeling was, perhaps, almost en- 
tirely due to the efficiency of the blockade as established 
by the Union forces at the mouth of the James and Eliz- 
abeth rivers that had furnished a waterway from Rich- 
mond and Norfolk to Hampton Roads. To raise the 
blockade at this point and thus secure an open way from 
the Confederate capital to the sea. Commander John M. 
Brooke, one of the most efficient officers that had left the 
old navy, suggested to the Secretary of the Confederate 
navy that a steam ironclad battery be constructed. 

The idea of using such a battery was not new. Congress, 
by the act approved April 14, 1842, had contracted with 
Robert L. Stevens, of Hoboken, N. J., to build "a war 
steamer, shot and shell proof." This contract was never 
completed, but Stevens proved definitely that the task 
could be done. In the Crimean War ironclad batteries 
were used with good results, and within two years before 
our Civil War, France had built the ironclad ship Gloire 
while England had put afloat a more powerful ship called 
the Warrior. 

Secretary Mallory adopted Brooke's suggestion, and in 

182 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 183 

spite of the lack of mills and forges in the Confederacy, 
he directed (June 10, 1861) Brooke to prepare the plans. 
Chief Engineer W. P. Williamson and Naval Constructor 
John L. Porter were ordered to assist Brooke. While the 
three were thus engaged Secretary Mallory ordered them 
to consider also plans for rebuilding the steam frigate 
Merrimac that had heen burned when the Union forces 
abandoned Norfolk. Thereupon the three decided to 
use what remained of the Merrimac in the construction 
of the proposed ironclad battery. The fact that her ma- 
chinery, although it had been condemned, was yet in 
place in the sunken, half-burned hull, and could be re- 
paired was the chief inducement for utilizing the old 
Merrimac. 

On placing the hulk in the drydock the old berth deck 
became the gun deck. Beginning about fifty feet from each 
end of this deck a casement, shaped much like the roof of 
a country house, was erected over it. The walls were 
slanted at an angle of thirty-six degrees, they were built 
two feet thick of solid timbers and they were covered over 
with two layers of two-inch iron plates, well bolted on. 
The ends of the casemate were rounded and the guns at 
the ends were mounted so that they could also be fired in 
broadside. Wlien the work was done enough ballast was 
taken on to submerge the uncovered ends of the deck and 
the eaves of the casemate. The bow of the ship was armed 
with a V-shaped casting to serve as a ram. The pivot 
guns at the ends of the casemate were 7-inch rifles designed 
by Commander Brooke — in shape something like the 
Dahlgrens, but well strengthened at the breech with 
wrought-iron bands. In the broadside were two 6.4-inch 
rifles and six 9-inch Dahlgrens. The rebuilt ship was re- 
named Virginia. 

The work on this ironclad was pushed with growing 
vigor, and when Commander Brooke had tested a target 



184 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

covered with the plates and found it proof against the shot 
of the best Dahlgren guns the enthusiasm of the people 
of the South was roused to a degree never reached either 
before or later in the war. Of course the people came to 
believe that their ship was far more formidable than the 
facts warranted, but that only increases the historical im- 
portance of their enthusiasm. For while the ironclad idea 
was popular a number of other ships of the kind were 
planned, and they were ships that lacked but little of show- 
ing an efficiency fatal to the hopes of those who wished to 
preserve the Union. Moreover, this enthusiasm is inter- 
esting because of the reaction that followed. 

Ironclads were first considered at the Navy Department 
at Washington in May, 1861. The gray-haired officers 
necessarily (it would seem) opposed any such innova- 
tion, just as similar officers at the present writing (1907) 
oppose the use of steam turbines, and the matter was left 
over for the consideration of Congress, which did not meet 
until July 5. Congress was full of the idea that the Navy 
Department had already spent more money for ships than 
the war would ever demand, but on August 3 an appro- 
priation was made. Two months after the Confederates 
had begun work a board of Union naval officers was ap- 
pointed to consider a number of plans that had already 
been submitted to the Navy Department by inventors, 
not one of whom was a naval officer. The officers of the old 
navy did not invent — they were not encouraged to do so. 

Of these plans three were accepted, but the one that 
was submitted by John Ericsson, of New York City 
(he who had introduced the use of the screw for driving 
warships), is alone worth notice here. This ship was the 
famous Monitor. 

No sailor could have invented the Monitor. Her hull 
was composed of two parts. Underneath all was a scow 
in shape something like a lengthwise cut from a long water- 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 185 

melon. It was 124 feet long, 34 wide and 6 deep. On top 
of this he laid a great box, wedge-shaped at each end, and 
172 feet long, 41 wide and 5 deep. A single row of rivets 
united the two. This superstructure projected 3 feet 8. 
inches beyond the sides of the lower hull and 24 feet be- 
yond each end. The combination was like a raft on a 
canoe. A revolving turret 9 feet high and 20 feet in diam- 
eter, inside measurements, was placed on the centre of the 
deck, and it revolved on a spindle turned by steam-engines. 
Two 11-inch Dahlgrens were mounted, side by side, in the 
turret and fired through ports cut in the wall, which was 
composed of eight 1-inch iron plates. The commission 
expressed the opinion that she did not have the properties 
which "a sea-going vessel should possess," and that opin- 
ion has been fully sustained, but she was devised on a plan 
that would " render the battery shot and shell proof," and 
a contract was made for a trial vessel. It should be said 
that the revolving armored turret had been invented by 
Theodore R. Timby in 1841, but it was Ericsson who first 
made a practical application of the device. 

The hull of this strange ship floated only a few inches 
above smooth water, and in rough seas the waves flooded 
across it unimpeded save by the turret and other elevated 
structures. These structures included a pilot house (built 
log-house fashion of iron bars 9x12 inches in size) and the 
smokestack, which rose only a few feet above the deck. 
Blowers were provided to make a draught, and in time of 
battle the smokestack was taken down altogether. The 
propeller wheel was under the overhang at the stern and 
the anchor was concealed in like manner at the bow. The 
side of the hull was protected with five one-inch plates and 
the deck with two half-inch plates. 

The contract for the Monitor was made on October 4, 
1861, and her keel was laid at Greenpoint, Brooklyn, 
on October 25 — more than four months after the Con- 



186 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

federates began work on the Merrimac. This needless 
delay cannot be emphasized too much, because in a service 
where promotions are always made by seniority conserva- 
tism becomes a deadly blight. 

But after the keel was laid three shifts of men were em- 
ployed — work was driven day and night. She was 
launched January 30, 1862, delivered at the navy yard 
February 19, and put in commission, with Lieutenant 
John L. Worden as captain, on the 25th. Lieutenant S. 
Dana Greene was her executive officer and Isaac Newton 
was the chief engineer. Her entire crew, fifty-eight men, 
was made up of volunteers. 

At 11 o'clock on March 6, 1862, the Monitor headed 
away for the Chesapeake in tow of a tug. On the way a 
northwest gale nearly drowned her and all hands, for 
when the seas rolled across the deck the water poured 
down her smokestack and every other opening. The 
fires were drowned. The blower belts got wet and would 
not work. Lack of draught filled the stokehole with deadly 
gases and nearly all the men there were made unconscious. 
When the rough water was avoided by heading inshore 
a tide rip was crossed and then the tiller ropes broke. 
But in spite of multiplied dangers and difficulties Cape 
Henry was reached at 4 p. m. on the 8th. And as she 
steamed in the crew heard the roar of cannon that were 
fired far up the bay and as night came on they saw flames 
of a ship that was burning fiercely just off Newport News. 

In spite of the lack of mechanics, and of the scarcity of 
iron, and of delays in transportation, the Confederate 
officers employed in converting the wooden-hulled Merri- 
mac into an ironclad steam battleship had just completed 
their work. Flag-Officer Franklin Buchanan was in com- 
mand of the Merrimac with Lieutenant Thomas Catesby 
R. Jones as executive officer, and when the Monitor 
arrived they had been giving their new ship the most 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 187 

remarkable trial trip known to the history of armored 
vessels. 

At 11 o'clock A. M. on March 8 the Merrimac cast off 
the lines that held her to the dock at the Norfolk navy- 
yard and headed north for Hampton Roads. With her 
were two armed steam canal boats, survivors of the battle 
at Roanoke Island — the Beaufort and the Raleigh. In the 
wake of this war squadron followed nearly every boat 
afloat in the Norfolk waters, and all loaded to the brim 
with people who were going to points from which "they 
could see the great naval combat which they knew was at 
last to take place. Some went by land. All work was 
suspended in public and private yards, and those who 
were forced to remain behind were offering up prayers for 
our success. A great stillness came over the land . . . 
As we steamed down the harbor we were saluted by the 
waving of caps and handkerchiefs, but no voice broke the 
silence. All hearts were too full for utterance; an attempt 
at cheers would have ended in tears." (Parker, "Recol- 
lections of a Naval Officer.") 

From the Elizabeth River the Merrimac turned west 
toward Hampton Roads. The Union steam frigates 
Roanoke and Minnesota and the St. Lawrence, a ship of 
the sail, were anchored in the order named at wide inter- 
vals from Fortress Monroe westerly toward Newport 
News. The sailing frigate Congress was anchored just 
to the east of Newport News Point, while the sailing sloop 
Cumberland was anchored just to the west of the Point. 
These two ships were supposed to be blockading James 
River and about ten miles away up that stream were three 
Confederate armed steamers waiting to see the Merrimac 
come to Hampton Roads on her trial trip. 

No sign of preparation for battle was to be seen on any 
of the Union ships. They had heard from runaway 
slaves that the Merrimac was ready, but they did not be- 



188 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

lieve she would amount to much, even if she did come. 
The captain of the Cumberland had gone away to attend 
a court-martial, leaving Lieutenant George U. Morris in 
charge. The captain of the Congress had been relieved 
and Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith was in command for the 
time being. 

Just before 1 o'clock, when the smoke of the squadron 
coming from Norfolk was seen, however, there were hasty 
calls on every ship to clear for action. 

Having an experiment under him. Captain Buchanan de- 
termined to see what he could do with the sailing warship 
in the mouth of the James — the Cumberland. This ship 
was lying with her head towards the land and her starboard 
broadside towards the Confederate ironclad, when, at 
about 1 : 30 o'clock, the Merrimac opened fire upon her. 
The fire was returned by both the Congress and the Cum- 
berland. The guns of the Cumberland were especially 
well handled and whole broadsides struck the ironclad 
walls of the Merrimac; but all in vain. The grease that 
had been thickly smeared over the iron plates, to make the 
shot slide off easily, sizzled and smoked under the impact 
of the shot, but solid balls as well as shells either bounded 
clear or fell shattered into the water alongside. Wholly 
unimpeded, the Merrimac came on steadily until she drove 
her armored bow into the side of the Cumberland with a 
crashing of planks and timbers heard distinctly above the 
roar of the guns. The wound— it was made near the 
starboard forerigging — was mortal. The Cumberland at 
once began to go down by the bow as the water flowed in, 
but her "guns' crews kicked off their shoes and stripped to 
the waist. Tanks of cartridges were hoisted on the gun 
deck and opened. On the berth deck the wounded men 
were lifted upon racks and mess chests to keep them from 
drowning; and as the water rose those who fell on the upper 
deck were carried amidships and left there. The boats 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 189 

were lowered and made fast in a line on the shore side," 
ready for abandoning the ship, but when the Merrimac, 
after passing on up the James to turn around, had re- 
turned alongside the sinking Cumberland and demanded 
that she surrender, Lieutenant Morris replied : 

"Never! I'll sink alongside." 

The men worked their guns till the water came brim- 
ming through the hatches, and even then, as the ship 
heeled for the final plunge, one crew, with the water 
wetting their feet, awaited to fire a final shot before they 
plunged overboard to swim for life. This gun was com- 
manded by William P. Randall, a New Bedford whaler. 
He was promoted for his gallantry and became a com- 
mander. " Never did a crew fight a ship with more courage 
and hardihood than those brave fellows of the Cumberland 
while the vessel was going down." (Soley, "The Blockade 
and the Cruisers.") 

In the meantime the Confederate vessels that had been 
seen up the James came down and joined the ironclad 
and the canal boats in their attack upon the Congress and 
the shore batteries. At the same time the three Union 
frigates, Roanoke, Minnesota and St. Lawrence, were coming 
either under steam or in tow, but all three ran aground, 
"prudently," according to Admiral Porter, though it is 
said that the Minnesota was put on the mud by a pilot 
who was in the Confederate pay while pretending to be 
loyal. The Roanoke and St. Lawrence got clear, after a 
time, and both made haste back to the shelter of Fortress 
Monroe. The Minnesota was thus left open to an attack 
from the Confederate squadron. 

As the Cumberland went down, Lieutenant Smith, of the 
Congress, saw that he had no hope of escaping, and he 
therefore slipped his anchor, made sail and drove his 
ship ashore to prevent the Confederates carrying her off. 
Thereupon the Confederates concentrated their fire upon 



190 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

her. No effective reply could be made even to the smaller 
Confederate vessels (no guns would bear on them), but 
the Stars and Stripes were kept flying for an hour; the flag 
would not have been hauled down even then but for the 
fact that Lieutenant Smith had been killed. 

As the Congress could not be dragged out of the mud 
the Confederates fired red-hot shot into her and set her on 
fire. It was the burning Congress that the crew of the 
Monitor saw as they steamed up from the sea that night. 

From the Congress the Confederate squadron turned 
to the Minnesota. The Merriniac drew so much water 
that she had to lie off at a distance of a mile in making this 
attack, and at that range her shot did but little damage. 
The smaller confederate vessels, however, took positions 
where the Minnesota's guns would not bear, and thus they 
were able to rake her with little hurt to themselves. In 
fact she would have been destroyed by them alone but for 
the fact that night came on and the falling tide compelled 
the ironclad to return to the mouth of the Elizabeth river, 
where she could anchor in deep water. 

In the fight the Merrimac had lost two killed and nine- 
teen wounded. Captain Buchanan being among the latter. 
He was shot through the thigh by a musket ball. The 
others were hit by the fragments of a shell that burst in 
one of the open ports. The wound of the captain was so 
severe that Lieutenant Jones took command of the ship. 
The Cumberland reported 121 killed, wounded and 
missing, the Congress 120, while the fleet surgeon reported 
six killed and thirty-six wounded on the Minnesota and 
the other vessels. 

When at 7 o'clock the Merrimac left Hampton Roads 
she had not only destroyed two well-armed ships of the old 
style but she had demonstrated that every wooden ship in 
the world was worthless, practically, in a conflict with a 
well-built armored ship. The three great frigates at 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC . 191 

Fortress Monroe were at her mercy. She had achieved 
a victory more remarkable in its effect on sea-fighting than 
any known to naval history. The cheers of her crew as 
they entered the Elizabeth River were taken up by the 
waiting throng of spectators and a prolonged shout of 
triumph roared away to the uttermost parts of the Con- 
federacy. The Confederate Secretary of the Navy had 
planned for the Merrimac "a dashing cruise on the Poto- 
mac as far as Washington," and she waited only to finish 
her work at Hampton Roads before starting to obey these 
orders. 

At the North the Merrimac' s work had a still more mem- 
orable effect. A shameful panic seized upon the people 
and even upon some of the officials in highest authority 
at Washington. Stanton, while at a cabinet meeting, pro- 
posed recalling Burnside from the work in North Caro- 
lina, and abandoning Port Royal Sound. He said he ex- 
pected to see the new ironclad appear within range at any 
minute and fire a shot into the White House. He and his 
Assistant Secretary got into communication with several 
ship merchants of New York City and begged them to in- 
vent something to destroy the monster — "regardless of 
cost." Sixteen canal boats were loaded with stone and 
towed to a shoal in the Potomac ready to sink and block 
the channel. But for the patient and resolute Lincoln 
that panic might have ended all hopes of the restoration 
of the Union. A more effective portrayal of the value of 
aggressive warfare than the work of the Merrimac that 
day has rarely been seen. 

Yet even in Washington, disgraceful as were the facts 
that have been given, there was one scene which went far 
toward making amends for the wound to American char- 
acter. When the news of the surrender of the Congress 
reached Washington (Sunday morning). Commodore 
Joseph Smith, father of the young commander of the lost 



192 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

ship, was at church, as was also Secretary of the Navy 
Welles, to whom the telegram was delivered. As soon as 
the service ended the Secretary carried the news to the 
old Commodore. 

"What?" said he, "the Congress surrendered? Then 
Joe is dead." 

The Secretary began to say that while the despatches 
did not give a list of the injured there was no reason for 
such gloomy forebodings, but the Commodore shook his 
head. 

"You don't know Joe as I do," he said. "He would 
never surrender his ship." 

While the Confederates were leaving Hampton Roads 
in triumph and officials at Washington were appealing 
to rich merchants of New York to save the nation, the little 
turreted Monitor reached the scene of action. Captain 
John Marston, of the Roanoke, senior officer present, had 
orders at this time to send the Monitor through to Wash- 
ington. The idea of waging war by defensive tactics — 
the old Jeffersonian ideal — prevailed there at that mo- 
ment. Marston, however, had enough of the spirit of the 
American navy in him to disobey the panic-order he had 
received. He held the Monitor to fight the Merrimac in 
the waters she had made her own. 

Accordingly, at 7 o'clock the next morning (Sunday, 
March 9, 1862), when the Merrimac came once more to 
Hampton Roads, the Monitor steamed forth to meet her. 
With perfect courage, if not with perfect confidence in 
his untried ship, Worden laid her alongside the Confed- 
erate ship and the fight was begun at pistol range. The 
two guns of the turret were fired point-blank. The shot 
broke the plates, but did not penetrate the wall. The 
Merrimac returned the fire and her shots dented the 
Monitor's turret, but did not enter. No material advan- 
tage was gained by either ship then or later as they 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 193 

steamed around each other and fired at will. The Mon- 
itor, being relatively handy, crossed the Merrimac's stern 
and missed breaking the rudder by a narrow space. The 
Merrimac, after a prolonged effort (for she was unwieldy), 
rammed the Monitor. But it was a glancing blow that 
did not hurt. Indeed, the ramming was a mistake, be- 
cause the blow that had been given the Cumberland had 
knocked off the iron prow of the Merrimac and otherwise 
weakened the bow so that hitting the Monitor opened the 
Merrimac's timbers, making an "alarming leak." 

The Monitor's crew also made mistakes. Loss of weights 
forward on the Merrimac had brought her bow up until 
the casemate eaves were awash. If the Monitor had fired 
into her water-line the shot would have gone through and 
sunk her. If the Monitor's gunners had used a full charge 
of powder (fifty pounds) instead of fifteen, to which their 
orders limited them, the shot would have pierced through 
the Merrimac's plates with destructive effect. Even as it 
was Lieutenant Jones reported that if two of the Moni- 
tor's shot had happened to strike in succession on the 
same spot, the iron plates would have been pierced and 
the wooden backing hurled in splinters across the deck. 

During all the forenoon the two ironclads hammered at 
each other in vain. Then a shell from the Merrimac ex- 
ploded against a peep-hole in the Monitor's pilot-house 
and Worden was entirely disabled — blinded — by the 
powder and iron splinters. In the confusion that followed 
the Monitor was withdrawn from the fight and taken into 
shoal water. Then Lieutenant Jones, who supposed that 
the Monitor had given up the fight, took the advice of his 
pilots, who said the Merrimac must leave for Norfolk at 
once if he hoped to reach the drydock and begin repairs 
that day. 

Lieutenant John Taylor Wood, of the Merrimac, in de- 
scribing this battle, said later: 



194 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

"Although there is no doubt that the Monitor first re- 
tired — for Captain Van Brunt, commanding the Minne- 
sota, so states in his official report — the battle was a drawn 
one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned. 
But in its general results the advantage was with the 
Monitor." 

Lieutenant Greene, of the Monitor, wrote regarding the 
fight: "It has never been denied that the object of the 
Merrimac on the 9th of March was to complete the de- 
struction of the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, and that 
in this she was completely foiled." 

At Norfolk the Merrimac was overhauled and then, on 
two different occasions, she appeared under the command 
of Flag-Officer Tattnall in Hampton Roads. A great 
Union fleet had been gathered there. Among the ships 
were several big merchantmen that had been strengthened 
for use as rams. The Monitor was there also. To en- 
courage this fleet to attack him Tattnall, on one occasion, 
sent two of his little consorts to Newport News where they 
cut three merchantmen from under the Union guns. The 
Union officers bashfully looked on. The Union fleet was 
under orders not to fight the Merrimac unless she made 
the attack. Of course, if a Farragut had been present he 
would have found excuse for a fight in the capture of the 
merchantmen, but Farraguts, alas, were few in number. 

In the meantime the operations of the Union forces in 
the Peninsula and on the North Carolina sounds had made 
the Confederate occupation of Norfolk no longer feasible, 
and on May 10, 1862, the Union soldiers took possession 
of that city. The Merrimac was at anchor near Craney 
Island when the Confederates abandoned their works 
along the Elizabeth River. Tattnall wanted to take her 
up the James River, but his pilots said that it could not 
be done on account of the lack of water. Thereupon 
Tattnall ran her ashore at night on May 10, in the sight of 




DECK \-IEW OF THE UONITOR AND CREW. 




COMMODORE. WORDEX AND THE OFFICERS OF THE MOXITOR. 



THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC 195 

Craney Island, not far from where he had, as a midship- 
man, driven the braggart British helter-skelter back to 
their ships during the War of 1812, and there he blew 
her to pieces. 

On January 2, 1863, the Monitor foundered in a gale 
at sea while on her way to Beaufort. 

The loss of the Merrimac was much greater than has 
ever been appreciated. For the Confederate people had 
built the highest hopes upon her success. They had been 
half wild with joy over the success of her first fight, and 
when Tattnall, the ablest fighting man of their navy, had 
failed to accomplish anything with her a revulsion of feel- 
ing came over the people. They lost all confidence in any 
kind of naval power, and the distrust then created — the 
prejudices then aroused — have not yet been wholly dissi- 
pated, although every one knows now that the work of the 
Merrimac was altogether creditable to the men who com- 
manded her, and every one knows, too, that it was out of 
the fight she made with the Monitor that the modern tur- 
reted and casemated battleship was evolved. 



CHAPTER XX 
ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 

Plans for operations on the Mississippi were considered 
in Washington as early as April 17, 1861, three days after 
the fall of Fort Sumter. At the invitation of the Navy 
Department, Captain James B. Eads, a noted river man 
of St. Louis, Mo., submitted, on April 29, proposals for 
building a fleet of ironclad gunboats of light draught and 
heavy guns for use on the Mississippi and its tributaries, 
and the plans were adopted. 

On May 16 Captain John Rodgers, of the navy, was 
directed to supervise the naval work that was to be done 
in the Mississippi Valley. The Federal plan of action in 
this valley proposed first of all to regain control of the 
river by an advance with a naval force afloat and an army 
alongshore. It was seen that once the river was thus con- 
trolled the Confederacy would be severed, as the British 
tried to sever the United States when they sent powerful 
armies to Lake Champlain, in the War of 1812 and in the 
Revolution. Cutting off the western part of the Confed- 
eracy would deprive the Confederate armies of both men 
and food, especially food. Moreover, the plan for recover- 
ing the river was sure to arouse enthusiastic support not 
only throughout the Northwest but in Kentucky also; 
for the people there had been greatly alarmed at the 
prospect of having their grand highway under foreign 
control. 

For the work thus proposed Rodgers purchased three 
river steamers which were armed and strengthened some- 

196 



ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 197 

what by the erection of timber bulwarks. On August 7 
a contract was made with Captain Eads by which he agreed 
to build seven ironclad ships and deliver them ready for 
war by October 10, a period of sixty days. As built, these 
boats were 175 feet long by 50 wide and they had a draught 
of about six feet. The boilers were located in the hull, 
which floated with only a foot of freeboard. On the deck 
was erected a casemate something like the one of the old 
Merrimac. The front end of the casemate was covered 
with iron plates 2^ inches thick. The sides were not ar- 
mored save in the space abreast the machinery. The pilot- 
house above the casemate had its front wall covered with 
2^-inch iron, and the other walls with 1^-inch iron. A 
premium was thus placed on keeping them facing the en- 
emy. The probability that a boat would ever wish to run 
past batteries located along the river seems not to have 
been contemplated. The boats were armed with 8-inch 
smoothbores, old 32-pounders and wretched rifles that had 
been made by cutting grooves in the bores of old 42-pound- 
ers — 7-inch smoothbores. 

An old snagboat, 202 feet long by 72 wide, was con- 
verted into an ironclad on much the same plan used in 
the new boats. She was called the Benton. She carried 
sixteen guns, of which two were 9-inch Dahlgrens. The 
new ships carried thirteen guns each. 

The Confederate Congress, on hearing about the work 
planned north of the Ohio, provided "for the construc- 
tion, equipment and armament of two ironclad gunboats 
for the defence of the Mississippi, and the city of Memphis, 
$160,000." (Act of August 24, 1861.) Mr. Davis, in a 
special message, had recommended $250,000. A con- 
tract for the building of the two ironclads was made im- 
mediately, and work was begun as soon as possible at 
Memphis. While the Union authorities provided for 
eight efficient ironclads to be used in aggressive war, the 



198 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Confederates made a meagre appropriation for two iron- 
clads that were to be used for "defence." 

The first aggressive movement of the Union naval force 
on these waters was made when General Grant took pos- 
session of Paducah and Smithland, towns at the junction 
of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers with the Ohio. 
Two of the unarmored gunboats Rodgers had provided 
went with Grant, but they did not fire a gun. This was 
done on September 6, 1861. On that day Captain A. H. 
Foote relieved Rodgers of the command in those waters. 
Early in 1862 an expedition to reduce Fort Henry, an 
earthwork that had been constructed on the Tennessee 
to block the Federal advance, was undertaken. Foote, 
with four ironclads and the three wooden-clad gunboats, 
went on this mission. The army made such slow progress, 
on account of mud, that Foote got tired of waiting, and on 
February 6 he attacked the fort, beginning soon after noon. 
The fight was remarkable chiefly for the good work of the 
gunners on both sides. The Confederates had had little 
training, but they hit all the gunboats repeatedly, the flag- 
ship receiving thirty-one projectiles. On the other hand, 
the Union gunners dismounted seven of the twelve guns 
in the fort that could be brought to bear on the boats 
and at the end of an hour and a quarter they compelled 
the fort to surrender. It is to be noted here that through- 
out the war the marksmanship of the Western gunners 
was always better than that of those of the East. The 
action is also notable because here for the first time the 
men of the navy faced death in a new form. A shot 
pierced the boiler of the ironclad Essex and the steam 
scalded thirty-two men so severely that many of them 
died. 

In the capture of Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland 
River, Foote's boats had a conspicuous part (February 
13-16), and thereafter the Cumberland and the Tennes- 



ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 199 

see rivers were ranged at will by the Union boats to points 
well within Confederate territory. 

The next notable work done by the navy was at Island 
No. 10. The Confederates had erected powerful batteries 
there and on the adjacent mainland in a determined effort 
to stay the Federal advance. 

Foote, with six ironclads, arrived within sight of the 
island on March 15. A dash past the forts was consid- 
ered, but it was not attempted then because there would be 
no way to secure coal after the passage had been made 
until the island was taken. Then General John Pope, 
commanding the expedition, cut a passage through the 
swamps from a point above the island, across a narrow 
neck of land to New Madrid, well below it. This gave 
passage (April 4) for coal barges. 

On March 30 Foote, foreseeing the completion of the 
canal, called a council of his captains to discuss, once more, 
a da^h down the river. It was a memorable meeting. 
Every man present knew that the heavy Confederate guns 
could easily pierce the imperfect side walls of all the Union 
boats, and in this piercing there was a reasonable certainty 
that steam connections would be cut and boilers opened. 
To a man, the crews of all the boats were willing to face 
shot and shell and splinters, but to face the prospect of 
bemg boiled to death made the boldest hesitate. Of all 
the officers present only one. Commander Henry Walke, 
believed that any one of the boats could successfully pass 
the batteries. He eagerly offered to make the run alone 
and Foote felt obliged to let him try it. 

To supplement the protection of the machinery Walke 
piled wood and planks alongside, and then flaked the iron 
chain cables over all. The deck was thickened with plank 
and finally a scow loaded with baled hay was lashed along- 
side. On the night of April 4, the day the canal through 
the swamps was opened, Walke reported ready, and at 



200 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

10 o'clock at night he headed his boat, the Carondelet, down 
the stream. 

As it happened, the moon had disappeared behind a 
heavy bank of clouds some time before, and as the black- 
hulled steamer approached the Confederate batteries a 
thunderstorm of tremendous power broke over the river. 
A prolonged flash of lightning revealed the ship to the 
Confederate sentinels on the island, and a minute later the 
garrison opened fire, aiming their guns as best they could 
by the lightning's glare while the pilot on the Carondelet 
steered by the flash of the guns on shore, 

"The passage of the Carondelet was not only one of the 
most daring and dramatic events of the war; it was also 
the death blow to the Confederate defence of this position." 
(Mahan, " Navy in the Civil War.") On April 7 the Con- 
federate force, numbering 7,000 men, surrendered, and at 
10 o'clock that night the naval vessels took possession of 
Island No. 10. Walke never received the credit he earned 
in this dash. It was quite equal to that of Hobson at 
Santiago. 

On April 12 Foote and his fleet came to rest just above 
Fort Pillow, on the first Chickasaw bluff, where the 
Confederate naval force was met for the first time. Five 
Confederate gunboats approached under the command 
of Captain George N. Hollins, a most efficient officer of the 
old navy. They were merely river steamers a little strength- 
ened and poorly armed, and they were by no means fit to 
cope with Foote's ironclads. The ironclads for which 
the Confederates had contracted had not been finished. 
Lacking shops and mechanics and all kinds of materials 
that go with shops, the Confederate contractor had had a 
sorry time with his building; and yet it was for the building 
of a nation wherein the curse of slavery with this, and all 
its other attendant evils, were to be perpetuated that the 
Confederates were fighting! 




MISSISSIPPI RIVER TYPE Ul- r.rXIiuAT: CAIRO. 




BLOCKADE RUNNER. TliASER. 



ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 201 

The gunboats quickly gave up hope of fighting Foote's 
ironclads. Not so with another class of ships that the Con- 
federates had provided. Most remarkable were these ships 
that would meet the ironclads, and withal they were char- 
acteristic of the American people of that day both at the 
North and the South; for a similar fleet was provided 
for the river by the Federal authorities, at about the same 
time, and some consideration must therefore be given 
them. 

When it was learned in New Orleans that the Federals 
were building ironclad ships with which to sweep the river, 
a number of steamboat men proposed utilizing some of 
the swifter river steamers as rams for the destruction of the 
Union ironclads. This ram fleet was to be organized as 
a force entirely distinct from the naval vessels on the river. 
The river men asserted that while naval officers might do 
very good work upon the salt seas, naval red tape would 
make a sorry figure on the river. What was needed there, 
first of all, was valor, and if anybody in the world was brim- 
ful of valor it was the river man. He had been born to a 
fighting career and he had pursued that career with joy. 
Moreover, the river man knew the river and its ships. 
Two men, named Montgomery and Townsend, took the 
lead in urging the use of these rams and their arguments 
prevailed promptly at the Confederate capital. By the 
acts of January 9 and 16 the Confederate Congress ap- 
propriated $1,000,000 for fitting out this ram fleet. Major- 
General Mansfield Lovell, commanding at New Orleans, 
received general charge of the fleet, but he was instructed 
by the Confederate Secretary of War (letter of January 19) 
that " the general plan [is] to be worked out by the brave 
and energetic men who have undertaken it," and that 
"you will allow a very wide latitude" to them. 

For this ram fleet, who had valor only to recommend 
them as warriors, the Confederate Congress gave freely 



202 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

a million dollars; for the building of two ironclad naval 
ships for use in the same waters they grudgingly gave 
$160,000. 

Fourteen steamers were seized at New Orleans and cap- 
tains were appointed to them. Each captain fitted out as 
he thought best, but in general all the ships were filled in 
with timber at the bows and iron plates and straps were 
bolted on over all. Guns were also provided — two or three 
each — for use when occasion offered. 

On April 15, 1862, eight of these rams were sent up the 
river, and they arrived at Fort Pillow while Foote was 
bombarding it with mortars afloat on rafts, just above 
Craighead's Point on the opposite side of the river. 

On May 9 Foote was relieved by Captain C. H. Davis. 
Foote had been wounded at Fort Donelson and the wound 
refused to heal. It eventually killed him. The day after 
Davis took command he sent the ironclad Cincinnati to 
guard the mortar boats above Craighead's Point. On 
this day fire was opened at 5 o'clock. At 6 : 30 the Con- 
federate ram fleet was seen coming up to attack the Cin- 
cinnati. She at once steamed out to open water to receive 
them and opened fire. Three of the rams steamed up 
above and then turned upon her. The Bragg rammed 
her, and she sank near the shore in eleven feet of water. 
The other Union boats were slow in coming to the rescue, 
but when they did arrive there was a rough and tumble 
fight, quite to the river man's taste, with the result that 
three of the rams were disabled. So were two of the Union 
ironclads. The rams retreated, when the fighting ended. 

On June 4 Fort PiUow was evacuated by the Confed- 
erates because of the work of the Union army in driving 
Beauregard from Corinth (May 30), and it was seen that 
Memphis was no longer tenable. Nevertheless, when 
Davis and his ironclads arrived within sight of Memphis 
(June 5) the eight ram steamers were seen in waiting. 



ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 203 

The disabled ships on both sides had all been repaired, 
and the Union fleet had been increased by the addition 
of two rams which had been fitted out much as those of 
the Confederates had been. One, called the Queen of the 
West, was commanded by Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., and 
the other, the Monarch, was commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel A. W. Ellet, a brother of Charles. Colonel Ellet 
had advocated an independent force of rams, as the New 
Orleans river men had done, and had had his ideas 
adopted at Washington. He now had his rams with the 
Union ironclads, but he was at entire liberty to decide when 
and how he would join in any fighting. 

On the morning of the 6th the ironclads dropped down 
toward Memphis in line abreast. They found the Con- 
federate rams in a double line in front of the city, and it is 
recorded that the river banks, which are high at this point, 
were covered with the people of the city who had come 
out to see the battle. 

The Confederates opened the fight with a gun at long 
range; the ironclads replied with all their guns that would 
bear, and then, as the range grew shorter, Ellet's rams 
came steaming down through the open places between the 
ironclads. Cutting across their line of fire he headed the 
Queen of the West (which was in the lead) at a Confederate 
ram called the Lovell. He sunk her in deep water at the 
first stroke, but he was immediately struck by the Confed- 
erate rams Beauregard and Price and so badly hurt that 
he steamed to friendly shelter on the west side of the river. 
Then the Beauregard and the Price headed for the iron- 
clad Monarch, but she dodged them and they collided in a 
way that sent the Price to the shore. A minute later the 
Monarch rammed the Beauregard and, at the same time, a 
shot from the Benton entered the Beauregard's boiler. 
Thus the Beauregard was put out of the fight and many 
of her people were scalded to death. Meantime the ram 



204 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Little Rebel had received a shot in her steam chest that 
disabled her, and then the four remaining Confederate 
rams fled for Hfe. One only, the Van Dorn, escaped. Two 
of the four were captured and one was sunk by shot. 
Memphis surrendered the same day. In the meantime, 
however, one of the Confederate ironclads, the Tennessee, 
that had been building there, had been burned on the 
stocks, while the Arkansas was towed away to the Yazoo 
River with a barge load of railroad iron for plating. 

The Union naval forces were making steady advances, 
but with pluck unsurpassed the Confederates stuck to the 
task of preparing defences. It is a story to make a man 
proud of the reunited country. 

On June 29 Davis steamed down the river, bound for 
Vicksburg. He arrived on July 1, and found there a 
squadron of salt-water warships that had come up from 
the Gulf of Mexico, under the command of Flag-Officer 
David Glasgow Farragut. 



CHAPTER XXI 

FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 

While the Federal Government had begun operations 
on the upper Mississippi in the spring of 1861, it was not 
until November of that year that serious thought was given 
to an attempt to capture New Orleans. Commander 
D. D. Porter, after a tour of duty on the blockading sta- 
tion at the mouths of the Mississippi, returned to New 
York to repair his steamer and, going to Washington, he 
laid a plan for taking the Southern metropolis. The 
plan was approved and Captain David G. Farragut was 
selected for the command, and on January 20, 1862, he 
was ordered to collect a fleet for the work. He sailed 
from Hampton Roads on February 2, bound for Ship 
Island anchorage, which lies not far to the north and east 
of the mouths of the Mississippi. There he gathered 
a fleet of seventeen steamers, of which the Hartford, a 
sloop-of-war carrying twenty-four guns (mostly 9-inch 
Dahlgrens), was the flagship. Four of the others were of 
similar force. The remainder were smaller, and armed 
with from four to ten guns. The guns, however, were in 
all cases of notable size, for even the gunboats carried one 
11-inch Dahlgren each, and all but the Varuna, a 10-gun 
converted merchantman, had been built for war uses. 
The 50-gun frigate Colorado, Captain T. Bailey, and the 
sailing sloop Portsmouth, Commander S. Swartwout, were 
added to the squadron, but the Colorado could not be 
dragged across the bar and the Portsmouth was obviously 
unfitted to pass the forts. 

205 



206 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

As the plan of action contemplated the reduction of the 
two forts that had been built to guard the river/ a 
mortar fleet of twenty schooners was provided with five 
armed steamers to handle them. Commander Porter 
was in immediate charge of this flotilla. 

To repel this powerful fleet — the most powerful the 
United States had ever assembled — the Confederates 
relied chiefly on the two river forts — Jackson, on the west 
bank, and St. Philip on the east — that stood in the swamps 
a few miles above the head of the passes, as the three 
mouths of the river were called. These forts were built 
of masonry and when the Confederates took possession of 
them, January 26, 1861, 109 guns were mounted in them, 
of which fifty-six were 24-pounders and the others were 
larger. General Mansfield Lovell, commanding at New 
Orleans, added two 7-inch Brooke rifles, three 10-inch 
smoothbores and a few mortars. The garrisons were 
composed chiefly of foreigners, because the natives of the 
region were too enthusiastic in the cause to remain cooped 
up in such a locality — they must needs go to the front. 
The junior officers, too, were young men without training, 
who had been appointed through social influence, and 
had been stationed where it was supposed they would do 
as little harm as possible. General J. K. Duncan and 
Colonel E. Higgins, commanding the forts, were, of course, 
men of ability. Higgins was one of the naval ofiicers for 
whom the Confederates had been unable to find employ- 
ment afloat. 

To aid in repelling any fleet that might come, a raft 
made of heavy cypress logs was stretched across the river 
immediately in front of Fort Jackson, the guns of which 
would in no case be more than 500 yards from any ship 

' Farragut's orders said: " You will collect such vessels as can be spared from 
the blockade, and proceed up the Mississippi and reduce the defences which guard 
the approaches to New Orleans, when you will appear off that city and take pos- 
session of it." 




ADMIRAL D. G. lARRAGUT. 



I' 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 207 

at this boom, while the guns of Fort St. Philip would bear 
at a range but little less effective. High water and drift- 
wood carried away part of this boom in March, 1862, 
but when, early in April, Farragut brought his fleet to the 
passes, the breech had been closed by anchoring eight 
schooners in it, side by side, and connecting them together 
with heavy chains. As an additional defence, General 
Lovell provided more than forty fire rafts. 

The floating or naval defences of the river were particu- 
larly interesting because they were either novel or well- 
nigh worthless. Most noted of all was an ironclad ram 
named the Manassas. A twin-screw tugboat was cut 
down and covered with a rounding deck of timbers that 
made her look something like a modern submarine. This 
deck was armored with iron and the bow was fitted to 
serve as a ram. Under Lieutenant A. F. Warley, of the 
old navy, it proved much more efficient than any one had 
reason to expect. A steamer that had been plying to 
Havana was armed and became the warship McRae. 
Two other sea-going steamers were converted to war uses 
by giving each a battery of two 32-pounders, and one of 
them, under Captain Beverley Kennon, who had been 
in the old navy, did remarkably good work. Then six 
of the ram fleet that was manned by river men only had 
been retained for the defence of the lower river, and much 
was expected of them. 

At best all these vessels were mere makeshifts, something 
to be used as pitchforks have been used by other peoples 
who were compelled to fight without previous preparation. 
Of real warships, however, the Confederates had, or al- 
most had, two. One, the Louisiana, was a converted 
floating drydock, 270 feet long. This dock was altered 
into a scow and a casemate armored with railroad iron 
was built on deck. Two paddle-wheels in wells, under 
cover, and two screw propellers were provided to drive her, 



208 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

and she was armed with sixteen guns, of which two were 
7-inch and seven were 6.4-inch Brookes. In design she 
was a most powerful battery; as built she was simply a 
botch for want of mechanics. 

The Mississippi was the design of a Florida planter 
named Nelson Tift. Her hull was built with bottom and 
walls of solid timbers two feet thick, bolted together 
without frames or knees — simply a box 260 feet long, 
58 wide and 15 deep. A casemate was built on deck in 
the usual style of the Confederates. The work on the 
Mississippi was done to a large extent by slaves from the 
neighboring plantations, and it was never completed. 
White men built the Louisiana and took advantage of 
the necessities of the occasion to go on strike. 

Nevertheless, when Farragut came to the river, the 
Louisiana was nearing completion. Though her machin- 
ery was not able to drive her she was taken to Fort St. 
Philip and moored to the bank where she served as a bat- 
tery when Farragut passed the forts. 

There was urgent need for swift work in the Union fleet, 
when it reached the bar at the mouth of the river, but speed 
was out of the power of the energetic commander. To 
get the ships across the bar it was necessary to take -out 
every movable weight and then drag them, one at a time, 
through the mud. The attempt to get the Colorado across, 
which was made under imperative orders, consumed much 
time and it was not until April 16 that Farragut saw his 
fleet safely anchored above the passes. 

It is a curious fact that while many of the Union ships 
were dismantled and all the force was intent on making 
the crossing, the Confederates did nothing to molest them. 
Captain George Hollins, commanding the river forces 
of the Confederates, was sent to the upper river to meet 
Foote, and when at last he returned to New Orleans he 
was promptly ordered to Richmond to sit on a court- 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 209 

martial to try Captain Tattnall for burning the Merrimac. 
In explanation of the lack of interest which the Confed- 
erate authorities showed in Farragut's work it is said that 
when it was learned in Richmond that Eads was to begin 
building ironclads for use in the upper Mississippi, some 
spies were sent to help build the new ships. These not 
only kept Richmond posted on the progress made but they 
impressed the Confederates with the idea that the only 
real attack was to come from the upper river. The Farra- 
gut movement was not taken seriously. 

Farragut's first offensive move was made by posting the 
mortar boats. The first shell was fired at 10 o'clock on 
April 18. It exploded in the air above Fort Jackson. 
The second dropped into the river at a point which the 
ram Manassas had just vacated — it almost accomplished 
something, and in that respect it was like the mortar firing 
as a whole. More than forty shells were thrown every 
minute for six days and nights, all at Fort Jackson, but it 
remained " as strong to-day as when the first shell was fired 
at it." (Report of Lieutenant G. Weitzel, U. S. Engi- 
neers, May 5.) 

Seeing, at the end of two days, that the mortar fire would 
prove ineffective, Farragut called a council of his ofiicers 
on April 20 in order that they might give their opinions 
"as to the best manner of passing the forts." He had de- 
termined to ignore his orders and force the fighting. 

At the council the officers, instead of offering plans for 
passing the forts, pointed out the dangers and difficulties 
of so doing. The British frigate Mersey, Captain Preedy, 
and a French frigate had come into the river. The cap- 
tains of these ships were under orders to do everything in a 
neutral way to obstruct Farragut's work. Both captains 
took a look at the raft and forts, and then, with an assumed 
air of candor, told every officer of Farragut's fleet who 
would listen to them that passing the forts was utterly 



210 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

impossible. And many of the Farragut's officers would 
listen to them. 

But Farragut was confident that he could pass the forts, 
as DuPont had passed those at Port Royal, and he saw 
that when he had passed the forts he could receive supplies 
through the bayous while the forts would be entirely shut 
off from every source of succor. The way to New Orleans 
would then be open, or easily opened. 

Accordingly he dismissed his council and then expressed 
his own opinion in the form of a general order, in which 
he said: 

"The flag-officer is of the opinion that . . . the forts 
should be run. . . . When in the opinion of the flag-officer 
the propitious time has arrived ... he will make the 
signal for close action and abide the result — conquer or 
be conquered." 

It was characteristic of Farragut that he would disobey 
orders, if need be in order to force the fighting, when that 
seemed necessary for the honor of the flag. It was also his 
habit to call councils only to ask for fighting plans; he 
never asked his officers whether it was advisable to fight 
or not. But with all his unswerving determination to 
force the issue he was cautious to the extent that he 
would make every possible preparation and leave nothing 
to chance. He was the ideal leader of a campaign. His 
ships were carefully prepared for action. Useless spars 
were landed. Mud was daubed over all the hulls to give 
them a neutral tint not easily distinguished at night. 
The machinery was protected as far as possible by bags 
of coal, ashes and sand, and even hammocks and bags of 
clothes were piled for this purpose. At the suggestion of 
Engineer J. M. Moore the iron cables were stretched along 
the hull to give additional protection, just as Walke had 
protected the Carondelet at Island No. 10 a few days earlier. 

On the night of the 20th (after the council) the gunboats 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 211 

Itaska, Lieutenant C. H. B. Caldwell, and Pinola, Lieu- 
tenant Pierce Crosby, were sent up to break the barrier 
raft. Caldwell had volunteered to try breaking it alone, 
but Farragut thought two ships would be needed and that 
Fleet-Captain Bell ought to go along to supervise the work. 
The Itaska's crew boarded one of the schooners in the 
barrier — the second from the last — and while Caldwell 
was looking her over, one of the -crew saw that the chains 
holding the hulk to its next neighbor might be cast loose. 
This was done and the current carried the hulk and the 
Itaska aground on the bank of the river. The Pinola 
was called to the rescue and after breaking two hawsers 
she dragged the Itaska clear. 

During all this time the Confederates had been firing 
steadily at both of the Union vessels, and as the Itaska 
was dragged out from the bank she became a much more 
conspicuous target than she had been at any time. But 
her head was pointed up stream and Caldwell could see that 
an opening wide enough to let his boat through had been 
made in the raft. On seeing that, he drove her through 
and well beyond the raft, turned her around, and giving 
her a full head of steam, he came back at the barrier with 
the current to aid him. Striking the chain between the 
third and fourth hulks the Itaska broke her way through 
and three of the hulks floated away with the current, leav- 
ing an opening sufficient for the whole fleet. 

Being willing to give the mortars every opportunity, 
Farragut waited until the 23d before giving a definite order 
to advance. On that day he inspected every ship carefully, 
and then at 2 o'clock the next morning displayed two red 
lights in the rigging of the Hartford as the signal to form 
the battle line. The ships were placed in the following 
order: 

First Division : Captain Theodorus Bailey, commanding; 
Cayuga, Lieutenant-Commander H. Harrison; Pensacola, 



212 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Captain H. W. Morrison; Mississippi, Captain M. Smith; 
Oneida, Commander S. P. Lee; Varuna, Commander C. S. 
Boggs; Katahdin, Lieutenant-Commander G, H. Preble; 
Kineo, Lieutenant-Commander G. M. Ransom; Wissa- 
hickon, Lieutenant-Commander A. N. Smith. 

Centre Division: Flag-OfBcer Farragut; Hartford, Com- 
mander R. Wainwright; Brooklyn, Captain T. T. Craven; 
Richmond, Commander J. Alden. 

Third Division: Captain H. H. Bell; Scioto, Lieutenant- 
Commander E. Donaldson; Iroquois, Commander J. 
DeCamp; Kennebec, Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Russell; 
Pinola, Lieutenant-Commander P. Crosby; Itasca, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander C. H. B. Caldwell; Winona, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander E. T. Nichols. 

As the fleet steamed up the river so little noise v^as made 
on the ships that the crews heard the frogs croaking in the 
marshes. It was a ghostly fleet as seen through a slight fog 
from Porter's mortar boats. Unmolested, the Cayuga 
passed through the barrier, but as the second boat entered 
the opening a single gun was fired from Fort Jackson, 
and then every cannon that would bear in both forts began 
its blazing work. Their roar was instantly answered 
by the boom of Porter's mortars. The air overhead was 
quickly filled with the curving light of flying shells and the 
dark walls of the ships were lined with the sheeting flames 
of their guns. Then came the fire rafts, dozens of them, 
piled high with burning pine and tar, towed out from the 
banks above; some were cast loose to float free, and some 
were driven by tugs toward the line of battle. At the same 
time the Confederate armed steamers made their way out 
across the stream to add their fire to the multiplied flames 
which already covered the water. Rarely, if ever, had the 
world seen a more impressive fire picture than that upon 
the Mississippi when Farragut came to the barrier at Fort 
Jackson. 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 213 

The first division of the Hne cleared the barrier without 
damage and hurried on to attack Fort St. Phihp. But 
when Farragut passed the opening the air was thick with 
smoke that partly concealed the heroic crew of the little 
Confederate tug Mosher who were driving a fire raft straight 
at the flagship. Too late the Hartford tried to dodge the 
hot assailant. A broadside sank the tug and drowned its 
crew, but in the meantime the Hartford had been forced 
ashore and the raft had set the thick paint on her side and 
the tar on her rigging afire. The crew fled from the fierce 
heat of the flames, but Farragut's " Don't flinch from that 
fire, boys," returned them quickly to their stations, and 
before the flames could do serious damage the fire brigade, 
led by Master's Mate Allen, quenched them. Then the 
Hartford backed off the mud and steamed on. 

While the second and third divisions were passing the 
barrier the big Pensacola and Mississippi overwhelmed 
the fire of Fort St. Philip. The ships were so near the fort 
that crews and garrison cursed each other with hearty 
ill-will. The big ships stood high enough out of water 
to shoot directly into the openings of the fort walls. The 
smaller ships, however, were too low to use their guns 
effectively, therefore they went steaming on to meet the 
Confederate fleet. 

The ram Manassas, the McRae and the Moore were 
found in the lead. They attacked the Cayuga together, 
but Harrison, with his 11-inch pivot, stopped the Moore 
and then he dodged the other two. Captain Kennon, of 
the Moore, however, was by no means put out of the fight, 
even when at this time the Oneida, the Pinola and another 
ship began firing at him. The Varuna was passing in 
chase of the Doubloon. The Varuna carried ten guns 
and the Moore two, but Kennon went in chase of her, for 
he was a man who understood that " the All of Things is 
an infinitive conjugation of the verb To Do." When the 



214 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Varuna was well separated from the other Union ships the 
Moore overhauled her. The one gun on the bow of the 
Moore could not be brought to bear on the Varuna at this 
time because, being mounted on a high forecastle, it could 
not be suflBciently depressed without pointing at the 
Moore's own deck. At that Kennon fired at his own deck 
— he shot a port hole through his own bow — and then fired 
a shot at the Varuna that killed three men and wounded 
nine more. And when the Varuna turned to give him a 
broadside Kennon rammed her and drove her sinking to 
the river bank. More than half of the Moore's crew were 
now dead or wounded — cut down by shots the Cayuga 
and the other vessels had fired — but Kennon turned from 
the Varuna to face the whole Union fleet. He worked his 
guns as well as he could, but his ship was shot to pieces 
under him. Nevertheless, he drove her ashore, set her 
afire and burned her with her flag flying. It was a sad 
day for the nation when men like Kennon left the old 
navy. 

The ram Manassas also made a good fight. After miss- 
ing the Cayuga she rammed the Brooklyn, breaking through 
the planking, and failed to sink her only because of the 
imperfect machinery that cursed all Confederate warships, 
except the English-built cruisers. She then went in pur- 
suit of the flagship, but the Mississippi turned on her, gave 
her a broadside that disabled her and she was then run 
ashore and abandoned. Finally, she drifted down the 
river and sank near the mortar flotilla. 

The last of the Union fleet to pass the forts was the 
"gaflant Iroquois," as Porter called her after seeing her 
"provokingly linger and slow her engines opposite the 
forts to give the rebels a taste of her formidable battery." 
As she cleared the barrier the Confederate McRae fired 
on her with guns loaded with copper bolts, in part — a fact 
that shows how the Confederates were supplied with am- 



FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS 215 

munition. The Iroquois ended the McRae's usefulness, 
by a single broadside. Commander Thomas B. Huger, 
who had been executive ofBcer of the Iroquois a few 
months before, and was well liked by her crew, was cap- 
tain of the McRae and was mortally wounded by the 
broadside that ended her career. 

Since the battle line of the Union ships was in disorder 
after passing the ports, and since the air was full of smoke, 
the Confederate ram fleet, that was manned by river men 
only, had a far better opportunity to earn distinction than 
any one could have hoped for. The captains had only to 
steam in, choose their victims and use their armored bows. 
All of the captains had boasted of what they intended to 
do, and some had said they intended to show the old navy 
men how to fight. But the Union "ships came among 
them like dogs among a flock of sheep," as Mahan says, 
and like sheep they were destroyed. One, the Stonewall 
Jackson, while flying up the river, observed the Varuna 
lying half under water on the river bank and rammed her. 
That was the only stroke given by this fleet. She and all 
the others of her class were destroyed, either by their own 
crews or the guns of the Federal ships. 

Farragut lost one ship, the converted merchantman, 
while thirty-five men had been killed and 147 wounded. 
But he had passed the forts, he had made away with nine 
of the Confederate ships, he had the other Confederate 
ships at his mercy and the way to New Orleans was 
open. Seeing that his victory was thus complete he al- 
lowed his men to rest until the next day, when he steamed 
up the river, and at noon on April 25, 1862, anchored be- 
fore the defenceless city. 

The Confederate ironclad Mississippi was burned as 
the fleet arrived. The garrisons in Fort Jackson and Fort 
St. Philip became mutinous as soon as the Union ships 
had passed up, and on the 2Sth General Duncan was 



216 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

obliged to surrender. The ironclad Louisiana was set on 
fire and blown up by her commander. 

In a way Farragut's victory was the decisive naval battle 
of the Civil War. Napoleon III of France had been pre- 
paring to establish a French empire in tropical America. 
The division of the United States would remove the chief 
obstacle to his ambition. That he did not at once recog- 
nize the Confederacy is a fact that shows, perhaps better 
than any other in our history, the estimation in which Eu- 
ropeans then held the power of the American people. 
He did not dare to do it even after he had mustered the 
courage to invade Mexico. A comparison of the French 
and the American navies at the time Napoleon invaded 
Mexico will show that this is so. In the spring of 1862, 
however, he was negotiating with England for a joint in- 
tervention in aid of the Confederacy, and at the very mo- 
ment when Farragut's mortar fleet opened fire on Fort 
Jackson he was consulting with a British emissary with 
that end in view. No decision in the matter was reached 
that day because Napoleon had heard about the New 
Orleans expedition, and he was cautious enough to await 
the result of Farragut's work. Had Farragut failed, 
France and England would have intervened. The capt- 
ure of New Orleans, coming as it did after the unbroken 
series of advances which the navy had made on the At- 
lantic and the upper river, was a decisive factor in the 
preservation of the Union. 



CHAPTER XXII 

PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 

In the Civil War the Federals had no use for privateers 
because the Confederacy had no commerce to destroy. 
There were many Federal cruisers — unarmored ships of 
considerable speed — but they were used on the blockade, 
or in searching for blockade runners and for the com- 
merce-destroying cruisers sent out by the Confederates. 

When the President of the Confederacy, on April 17, 
1861, issued a proclamation "inviting all those who may 
desire by service in private armed vessels on the high seas 
to aid this government ... to make application for com- 
missions," he was following well-cherished American tra- 
ditions. A Congress of seven of the Powers of Europe, 
gathered in Paris in 1856, declared that "privateering is 
and remains abolished," but the United States declined 
to join in the declaration chiefly because it was in the inter- 
est of nations that, like England and France, then sup- 
ported large navies — something the American people were 
determined not to do. Once the secession movement had 
been carried to an extent where the Confederate Govern- 
ment was entitled to belligerent rights, privateering was 
justifiable. That the Union people should have called all 
Confederate armed ships pirates was natural enough 
during war times, but wholly unjustifiable in fact. 

Pilot boat No. 7, of Charleston, S. C, was the first 
privateer fitted out under the proclamation of President 
Davis. She was named Savannah. She went to sea on 
June 3, 1861, and the next day captured the brig Joseph, 

217 



218 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

of Rockland, Me. She was then captured by the United 
States brig Perry and sent to New York. Her crew were 
prosecuted for piracy, but they were in due time held as 
prisoners of war and exchanged. 

Scharf's "Confederate States Navy" describes seven- 
teen privateers all told. Five of them were fi|;ted out at 
New Orleans, and these captured twenty prizes. At no 
other point was such success attained. The efficiency of 
the blockade ended privateering enterprises, because it 
prevented sending in prizes. 

The first of the Confederate armed cruisers fitted out 
was the Sumter, a merchantman that had been plying 
between New Orleans and Havana. She was slow under 
sail, but good for ten knots under steam and sail. She 
could carry coal for eight days' steaming. Commander 
Raphael Semmes was ordered, on April 18, 1861, to fit her 
out and, on June 30, he went to sea. 

On the way to Cienfuegos seven merchantmen were 
taken, of which six were carried into that Spanish port 
while the seventh was retaken by her original crew. The 
six vessels left at Cienfuegos were returned to their owners 
by the Spanish authorities. From Cienfuegos the Sumter 
went to Curacoa, to Puerto Cabello, to Trinidad Island, to 
Maranham on the Brazil coast and then back to St. 
Pierre, Martinique. Here she was blockaded by the 
U. S. S. Iroquois, Captain J. S. Palmer, for nine days, 
but when Semmes was ready to sail he steamed towards 
the south side of the harbor until he found that the Iroquois 
was coming down swiftly to head him off when he doubled 
back under the land and went out the north side of the 
harbor unobserved. 

The Sumter now crossed to Cadiz and went thence to 
Gibraltar. There she was effectually blockaded by 
three United States steamers and she was sold for a 
blockade runner. She had captured eighteen ships all 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 219 

told, of which seven were destroyed, two were bonded 
(released on a bond given by the captain to pay the cap- 
tors the value of the ship six months after the success of 
the Confederacy should be acknowledged) and the re- 
mainder were carried into some foreign port and event- 
ually given to the original owners by the foreign authorities. 

After leaving the Sumter Semmes was ordered to the 
Alabama, the most famous of the Confederate cruisers. 
The interest in the story of this ship is greatly increased 
on account of the attitude of the British Government 
and ruling classes at the time. For she was British built, 
she was manned by British citizens under Confederate 
officers and the work she did was almost wholly in the 
interest of British shipping. 

"From the date of our independence it [England] had 
grudgingly yielded our just claims. The marvellous de- 
velopment of the American Republic had been regarded 
with marked disfavor by the aristocracy. . . . The break- 
ing up of the great democracy was a welcome anticipa- 
tion." (Foster's "Century of American Diplomacy.") 
Bluntly speaking, the British believed then, as they believed 
when they sent the Barbary pirates hunting American 
ships, that American prosperity on the high seas would be 

a detriment to British shipping — (" By , we must put a 

check to those people; they are ruining our commerce 
here!") The British determined, therefore, to do every- 
thing possible to make permanent the rupture of the 
Union — everything, that is, short of an open break with the 
North. 

At the very beginning of the secession movement the 
British secured an understanding with the French by which 
the two governments were to act in unison in American 
affairs. On reading a newspaper rumor that President 
Lincoln had issued a proclamation blockading the South- 
ern ports, orders were immediately issued by the British 



220 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Government according the Confederates belligerent rights. 
And this was done, although Lord John Russell, the Brit- 
ish minister of Foreign Affairs, had agreed with the Ameri- 
can minister to take no such step until Mr. Charles Francis 
Adams, the newly appointed American minister, should ar- 
rive to give the views of the new administration. 

Great Britain had declared that " Privateering is and re- 
mains abolished." A British work on international law 
(Willcock's, issued in 1863, and showing a violent antipathy 
toward the United States) declared that "should any 
nation, which has not assented, commission privateers, all 
the parties of that famous declaration, and indeed all others, 
are bound to regard the commission as null and void." 
But as soon as the Confederates commissioned privateers 
the British Government hastened to announce formally 
that it would recognize the commissions. And yet, look- 
ing to the possibility of a rupture with the United States, 
every effort was made to secure from the United States a 
promise to adhere to the Declaration of Paris. 

On May 6, five days before he received an official copy 
of Lincoln's proclamation blockading the Southern ports. 
Lord Russell wrote to Lord Lyons, British minister to 
Washington, and called the United States "the northern 
portion of the late union." In the despatches sent at this 
time Lord Lyons was instructed secretly to enter into com- 
munication with the Confederates, who were to be urged to 
consent to all the paragraphs of the Declaration of Paris 
except that relating to privateers. 

Then came the Trent affair. The Trent was a British 
steamer that sailed from Havana on November 7, 1861, 
bound to St. Thomas, carrying John Y. Mason, whom the 
Confederates had sent as an envoy to France, and John 
Slidell, envoy to Great Britain. On the 8th she was 
stopped in the Bahama channel by the U. S. S. San Jacinto, 
Captain Charles Wilkes (who had been cruising in search 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 221 

of the Sumter), when the Confederates were taken from 
her. 

Against such acts as this, when committed by British 
commanders in the years before the war of 1812, the 
United States had protested in vain. The British courts 
had sanctioned such acts and the British Government had 
haughtily refused to consider any proposition to end them. 

But when it was learned in England that the Confed- 
erates had been taken from the Trent the act was de- 
nounced as a national affront. The suggestion that it 
was the unauthorized act of an individual was jeered. 
Instead of waiting to learn what the United States Govern- 
ment might have to say (there was no cable in those days), 
or showing the least disposition to negotiate, Lord Russell 
at once ordered the British minister at Washington to issue 
an ultimatum: — "Surrender the Confederates and apolo- 
gize within seven days or fight," said he in substance, 
though not, of course, literally. At the same time orders 
to place the British navy and army at once upon a war 
footing were issued. Troops were embarked for Halifax 
and, as the first of the fleet of transports left her pier, her 
band played "Dixie," while the soldiers and populace 
cheered wildly. When in the midst of all these prepara- 
tions for war Minister Adams officially informed Lord 
Russell that Wilkes had acted without authority the in- 
formation was suppressed. "The arming continued with 
ostentatious publicity and public opinion was encouraged 
to drift into a state of hostility toward the United States." 
("The Case of the United States to be Laid Before the 
Tribunal of Arbitration" at Geneva, p. 38.) 

Having no warships or means of building them, the Con- 
federates, under the act of their Congress approved May 
10, 1861, sent Commander J. D. Bullock to England as 
naval agent to secure them. He reached Liverpool 
June 4, Eraser, Trenholm & Co., a branch of the firm 



222 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

of Fraser & Co., of Charleston, S. C, were appointed 
financial agents, and they were kept in funds by sending 
cotton through the blockade to their order. 

Captain Bullock was under orders to build warships; 
but a cruiser for the destruction of American commerce, 
and not an ironclad for opening the blockade, was the first 
ship built. Her keel was laid at Liverpool, ostensibly for 
the Italian Government. The protests of the American 
minister, who presented the facts to Lord Russell, were, 
of course, unheeded. Under the name of Oreto she cleared 
from Liverpool on March 22, 1862, for Palermo, and 
Jamaica; she went to the Bahamas. There she was de- 
livered to Captain J. N. Maffitt, of the Confederate navy, 
who took her to Green Cay, hoisted the Confederate flag, 
renamed her the Florida and armed her with rifled cannon 
that had been sent with other war material in another 
vessel. 

This work was done by Maffitt with eleven officers and 
eleven foremast hands, among all of whom the yellow 
fever began to rage before the task was more than started. 
With his war material on board Maffitt headed across to 
Cardenas where he arrived with but one fireman able to 
do duty, and but four men able to keep the deck. There 
Maffitt himself was stricken. The Spaniards sent a phy- 
sician to care for him, and he recovered only to learn that 
several of his crew were lost and but twelve men could be 
secured. With these he went to Havana. On finding 
he could get no men there he determined to run to Mobile. 
He left Havana at 9 o'clock at night on September 1, 1862, 
and at 3 o'clock on the 4th arrived among the blockaders 
off Mobile. With the British flag flying he steamed boldly 
in until he arrived where a British ship would naturally 
stop, then he sent up his own flag and made a most ex- 
citing run for Fort Morgan, which he reached in safety. 

After refitting at Mobile, Maffitt ran the blockade once 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 223 

more on January 15, 1863. The gunnery of the United 
States ships was so poor that he escaped with no harm 
worth mention. Being cordially received in the British 
ports he visited, MafBtt was able to continue his cruise 
without material difficulty. His most important act was 
done on May 6, 1863, when he fitted out a captured brig, 
the Clarence, of Baltimore, as a cruiser and sent her, under 
Lieutenant C. W. Read, to the coast of the United States. 
Read captured five vessels before June 10. To one of 
these he transferred his men and guns because she was 
superior for his purpose, and because a change of ships 
would assist in eluding the Federal ships sure to be sent 
after him. The new vessel was the schooner Tacony. 
With her, ten prizes were captured. Changing, then, to 
the schooner Archer, Read went to the coast of Maine and 
entering Portland, he cut out the revenue cutter Caleb 
Cushing (June 27). An expedition that went in chase of 
him at this time captured him. He was charged with 
piracy, but was finally exchanged. Meantime the Florida 
had gone to Brest, France, where she remained six months 
and was fully refitted in the government dock. On ac- 
count of ill health Maffitt left the ship and Lieutenant 
C. M. Morris took command. He took the Florida to 
Bahia, Brazil, where the U. S. S. WachuseU, Captain N. 
Collins, took her from under the Brazilian guns (October 
7, 1864) and sent her to the United States. The Wash- 
ington authorities ordered her returned to her crew in 
Bahia, but while she was lying at Newport News with 
only an engineer and two assistants on board, the seacocks 
were opened and she sank at her mooring. She had 
captured thirty-seven merchantmen all told. As Brazil 
had allowed the Confederates to violate her waters re- 
peatedly it was not difficult to pacify her for the lack of 
respect shown in taking the Florida. 

After starting work on the Florida, Commander Bullock 



224 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

contracted with the Lairds, shipbuilders of Liverpool, 
for another cruiser (no battleship was wanted yet) that 
became the Alabama. The name of the builders is of 
note only because one of them was a member of Parlia- 
ment who openly boasted in a speech, made in the 
House of Commons (February 5, 1863), of what he was 
doing, and he was enthusiastically applauded by a large 
majority of that House, although all knew that he was 
violating the law of the land in building the ship. 

The work on this ship was carried on so well that Min- 
ister Adams was not able to secure conclusive evidence 
that she was a Confederate cruiser until June 23, 1862, 
only about a month before she sailed. The British re- 
fused to admit the evidence sufficient to detain the ship. 
On July 21, 23 and 25 evidence that could not be denied 
or ignored was transmitted to Lord Russell, but it was 
purposely held in abeyance until the ship could be so far 
completed that she was able to sail on a "trial trip" — 
July 29. When she had gone it was announced that she 
could not lawfully sail, but no effort was made to compel 
her to return to port although she lay at Anglesea for two 
days more. 

At the Azores the Alabama was fitted out as a Confed- 
erate cruiser, with Confederate officers and British seamen. 
Some of her crew had had experience in naval ships. 
Thereafter, the British authorities did everything possible 
to favor this ship. 

In no way, however, was the British desire to see the 
Alabama succeed shown so conclusively as when Lord 
Russell wrote to the Liverpool chamber of Commerce, 
in regard to a British cargo that the Alabama had destroyed 
in a captured United States merchantman. Russell said: 

"British property on board a vessel belonging to one of 
the belligerents must be subject to all the risks and con- 
tigencies of war, so far as the capture of the vessel is con- 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 225 

cemed. The owners of any British property, not being 
contraband of war, on board a Federal vessel captured and 
destroyed by a Confederate vessel of war, may claim in a 
Confederate prize-court compensation for the destruction 
of such property." 

Not only did Lord Russell wish to the Alabama success 
in her cruise against American merchantmen; here was an 
unmistakable notice to British merchants that they must 
not ship their cargoes in American ships. The British 
authorities had seen how the work of the Sumter had 
driven American merchantmen from the West Indies. 
They had noted, too, that American shipowners were al- 
ready seeking protection from British Confederate cruis- 
ers by placing their vessels under the British flag. The 
Alabama was allowed to go to sea, and once under the 
Confederate flag was in every way encouraged to destroy 
all American high-seas commerce, in order to drive the 
American flag ojf the ocean. Said the Marquis of Salis- 
bury (he was then Lord Cecil), in the House of Com- 
mons: 

"They [the Southern people] were the natural allies of 
this country as great producers of the articles we needed 
and great consumers of the articles we supplied. The 
North, on the other hand, kept an opposition shop in the 
same departments of trade as ourselves." 

Lord Russell himself said: "It was the great object of the 
British Government to preserve for the nation the lucrative 
trade of shipbuilding." 

For stopping a British merchantman and taking Con- 
federate envoys from her the British Government threat- 
ened the United States with war within seven days, but 
when the Alabama destroyed British cargoes the owners 
were told to apply to the Confederate prize-courts for re- 
dress, and, in future, to keep their cargoes out of Ameri- 
can ships. As Professor Goldwin Smith said, "No na- 



226 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

tion ever inflicted upon another a more flagrant or more 
maddening wrong." 

Of the work of the Alabama as a cruiser it is necessary 
to say Httle, for the reason that it was on the whole de- 
voted to capturing American merchantmen. Semmes 
was able and enthusiastic. He haunted the highways of 
the sea, remaining on each station until it was time to look 
for the appearance of a Federal ship of greater force, when 
he went elsewhere. The ships captured were usually 
burned. Sometimes the light of the fires brought humane 
captains of other ships to the scene, hoping to rescue those 
who were supposed to be in dire distress. These ships 
were, of course, at once taken and burned, an act that 
roused a strong sentiment of hatred among Northern 
seamen. 

On January 11, 1863, the Alabama appeared off Gal- 
veston, where the converted merchantman Hatteras was 
sent in chase of her. The Hatteras was shot to pieces 
in just thirteen minutes, and but for the activity of the 
Alabama's men in rescuing them, the crew would have gone 
down with her. 

From Galveston the Alabama went to the coast of Brazil 
and thence to the Cape of Good Hope. A prize taken on 
the way was fitted out as the cruiser Tuscaloosa. Semmes 
claimed for her the privileges of a regular man-o'-war, 
and the civil authorities at the Cape inclined to agree with 
him, but the admiral on the station. Sir Baldwin Walker, 
pointed out that putting a few small guns and a small 
prize crew on the vessel had not changed her character 
as a prize. The dispute was referred to London and, after 
the Tuscaloosa had sailed, the Home Government decided 
that the vessel was a prize and should have been detained. 
"These instructions were calculated to afford a cheap sat- 
isfaction to the United States, without injuring the Con- 
federates." (Soley.) But contrary to expectations the 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 227 

Tuscaloosa came into the Cape once more and the governor 
at once detained her. " This was not at all what the Home 
Government wanted; and it immediately disavowed the 
act and restored the Tuscaloosa" to her commander. 

While at Cape Town, Semmes increased his crew and 
sold a prize, both acts being contrary to the British law, 
and then went to the East Indies where he remained six 
months and destroyed many ships. Returning thence to 
the Atlantic, the ship Tycoon was taken on April 27, 1864, 
and she was the last vessel destroyed by the Alabama. 
Being in need of repairs, Semmes took his ship to Cher- 
bourg, France, where she arrived on June 11. On the 
14th the U. S. S. Kearsarge, Captain John A. Winslow, 
arrived, and Semmes sent word to her that he would come 
out for a fight as soon as he could; for he had grown weary 
of commerce destruction. 

In model, steam-power and armament the Alabama 
was, for her size, and purpose (a cruiser), the ideal of the 
British naval architect of her day. In like manner the 
Kearsarge was the American ideal. The Kearsarge 
measured 1,031 tons, the Alabama 1,016. The Kearsarge 
carried 163 men, the Alabama 149. The Kearsarge was 
armed with two 11-inch Dahlgrens, four short 32-pounders 
and a 30-pounder rifle; the Alabama carried a Blakely 
100-pounder rifle and a 68-pounder smoothbore for pivots, 
and six long 32-pounders in broadside. The Kearsarge 
used five of her guns in the broadside, the Alabama seven. 
(Report of Captain Winslow, July 30, 1864). The 
Alabama fired 384 pounds of metal at .a broadside to the 
366 of the Kearsarge. The Kearsarge was one of the 
vessels that had been authorized by Congress during the 
session before the Lincoln administration came into power. 

After fitting out his ship as well as possible, Semmes 
sailed out of port soon after 9 o'clock, on Sunday morning, 
June 19, 1864. Captain Winslow at once headed the 



228 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Kearsarge off shore, "fearing the question of jurisdiction." 
When six or seven miles off shore he turned back, heading 
directly at the Alabama. 

As Semmes had pivoted his guns to starboard he now 
sheered off so as to bring that side of his ship into action, 
and at 10:57 began firing. The Kearsarge soon sheered 
off also to avoid being raked and thereafter the two ships 
steered in spirals round and round, the diameter of the 
spirals growing smaller with each turn until seven circles 
had been made. 

During this time the crew of the Alabama fired rapidly 
— twice as fast as the men of the Kearsarge — but the Fed- 
eral fire was made slowly in order that it might be more 
effective. The two 11 -inch guns were carefully aimed 
to sink the Alabama while the others were aimed to clear 
her decks. The effect was deadly. At the end of an 
hour, or a little more, the Alabama was sinking. Turning 
away, Semmes tried to run her ashore, but the movement 
was made too late. It was quickly seen that she would 
go down with all hands unless something was done to se- 
cure help, and the flag was hauled down. Owing to a mis- 
understanding, of the kind that have been common -enough 
in ship duels, both ships fired their guns after the flag was 
down. At 12:20 the fires under the Alabama's boilers 
were drowned and at 12:30 she sank stern first. 

The wounded and the men who could not swim were got 
afloat in such boats as were unhurt. Semmes and many 
of his crew remained on the ship until the waves 
lapped the deck. Then Semmes threw his sword into the 
sea and jumped overboard, with the others that had re- 
mained. It is a good man that fights till his ship is sinking. 

Captain Winslow called on the captain of the British 
yacht Deerhound to help pick up the men seen in the water 
and it was done; for the Kearsarge had only two boats in 
condition for use. A French pilot boat carried some of 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 229 

the crew ashore. The Deerhound took Semmes and about 
forty others to England, an act that excited much anger 
in the United States, although the act was, of course, en- 
tirely right. The British had been so persistent in their 
underhand efforts to destroy the Union that the American 
people were not in a mental condition to give a sober judg- 
ment. The anger of the Americans was greatly increased 
when Captain Bedford Pirn, R.N., who had written two 
books to show his hatred for the "Yankees," led in raising 
a sum of money with which to purchase a handsome sword 
to give to Semmes in place of the one that had been thrown 
into the sea. 

As showing the difference in the gunnery of the two ships 
it is noted that the Alabama fired 370 shot and shell, of 
which but twenty-eight hit the Kearsarge, and of the twenty- 
eight, only five struck her in or below the gun-deck. The 
Kearsarge fired 173 shots, of which fifty-five were from the 
11 -inch Dahlgrens. It is not known how many struck 
the Alabama. One of the Alabama's 100-pounder shells 
entered the hull of the Kearsarge and penetrated until it 
lodged in the stern-post, but it did not explode. The friends 
of Semmes declared that if this shell had been of good 
quality it would have destroyed the stern-post, thus ruin- 
ing the steering gear of the Kearsarge and putting her at 
the mercy of the Alabama. The fact is that if the per- 
cussion cap had been in order to explode the shell, the ex- 
plosion would have occurred long before the stern-post 
was reached. Moreover, this shell did not hit the Kear- 
sarge until the Alabama had been cut up beyond salvation. 
Bad as were the American gunners of that period, the Brit- 
ish on whom Semmes had to depend were worse. And 
Semmes was unable to train his gunners because he lacked 
ammunition. 

The Kearsarge was also called an ironclad because she 
had a cable flaked on the outside opposite the machinery 



230 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

after the fashion adopted on the Mississippi River. This 
armor stopped two shot that struck it, but these would have 
had no influence on the result if they had penetrated. 
The shot of the 100-pounder would have cut the chain 
readily. 

Next to the Alabama the Shenandoah was the most suc- 
cessful of the Confederate cruisers. She was a full-rigged 
ship with auxiliary steam-power and rather swift for her 
class. She sailed from London on October 8, 1864, and 
was transferred to Captain J. I. Waddell at the Madeiras, 
where she was fitted out as a man-o'-war. She was then 
taken to the Pacific for the destruction of the American 
whaling fleet, at which she was employed until some time 
after the end of the war. On June 22, 1865, on over- 
hauling the whaler Milo, of New Bedford (Captain J. C. 
Hawes) , the crew of the Shenandoah were told that the war 
was over. Captain Waddell refused to believe the state- 
ment. The Milo was bonded and four other ships were 
burned that day. They were all whalers and were found 
in latitude 63'40'' north and longitude ITS'SO" west. On 
the 23d another whaler was taken, on the 25th still another 
and then on the 26th six were captured. All but one of 
the eight were burned, the one being bonded for use as 
a cartel to carry the prisoners. The final day's work of 
destroying the whalers was June 28, when eleven were 
captured, of which nine were burned and two bonded. 
The Shenandoah then headed south and, on August 2, 
fell in with the English bark Barracouta, from San Fran- 
cisco to Liverpool, the captain of which confirmed the 
news given by the captain of the whaler Milo. The final 
entry in the Shenandoah's log says: 

Nov. 5. — Arrived in the Mersey, off Liverpool, and on Monday 
the 6th surrendered the Shenandoah to the British nation, by letter 
to Lord John R. Russell. 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 231 

She had captured thirty-eight vessels of which thirty- 
two were destroyed. 

In March, 1862, the Lairds began building two iron- 
clad, turreted rams (armor 4| to 5| inches thick), that 
were armed with two 9-inch guns in each turret. They 
were really formidable ships. When nearly ready for 
sea, however, it appears that their very power decided 
the British Government to hold them. For it was seen, 
as Minister Adams wrote to Lord Russell, that to let them 
go was to declare war on the United States, and England 
was not quite ready to do that at that time. Conditions 
had changed since the Trent affair. In November, 1861, 
the date of the Trent affair, the United States had been 
able to add to the thirty-two available steamers of the old 
navy only seventy-three converted merchantmen, carry- 
ing an average of less than three guns each. We had 
some warships in hand, but what the quality would be no 
one could tell. England had, at that time, 252 steam 
warships (Busk), not counting armed transports, floating 
batteries or armed store ships. Even their small "screw 
gun vessels" of four guns might hope to meet our con- 
verted merchantmen with success. But in 1863, when 
the Confederate ironclads were ready, the United States 
had 588 well-armed warships, of which 284 had been built 
within two years; of these, twenty-four were of the well- 
tried Monitor class, and all were armed with the superior 
Dahlgren guns of a calibre up to fifteen inches or with 
rifled guns of a calibre up to eight inches. More impor- 
tant yet— most important of all — these ships were manned 
hy men who had been under fire, and every man of every 
crew would have understood why he was fighting had a 
war with England been necessary. So we escaped war 
once more because we were 'prepared to make a good fight. 

To show good will to the Confederates, however, the 
British Admiralty bought in the two ships, paying for them 



232 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

$150,000 in excess of the contract price. "And while the 
loss of such formidable ships was a severe disappointment 
to the Confederate Government, the money was much 
needed at the time, and was beneficially applied to other 
purposes of the navy." (Scharf.) 

Contracts for building six warships were made in France, 
but of these only one, the battleship Stonewall, got away 
to sea. She carried a 300-pounder Armstrong rifle in her 
forward turret and was protected with 4f-inch iron. She 
was first sold to the Danish Government and then, while 
at Copenhagen, was transferred to the Confederates, and 
placed under Captain T. J. Page. He sailed from Copen- 
hagen on January 6, 1865, and went to the Spanish coast, 
where, in the port of Corunna, he found the United States 
steamer Niagara, carrying ten 150-pound Parrott rifles, 
and the Sacramento, armed with two 11 -inch and two 9-inch 
Dahlgrens, all under the command of Commodore T. T. 
Craven. Page did all he could to induce Craven to come 
out and fight, but Craven declined to do so. By the stand- 
ards of naval honor at that time Craven should have gone 
out. It will never do to weigh the chances of success too 
closely, and Craven deserved the disgrace that came upon 
him. Yet it is easy to see now that with her concentra- 
tion of power and her thick armor the Stonewall was more 
than a match for the two wooden vessels under Craven. 
The Stoneivall eventually went to Havana, where, the war 
having ended, she was turned over to the United States. 

All told, the Confederates had afloat nineteen cruisers, 
though it is not certain that some of them were properly 
so-called. They captured 257 American ships and thus 
inflicted the blow upon American shipping which the Brit- 
ish authorities had intended that they should inflict. As 
every reader knows, the United States eventually called 
upon the British to pay for the damage thus intentionally 
inflicted. Very grudgingly the British agreed to arbitrate 



PRIVATEERS AND CRUISERS 233 

the matter. The result of that arbitration has never been 
well comprehended by the American people. The British 
were compelled to pay the actual losses sustained through 
the destruction of certain enumerated ships. But it did 
not pay a penny for the damage sustained in driving Ameri- 
can shipping off the seven seas. 

The damage thus incidentally inflicted was the one ob- 
ject which the British had in view when they allowed the 
Confederate cruisers to go to sea, contrary to law and right. 
And to this day the British are enjoying the ill-gotten carry- 
ing trade thus taken from our shipping. Yet it is im- 
possible to induce the American people to do anything 
to give the American flag its old-time place upon the ocean. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED— EVOLUTION OF THE 
TORPEDO 

New Orleans having been captured, Farragut was 
anxious to repeat the work thus done by going to Mobile, 
the forts of which were then not in good order, and their 
supply of ammunition was short. He saw that he could 
pass into Mobile Bay easily and when there could compel 
the surrender of the forts guarding the entrance to the bay 
much as he compelled those on the Mississippi to do so. 
The evacuation of Pensacola by the Confederates on May 
10 increased his desire to do this, but in the meantime the 
Navy Department had ordered him, with his fleet of sea- 
going ships, up the Mississippi, hoping to take the Con- 
federate works on the banks and restore the whole valley 
to the Union. 

On June 18 Farragut arrived within view of Vicksburg, 
400 miles (all within the territory of the enemy) from New 
Orleans, and on the 28th the well-manned, well-armed 
batteries, three miles long, were passed. But Vicksburg 
was not captured. The Confederate batteries were on 
bluffs so high that the naval guns could not be elevated to 
reach them. The fact that 1,500 soldiers had been sent 
along to hold the forts that Farragut was expected to capt- 
ure, including the three miles of fort at Vicksburg, shows 
the state of mind prevailing at Washington at that time. 

As noted, the river fleet, under Flag-Officer Davis, joined 
Farragut at Vicksburg. On July 15, while the two fleets 

234 



THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED 235 

were dozing at their anchors, the Confederate ironclad 
Arkansas, Commander Isaac N. Brown, came down the 
Yazoo. Deserters had said she was coming, and two gun- 
boats and an Ellet ram were sent to meet her, but she 
spanked the three out of her way, and then ran amuck 
through the combined fleets, to the great mortification of 
Farragut. But for the worthlessness of her machinery she 
might have destroyed a large part of the Federal fleet, since 
her armor was sufficient and her guns were good. She 
was then moored under the batteries at Vicksburg and the 
work of fitting her out continued. 

When it was learned that Farragut's deep-water ships 
could not take Vicksburg even with the aid of 1,500 soldiers, 
and that low water might hold them idle in the river there, 
when they were needed elsewhere, they were ordered to 
New Orleans. The whole expedition had been a failure, 
through no fault of Farragut, but his chagrin was modified 
when (July 16, 1862) he was made a rear-admiral by act 
of Congress — the first of the rank in the American navy. 

The retreat of the Federal fleet having left the river to 
the Confederates, they fortified the bluffs at Port Hudson 
and thus held undisputed sway between that place and 
Vicksburg. This gave them the navigation of the Red 
River and an overland route to Matamoras, Mexico, by 
which large quantities of supplies were obtained for their 
armies in the East. An adequate advance was therefore 
planned against Port Hudson and Vicksburg, General 
U. S. Grant being at the head of the army sent against 
Vicksburg. Of Grant's operations nothing need he said 
liere except that he went down along the west side of the 
river, crossed over to take the Confederates in the rear, 
and that to facilitate this work as well as to get control of 
the river. Acting Rear-Admiral Porter, who was at that 
time in command of the upper river fleet, sent two of his 
boats down past Vicksburg. The Arkansas had been 



236 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

destroyed by her own crew, meantime, because her ma- 
chinery had given out when she was under the fire of the 
Union ironclad Essex. The river was, therefore, under 
Union control until the Confederates, by good aggressive 
fighting, captured both of Porter's boats. 

On hearing of this disaster to Porter's vessels, Farragut 
determined to go up the river, even though his ships were 
unfitted for such work, since at this time it was imperative 
to shut off the Confederate supplies coming from Red 
River in order to cripple the Confederate garrisons — ■ 
starve them — at both Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The 
Hartford, Monongahela, Mississippi and Richmond, all 
sea-going ships, each with a gunboat lashed alongside to 
help as a tug, anchored below Port Hudson on March 14, 
1863. Farragut then issued a general order, one sentence 
of which ought to be framed and hung up where all can 
see it on every ship of the navy, in every room at the naval 
academy and (printed in type which old eyes can read 
easily) in every room of the Navy Department. For, 
along with such instructions as were needed by his cap- 
tains in passing the forts, he said: 

" The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well- 
directed fire from our own guns." 

Farragut did not fail to appreciate the real value of 
armor— he saw that it was necessary — but he saw also that 
it was, bluntly speaking, a cowardice breeder (he called 
ironclads "cowardly things") — something that inclined a 
captain to make a defensive rather than an aggressive 
fight. 

The dash past Port Hudson was begun at 10 o'clock on 
the night after Farragut arrived ready for the task. The 
Hartfoi-d with the Albatross alongside led the way and 
passed successfully. The Mississippi grounded and was 
burned to keep the Confederates from getting her. The 
others were disabled and had to drop down because the 



EVOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO 237 

gunboats could not handle them. In spite of these losses 
the movement succeeded. Farragut, with his two vessels, 
was able to stop the Red River trade until Porter came 
down with reinforcements. He thus materially aided in 
the capture of Vicksburg on July 4, and Port Hudson on 
July 9, 1863. From that time on the Mississippi was 
restored to the United States. 

A feature of the naval work on the coast of the Atlantic 
that needs to be considered here is that in connection with 
the evolution of the torpedo and its effect upon the course 
of the war. 

The torpedo was not a new device, strictly speaking. 
David Bushnell, of Connecticut, had made a submarine 
boat with which he navigated New York bay and barely 
missed blowing one British man-o'-war out of water, 
during the Revolution. Robert Fulton, during the first 
few years of the nineteenth century, demonstrated that 
submarine boats propelled by hand could be used with de- 
cisive effect in defending harbors, but having boasted that 
such boats would make warships useless, a boast that he 
could not make good, he antagonized the naval men and 
failed to get his devices adopted. Colonel Samuel Colt, 
inventor of the revolver, devised a torpedo system nearly 
twenty years before the Civil War, but he, too, failed to get 
it into use, and it was, therefore, with traditions of failure 
of a kind around it that the torpedo came up for considera- 
tion during the Civil War. Naturally the Confederates 
took hold of it first, for it was exclusively a weapon of de- 
fence, since they were waging a war that was defensive. 

On July 7, 1861, a number of torpedoes made of boiler 
iron and buoyed with oil barrels were turned loose in the 
Potomac, near Aquia Creek, in the hope that they would 
drift against the Union vessels near at hand, but they were 
discovered and the fuses (open and easily seen) were ex- 
tinguished by a boat's crew. Torpedoes were found in 



238 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the Savannah River on February 13, 1862, and in the 
Neuse in March following. On April 21, 1862, the Con- 
federates passed an act offering to pay prize money to 
aruyone who would destroy a Union ship by means of a 
torpedo. This was followed in October by the establish- 
ment of a torpedo bureau under an army officer, and a 
"Naval Submarine Battery Service" under Captain 
M. F. Maury. Torpedo stations were established at 
Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah and Mobile before 
the end of 1862. (Scharf.) 

On December 12, 1862, the Federal gunboat Cairo was 
sunk in the Yazoo River by a torpedo that had been made 
of a demijohn and was fired by a string pulled by a man 
who was concealed in an earthwork on shore. About 
two months later the monitor Montauk, Captain Worden, 
went up the Ogechee River, in Georgia, and taking a po- 
sition under the fire of a fort, she shelled and destroyed 
the Confederate cruiser Nashville, that had been trying 
to run to sea. She suffered no damage from the fire of 
the fort, but when dropping down the river after the 
Nashville was burned, she struck a percussion torpedo 
that laid her up for a month. In July following the gun- 
boat Baron de Kalh was destroyed in the Yazoo in a 
similar manner. 

The torpedoes used during the war were of various 
kinds. Heavy timber frames were moored in the chan- 
nels where Union ships were expected, and to these frames 
were secured receptacles filled with powder and fitted 
with percussion caps. Beer kegs were favorite receptacles. 
Tin cans were used. In many cases (in the channel at 
Mobile, for instance) the torpedo was made buoyant and 
was held in place by ah anchor. As these swayed with the 
tide they usually turned their percussion caps away from 
a vessel that approached with the tide. Many floating 
torpedoes were sent adrift in the hope that that they would 



EVOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO 239 

chance to hit a Union ship. A pubUshed Hst shows that 
twenty-nine Union ships were destroyed by torpedoes of 
one kind and another and eleven more were injured. 

The most interesting feature of the torpedo work was 
that done at Charleston in the development of the submar- 
ine torpedo boat. One submarine, called a fish torpedo, 
and two torpedo boats that were designed to float with 
the upper skin just awash were in use there. The sub- 
marine was constructed at Mobile where in a trial in the 
bay she went down and drowned all hands — nine men. 
She was then raised and taken to Charleston. She was 
fitted with fins on the side to help keep her under water 
while moving forward, and with ballast tanks to submerge 
her. A screw turned by eight men propelled her and a 
percussion torpedo was affixed to the end of a pole pro- 
jecting from her bow. 

While Lieutenant Payne and a crew were fitting her for 
an attack on the blockaders, in February, 1864, a wave 
from a passing steamer swept over her and she went down 
with all but Payne. When she was raised one of her 
builders took her for a trial trip and getting fast on a mud 
bank under water all hands were suffocated. Once more 
she was raised, and although she had killed thirty-one men, 
she was promptly manned by volunteers. Lieutenant 
George E. Dixon, of the 21st Alabama Infantry, then took 
her to sea during the night of February 17, 1864, and fired 
her torpedo against the side of the U. S. S. Housatonic, 
sinking her within four minutes. The torpedo boat was 
just awash at the time, and the wave thrown up by the ex- 
plosion overwhelmed her with all her crew. The Housa- 
tonic lost four men. It is a comfort to think that the de- 
scendants of the men who repeatedly manned this boat 
are now among the most loyal of the citizens of the re- 
public. 

A somewhat similar boat (cigar shaped) was made by 



240 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Mr. T. D. Stoney, of Charleston, but there is no further 
record of her. Captain F. D. Fee, C.S.A., built a steam 
torpedo boat that floated with her deck just awash, and 
she exploded a torpedo against the side of the New Iron- 
sides, but the explosion was not powerful enough to dam- 
age the ship seriously. 

A review of all the facts seems to show that Charleston 
successfully resisted the Federal attacks chiefly because of 
the torpedoes in the harbor. While the writer was dis- 
cussing this matter with Bishop John Johnson, of Charles- 
ton, who, as a major in the Confederate service, helped to 
defend Fort Sumter, he said: 

"The moral effect of these obstructions was excellent — 
excellent." 

How they kept the Federal fleet from passing Fort 
Sumter and reaching the city on April 7, 1863, is told by 
the reports of the officers of the various ships as well as 
that of Rear Admiral DuPont. The assaulting ships in- 
cluded seven monitors, the broadside ironclad New Iron- 
sides and a nondescript ironclad called the Keokuk. The 
Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, with a timber de- 
vice under her bow with which to pick up torpedoes, led 
the line. Captain Rodgers, in his report, said: 

" We succeeded in arriving under the fire of Fort Sum- 
ter at about 2:50 p. m. . . . We approached very close 
to the obstructions extending from Fort Sumter to Fort 
Moultrie — as near, indeed, as I could get without running 
upon them. . . . The appearance was so formidable that 
upon deliberate judgment I thought it right not to entangle 
the vessel in obstructions that I did not think we could 
have passed through." 

The "obstructions" were dummy torpedoes, as Bishop 
Johnson told the writer. Because they lacked suitable 
material for real torpedoes the Confederates laid these 
"Quakers." Moreover, there was a passage through the 



EVOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO 241 

line, there was deep water clear of the few real topedoes 
that had been laid and when the New Ironsides happened 
to get into position over one of the real torpedoes which 
was laid in the channel off Fort Wagner (well out of range 
of Fort Sumter), all efforts to explode the thing failed. 
The Federal ships should have found a way through the 
"obstructions," or they should have made one— as Farra- 
gut had done at New Orleans and was to do again at 
Mobile. 

In failing to pass the "obstructions," through which he 
could have steamed easily, Rodgers threw the Federal hne 
mto confusion and held his own ship and some of the others 
among a number of range buoys that had been placed by 
the Confederates to give accuracy to the guns in their forts. 
So turrets were jammed, port stoppers were riveted in place 
—five of the ships were disabled and all had to retreat. 
The flagship New Ironsides was held so far out of range 
(see Johnson's "Defence of Charleston," p. 49) that she 
escaped damage. In his detailed official report DuPont 
speaks of the "obstructions" eight times. In the first 
despatch he says " Charleston cannot be taken by a purely 
naval attack." There was but one Farragut in the navy, 
apparently, at that time, and Rodgers was by no means 
a T. A. M. Craven. 

Rear-Admiral Dahlgren replaced DuPont a little later. 
His reputation rested on the excellence of the cannon he 
had developed, and on that it yet rests. The army capt- 
ured Charleston. 

The Federals used torpedoes on one notable occasion 
only. The Confederates had built an ironclad called the 
Albemarle on the banks of the Neuse River, intending to 
use her in clearing the Federals from the North Carolina 
sounds. She came down the river on April 19. and again 
on May 5, and on each occasion she played havoc with the 
gunboats that opposed her, but because of the defects al- 



242 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

ways found in the Confederate-built ships it was thought 
advisable to lay her up at Plymouth until another ironclad 
building on the Tar River was completed to aid her. 

While the Albemarle was thus in waiting, Lieutenant 
W. B. Gushing, U.S.N. , who had won his commission by 
repeated "acts of successful daring," went up the river 
(October 27, 1864) in an open steam launch with a tor- 
pedo secured to the end of a pole projecting from her 
bow. On arriving opposite the Albemarle, Gushing 
found her surrounded by a log boom which was placed so 
far from her that his torpedo pole was not long enough to 
reach across the intervening space. Just as he learned 
this discouraging fact he was discovered by sentinels on 
shore. The soldiers stationed there began to shoot at 
him, and a huge pile of fat pine knots was jBred, the 
flames illuminating the whole river. 

To any other than a Gushing this expedition would have 
been a bloody failure, but, turning his launch out into the 
stream, he swung her around a wide circle and then headed 
straight for the boom abreast the Albemarle. Two howit- 
zers and a score of muskets were fired at him, but he held 
his way until his launch slid up on and part way across the 
boom, within reach of the ironclad. At that moment a 
100-pounder was shoved from a port directly in front of 
him, yet he coolly placed his torpedo against the hull of the 
ship and fired it just as the cannon was discharged at him. 
The cannon-shot flew high; the torpedo destroyed the 
Albemarle. It was for this deed that the first modern 
torpedo boat used in our new navy was named the Cushing. 



CHAPTER XXIV 
FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 

Mobile lies at the head of a shoal, bell-shaped bay, that 
is about thirty miles long and fifteen wide at the lower 
end. A dredged channel now runs to the city, but in 
Civil War times the only deep water (20 to 24 feet) was in 
a pocket two and a half by six miles large in the lower bay, 
and in the channel leading thence to the open water. The 
lower side of the bay was protected on the east side of the 
channel by a long sandy point, on the end of which stood 
Fort Morgan, a brick structure mounting eighty-six guns, 
of which the best were 10-inch smoothbores and 8-inch 
rifles. On the west side of the channel, which lay close 
under the walls of Fort Morgan, was a shoal that arose 
above water eventually and was called Dauphin Island. 
Fort Gaines stood on this island, but it was so far from the 
channel as to be of no account in the defence of the bay 
against Farragut. Since this shoal might have been 
crossed by such gunboats as the Federals used in the Mis- 
sissippi, the Confederates blocked it by driving rows of 
piles from Fort Gaines well out to the channel. Then to 
cover a channel that led westerly behind a row of islands 
to New Orleans (Grant Pass) Fort Powell was built on 
a sandbar beside that channel. This fort was not quite 
finished when Farragut came. As an aid to the forts, the 
main channel was filled with torpedoes, buoyant and 
anchored in place, save for a passage about 480 feet wide 
on the side toward Fort Morgan that was reserved for 
blockade runners. There were thirty-six torpedoes all 

243 



244 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

told. A red buoy marked the lirait of open water and black 
buoys the location of the torpedoes. 

"A ship passing between that buoy [the red one] and 
the shore would be exposed to the fire at short range of 
seven 10-inch Columbiads, three 8-inch guns, two 8-inch 
Blakelj rifles, two 7-inch Brooke rifles, some 6.4-inch 
rifles, several 32-pounders and the rifle fire of the sharp- 
shooters." (Report General D. H. Maury, C.S.A.) 

The naval defences of the bay included a converted river 
steamer and two gunboats built for the purpose, all of 
which had good guns and very poor hulls and machinery, 
as usual. Besides these the Confederates had an ironclad 
called the Tennessee that just missed being a most formi- 
dable ship. She was of the usual casemate type, but the 
casemate walls extended over the sides of the hull like the 
eaves of a country house and then were turned back toward 
the hull which they reached below the water line. The 
knuckle thus formed was filled in solid with timber. No 
vessel then afloat could have broken in her sides by ram- 
ming. Her armor was from five to six inches thick, and 
she was armed with 7-inch and 6.4-inch Brooke rifles. 

Thus far the Tennessee was excellent. Her machinery, 
however, was defective. There was no effective way of 
forcing the draught in case her smokestack should be shot 
away, her port shutters were so arranged that a chance shot 
might rivet them in place when shut, and, last and worst 
of all, her tiller chains and her spare tiller gear all lay in 
fair view on the after-deck. 

Admiral Franklin Buchanan (he had been promoted 
for his part in the Merrimac's attack on the Federal ships 
at Hampton Roads) was in command of the fleet, and 
General R. L. Page, who had been a commander in the old 
navy, was in command of Fort Morgan. 

The fleet which Farragut gathered off Mobile in July, 
1864, included the single-turret monitors Tecumseh, 



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 245 

Commander T. A. M. Craven, and Manhattan, Command- 
er J. W. A. Nicholson; the double-turret monitors Winne- 
bego, Commander T. H. Stevens, and Chickasaw, Lieu- 
tenant G. H. Perkins. The flagship was the Hartford, 
Captain Drayton. The best battery in the wooden fleet, 
by the standard of the day, was on the Brooklyn, Captain 
James Alden. She carried twenty 9-inch Dahlgrens and 
four Parrott rifles, of which two were 100-pounders. 
There were twelve other unarmored ships and gunboats 
in the attacking fleet, and they carried guns varying from 
a 150-pounder rifle to a 12-pounder howitzer, the total 
number of guns in the fleet being 159, of which more than 
half were 9-inch smoothbores or better. 

After soul-trying delays Farragut at last had this fleet 
in hand, on August 4, 1864, and preparations for passing 
the forts next morning were completed. Farragut's work 
at this time may very well be compared with that done by 
DuPont at Charleston, in April, 1863, as already described. 
Thus DuPont ordered his ships to go in against the ebb- 
tide so that if any one was disabled she could float with the 
current out of range. Farragut ordered his ships to go 
in with the flood-tide. Then a small vessel having been 
lashed beside each large one, tug-fashion, he wrote an 
order saying: 

"If one or more ships be disabled their partners must 
carry them through, if possible, but if they cannot, then 
the next astern mu^t render the required assistance." 

DuPont was thinking of securing the safety of his ships; 
Farragut thought only of going through, happen what 
might. 

Another sentence in Farragut's general order is mem- 
orable. "It will be the object of the admiral to get as 
close to the fort as possible before opening fire." 

At 6:10 o'clock in the morning on August 5, 1864, 
Farragut's unarmored ships crossed the outer bar of 



246 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Mobile Bay. The monitors that had passed the night 
further in, then joined the fleet, taking position ahead of 
the unarmored ships, with the Tecumseh leading all. 
The Brooklyn led the unarmored ships, because she had 
a device for picking up torpedoes, and because she could 
train four guns dead ahead, something that none of the 
ships behind her could do. But the Hartford, happily, 
was next in line. 

At 6:55 the whole fleet moved forward in the channel. 
The eager captain of the Tecumseh fired both of his guns 
as he started his ship. Ten minutes later Fort Morgan 
opened on the fleet, the Brooklyn replied immediately, the 
other ships of the fleet joined in as their guns would bear 
and the Confederate ships steamed out from the shelter 
of Fort Morgan and took a position behind the torpedo 
line where they could rake the Federal ships coming to 
the turn in the channel found just abreast the fort. 

With the long line of Union ships, flag-draped, hurling 
storms of shells and shrapnel upon the fort and earthwork, 
and the fort firing back with shot that knocked sprays of 
smoking splinters from the sides of the ships, while the 
Confederate ships lay grim and silent, it was an awe- 
inspiring scene. The smoke, however, soon began to fog in 
fleet and fort, and then Farragut left his place on the poop 
of the Hartford and climbed the port main rigging until 
he was above the smoke. His own captain and the cap- 
tain of the Metacomet, the gunboat along side (Lieutenant 
Commander Jouett), were then within easy reach of his 
voice, and the whole fleet was under his eye. As the 
smoke arose he climbed higher until the futtock shrouds 
were reached. Seeing the admiral exposed thus, and 
liable to fall from a wound that might not be fatal if he 
could be kept from falling. Captain Drayton sent Quarter- 
master Knowles up with a piece of a lead-line which was 
passed around the admiral's body and then made fast to 



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 247 

the shrouds. It was a simple incident, but the people of 
the nation have rarely been thrilled as they were when the 
newspapers told how the admiral had gone into battle 
"lashed to the mast." 

And while the admiral stood in the Hartford's rigging, 
Stevens of the Winnebago paced the deck between his tur- 
rets, unable to endure confinement behind iron walls at 
such a time, and Perkins of the Chickasaw showed the 
uplift of a daring soul in batde by standing on the top of 
his forward turret. 

Of a similar spirit was Craven of the Tecumseh. As he 
led the way his impatience to get at the Tennessee, lying just 
beyond the line of torpedoes, grew until he said to his pilot : 

" It is impossible that the admiral means us to go inside 
that buoy; I cannot turn my ship." 

The admiral had ordered all vessels to pass on the east 
side of the red buoy to avoid the torpedoes. Craven was 
arguing with himself, however, rather than the pilot — 
seeking an excuse for a dash straight at the Tennessee — 
and finding it. 

"Hard a starboard," he said, and headed across the tor- 
pedoes. But as the bow of the Tecumseh touched the 
black buoys she began to lurch from side to side, puffs 
of smoke arose around her, her bow dipped down, her 
stern arose until her screw was seen revolving in the air, 
and then she sank swiftly from view. 

During the brief interval while she rocked on the sur- 
face, both Craven and his pilot ran to the ladder leading 
from the pilot house up to possible safety, but as they met 
Craven stepped back. 

"After you, pilot," he said. The pilot escaped to tell 
the story, but there was no "after" for Craven. 

It was a frightful disaster, and on seeing it the captain 
of the Brooklyn stopped his ship, and then began to back 
her in a way that threw her broadside to across the chan- 



248 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

nel. The other ships closed in rapidly, and their fire died 
away, while the Confederates, seeing the fleet in a tangle, 
worked their guns with redoubled energy. The supreme 
moment of the battle and of Farragut's life had come. In- 
stinctively he breathed a prayer — "Shall I go on?" — and 
then, inspired, he hailed the Brooklyn: 

"What is the trouble?" 

"Torpedoes," replied Captain Alden. 

"Damn the torpedoes! Full speed, Jouett! Four 
bells, Captain Drayton!" shouted Farragut. And when 
the crew of the Hartford heard those orders they leaped as 
one man to the starboard rail, facing the fort, and gave 
three yells of defiance, while Perkins, of the Chickasaw, 
waved his hat and danced for joy as he saw his admiral 
lead the way across the torpedo line into the bay. 

Farragut's instant decision to go ahead saved the day. 
The line untangled behind the flagship, and all passed in 
beyond range of the fort, if not unharmed, yet without re- 
ceiving material injury. 

Nevertheless, while the scales of fortune yet hung quiv- 
ering — while Farragut was listening to the futile crack of 
the caps on the torpedoes under his ship, and was looking 
to see her lifted as the Tecumseh had been — he thought of 
the men he had seen leaping from the Tecumseh as she was 
going down, and ordered a boat to be sent to pick them up. 
Acting Ensign H. C. Neilds, a mere boy, who was in charge 
of the boat, noticed after he had pulled away that he had 
no flag flying. He was in the midst of a storm of shot and 
bursting shells, but he dropped his tiUer ropes, picked the 
boat flag from its case, shook out the folds, and then stepped 
it above the stern. The Tennessee at that instant had a 
gun pointed at the boat, but the commanding officer, 
thrilled by "this most gallant act," elevated the muzzle, 
and the shot "flew harmless over the heads of that glori- 
ous boat's crew." 



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 249 

The Tennessee was left behind by the Union ships. 
She had enough armor to enable her to stay in the battle 
line, but her builders had not been able to give her enough 
power to get into the battle line when the Union ships 
wished to avoid her. The Confederate gunboats were 
chased away. The Metacomet followed the Selma into 
such shoal water that Jouett found his keel in the mud; 
but instead of turning back he said to First Lieutenant 
H. J. Sleeper: 

"Call in the men from the chains; they are only intimi- 
dating me." 

One of the gunboats (the Morgan) escaped to Mobile. 
The other was destroyed. 

The Tennessee was left behind, but she was still in the 
fight. Buchanan came in pursuit, although with that ship 
he was like a gladiator crippled in advance of the conflict. 
When she had arrived in the midst of the deep-water 
pocket of the bay the whole Union fleet turned upon her — 
mobbed her. With the Monongahela leading, ship after 
ship rammed her, all in vain. The ships like the Hartford 
fired broadsides at her while touching her side, without a 
shot piercing the casemate. But her smokestack was cut 
off close at the deck of the casemate and the lack of draught 
slowed her engines and filled the casemate with deadly 
gases. The stearing gear was shot away, leaving her a 
helpless, floating hulk. Then a 440-pound shot from the 
Manhattan struck the casemate, crushing it in until it was 
splintered like a basket. Other shots riveted the after 
port shutters over the ports so that her guns could not be 
run out. And Perkins placed his Chickasaw at her stern 
and fired shot after shot against one point on the armor 
until it was seen that he would soon crush in the case- 
mate. Last of all, as Buchanan superintended the work 
of clearing away one of the after-port shutters, a shot from 
the Chickasaw beat in the casemate so far that the 



250 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

two mechanics at the side of the admiral were torn to 
pieces. 

"I saw their Hmbs and chests, severed and mangled, 
scattered about the deck, their hearts lying near their 
bodies," wrote Surgeon Conrad when describing the hor- 
rors of this combat. At the same time Buchanan's leg 
was broken by a flying splinter. As he was carried below 
the bolts that held the armor plate in place were flying. 
The gunners of the Tennessee had shot the Union ships 
through and through before the guns were put out of com- 
mission, but now they could do nothing except stand idle 
and wait for the shot from the Union ships to enter and 
kill. Seeing that he was utterly helpless to inflict further 
injury, Buchanan hauled down his flag. "It had been 
raised in triumph; it was lowered without dishonor." 
("The Battle of Mobile Bay," Foxhall A. Parker, p. 37.) 

That night the garrison was driven out of Fort Powell, 
leaving the way to New Orleans open. The next day, 
in spite of orders to hold on, Fort Gaines surrendered, be- 
cause it seemed impossible to accomplish anything by 
holding out. General Page held on at Fort Morgan, 
hoping against hope for some turn in the war, until the 
walls were shot to pieces around him, all but two of his 
guns were disabled, and his source of supplies was cut ofi^. 
On August 23 his flag came down. 

Speaking of the work of Farragut at Mobile the Army 
and Navy Gazette (British) said: 

"There can be no doubt of the signal character of his 
victory. . . . Already a fleet of transports, laden with 
fresh provisions and ice has sailed from New York to sup- 
ply the doughty Admiral, whose feats of arms place him 
at the head of his profession, and certainly constitute him 
the first naval officer of the day, as far as actual reputation, 
won by skill, courage and hard fighting goes." 

It was in these words that the British army and navy 



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 251 

men for the first time admitted the possibility of the Union 
forces winning in the fight. The quotation is memorable 
for its kindly tone, too. It shows how "skill, courage and 
hard fighting make friends for a nation as well as for a 
man." 

With the capture of Mobile Bay the aggressive, forward 
work of the navy almost came to an end. One expedition, 
that against Fort Fisher, guarding the entrance to Wil- 
mington, N. C, the most famous rendezvous of blockade 
runners, remained. But it is a tame story. 

Preparations for this expedition were begun soon after 
the capture of Mobile Bay. Farragut was asked to lead it, 
but he wished to be excused on account of ill health, and 
Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter took command. A fleet of 
five ironclads and forty-eight unarmored warships as- 
sembled, and 6,500 men, soldiers under General B. F. 
Butler, were added. The fleet bombarded the fort for 
two days (December 24 and 25, 1864), and Butler sent 
3,000 men ashore to make an assault. The main body 
of this detachment marched up within 600 yards of the 
fort and stopped. Some skirmishers captured a flag from 
the walls and one man killed a Confederate courier in the 
sally port and brought away the courier's mule. Then 
Butler decided that the fort could not be taken by assault 
and, in spite of orders to fortify himself on the island on 
which the fort stood, he sailed back to the Chesapeake. 
At Grant's request Butler was relieved by General A. H. 
Terry and, the navy having held its place in the ocean off 
the fort, Terry came to capture the work. 

Terry landed on the island on January 12, 1865, and 
found there, in good condition, 700 men, who had been left 
behind by Butler. The navy had had no difficulty in 
protecting them. The whole force completed breast- 
works within two miles of the fort that night. Beginning 



252 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

next day the navy bombarded the fort for two days, and 
then Terry decided to make the assault on the 15th. A 
detachment of 1,400 marines and 600 sailors was landed to 
assist. The navy men took a position on the beach over 
against the main (northeast) angle of the fort while the 
army was placed to attack the inland end of the north line 
of the work. The bugles sounded the advance, the navy 
men under Captain K. R. Breeze dashed along the beach 
and the army charged inland. So well was the army force 
concealed by shrubbery, etc., and so open was the attack 
of the navy men that the Confederates thought that the 
sailors composed the main column of assault. They 
therefore concentrated all their force against the navy, 
beating them back with heavy loss, but the army on that 
account entered with all the more ease. 

The capture of Fort Fisher closed the last of the ports 
through which the Confederates had been able to draw 
supplies. They were beleaguered on every side and starv- 
ing. They had begun the war without preparation, and 
without munitions or any other material of war. They 
had made from the first, and almost continuously, the mis- 
take of failing to appreciate the necessity of aggressive 
as distinguished from defensive work. Nevertheless, 
with magnificent courage and fortitude, and with endless 
hope, enterprise and persistence, they had struggled on 
until they were at last overwhelmed by the numbers and 
resources of the national forces. The secession movement 
— the rebellion, for so it came to be — was ended forever. 
It had been a period of indescribable woe and of uncount- 
able losses, but there was left, as the proudest heritage 
of the new nation, the record of the men who had fought 
out, man-fashion, the unavoidable conflict. 



CHAPTER XXV 
BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 

For a brief interval at the end of the Civil War the 
monitors, with their 15-inch Dahlgren guns (some had a 
rifle each, made of cast-iron with a wrought band shrunk 
over the breech), made the American navy the most pow- 
erful in the world. But political considerations, of which 
it need be said only that the good of party seemed to be 
something different from, and of more importance than, 
the good of the country, led Congress to neglect the navy. 
The ships that had done good service in the war wore out. 
Repairs became expensive. To save money it was thought 
best to build nothing new and let the old ships go to the 
scrap heap. A secretary of the navy who was ambitious 
to build made the mistake of constructing ships on the 
false pretence of making repairs. But what was of greater 
weight than all else was the fact that, naval ships being 
just then in a period of transition, it was confidently as- 
serted that it would be good policy to allow European 
countries "to make the experiments for us." While Eu- 
ropean nations developed breech-loading rifles, and battle- 
ships of vastly greater size and power than our monitors, 
we did nothing, and within ten years after the Civil War 
ended the American navy was the standard of inefficiency 
among the seamen of the world. 

It was a period to recall the days before the War of 
1812. Since we had no navy a Spanish coast-guard 
seized an American ship on the high seas, and held her in 
Cuban ports under guard for ninety-eight days because 

253 



254 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the captain of the coast-guard supposed that she might 
have been carrying arms to Cuban insurgents. The pro- 
tests of the American Administration were treated with 
contempt; they were even left unnoticed and unanswered. 
American citizens found on a ship that belonged to a Cuban 
filibuster were shot to death without trial, and while the 
shooting party was at its work (it was at Santiago de Cuba) 
the American consul at the port was held a prisoner in his 
office by soldiers who were stationed at his door. This 
happened within eight years after the end of the Civil War 
— so rapidly did the respect of foreign nations fall away as 
our navy was allowed to decay. 

We saved a few dollars while other nations were "ex- 
perimenting for us," but there are those who understand 
that what we lost in the development of the brains of our 
mechanics and inventors by letting the other nations " do 
the experimenting for us" was of infinitely greater value 
than the whole revenue of the nation. Even that is not 
all of the evil of the policy then followed. For Congress 
voted $15,000,000 to prepare the navy for war, after the 
Virginius affair, as the trouble was called, but the money 
was not used for the purpose. Somebody spent it — no- 
body knows who, or how, apparently. 

On June 29, 1881, eight years after the American citi- 
zens were murdered at Santiago de Cuba, the United States 
for the third time began the work of building a naval fleet. 
On that day aboard, of which Rear- Admiral John Rodgers 
was the head, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy 
to consider the state of the navy, and report what action 
ought to be taken by Congress. The board recommended 
the building of twenty-one battleships and seventy cruisers, 
besides torpedo boats and rams. Of the programme thus 
proposed Congress built, in due time, one worthless ram. 
But the subject was before the people, and a host of naval 
oflacers who could handle the pen as well as the sword 



BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 255 

kept agitation going until the nation saw that the con- 
dition of affairs then existing was not only humiliating and 
destructive of the moral jfibre of the people, but it steadily 
invited aggressions and actual war. In consequence, the 
nation was finally aroused to a point where Congress pro- 
vided money for beginning work on two cruisers. 

For seventeen years we had allowed foreign countries 
"to do the experimenting for us." In that time England 
had learned how to build an Inflexible, with armor from 
18 to 24 inches thick, and carrying four built-up rifles of 
16-inch calibre, firing a projectile of 1,700 pounds weight 
that exerted a muzzle energy of 27,213 foot-tons and was 
able to pierce 27.5 inches of wrought-iron armor at a range 
of 500 yards. Our best naval ship was a monitor carrying 
smoothbore guns that fired a shell having a muzzle energy 
of 7,997 foot-tons — something as little able to penetrate 
the armor of the day as a flint-lock musket would have 
been. The Inflexible could fight on water rough enough 
to compel the monitor to close all ports, and she could 
steam almost twice as fast as the monitor. 

We had a complete book knowledge of the best of the 
British ships, and now we were to begin using the advan- 
tages we had gained by allowing other nations " to do the 
experimenting for us." 

The Secretary of the Navy appointed officers to plan 
and build the ships that Congress had authorized, but when 
they got together they found that the only facilities that the 
country afforded for their work included draughting boards, 
pencils, pens and India ink. There was not a shipyard 
in the country adapted to the construction of a 5,000-ton 
cruiser, not to mention an ^rmor-clad. There was not a 
mill in the country that could make the steel plates and 
frames required, let alone armor. There was not a ham- 
mer in the country that could make a forging for the 
smallest rifle needed. Instead of building a 5,000-ton 



256 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

cruiser fit to meet anything of the kind afloat, we began 
perforce by building a despatch boat and two little 3,000- 
ton cruisers, and we could not do even that much until 
facilities for making steel plates had been provided. We 
had to do some experimenting for ourselves. We could 
not serve an apprenticeship by proxy. 

In 1884 the Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, 
having no confidence in the ability of our ov/n naval 
architects, sent to England for plans for further shipbuild- 
ing that had been authorized by Congress. Plans for 
the Texas, the Charleston and the Baltimore were thus 
obtained. The English designers in every case sold him 
gold-bricks, so to speak — plans that were defective — and 
it was only after many alterations that ships fit for duty 
were provided. The error of buying plans abroad was a 
continuation of the error of allowing other nations to do 
the experimenting for us. The people who made the error 
failed to see that what the nation needed first of all was 
men able to build ships, not merely as good as those of 
Europe, but ships with enough new ideas in them to make 
them the best afloat, as the Constitution was in her class. 

Nevertheless, this Secretary of the Navy did one thing 
that atoned for all errors. By skilful handling of the ap- 
propriations he accumulated a fund wherewith he was 
able to induce a steel-making company to erect a plant 
for the production of armor and the forgings for high- 
power guns. 

By the contract signed with John Roach, on July 23, 
1883, for the building of the despatch boat Dolphin, the 
3,000-ton Atlanta and Boston, the mills for the making of 
such steel plates as were needed for ship hulls were guar- 
anteed. By the contract of June 1, 1887, with the Beth- 
lehem Iron Company, facilities for making the best of 
steel armor and forgings for the largest of steel guns were 
provided. 



BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 257 

For the battle of Lake Champlain Macdonough built 
a very good ship in thirty days. During the Civil War we 
built some good fighting machines of that period in ninety 
days. But between June 29, 1881, and June 1, 1887, it 
was demonstrated that we had to build steel mills before 
we could build modern battleships, and it was thereafter 
demonstrated that even with the best of facilities it was 
not possible to build a battleship in less than a year, 
though the work was driven at the highest practicable 
speed. 

The steel-making establishments that were founded on 
these naval contracts are worth a paragraph more for the 
reason that the present (1907) enormous steel industry of 
the United States was thus begun and made possible. 
The important fact in a business point of view is that the 
money for shipbuilding was spent in such a way that use- 
ful 'producing industry was promoted. Further than that 
shipyards able to produce the best fighting machines in 
the world were built. We may hope a time will come when 
the steel industry and the shipbuilding industry will com- 
bine to produce a merchant marine, but in the meantime 
the battleship has been so far developed that a nation's 
fighting strength is calculated by its facilities for turning 
out such ships rather than by the actual guns afloat; and 
in its ability to build battleships the United States is the 
second Power of the world. 

Great as have been the advantages obtained through this 
use of the nation's revenues for the simultaneous promo- 
tion of the nation's industries and the increase of the na- 
tion's influence, these benefits are of minor importance 
when compared with one yet to be considered. Says 
Roberts, the well-known writer on agricultural topics, in 
his "Fertility of the Land": "If the introduction of the 
reaping machine had been t)f no value in the farm econ- 
omy, the invention would still have been worth the while 



258 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

because of the mental uplift which it gives the farmer's 
boy who learns how to manage it." 

If our battleships were of no advantage in increasing 
the influence of the nation in its efforts to preserve the peace 
of the world, their development and construction would still 
have been worth the while because of the mental uplift they 
give those who learn to handle them, and who learn to 
build them. For the battleship is the most splendid ma- 
chine the world ever saw. 

It is also to the credit of Secretary of the Navy Whitney 
that he caused a factory for making the smaller cannon, 
such as 6-pounders, to be established in this country. 
The Hotchkiss guns were an American invention, although 
the inventor had to go to Europe to secure recognition. 
When we began to build a navy Whitney would give the 
contract for the smaller guns only on the condition that 
they be made in this country. 

We began our new navy with a despatch boat and two 
small cruisers. Our first armored ship worth mention was 
the lamented Maine. She carried side armor twelve inches 
thick, and she had two 10-inch guns in each turret. Her 
keel was laid on October 17, 1888, and she was launched 
on November 18, 1890. Up to that date we were experi- 
menting for ourselves, and we had learned how to do the 
work. The time had then come when we were ready to 
begin to set a pace in the design and construction of fight- 
ing ships for the world to consider. On August 28, 1890, 
the contract for the construction of the armored cruiser 
New York was signed. She was launched December 2, 
1891. She was 380.5 feet long by 65 wide, and she dis- 
placed 8,200 tons. Under the contract the speed was to 
be twenty knots an hour, but a premium was allowed for 
any excess of speed. On May 22, 1892, she was at sea for 
her official trial, and if we consider the effect of that trial 
upon the navy and the nation we shall find few other days 



BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 259 

to compare with it. For, because of the pessimistic habit 
of thought cultivated during the dark ages of the navy, even 
the officers v^ho were to test her had not full confidence that 
she would make good the record for which she was de- 
signed. But when with eager eyes they watched the swift 
beating of connecting rods and the smooth whirr of shafts, 
and in the midst of the perspiring heat of the air they found 
the bearings cool, while the indicator cards showed such 
power as they had never seen before, their fears faded 
away. For four hours they kept their eyes on engine- 
room and taffrail log and clock, and then when the time 
was done the whole crew burst into cheers, while a sailor 
climbed aloft and lashed a broom to the mast-head. She 
had covered twenty-one sea miles an hour. No such ship 
as that had ever floated the "gridiron flag"; no such a ship 
of the class floated any flag. The shame that for twenty- 
five years had rested on our navy was wiped out. The 
New York was the Constitution of the new navy we affec- 
tionately called the White Squadron. 

And yet, without retracting what has been said in praise 
of the New York, it must be noted that even for her day 
she was not a good warship. She was inspiring to the 
people chiefly because she broke the record for speed. 
She was to be a commerce destroyer. People then thought 
that the way to win in war was to destroy the enemy's com- 
merce. If the truth be told, most Americans of the New 
York's day thought first of England when the possibility 
of a war was mentioned. The New York was swift enough 
to catch the British merchantman and escape the British 
cruiser, but in a battle she would have found the British 
cruiser armed with 6-inch broadside guns; she carried 
4-inch only. While a threat of destroying its commerce 
might (and it has) make a nation hesitate about embarking 
in a war it is seen very clearly now that commerce destruc- 
tion does not end a war after hostilities have been begun. 



260 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

And then came the battleship era. We tried our 
'prentice hands (1886) on the Maine and the Texas, two 
vessels of a little more than 6,000 tons displacement. By 
the act of June 30, 1890, Congress provided for three real 
battleships — "coast defence," of course. It is said that 
when the bill had been signed. Secretary of the Navy Ben- 
jamin F. Tracy sent for Lewis Nixon, then in the Con- 
structor's Bureau, and said to him informally : 

"Now, sir, what you've to do is to design a ship that 
can lick anything afloat." 

And Nixon designed the Oregon. Two 13-inch guns, 
the most powerful then made, were put in each of two 
main turrets located over the keel at bow and stern. Two 
turrets were then located over each rail, and in each of 
them two 8-inch guns were mounted. Along the side 
armor walls were placed four 6-inch guns. The ship dis- 
placed nearly 10,300 tons and the speed attained was 
15.547 knots. The armor varied from fifteen to eighteen 
inches in thickness. 

The Oregon and her class are out of date now, though 
that is due chiefly to the fact that the designer was ham- 
pered by the ancient idea that when we go to war we 
must invite the enemy to come to our harbors and coasts 
to do the fighting — it was imperative that these battle- 
ships should be for "coast defence." They have but a 
small coal capacity, nevertheless in their day, if able to 
get into the battle line, tkere was no ship afloat equal to 
them. 

The report of the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, 
dated November 15, 1897, a few months before the war 
with Spain was begun, said: 

"The present effective fighting force of the navy con- 
sists of four battleships of the first class, two battleships of 
the second class, two armored cruisers, sixteen cruisers, 
fifteen gunboats, six double turreted monitors, one ram. 



BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 261 

one dynamite gunboat, one despatch boat, one transport 
steamer and five torpedo boats. There are under con- 
struction five battleships of the first class, sixteen torpedo 
boats and one submarine boat." 

Mention was then made of "sixty-four other naval 
vessels" — such as "tugs, disused single-turreted monitors 
and some unserviceable craft," together with an " auxiliary 
fleet" of "twenty subsidized steamers" that might be of 
some use. He thought the country was to be " congratu- 
lated upon the results obtained in the rebuilding of the 
navy." 

The Oregon, Massachusetts, Indiana and Iowa were 
the four battleships. The New York and Brooklyn were 
the two armored cruisers, the Brooklyn being a greater 
New York. Where the New York carried six 8-inch 
and twelve 4-inch guns, the Brooklyn carried eight 8-inch 
guns and twelve 5-inch. The Olympia was the best of 
the so-called protected cruisers. She carried no vertical 
armor, but a "protective deck," 4| inches thick on the 
sloping walls and two inches thick on the flat, was laid 
to protect the machinery and magazines. She was armed 
with four 8-inch guns in two turrets, and ten 5-inch in 
broadside, besides the usual 6-pounder and 1 -pounder 
small guns. The Puritan was the best of the harbor- 
defence monitors. She was commissioned on December 
10, 1896. She carried four 12-inch and six 4-inch guns. 

The torpedo boats should have special mention, per- 
haps, because they were most excellent little ships of their 
class. The Porter was the largest in commission. She 
was 175 feet long, 17 wide and drew 5.5 feet of water when 
in fighting trim. She had made 28.63 knots, and she was 
armed with three tubes for firing torpedoes, and four 
1-pounder guns. The ram was worthless, as v/as the dyna- 
mite cruiser. The torpedo might have been called a 
cigar-shaped, automobile boat driven by compressed air 





o II 




If* 



BUILDING THE WHITE SQUADRON 263 

and carrying a charge of gun cotton in the head which 
could be fired by contact — percussion. 

Of the evolution of the gun it should be said that when, 
in 1883, we began a little experimenting for ourselves the 
European powers were building rifled guns which were 
composed of wrought steel tubes placed sleeve-fashion, 
one within the other and so designed that they could be 
loaded at the breech. We had plans of such guns, but our 
ships were armed with smoothbore Dahlgrens, though an 
attempt to improve on these had been made by converting 
them into rifles. A rifled steel tube was forced into the 
cast-iron smoothbore. There was but one more foolish 
waste of the money of the people and that one was made 
when new ships were started under the pretence of repair- 
ing old ones. With the building of the new ships we also 
built guns on plans adapted from plans obtained from 
Europe. These were of wrought steel tubes and breech- 
loaders. The largest of these guns weighed 60 tons. It 
was 40 feet long over all, the bore was 13 inches in diam- 
eter by 454.5 inches deep (or long), and the wrought steel 
projectile weighed 1,100 pounds. A charge of 550 pounds 
of brown powder hurled this shot at a muzzle velocity of 
2,100 feet per second. The muzzle energy of the shot was 
33,625 foot tons. It could perforate 33.5 inches of wrought 
iron at the muzzle The 12-inch gun, which has since be- 
come the standard size for large guns, weighed 45.2 tons, 
it was 36.8 feet long over all, the projectile weighed 850 
pounds, and this, with a charge of 425 pounds of brown 
powder, was calculated to attain a velocity of 2,100 feet 
per second and to pierce thirty inches of wrought iron 
at the muzzle of the gun. When we went to war with 
Spain, England had a very good smokeless powder and 
she had built longer and more powerful guns than any in 
the American navy. Thus the muzzle velocity of their 
6-inch projectile was 2,642 feet per second, while the 



264 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

American projectile reached 2,150. As gun builders we 
were yet serving an apprenticeship, even if a few of our 
ships had, at the time they were designed, broken the 
record. 



CHAPTER XXVI 
BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

III feeling had prevailed between the United States and 
Spain, off and on, for just a century before war came, and 
the old matters, though closed in a diplomatic point of 
view, had created an antipathy between the two peoples 
that was particularly well defined among the Spaniards. 
We had flattered ourselves that our patience and long- 
suffering under aggression and outrage (as when American 
citizens were shot to death without trial at Santiago) had 
been highly praiseworthy. In a civilized point of view 
we were in the right, very likely, but the aggressors sup- 
posed that we endured outrage because we were unwilling 
to spend dollars, and they had our attitude toward a navy, 
while the foreigners were doing the experimenting for us, 
to justify that view. The Spaniards were not the only 
Europeans, either, who believed that we would sacrifice 
honor rather than spend money in resenting aggression, 
and the influence of this contemptuous feeling in bring- 
ing on a war is a matter worthy of the most serious con- 
sideration. The fact that the Spaniards commonly spoke 
of the Americans, just before the war, as pigs, is memo- 
rable as an admonition. 

The immediate cause of the war was the Cuban struggle 
for liberty. The first serious struggle of the Cubans, 
known as the "Ten Years' War," came to an end in 1878 
because of the utter exhaustion of the combatants, an ex- 
haustion due to their brutal "disregard of the laws of 
civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity." 

265 



266 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Nevertheless, when in 1895 the island had in a measure 
recovered, the insurrection broke out afresh with the piti- 
less rigor of the former war emphasized. The Spaniards 
deliberately determined to conquer the revolt by the ex- 
haustion of the physical resources of the island and the ex- 
termination of its inhabitants. An armed force of 250,000 
men was sent to Cuba. The principal towns were gar- 
risoned. Blockhouses were built along the railri^ads. 
Two lines of tiny forts connected by barbed wire entangle- 
ments (trochas) were constructed across the island. It 
was proclaimed that whoever failed to assist in putting 
down the insurrection was to be considered as an armed 
enemy, and the rural populace was gathered into the garri- 
soned towns and there held in idleness, with the deliberate 
intention that they should perish of want and disease. 
Senator Foraker, of Ohio, after an investigation, reported 
{Forum, June, 1898) that more than 200,000 had died 
thus within a year before the war. 

The foreign trade of the island was ruined, and the 
Americans were the chief losers. The Americans domi- 
ciled in Cuba lost their investments amounting to many 
millions. The Cubans who resided in the United States 
by fitting out filibustering expeditions compelled our 
Government tc use our naval ships as well as the revenue 
marine for the protection of Spanish treaty rights. The 
financial injury to the American people through the misrule 
of Spain in Cuba is beyond computation, but it is to be re- 
membered that when President Cleveland, in 1895, and 
President McKinley, in 1897, offered the good oflSces of 
our Government for the ending of the insurrection, the 
offer was made first of all on the grounds of humanity. 
Our people rose above "interest." Of course our offers 
were rejected. 

An English author, in speaking of the Spaniards in 
Cuba, said: "There must be a stage in misg-overnment 



BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 267 

which will justify the interference of bystanding nations/* 
This stage arrived when the Spaniards adopted starvation 
as a weapon of war. On September 18, 1897, Stewart L. 
Woodford, American Minister to Spain, said in diplo- 
matic language to the Spanish Government: "You must 
improve conditions in Cuba or we will do it for you." 
A few days later the Spanish announced an autonomist 
government on the island, but the effort to carry out this 
reform, if sincerely made, was unsuccessful. The Cubans 
rejected it with scorn while the Spaniards in Cuba were 
angered beyond all precedent because the Americans 
had forced this measure. The Havana newspapers were 
filled with virulent attacks upon the American people, 
while cartoons, usually vulgar, and in all cases adapted to 
inflame the populace against all things American, were 
spread broadcast among those who could not read. 

The animosity toward Americans having increased to 
a point where mob attacks were to be expected the second- 
rate battleship Maine, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, was ordered 
to Key West, ninety miles from Havana, where she was 
held in readiness to run across and afford asylum to any 
Americans in peril. The expected outbreak came on 
January 12, 1898, but because it was not particularly 
dangerous the Maine did not arrive at Havana until Tues- 
day, the 25th. 

The presence of the Maine, however, was anything but 
quieting, as was shown by a circular thrust into the hands 
of Captain Sigsbee as he was crossing the bay on a ferry- 
boat the next Sunday. Among other things the circular 
had the following: 

And finally these Yankee pigs who meddle in our affairs, humil- 
iating us to the last degree, and for a still greater taunt order to 
us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron. . . . Spaniards! The 
moment of action has arrived. Do not go to sleep. Let us teach 
these vile traitors that we have not yet lost our pride, and that we 



268 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

know how to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy and 
strong as our Spain is, and always will be! Death to the Amer- 
icans! 

In the meantime the Maine had been moored, by order 
of the Captain of the Port, to a specially located buoy, 
and there at 9:40 o'clock at night, on February 15, 1898, 
she was blown up. Of her crew 266 were killed outright, 
while one more died later from the effects of the shock 
then received. 

A naval court of inquiry was ordered by the Navy De- 
partment. Captain W. T. Sampson (president), Captain 
F. E. Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander W. E. Potter 
constituted the court, with Lieutenant-Commander Adolph 
Marix as judge advocate. These officers were selected 
because none more worthy of the confidence of the country 
and the civilized world could be found. The "Spanish 
ofllcers sought to throw obstacles in the way of our inde- 
pendent inquiry," but " a sharp protest ended this proced- 
ure." (Long, "The New American Navy," vol. I, p. 143). 

The examination of the wreck by both civilian and naval 
divers showed that " the outer shell of the ship," and that 
is to say the bottom plating, "at a point eleven feet six 
inches from the middle line of the ship" had been "forced 
up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the 
water." The keel had been broken and the broken parts 
forced up until they were within six feet of the surface. 
On consideration of these facts the court was compelled 
to find that "this effect could have been produced only by 
the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the 
ship." 

It was at that time suggested that the Cubans might have 
placed and exploded the mine for the sake of inciting the 
Americans to make war, on the supposition that the 
Spaniards did it. But the harbor was at that time es- 
pecially well guarded by the Spanish officers and patrol. 



LONtflrarxNAi. section 



_f!_l (SL.w*.T£R.ij>tJ.._ 




Diagrams Showing in the Heavy Lines the Position of the Keel and Bow of the " IVIame ' 
after the Explosion. 




SKETCH SHOWWIS 
VERTICAL KEEL BROKEN 
AND FLM KEEL PLATES BENT, 
IN PRESENT POSITION AT POltVt 

MARKED I Aon projection of 
injuries. redrawn from _,. 
drawing made bv chief gunners* ^ 
hate: a.ousson.u.S.N^Coliver). 

Sketch Showing Broken Keel at Point Marked I A in the Above Plan. 

(Both drawings reproduced from the Official Report.) 



269 



270 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

An examination of the locality is sufficient, in connection 
with the evidence made public, to convince any candid in- 
vestigator that such a mine as that could have been placed 
and exploded only with the aid of the Spanish officials 
of some rank. In fact, if the deed had been committed 
by any other persons than Spaniards of rank the detailed 
story would have been told long ago. 

Great as was the impression made upon the American 
people by this slaughter it should be noted that it did not 
cause the war. Preparations for the inevitable conflict — - 
a conflict made inevitable by conditions in Cuba — were 
already well in hand long before the Maine went to Ha- 
vana. On January 11 the commanders of the various 
squadrons were ordered to retain in the service any men 
whose terms of enlistment might be expiring. The South 
American squadron was ordered north from Montevideo. 
Vessels en route to foreign parts were intercepted and 
ordered home. Lieutenant G. L. Dyer, naval attache at 
Madrid, had been gathering all possible information about 
the Spanish navy. Commodore George Dewey was se- 
lected for the command of the Asiatic squadron (October 
21, 1897), and he had been diligent in securing information 
about the Spanish fleet at Manila. The Secretary of the 
Navy had exliausted his powers in preparing his ships for 
service and especially in securing adequate supplies. 

Of course the destruction of the Maine somewhat has- 
tened matters. A full supply of ammunition for Dewey's 
fleet was forwarded to Honolulu, where the Baltimore took 
it and then steamed away to Hongkong. There she 
arrived, happily, in time for an overhauling in the dry- 
dock. The battleship Oregon was started on her long 
journey from San Francisco to Key West on March 19. 

In the meantime (March 9) Congress appropriated 
$50,000,000 for the "national defence" and $25,000,000 
was added later to this sum. Efforts were then made to 



BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 271 

buy warships and we secured one that we were able to get 
into actual service — the New Orleans, formerly the 
Amazonas, of Brazil. A few others were secured, but not 
in time to be of service worth mention. We learned that 
when war was actually at hand we had to depend on what 
we had provided in advance for such an emergency. 

We secured some merchantmen — ninety-seven in all. 
"Some American owners displayed far more greed than 
patriotism," says Secretary Long, and in "two instances 
there was rank extortion. ' ' Of these ships we made shoddy 
warships, in some cases, and in others colliers and despatch 
boats. One ship was fitted as a hospital and another as a 
floating machine shop. Thus, before the actual need came, 
the Department was able to report "ready." The country 
ought to remember Secretary Long, Assistant Secretary 
Roosevelt and the many naval officers who did this 
work. 

In laying out the work of the navy an attack upon the 
ports of Spain was considered and abandoned because of 
the unfriendly attitude of European Powers and because, 
too, the end could be accomplished perhaps better by 
making the fight on the coast of Cuba where the Spanish 
navy would be operating 3,000 miles from home. The 
American ships were therefore assembled, as far as possible, 
at Key West. All would have gathered there but for the 
disgraceful cowardice of people of political influence in 
the coast cities. So many of these demanded protection 
that a coastguard squadron which included one of the 
swiftest of our cruisers had to be detailed for patrol duty 
along shore. In addition a stronger squadron was lo- 
cated in the Chesapeake. However, a sufiicient but most 
heterogeneous fleet was found at Key West when the day 
of war came. There was the Indiana with armor eighteen 
inches thick, and gunboats like the Nashville with no 
armor at all. There was the New York with her 4-inch 



272 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

broadside guns and a speed of twenty knots and the moni- 
tors with 12-inch guns and a speed of from six to eight 
knots. We had built a navy for "coast defence" and 
when the time to use it came we found that we had to seek 
the enemy on his own coasts, and do it with armored ships 
having a coal-bunker capacity of from 236 to 410 tons 
only. 

Still, as said, the navy was ready when on April 9 
Consul General Lee left Havana. On the 11th the Presi- 
dent sent a message to Congress, setting forth the situa- 
tion. On the 18th Congress resolved that "the people of 
Cuba are and of right ought to be free," and directed the 
President to use our entire land and naval forces to make 
them free. The vote in the House was 310 to 6. 

This act was signed by the President on April 20. The 
Spanish Minister left Washington that night. The next 
day Minister Woodford left Madrid, and then at sunrise 
on April 22, 1898, the American fleet steamed away from 
Key West, under Rear-Admiral Sampson, who had been 
promoted for the work in hand. It was bound for the 
coast of Cuba, where a blockade was to be established from 
Cardenas to Bahia Honda on the north coast, and at Cien- 
fuegos on the south coast. The whole island was not 
blockaded because (according to Secretary Long) the 
navy did not have enough ships to do more than was done. 
Torpedo boats and lighthouse tenders were necessarily 
utilized in order to make the blockade effective. 

As the fleet steamed away a merchantman was seen 
approaching from the west loaded with lumber. A little 
later this vessel displayed her flag and as it was spread to 
the breeze a lookout on the New York reported that it 
was Spanish. The Nashville, Captain W. Maynard, was 
ordered in chase. Turning out of her place in line she 
headed for the ship and then gunner Patrick Malia, at 
7:02 o'clock, fired the first shot of the war by sending a 



BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 273 

shot across her bows. She was the inappropriately 
named merchantman Buenaventura, of Bilboa, bound 
from Pascagoula to Rotterdam. She was condemned as 
a good prize and eventually became a coal barge on the 
American coast. 



CHAPTER XXVII 
THE BATTLE OF MANILA 

It was a fortunate thing for the United States that when 
the first gun of the War with Spain was fired off Key West, 
on April 22, 1898, no formal declaration of war had been 
made on either side. For while Admiral Sampson was 
directing the capture of the Buenaventura the cruiser 
Baltimore was just steaming into Hong Kong after her 
long run from Honolulu with ammunition for Dewey, and 
she was short of coal and needed cleaning in the drydock. 
Until war had been officially declared the British at Hong 
Kong were under no obligations as neutrals, and the Balti- 
more was free to get everything she needed. Immediately 
on arrival she was docked and at the end of forty-eight 
hours she came forth ready. 

It was then — on April 24 — that the Spanish officially 
proclaimed that war existed and British neutrality was 
announced. At the same time Dewey received an order 
from Washington which said: 

"Proceed at once to the Philippines. Commence oper- 
ations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. 
You must capture vessels or destroy." 

International law allowed Dewey a day of grace in 
port for such further preparation as was needed, and on 
the 25th he sailed away with the bands on the British ships 
playing the "Star Spangled Banner" and the British crews 
cheering. The captain of the Immortalite shouted as the 
ships passed out: 

"You will surely win." 

274 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 275 

Commodore Dewey's fleet consisted of the Olympia 
(flagship), Captain C. V. Gridley; the Baltimore, Captain 
N. M. Dyer; the Raleigh, Captain J. B. Coghlan; the 
Boston (one of the first ships built for the White Squadron), 
Captain F. Wildes; the Concord, Captain A. Walker, and 
the Petrel, Captain E. P. Wood. The revenue cutter 
McCulloch, Captain D. B. Hodgson, R.M., was assigned 
to the fleet as a despatch boat, and two transports had been 
purchased and loaded with supplies sufficient to last the 
fleet six months. The fighting ships mounted all told 
fifty three guns, 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch rifles. Of 
small guns — 6-pounders and smaller — there were eighty- 
four. Four of the ships were classed as cruisers and three 
as gunboats. 

The Spanish fleet at Manila included two cruisers, 
eleven gunboats and twenty-five "mosquito" gunboats, 
but Admiral Montojo, commanding, could place in the 
battle-line no more than eleven of the largest of the vessels, 
and they together mounted only forty-four guns, of which 
the smallest was of 3.5 inches and the largest 6.2 inches 
calibre. More than half of the main battery guns were 
4.7-inch calibre. Of smafl guns the Spaniards mounted 
eighty-one. It is manifest that afloat the Spanish force 
was vastly inferior. But Admiral Montojo had placed 
his fleet at the Cavite arsenal, located on Cavite Bay, an 
indentation on the south side of Manila Bay, and this bay 
was guarded by two 6.2-inch guns and three 6.3-inch guns 
placed in forts of which the one on Sangley Point was a 
modern casemate. Moreover, Manila city was guarded 
by four 9.5-inch guns and four 5.5-inch besides fifteen old- 
style rifles of 6.3-inch calibre. On islands at the entrance 
of the bay were seventeen rifles of modern build and vary- 
ing in size from 4.7-inches to 7 inches in calibre. 

To reach the Spanish fleet at Cavite it was necessary 
that Dewey should pass within easy range of nearly all 



276 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

of the guns at the entrance of the bay, where they were 
located well for a plunging fire; and when within the bay 
he would have to fight, as he knew very well, not only the 
Spanish fleet but the Spanish forts both at Cavite and 
Manila city. 

On leaving Hong Kong the American fleet made Mirs 
Bay a rendezvous until the 27th when they sailed and at 
dawn on the 30th they arrived within sight of Luzon, the 
island on which Manila stands. That day was passed in 
searching the coast for the Spanish fleet as far as Subig 
Bay, for the coast affords a number of nautical-ambush lo- 
calities, but nothing was found, and at midnight the 
Olympia led the way past the forts guarding the entrance 
to Manila Bay. Flames from a smokestack revealed the 
fleet to the sentinels on shore, but only one shot was fired 
from the forts. 

The dawn of Sunday, May 1, 1898, found the American 
fleet lying about seven miles west from Manila city and 
perhaps as far northwest from the Cavite forts where the 
Spanish ships were at anchor. The crews had passed the 
night at their guns. A haze on the water was so thick 
that the Spanish ships could not be seen, but as soon as it 
was light enough for navigation the fleet, with the Olympia 
in the lead, was headed in toward Manila and then around 
in a curve to pass within range of the Spanish fleet. At 
5:15 o'clock a gun, mounted at Manila, opened fire, and 
as the signal "Fire as convenient" was flying on the 
Olympia, the captain of the Concord sent two shells at the 
Manila fort. Thereafter the fleet steamed on, with the 
gunners grinning like prize fighters, until the Olympia was 
5,600 yards from the Spanish ships, which could then be 
seen anchored across Cavite Bay. Then Dewey turned to 
Captain Gridley and said quietly: 

"You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." 

The 8-inch guns in the forward turret were discharged 




From a photograph, copyright igoj, />y Ctinetlinst. 

ADMIRAL GEORr.E DEWEV. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 277 

immediately. It was then exactly 5:35 o'clock. The 
speed of the fleet was now reduced and with their port 
batteries working vigorously the ships passed in front of the 
Spanish fleet and the forts. Two submarine mines were 
exploded in front of the Ohjmpia at a distance of a thousand 
yards or so, but because the distance from the flagship 
was so great they only gave confidence to the American 
commanders. The fire of the Spanish had been rapid but as 
little harmful as the explosion of the torpedoes, and when 
Dewey drew out of range to westward he turned inshore 
and came back so as to pass much closer to the enemy. 

It had been manifest to the Spaniards from the first 
that their fire was ineffective, and when the American ships 
turned back Admiral Montojo slipped the cable of his 
flagship, the Reina Christina, and steamed out to reduce 
the range. Here, if ever, was uncircumspect gallantry, for 
the guns of the whole American fleet were at once concen- 
trated on the venturesome Spaniard, and she was riddled 
from stem to stern. Her sides were beaten in, her men 
were swept away from their guns and she was set afire in 
so many places that flames burst up from every hatch, 
while puffs of steam followed, showing that steam con- 
nections had been cut. In haste she was turned back 
toward the shelter of the harbor forts, and then an 8-inch 
shell from the Olympia raked her from aft forward, the 
whole length of her gun deck. As she arrived within the 
bay her crew were seen leaping overboard from both sides, 
while boats came hurriedly from the other ships to rescue 
those who could not swim. Of 493 men on board when 
she began the battle only seventy escaped unhurt. 

While his flagship was destroyed Admiral Montojo was 
yet unbeaten. Crossing to the Isla de Cuba, as Perry 
crossed from the Lawrence to the Niagara, during the 
batde of Lake Erie, Montojo spread his flag once more 
and fought on. 



278 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

In the meantime two torpedo boats made a dash at the 
American fleet, but the small-gun men picked them up 
and within a few minutes sank one of them and drove the 
other, crippled, to the beach, where it was found after- 
wards broken and bloody. 

Three times the American ships circled in front of the 
enemy, and then at 7:35, "being erroneously informed 
that the 5-inch battery was short of ammunition" (Long), 
Dewey ordered the fleet out of action. When out of range 
all hands were sent to breakfast. 

At 10:45, when the men had been well rested (some of 
them stretched out on deck and had a comforting sleep), 
the fleet once more went in search of the Spaniards. The 
Spanish flagship was now under water, while all the other 
ships except one were well within Cavite Bay, where they 
had either been set on fire, or were sinking, because the 
seacocks had been opened. The Antonio de JJlloa was 
still in the fight. Her captain nailed her flag to the mast 
and fought until she sank with her guns sissing hot as the 
water reached them. 

The American gunners then gave special attention to 
the Spanish forts. The little Petrel, by going into Cavite 
Bay, where she could take the enemy in the rear and at 
short range, was named the " Baby Battleship" by the en- 
thusiastic sailors of the other ships. The fire proved so 
hot that the garrisons were unable to endure it. At 12:20 
o'clock the white flag was displayed and the Petrel sig- 
nalled "The enemy has surrendered." 

Three of the Spanish ships were sunk by the fire of 
the American ships and eight were set on fire and scut- 
tled by their own crews after it was seen that there was 
no hope. In the forts and ships together there were 
381 men killed. In the American fleet seven men were 
wounded somewhat and none were killed. No shot from 
the forts hit any ship. Though several shot from the 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 279 

Spanish ships struck home, no damage of moment was 
inflicted. 

Of the results of the battle it must be said first that the 
destruction of the Spanish ships ended the Spanish power 
on the Pacific. American commerce was thereafter as free 
as before the war began. A Spanish fleet was ordered 
from home waters toward the Philippines; it was probably 
only a threat, but even if it was really bound for a contest 
with Dewey, it never got beyond the Suez Canal. It left 
the Spanish coast without ships and the prospect of an 
American raid across the Atlantic turned it back. 

The thoroughness with which Dewey did his work, it 
should be said, was a notice to the unfriendly Powers of 
Europe that American sailors could and would fight just 
as well as they had fought in the Civil War and the War 
of 1812, and that notice, we may suppose, confirmed the 
new-born British faith in Tattnall's celebrated expression, 
" Blood is thicker than water." The desire to be on friend- 
ly terms with a first-class fighting man is entirely natural. 

It was seen at last, that in defending American rights 
it had been necessary to fight a battle in far waters — in a 
part of the world where the much-vaunted strategic 
value of "the broad Atlantic" was of no avail. 

Finally, though the lesson has not been well learned yet, 
the victory, gained by the gun-fire of unarmored ships, 
confirmed the words of Farragut when he said that "the 
best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed 
fire from our own guns." 



CHAPTER XXVIII 
ON TO SANTIAGO 

On the approach of war Spain divided her home fleet 
into two squadrons, one of which was ordered first to the 
Canaries, to which the Americans were expected to send 
a squadron, and then to the Cape de Verdes. This 
squadron was composed of the Maria Teresa, the Vizcaya, 
the Oquendo, and the Cristobal Colon, with the torpedo 
destroyers Furor, Terror and Pluton. The Teresa, Viz- 
caya and Oquendo carried armor that was twelve inches 
thick, with a three-inch incHned deck within the belt, and 
each was armed with two 11-inch guns in turrets and ten 
5.5-inch guns in broadside, besides smaller guns. They 
were credited with a speed of twenty knots. The Colon 
had the same speed as the others. Her armor belt was 
six inches thick, and she was supposed to be armed with 
two 10-inch, ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns, but her 
largest guns had never been mounted. As the torpedo 
destroyers were also formidable and able to cross the sea, 
this squadron engaged the serious attention of the Wash- 
ington strategists from the first, and when, on April 29, it 
left the Cape de Verdes with destination unknown, the 
"Navy Department floundered in a sea of ignorance." 
(Long.) 

Because some of the things done thereafter during this 
campaign became the subject of a heated controversy that 
raged throughout the country, creating settled prejudices 
and bringing unmerited reproach upon many naval offi- 
cers of superior ability and personal character, it seems 

280 



ON TO SANTIAGO 281 

necessary to say here that every material statement to be 
found herein has been gathered from the "Record of Pro- 
ceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear- Admiral 
Winfield S. Schley" (a court held in 1901, at Schley's 
request), from Schley's "Forty-five Years Under the Flag," 
and from the official reports in the " Appendix to the Re- 
port of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for 1898." 
No campaign was ever before described as that of Santi- 
ago was, and all interested can rest assured that when all 
prejudices have been lost the historians of the future will 
do exact justice to everyone who was engaged in the work. 
The members of the court were: Admiral George Dewey, 
Rear-Admiral A. E. K. Benham and Rear-Admiral F. M. 
Ramsey, with Captain S. C, Lemly Judge Advocate 
General, From the immense mass of material thus pro- 
vided have been gathered the following facts: 

Admiral Cervera, commanding the Spanish squadron 
from the Cape de Verdes, appeared off Martinique on 
May 11, the day when Sampson, with a heterogeneous 
squadron, was bombarding San Juan, Porto Rico, whither 
he had gone in search of the Spaniards. The news of the 
arrival of the Spanish was held up by the French for thirty- 
six hours. When Washington heard the news Sampson 
was ordered back to Key West. The Flying Squadron, 
(that in the Chesapeake) was ordered south, and scouts 
were sent to patrol certain channels through which Cer- 
vera would have to go if he were to make a run to Havana. 
All but the smallest of the blockaders off Cienfuegos were 
ordered away. 

The Department knew that Cervera would need coal, 
and that his machinery would need overhauling. There 
were only four Spanish ports in the West Indies where he 
could be accommodated— Havana, Cienfuegos and Santi- 
ago, Cuba, and San Juan, Porto Rico. No effort was 
made to keep unbroken watch off either Santiago or San 



282 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Juan until after it was rumored that Cervera was in San- 
tiago. 

From Martinique Cervera went to Cura9oa to coal. 
When he was about to leave Cura9oa on May 15 the fact 
was telegraphed promptly to Washington and then to 
Sampson, who was on his way to Key West from San Juan. 
Sampson placed his ships in the Bahama Channel, where 
they could intercept Cervera if a dash for Havana were 
made by way of the east end of Cuba, and after putting 
Captain R. D. Evans in charge, he continued on, under his 
orders from Washington, to Key West, where he arrived 
May 18. The Flying Squadron was already there. Samp- 
son chose to guard the north shore of Cuba, and sent 
Commodore Schley, commanding the Flying Squadron, 
to Cienfuegos. The order said "Proceed with despatch 
(utmost) off Cienfuegos." It had been learned, on au- 
thority supposed to be trustworthy, that Cervera had sup- 
plies for Havana, and it was believed that he would try to 
reach Cienfuegos, from whence a railroad led to Havana. 
A scout was now sent to San Juan, but none to Santiago. 

"Early on the morning of the 19th" (Schley's "Forty- 
five Years Under the Flag," p. 262) another order, sent to 
Schley from Sampson, said: "You should establish a 
blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay." 
In obedience to this order the " Flying Squadron, consist- 
ing of the Brooklyn!, Massachusetts, Texas and Scorpion, 
sailed from Key West between 7 and 8 a. m.. May 19, 
for Cienfuegos via the Yucatan Channel. ... At day- 
light on the 22d position was taken off Cienfuegos, near 
the entrance, and the port was thus blockaded." (Schley, 
pp. 263, 265.) The route had been covered in a little less 
than three days. The loiva. Captain R. D. Evans, fol- 
lowed, leaving Key West on the 20th, going by way of the 
blockading station off Havana (a longer route), and arrived 
after two days and two hours. 



ON TO SANTIAGO 283 

A converted yacht, which Schley met on the way, sent 
word, saying "No news of the Spaniards." When forty 
miles from Cienfuegos "a number of guns were heard, 
apparently with the cadence of a salute." (Schley.) 
Schley, therefore, thought that Cervera might be arriving at 
Cienfuegos at that moment. When the blockade had been 
established off Cienfuegos smoke as from steamers was 
seen within the harbor. 

Officers on Schley's ships saw lights on shore that were 
supposed to be signals, on the nights of May 22 and 23. 
Schley saw them on the 23d. Captain Evans received, 
before leaving Key West, a memorandum regarding such 
signals, which were to be made by insurgents in Cuba who 
wished to communicate with the American ships. Schley 
testified ("Proceedings," pp. 1348-1349) that he did not 
receive this memorandum until it was brought by a de- 
spatch boat on the 23d. No effort was made to investigate 
the signal lights that night. On the 24th Captain McCalla, 
of the Marhlehead, arrived and asked if such signals had 
been seen, and said he had arranged for them. He was 
sent to investigate, and near 4 o'clock of the same day re- 
ported that the insurgents said Cervera was not in Cien- 
fuegos. 

By the despatch boat that arrived on the 23d Schley 
had received from Sampson a letter containing a copy of a 
letter from the Department, dated May 20, as follows: 
"The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago might 
very well be correct, so the Department strongly advises 
that you send word to Schley to proceed off Santiago with 
whole command." Sampson's letter (dated May 21) said : 
"Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. If you are 
satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all 
despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the 
enemy is there blockade him." 

Schley was satisfied, at 4 o'clock p. m. on the 24th, that 



284 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. He reported this to the 
Department, and said he would "move eastward to-mor- 
row." At 7:45 o'clock that night (24th) he moved east- 
ward, having notified the ships to rendezvous at a point 
twenty-five miles south of Santiago. The collier Merrimac, 
carrying 4,500 tons of coal, went with Schley. Next day 
the sea was rough for the small craft. The Eagle (a con- 
verted yacht) took a solid sea over her bow and filled her 
forward compartment. Schley then slowed down the 
squadron to a speed that the Eagle could make. On the 
26th, after the Eagle had been pumped out, she was 
ordered to Jamaica. At 5:30 p. m. that afternoon 
Schley stopped at a point twenty-two miles south of 
Santiago. 

At midnight on May 20 Captain W. C. Wise, command- 
ing the scout Yale, then at Cape Haytien, received a de- 
spatch from Washington, saying ("Proceedings," p. 212): 
"The Spanish squadron arrived on the 19th at Santiago. 
Proceed off that port. Get in touch with the enemy." 
It was also said that Schley had been ordered to Santiago 
"with all possible despatch." 

On the way to Santiago the Yale fell in with the scout 
St. Paul, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, and took her along. 
Neither of these ships saw anything of the Spaniards. 
The scout Harvard, Captain C. S. Colton, joined them. 
She saw nothing. The cruiser Minneapolis, Captain 
T. F. Jewell, arrived on the 23d. She saw nothing. The 
Spaniards were all far inside at this time. The Minne- 
apolis was sent on the 24th ("Proceedings," p. 350) to 
report to Schley off Cienfuegos, but not finding him there 
she returned to Santiago, arriving on the 26th. She saw 
nothing of the Flying Squadron while on the way. 

When Schley arrived at a point twenty-two miles south 
of Santiago his smoke was seen by the cruiser Minneapolis, 
and the scouts Yale and *S^. Paul, and all three joined him. 



ON TO SANTIAGO 285 

Captain Sigsbee was called to the Brooklyn, where he 
reported' "I have seen absolutely nothmg of the Spanish 
fleet." He also reported that he had captured "very 
close to the Morro, off Santiago,'' the British ship Res- 
tormel, loaded with 2,400 tons of coal. The Restormel 
had left Cardiff after the war began, she had been sent to 
San Juan, Porto Rico, for orders, she had been sent 
thence to Curajoa, where she had arrived two days after 
Cervera sailed, and she had then been ordered to Santiago. 
The captains of all three of the scouting vessels have testi- 
fied that they all believed, when they joined Schley, that 
Cervera was in Santiago, as the Department's despatch 
had said. 

Captain Sigsbee put a Cuban pilot on the Brooklyn, and 
he told Schley that ships as large as Cervera's could not 
enter Santiago except under circumstances extraordinarily 
favorable. 

The log of the Brooklyn for the 26th shows that the 
weather was "cloudy and pleasant," and that the "breeze" 
varied from "light" to "moderate" and back to "gentle." 

Before leaving Cienfuegos, Schley had written the De- 
partment that he should not be able to remain off Santiago 
" on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so 
we will proceed to the vicinity of Nicholas Mole where the 
water is smooth." 

At 7:45 o'clock p. m., on the 26th, two hours and fifteen 
minutes after reaching a point twenty-two miles south of 
Santiago, Schley signalled to his squadron: "Destination 
Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, 
as soon as collier is ready; speed nine knots." 

The Merrimac's machinery was out of order, but the 
Yale took her in tow. The fleet steamed westward 
eighteen miles, stopped at 11:15 p. m. and then drifted 
until 3 : 40 in the afternoon of the next day. May 27. WTiile 
thus drifting, at 9:30 o'clock in the forenoon of May 27 



286 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the scout Harvard joined the squadron and dehvered to 
Schley the following despatch, which had been addressed 
to the Harvard at St. Nicholas Mole: 

"Proceed at once and inform Schley as follows: All 
Department's information indicates the Spanish division 
is still at Santiago de Cuba. The Department looks to you 
to ascertain the fact, and that the enemy, if therein, does 
not leave without a decisive action." 

To this Schley replied ("Proceedings," p. 1827): 

Received dispatch of May 26th delivered by Harvard off Santi- 
ago de Cuba. Merrimac's engine is disabled and she is helpless; 
am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely 
unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from 
collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leav- 
ing Key West. Brooklyn is the only one in squadron having more 
than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off 
Santiago in present state of coal account of the squadron. Not pos- 
sible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer, owing to south- 
west winds. Harvard just reports to me she has only coal enough 
to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports 
only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti. Minne- 
apolis has only coal enough to reach Key West, and same of Yale, 
which will tow Merrimac. It is to be regretted that department's 
orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that 
end. I am forced to return to Key West, via Yucatan passage, for 
coal. . . . Will leave St. Paid here. Will require 9500 tons of 
coal at Key West. 

The Court of Inquiry, in its report, unanimously wrote 
as follows under the sub-title of "Facts": 

The coal supply of the flying squadron at noon on May 27 was 
sufficient to have enabled them to steam at 10 knots per hour — the 
Brooklyn for 11| days, the Iowa for TJ days, the Massachusetts for 
10 days, the Texas for 6| days, the Marblehead for 3J days, the 
Vixen for llj days, or to have remained on blockade duty off San- 
tiago de Cuba — the Brooklyn for 26 days, the Iowa for 16 days, the 
Massachusetts for 20 days, the Texas for 10 days, the Marblehead 



ON TO SANTIAGO 287 

for 5 days, the Vixen for 23 days, and then steam to Gonaives, 
Haiti, or to Cape Cruz, Cuba, to coal. 

At that date the Flying Squadron was accompanied by the 
collier Merrimac, containing 4,350 tons of coal. The amount of 
coal required to completely fill the coal bunkers of all the vessels of 
the Flying Squadron on this same date was 2,750 tons. 

The conditions of wind, sea and weather from noon on May 26 
to June 1 were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off 
Santiago de Cuba. 

Having sent the despatch quoted above, Schley, at 3:45 
p. M. on the 27th, went on toward Key West, twenty- 
three miles, and then stopped again and drifted. While 
drifting at this time the Texas went alongside the collier 
and remained filling her bunkers all night. While she 
was there, at 10:45 that night, Schley signalled her: 
"The more coal you take on in this smooth weather the 
less you will have to take on in Haiti." 

After drifting until 1 p. m. on the 28th, Schley returned 
toward Santiago, and at 6 o'clock that night took a posi- 
tion seven miles south of the entrance of the harbor. 

" Commodore Schley made no effort to ascertain whether 
the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago; he 
left said harbor entirely unguarded from 6 p. m. of May 
26 to 5 p. M. of May 27, and guarded only by the scout 
St. Paul from 5 p. m. on May 27 until 6 p. m. May 28." 
("Facts," unanimously found by Court of Inquiry.) 

Schley, in his "Forty-five Years under the Flag," says 
(p. 278): "The move to the westward at 9:50 p. m. on the 
night of May 26th was made with the purpose in view 
of blocking the passage to the westward to bar any effort 
of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the 
Yucatan passage." 

On May 29 the Colon, of Cervera's squadron, was seen 
at anchor 1,200 yards within the entrance to the harbor. 
She had been there since the 24th, as her log shows. 



288 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

Others of the ships were seen near her. The four cruisers 
and two of the destroyers were in the harbor, the third 
destroyer having gone to San Juan. "No attempt was 
made by Commodore Schley on May 29 or 30 to capture 
or destroy these Spanish vessels." ("Facts.") 

On May 31 Schley went to the Massachusetts. He said 
to the captain : " Higginson, I am going in with you and the 
Iowa and pot the Colon with your big guns. I want to 
fire deliberately. Admiral Sampson will be here to- 
morrow morning and I wish to destroy the Colon." At 
11:10 o'clock he set signals saying: "The Massachusetts, 
New Orleans and Iowa will go in after dinner to a distance 
of 7,000 yards and fire at the Cristobal Colon with 8, 12, 
and 13-inch guns. Speed about ten knots." 

At 1 : 30 the three ships went to a range of something 
more than 7,000 yards (four land miles at least was the 
range), headed eastward across the harbor and fired at 
the Colon during the interval of from two to four minutes 
that she was visible from each ship. The shots fell short. 
The Colon and a battery on the hill replied. The Colon's 
shots fell short. One shot from the battery on the hill 
passed over the Massachusetts. In turning to cross back 
the ships used "a port helm" — they went out to sea still 
further. Captain Higginson suggested that the turn be 
made inshore — "with a starboard helm" — in order to 
reduce the range, but Schley " thought it would be better 
to go around with a port helm." ("Proceedings," p. 39.) 
Captain Higginson did not think the land batteries amount- 
ed to much. Before the Court of Inquiry Schley testi- 
fied ("Proceedings," p. 1,375) that he thought the guns 
were of 6 or 8-inch calibre." He also said: "Their shot 
did go beyond us. That being developed, I determined, 
of course, that there was no necessity to have risked — it 
would have been military folly to have risked — any of the 
battleships." 



ON TO SANTIAGO 289 

In his report to the Department regarding this affair he 
said the " reconnoissance was intended principally to injure 
and destroy Colon." (See "Proceedings," p. 1,505, "I 
will stand by that.") 

In connection with these statements of fact it seems 
worth while to note here that the scout St. Louis (the big 
Atlantic liner of that name), Captain C. F. Goodrich, and 
the tug Wompatuck, Lieutenant C. W. Jungen, were off 
Santiago early in the morning of May 18, and steamed in 
until "within 1.3 miles of the castle." They were then 
about 2,600 yards from the hill forts. The St. Louis 
was armed with 6-pounders; the Wompatux;k had one 
3-pounder. Using these guns these two unarmored ves- 
sels, with machinery high out of the water, silenced the 
batteries on the hills and then picked up and cut a cable. 
The Wompatujck was still closer in at one time. (See 
Append. Rep. Bu. Nav., p. 209.) 



CHAPTER XXIX 
BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 

After receiving Schley's telegram of May 27, saying 
he should go on to Key West in spite of orders, the De- 
partment ordered Sampson to Santiago, where he arrived 
on June 1. Schley had blockaded the port by cruising 
slowly to and fro "at an average distance of six or seven 
miles" ("Facts," in "Proceedings," p. 1,828), with two 
pickets two miles nearer shore at night. After Sampson 
arrived the fleet was divided into two squadrons, of which 
one, called the West Squadron, was under Commodore 
Schley, while the other, the East, was directly under 
Admiral Sampson, who also, of course, had supreme com- 
mand of both. The squadrons were arranged in a curve 
drawn around the harbor mouth with a radius that did 
not exceed six miles. At night the whole fleet closed in to 
a distance of two miles from the entrance. Then two 
battleships steamed in one mile and stopped there, after 
which one of them kept the entrance and the channel far 
beyond well illuminated with her search-lights, while the 
other kept her guns trained up the channel and the gunners 
stood with their fingers on the triggers, so to speak, ready to 
fire on any ship that might appear. Three auxiliaries 
were then sent in and placed in line across the harbor 
mouth at a distance of half a mile from land, while three 
steam launches were kept patrolling to and fro within a 
quarter of a mile of the beach. 

"The whole habit of mind of our Commander-in-chief 
was to be in close touch with the enemy," wrote Captain 
Chadwick, of the New York. 

290 



BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 291 

At 3 o'clock on the morning of June 3 the coUier Merri- 
mac was sunk in the mouth of the harbor by Naval-Con- 
structor R. P. Hobson, in an effort to close the channel— 
a brave deed, but not successful. On June 10 the harbor 
of Guantanamo, forty miles east of Santiago, was occupied 
as a coaling and repair station for the fleet. The marines, 
under Colonel R. W. Huntington, had a warm time with 
the Spanish soldiers, but of course they held on. There 
was a lot of brave work done along shore during the month 
of June, but no description of it can be given here because 
it did not directly influence the result of the campaign. 

On June 14 an army of 16,000 men sailed from Tampa, 
Fla., and on the 22d they began to land at Daiquira, to the 
eastward of Santiago. As this army (it was under General 
Shafter) was sure to besiege Santiago, and thus, as Cap- 
tain-General Blanco pointed out at the time, bring starva- 
tion upon Cervera's squadron as well as upon the city, 
the Spanish authorities were- in a quandary as to what 
should be done with the ships. The ships certainly were 
not in an efficient state for battle, but to remain was to face 
destruction in any event, and on July 2 Cervera received 
definite orders to leave within twelve hours. 

At sunrise the next morning the American squadron 
lay in a semicircle off the port at a distance of from two to 
four miles. The armored line included the Indiana, the 
New York, the Oregon, the Iowa, the Texas and the Brook- 
lyn, in the order named, beginning at the east side of the 
harbor. The auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen lay closer 
in, the Gloucester to the east and the Vixen to the west side 
of the harbor entrance. 

It was a beautiful morning, but much like other morn- 
ings that had passed. The lookout on the flagship had 
seen nothing to indicate a change of purpose among the 
enemy in the harbor. In the meantime the admiral had 
made an engagement to visit the headquarters of the army 



292 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

on that day, and at 8:50 o'clock the New York left the 
squadron and steamed east under three boilers of steam. 
Throughout the fleet the Sunday inspection was taken in 
hand at 9:30. 

While the men were lining up for this purpose a lookout 
on the Texas stood with his hand on signal halliards, to 
which were set signals that would announce the approach 
of the enemy, and on the Oregon and the Iowa sailors stood 
with fingers on the triggers of 6-pounders, ready to an- 
nounce the enemy's approach by firing a shot. It was in 
that fashion that watch was kept, and the keen lookouts 
were rewarded. At 9:31 the sharp bow of the Spanish 
flagship was seen coming from beliind Smith Cay, and at 
the first glance the lookouts began to bawl: 

"The fleet's coming out!" The signals were hoisted 
on the Texas and the guns were fired on the Oregon and 
the Iowa. With that the gongs on all the ships called all 
hands to quarters, and breaking ranks the men ran shout- 
ing for joy to gun-breech and stoke-hole. At the same 
instant the engineers on watch opened wide the throttles, 
and the American squadron began to close in for battle 
at close quarters, according to the plan that had been given 
to each captain in the squadron by Admiral Sampson — 
an order that said : " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships 
must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor 
to sink his ships or force them to run ashore in the chan- 
nel." 

The fleet was too far out to intercept the Spaniards in 
the channel. As the Spaniards reached the mouth of the 
channel they turned westerly, with the Teresa in the lead. 
At this time, and before she had cleared the shoal, found 
just to the west of the mouth of the channel, she was head- 
ing directly at the Brooklyn, and the Brooklyn was head- 
ing in toward her. The Teresa opened fire with her for- 
ward turret gun at the Brooklyn and her broadside at the 



BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 293 

other American ships, aiming especially at the Indiana. 
All the American ships were closing in with growing speed 
and all returned the fire with enthusiasm. The Spanish 
shot all flew wild at this time, but almost from the first 
round the Americans saw that they were striking home. 
But because they were using the old brown powder, a 
cloud of smoke soon arose around them, which made 
aiming difficult and navigation dangerous. 

As the Brooklyn steamed in Commodore Schley signalled 
" close in " and about the same time told his captain (Cook) 
to keep out of torpedo range of the Spaniards, Torpedo 
range at that time was about 1,000 yards. 

Before coming out the captain of the Teresa had de- 
termined to ram the Brooklyn, but as soon as he had 
cleared the shoal at the mouth of the channel he changed 
his mind and turned still further to the west in a de- 
termined effort to get away from the American fleet. 
This left the Vizcaya, the next Spanish ship in the line, 
heading directly at the Brooklyn. Schley had already 
thought that the Teresa would try to ram the Brooklyn, 
and had said to Cook, "Cook, look out; they are going 
to ram you." And now that the Vizcaya was seen clos- 
ing in on the Teresa's former course, both Schley and 
Cook thought of torpedoes, and Cook, under the general 
order he had received from Schley on that subject, ordered 
the Brooklyn's helm put hard aport and she turned away 
from the enemy, out to sea, and then to the west in a course 
parallel with that taken by the flying Spaniards. The 
Brooklyn was flying the signal "Follow the flag," as she 
turned away from the enemy. 

The Brooklyn made no effort to use either her torpedoes 
or her ram. "When the Brooklyn's helm was put hard 
aport, the Teresa was 1,400 yards to the eastward of north 
of the Brooklijn, the Vizcaya was to the eastward of the 
Teresa and the Colon to the eastward of the Vizcaya. 



294 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

When the Brooklyn completed the turn and was heading 
to the westward the Vizcaya and the Colon were about 
2,400 yards to the northward and westward of the Brooklyn. 
("Facts," found by the Court, p. 1,829.) 

In the meantime the other ships of the fleet had been 
closing in and firing as rapidly as possible. Chief-Engineer 
Milligan of the Oregon had kept up steam so well that she 
was able to cross astern of the Iowa and plough up between 
the Iowa and the Texas in chase of the Spaniards as they 
fled to the westward. Both the Iowa and Texas were 
obscured by the smoke for a time, but as the Oregon drew 
in between them the Texas suddenly came into view so 
close aboard to port that a collision seemed impending. 
Captain Clark instantly turned to the starboard only to 
find himself almost on top of the Iowa. 

When the Brooklyn turned away from the Spaniards 
she ran in so close on the Texas ("so near that it took 
away our breath," wrote Captain Philip) that Captain 
Philip felt obliged to stop and then back his engines to 
keep out of the way. Captain Evans estimated that the 
Brooklyn crossed the bow of the Texas at a distance of 
100 yards, while Lieutenant Heilner of the Texas esti- 
mated the distance at 150 yards. 

Schley explained that to have turned with a starboard 
helm instead of the port "would have carried us into a 
dangerous proximity to the torpedo attack, the broadside 
torpedo attack, of the enemy's vessels." ("Proceedings," 
p. 1,398.) In his autobiography he says that turning away 
from the enemy "was the proper military move . . . and 
saved the day beyond a doubt." 

When the Brooklyn was out of the way the three ships, 
that had been apparently so near in collision on account 
of her turn, were able to keep on closing in. As they 
drew near their fire became more deadly, and within 
fifteen minutes the Teresa was seen "wabbling like a 



BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 295 

wounded bird." Smoke was pouring from ports and 
hatches. She was on fire as well as in danger of jinking 
and, turning from her course, she ran ashore about six 
miles west of the harbor. 

Seeing the Teresa was done for, the fleet concentrated 
their fire on the Oquendo, the last of the squadron, because 
she was nearest, and she, too, soon turned as the Teresa 
had done, leaving the Vizcaya and the Colon to continue 
the wild flight. The Vizcaya was already badly wounded, 
however, and the pounding of the Brooklyn, the Texas 
and the Oregon, which were well to westward of the other 
American ships, drove her to the rocks at Asseraderos, 
fifteen or sixteen miles from the harbor. 

The Colon, by steaming closer to the shore, had escaped 
the fire and was now doing everything possible to get away. 
The fighting was ended; it was now a case of speed alone. 

In the meantime the two destroyers, the Pluton and the 
Furor, had followed out astern of the Spanish cruisers. 
They found Wainwright, of the converted yacht Gloucester, 
waiting for them. Wainwright had cleared his little ship 
for action with the others and, steaming in, he had fired 
at the big Spaniards with his 6-pounder and 3-pounder 
battery. Then he thought of the destroyers, and slowing 
down, he headed in, while Engineer G. W. McElroy 
bottled up steam. Wainwright was from the Maine, and 
his day had come. The Spanish destroyers carried two 
14-pounders, two 6-pounders and two 1 -pounders each, 
and there were two of them, but as soon as they appeared 
Wainwright drove the Gloucester into the mouth of the 
harbor under the fire of the land batteries as well as of 
the enemy's guns afloat to meet them "at short range." 
The Pluton was coming at full speed, but under Wain- 
wright's fire she first slowed down and then sought safety 
for her crew by a flight to the rocks alongshore; for she 
was sinking rapidly. The Furor turned as if with better 



296 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

pluck to run at the Gloucester, but it was soon seen that she 
was turning merely because she was no longer under con- 
trol — she was in the death flurry — and when she had com- 
pleted one circle she began to go down stern first. Hasten- 
ing to the rescue Wainwright secured a dozen of her crew, 
and then, after an explosion somewhere in the bow, she 
went down speedily. 

When in doubt about the conduct of an American naval 
officer in battle let the reader ask what would John Paul 
Jones, or Nicholas Biddle, or William B. Gushing, or 
G. U. Morris, or David Glasgow Farragut, or Richard 
Wainwright have done under the circumstances. Their 
conduct needed no explanation — there is none to dispute 
that they have set the pace for all American naval offi- 
cers. Try all others by their standard. 

As the Colon fled the Brooklyn and the Oregon held on 
in chase with the slower Texas following astern of them. 
Milligan went into the Oregon's stoke-hole, where the men 
who shovelled coal were gasping for breath but keeping 
the fires blazing until a speed of perhaps eighteen knots 
was reached. It was then that the impatient younger 
officers on deck asked Captain Clark to let them try a 
shot. Clark consented, and Milligan, black with coal, 
came up on deck to thank the captain and say that his 
men were fainting below, but if they could hear a shot, 
now and then, they could live through and keep her going. 

The first shot fell short, but another passed over and fell 
ahead of the Colon. With that shot hope fled from the 
Spanish ship, and hauling down her flag she turned 
ashore, grounding at the mouth of the Tarquino River, 
forty-three miles from Santiago. 

The American squadron lost one man killed and one 
wounded. Both were on the Brooklyn. She was for 
twenty minutes under the fire of perhaps all the four 
Spanish ships, and yet lost no more. The Spanish squad- 



BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 297 

ron lost at least 350 killed and 160 wounded, while seventy 
officers and 1,600 men were taken prisoners. Superior 
speed carried our ships within range and superior gunnery, 
not superior armor, protected our men and destroyed the 
enemy. 

As Farragut said, "The best protection against the 
enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from our own guns." 

Neither of the Spanish ships was saved, though at least 
two of them might have been by prompt effort, but the 
Spanish naval power was wiped out. The Spanish au- 
thorities did, indeed, start a small squadron eastward as a 
threat to Dewey at Manila, but it was not an effective 
squadron, and a threat of a Yankee squadron on the Span- 
ish coast stopped it. The destruction of Cervera's squad- 
ron decided the war. 

Nevertheless, it is useful to point out, that when the 
hulls of the wrecked Spanish ships had been examined it 
was found that out of more than 8,000 shots fired at them, 
only 123 struck home. To reach 123 hits the holes made 
by 6-pounders in the smokestacks were counted. It was 
to that degree of excellence that we trained our gunners 
before the War with Spain ! 

The New York, at the time the Spaniards appeared, 
was well on her way toward Siboney. On hearing the 
firing she was turned back at full speed, and she made 
such good headway that if by accident the Brooklyn and 
the Oregon had broken down she would have overhauled 
the Colon eventually. The Texas was also gaining on the 
Colon. The destruction of the Colon did not depend on 
any one ship of the fleet. At the time the Gloucester sank 
the destroyers, and even when the fleet opened fire, the 
New Ywk was nearer the Indiana than the Brooklyn was. 
("Proceedings," p. 1,841.) It was claimed for Adnnral 
Sampson that because of the position of the New York 
during the heavy firing "the absolute command and the 



298 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

fuH responsibility" were his — that a failure to destroy the 
fleet would have been charged to him. The Court of 
Claims, when the question of prize money came before it, 
decided that Sampson was in command at the battle. 

To complete the record the following is the Opinion 
of the Court of Inquiry : 



Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should 
have proceeded with utmost despatch off Cienfuegos and should 
have maintained a close blockade of that port. 

He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain 
information regarding the Spanish squadron by commimicating 
with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum 
delivered to him at 8.15 a.m. of that date. 

He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba 
with all despatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view 
of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron. 

He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. 

He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his 
squadron. He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Depart- 
ment's order of May 25. 

He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish 
vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29 
and 30. 

He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to 
capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he 
attacked on May 31. 

By commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery 
and turning the Brooklyn around with port helm. Commodore Schley 
caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels. 
The turn was made toward the Texas and caused that vessel to 
stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision. 

Admiral Schley did injustice to Commander A. C. Hodgson in 
publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed be- 
tween them. 

Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of 
the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by 
vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise. 

His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling 
facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading. 



BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 299 

His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he 
encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to 
fight courageously. 

George Dewey, Admiral U. S. N., President, 

Sam. C. Lemly, Judge Advocate-General, Judge Advocate. 

After signing the above Admiral Dewey wrote the fol- 
lowing personal opinion: 

In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to 
Cienf uegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible de- 
spatch. Commodore Schley having in view the importance of ar- 
riving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' 
bunkers. 

The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective. 

Commodore Schley, in permitting the Adula to enter the port of 
Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish 
squadron from her when she came out. 

The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about 22 miles south of 
Santiago was made with as much despatch as was possible while 
keeping the squadron a unit. 

The blockade of Santiago was effective. 

Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off 
Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the 
morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command, and is 
entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious 
victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships. 
George Dewey, Admiral U.S.N. , President, 
Sam. C. Lemly, Judge Advocate-General, Judge Advocate. 

It is important to note that the question of who was 
senior officer at the battle of Santiago was not at any time 
before the Court of Inquiry. Testimony looking to a 
consideration of that question was rigorously excluded. 
Moreover, when counsel for Admiral Sampson appealed 
for protection for their client, or for permission to appear 
and defend his rights, the Court, with Admiral Dewey con- 
senting, refused to let them appear, and Dewey wrote to 
them saying that "Admiral Sampson is not an interested 



300 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

party." ("Proceedings," p. 1,843.) When a letter was 
sent by the writer to Admiral Dewey asking why he had 
thus expressed an opinion against the claims of a man 
whom he had refused to hear, no answer was received. 



CHAPTER XXX 
TEN YEARS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 

The battle of Santiago was decisive. Spain's navy 
as a weapon of offence was annihilated. That she had 
some ships left at home for coast defence, and that her 
home ports were on the far side of the broad Atlantic 
from her enemy was a matter of no importance in con- 
nection with the result of the war. Her forces in Cuba 
were hemmed in and were compelled to surrender. The 
navy had part in the occupation of Porto Rico and the 
Philippines, but of the work done there nothing need be 
said here. 

As a result of the war with Spain we found ourselves in 
possession of the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico. It 
has been determined that we shall retain the govern- 
ment of these islands until the people thereof are fully 
capable of governing themselves, and the chances are 
that as fast as they reach that state of enlightenment they 
will rejoice that they live under the flag that first gave 
them opportunity for development. These islands we 
must protect. For many years we have had the Monroe 
Doctrine to uphold. No foreign nation shall obtain con- 
trol of another foot of soil on either of the Americas. And 
in defence of this doctrine we are as likely to be obliged to 
send a squadron to protect Rio Grande do Sul in southern 
Brazil as to any other part of the continent. We are build- 
ing the Panama Canal and we shall have to defend that as 
well as the new-made republic of Panama. We have de- 
termined that our merchants shall not be shut out of such 

301 



302 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

markets a.s China ami otln i similar powers afford hv unfair 
**spluTi\s of inihuMuv." 

In view of (ho ohhi:;n(ii>ns (hat wo havo assuniotl as a 
worUl Powc 1- (ho oUl-(inio talk about the advantjiges of our 
si(ua(ion \\'\{\\ an oooan (hviihnix us from (ho otlior <j;roat 
Powors of (ho world, and of nooding coiust-dofoncc ships 
only, is puerile. 

Wlion wo had no navv worth mention before the War 
of ISl'J we sutVorod from aggressions that drove us to war. 
When our navy was strong after that wax even the slaver 
pirates (hat earriml our flag on the coast of Africa wore 
inuuolostod by foreign warships. When, at about the year 
1848, our navy was again weak, aggressions were begun 
once more, but the building of the Mrrriniac and the Ilarf- 
foni, and the easting of the Dahlgron gun saved us from 
the horrors of a foreign war. During the Civil War we 
wore saved from intervention and foreign aggression solely 
by the strength of the navy. Eight years after the Civil 
W^ar our citizens w'ere murdered in Cuba, the flag was out- 
raged, and the whole nation humiliated because our navy 
had Ixvn allowed to dwindle and all but die. When, in 
1893, the territory of Venezuela was threatened the mere 
fact that we were building and had facilities for continu- 
ing to build a new navy, made the aggressor willing to leave 
its dispute with the little South American republic to a 
just tribunal. After Japan's war with China the Powers 
of EurojH^ gathered around the little brown "heathen" 
and robbed him of the fruits of his victory. His navy wjis 
(hen weak. After the war with Russia the whole world 
gathereil to apphnul the little brown giant. His navy was 
strong. Because of the strength of her navy Japan will 
have jxniee hereafter, as long as she wants it. Tn the days 
whcTi we had no navy the British kept well-appointed 
squadrons and depots of supplies at Halifax, Bermuda 
and Jamaica; after we had the homogeneous squadron of 



TEN YEARS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 303 

five Louisianas well in hand these British naval stations 
were abandoned as no longer necessary— because there was 
no longer any probability of war. The battleship is the 
modern emblem of peace. 

How we have built warships since the war with Spain 
can be told in brief space. Although we had no ships 
better than the Oregon for that war, we had other ships 
on the stocks when the war began. There was the Kear- 
sarge class, carrying four 13-inch guns in turrets, four 
8-inch guns in smaller turrets placed on the large ones 
and fourteen 5-inch guns in broadside. The superim- 
posed turrets have been criticised and praised, but with- 
out expressing any opinion on the merits of this feature, 
it may be said that it was an American design and it was 
therefore worth trying if only on the theory that the man 
is of more importance than the ship. We can have first 
quality in nothing while we follow foreign devices. In 
building the Alabama, authorized in 1896, with her four 
13-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, and again in designing 
the Maine class (1898), our naval constructors went back 
to the old idea that it would pay to let the foreigners do 
the experimenting for us. Originality among American 
designers was discouraged. It is interesting to note, 
however, that while the Maine class ships were called 
"sea-going, coastline battleships," in deference to the 
ancient American idea that the only American way of 
conducting war r/as to invite the enemy to come to our 
coasts to do the fighting, the ordinary coal supply was 
made double that of the Kearsarge class designed before 
our war with Spain. Campaigns on the coast of Cuba 
and in the Philippines had not been in vain. 

In 1899 we returned to the Oregon design and brought 
out the Virginia class with four 12-inch, eight 8-inch and 
twelve 6-inch guns. These ships were beyond question 
up to date; they were American and they were fit to meet 



304 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

the best in the world. It was not until 1902, however, 
that we took a decided step forward. In that year the 
ordnance bureau brought out a 7-inch gun for broadside 
batteries, and the Louisiana and Connecticut were armed 
with four 12-inch, eight 8-inch and twelve 7-inch guns, 
besides twenty most excellent 3-inch guns, a size that had 
been developed because of the effectiveness of our 6- 
pounders in the war with Spain. These ships were the 
Constitutions of the modern navy, and we have five of 
them. 

Of course, European nations soon laid down ships more 
powerful. England built the Lord Nelson class, carrying 
four 12-inch guns in turrets and ten 9.2-inch guns in 
broadside, the smaller gun being an armor-piercer at long 
range. Yet, in the meantime, a still more remarkable 
step forward was at hand and it was a step based on the 
evolution or development of the man behind the gun. 

A comparison will tell the story of this development. 
In our war with Spain less than three per cent, of the shots 
fired from our ships hit the enemy. Under the system 
of training adopted after the war, especially after Theo- 
dore Roosevelt became President (a system that was also 
adopted in foreign navies), the gunners became so expert 
that the trophy ship of the American navy at this writing 
(1907) has a record of 75.782 per cent, of hits with all 
guns at target practice. Through skill acquired and the 
improvement of the mechanism, the 12-inch gun can now 
be fired twice in a minute with much more accuracy than 
was obtained when it was possible to fire it but once in five 
minutes. At long ranges it has been found that the 12- 
inch gun is more accurate than guns of small calibre; the 
trajectory of the big gun is the smaller. Now small guns 
were mounted because of the supposed greater accuracy 
with which they could be fired. It followed, therefore, 
that when twelve hits could be made in twelve successive 



TEN YEARS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 305 

shots from the 12-inch gun— a record actually made in 
our navy— there was no longer any need for the 7-inch 
or 8-inch guns on our ships. 

It was in England, however, that the logical conclusion 
here reached was first adopted; for the British had made 
splendid progress in target work also. The Dreadnaught, 
the first ship to mount 12-inch guns only, displaces over 
18,000 tons, she carries ten 12-inch guns, and she makes 
a speed of twenty-one knots. She was launched on 
February 10, 1905. It is worth noting, in passing, that 
the tone of Continental papers had been noticeably un- 
friendly just before she was brought out, and that that 
tone was promptly changed after she was fully described 
in the newspapers. 

The American advance at that time was less. Congress 
had authorized two ships of 16,000 tons. They were de- 
signed to carry eight 12-inch guns, mounted in four tur- 
rets on the keel line, with the interior turrets built high 
enough to shoot over the others. These ships have an 
end-on fire of four guns. The Dreadnaught has an end-on 
fire of six guns, two of her turrets being on the rail. Our 
broadside of eight guns is as good as hers, but our speed 
is only 18^ knots. Moreover, as our hulls are small, they 
could not stand as much pounding as she could. 

As the other naval Powers were laying down Dread- 
naughts, so to speak, the United States was compelled to 
take the same step forward. We have in hand (1907) 
two ships of 20,000 tons displacement that will carry ten 
12-inch guns in turrets on the keel line, so arranged that 
an end-on fire of four guns can be had, with a broadside 
of the whole ten. A battery of 5-inch guns is provided 
for use against torpedo boats. In speed they will equal 
the best m Europe and their armor will be thicker than 
any other of their date. We did not evolve the class- 
partisan criticism makes our designers hesitate long before 



306 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

attempting anything untried — but these new ships will 
be able to hold up the flag at Sandy Hook, or at Panama, 
or in the Philippines. 

In 1898 our 12-inch guns fired a shot weighing 850 
pounds with a muzzle velocity of 2,100 foot-seconds and 
a striking energy of 25,985 foot-tons. Our present 12- 
inch guns have not been described officially, but it is 
known that they fire a shot of 850 pounds with a muzzle 
velocity of at least 2,800 foot-seconds and the muzzle 
energy is therefore not less than 46,246 foot-tons. 

In armored cruisers we advanced from the Brooklyn 
to the North Carolina. While the Brooklyn displaces 
10,068 tons our latest of the type, the North Carolina, 
displaces 15,981 tons. The old ship carried eight 8-inch 
guns of the old type, and twelve 5-inch guns in broadside. 
Her best small guns were 6-pounders, of which she carried 
twelve. The new ship carries four modern 10-inch guns, 
sixteen 6-inch and twenty-two 3-inch, Both are twenty- 
two-knot ships. The latest British cruiser carries eight 
12-inch guns and makes a speed of twenty-three knots. 

A new type of ship is the scout, of which we have three 
in hand. They displace 3,750 tons, make twenty-four 
knots speed and carry two 5-inch and six 3-inch guns. 

In the evolution of the engine England has definitely 
adopted the steam turbine for all kinds of ships. We have 
fitted one of our scouts with old-style engines and the other 
two with turbines of different makes. One battleship 
of the all-big-gun type is to have reciprocating engines 
and the other turbines. The marine engineers of the most 
enterprising sort have for some time foretold that gas en- 
gines would supersede all kinds of steam engines, but no 
provision has been made for developing this improvement 
for use in the American navy. 

We have been behind the world in submarines until 
recently when Congress provided $3,000,000 for these 




A TORPEDO BOAT DliSTROYER UNDER WAY. 




Frotn a photograph, copyright jgo6, fiy X. 11'. Pfu/Uhi. 

THE SUBMAKINK. SHARK. 




THE FULTOX. 

HOLLAND TYPE OF SUBMAKINE BOAT, USING HER GASOLINE ENGINE 

AS PROPELLING POWER. 



TEN YEARS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 307 

most fearsome and efficient harbor defenders. We have 
left the evolution of this class of defenders to private 
builders, while England has kept a crew of naval experts 
at that kind of work. The men who are evolving Eng- 
land's type of submarines will also handle them in war 
time. At the same time England buys all improvements 
made by civilians. 

According to Brassey's Naval Annual for 1907— the 
standard authority — the American navy ranks second in 
the world's fleets in her ships and guns. She is second 
in her capacity for building warships. In the skill of 
gun pointers England and America are in close rivalry for 
the lead, with the Americans a trifle ahead at present. 
Our naval officers command the confidence of the nation. 
Yet the writer ventures to repeat what he has written else- 
where, that there is one thing we might do for the im- 
provement at once of the navy and the whole nation — we 
might make the naval academy free to all boys who could 
pass the examination, and who would serve in the navy, 
beginning before the mast, as need required, and remain- 
ing a reasonable number of years. Chimerical as it may 
seem to those who have not given the matter serious 
thought, we might man our ships with graduates of the 
naval academy. By retaining the present course of 
study, with such improvements as became necessary, we 
should have crews of a grade never dreamed of before. 
In leaving the service, as many who grew tired of waiting 
for promotion would do when their terms of service had 
expired, these young men would carry with them an experi- 
ence and a training that would make them foremost citi- 
zens, and we should have in them a naval reserve worthy 
of the name. A chief function of government is the edu- 
cation of the young— it is especially the chief function of a 
republican form of government. A time ought to come, 
and so it will come, when every man who wears the 



308 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

uniform of the American navy will be thoroughly well- 
educated. 

In the War of the Revolution we gained opportunity 
to set up a republican form of government as an example 
to the world. The War of 1812 made jBrm the founda- 
tions of the nation, taught the people something better 
than " counting their interest more than their honor," and 
elevated the standards of international law. The Civil 
War wiped away the infinite disgrace of human slavery 
and welded a conglomerate of states into a nation. The 
War with Spain — the least selfish of all our wars — brought 
order to a people perishing through anarchy. What work 
the navy did in these wars has been told herein. Let the 
facts speak. As we have had war or dastardly submission 
to wrong when our navy was weak, and peace when our 
navy was strong, so in future shall we have peace, or war 
and humiliation, according as we build or neglect our guns 
afloat. 



INDEX 



Acasta, British frigate, in chase 

of Constitution, 130. 
Adams, Chas. Francis, U. S. 

Minister to England, work of, 

220. 

Adams, H., "History" quoted, 
62, 71. 

Adams, John, and Navy, 2; 4; 
as President favors a navy, 42. 

Admiralty, British, ceased pub- 
lishing reports of conflicts with 
American ships; makes unfair 
display of President, 131; re- 
jects screw propeller, 158; buys 
Confederate ironclads, 231. 

Adonis, Swedish merchantman, 
last vessel to meet Wasp, 128. 

Adula, British merchantman, off 
Cienfuegos, 299. 

Alabama, Confederate cruiser, 
mentioned, 219; work of, 224 
et seq.; destroyed by Kearsarge, 
227 et seq. 

Alabama, U. S. battleship, des- 
cribed, 303. 

Albatross, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at Port Hudson, 236. 

Albemarle, Confederate ironclad, 
account of, 241, 242. 

Alden, Commander J., with Far- 
ragut at New Orleans, 212; at 
Mobile Bay, 245, 247, 248. 

Alert, British sloop of war, men- 
tioned, 93; captured by the 
Essex, 99; mentioned, 140. 

Alfred, converted merchant ship, 
5; mentioned, 13. 



Algiers, a nation of pirates, 35; 
enemies of America, 36; im- 
presses American war-ship, 74. 

Allen, master's mate, gallant 
work on Hartford below New 
Orleans, 213. 

Allen, author "Battles of British 
Navy," quoted, 17. 

Allen, Capt. W. H., in battle be- 
tween Argiis and Pelican, 108, 
109. 

Alliance, frigate, built, 6; or- 
dered to join squadron under 
John Paul Jones, 16; at battle 
between Bonhomme Richard 
and Serapis, 17, 21 et seq.; 
end of, 33. 

Amazonas, see New Orleans. 

America, battleship, 7. 

"American Peril," first described 
in Parliament, 24, 25; influ- 
ence of considered, 53, 54. 

"American Privateers," quoted, 
133. 

"American State Papers," quo- 
ted, 35, 38, 65. 

Ammen, Lt.-Com. Daniel, at cap- 
ture of Port Royal, 180. 

Andrew Doria, converted mer- 
chant brig, 5. 

"Annual Register," quoted, 12, 
23, 24, 60. 

Antonio de Ulloa, gallant fight- 
ing on, 278. 

Archer, Confederate cruiser, work 
of, 223. 



310 



INDEX 



Argus, U. S. brig, described, 75; 
captured by Pelican, 108, 109. 

Ariel, gunboat, built, 116. 

Arkansas, Confederate river iron- 
clad, taken to the Yazoo, 204; 
defies U. S. fleets, 235. 

Armada, British line-of-battle 
ship, in chase of Wasp, 127. 

"Army and Navy Gazette" 
(British), quoted, 250. 

Arnold, work on Lake Cham- 
plain, 8 et seq. 

Asseraderos, Cuba, Vizcaya on 
rocks at, 295. 

Atlanta, U. S. cruiser, built, 256. 

Augusta, U. S. gunboat, at cap- 
ture of Port Royal, 180. 

Avon, British sloop of war, de- 
stroyed by Wasp, 127. 

Bahamas, American fleet at, 13; 
blockade runners at, in Civil 
War, 169, 170. 

Bahia (San Salvador), Brazil, 
battle off, 94 et seq. 

Bahia Honda, Cuba, blockaded, 
272. 

Bailey, Capt. T., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 205-211. 

Bainbridge, William, in com- 
mand of Le Croyable, 52 ; loses 
frigate Philadelphia, 75 et seq.; 
visit to President Madison, 80; 
in command of Constitution; 
captured Java, 94 et seq. 

Ballard, Mid. J., in Chesapeake- 
Shannon battle, 103. 

Baltimore, assault upon, 126. 

Baltimore, U. S. cruiser, foreign 
plans for, 256; carries ammu- 
nition for battle at Manila, 
270; with Dewey at Manila, 
275. 

Bankhead, Lt.-Com. J. P., at 
capture of Port Royal, 180. 

Barnegat, naval race off, 80. 

Barney, Commodore Joshua, in 



battle at Bladensburg; 126; 
success of as a privateer, 133. 

Barney, Mary, quoted, 133. 

Baron de Kalb, U. S. gunboat, 
destroyed by torpedo, 238. 

Barracouta, British merchant 
ship, and the Shenandoah, 230. 

Barreaut, captain of French frig- 
ate Insurgent, 44. 

Barron, Capt. James, in Chesa- 
peake affair, 66 et seq. 

Barron, flag officer Samuel, com- 
manding Confederate forces at 
Hatteras, 175. 

Barry, John, captain of Lexing- 
ton, Q; mentioned, 26; in com- 
mand of Lexington, captures 
British sloop, 27; work of, in 
frigates Effingham, Raleigh and 
Alliance, 28. 

Barclay, Capt. Robert Heriot, 
commanding British force on 
Lake Erie, 117; fails to keep 
Perry in port, 118; in battle of 
Lake Erie, 120 et seq.; force of, 
considered, 120. 

Bartholomew, Captain, fired on 
American gunboat in time of 
peace, 133. 

Basseterre Roads, mentioned, 
47. 

Beaufort, Confederate gunboat, 
with Merrimac at Hampton 
Roads, 187. 

Beauregard, Confederate ram, in 
battle at Memphis, 203. 

Belfast Lough, British warship 
Drake at, 14. 

Bell, Capt. H. H., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212. 

Benham, Rear Admr. A. E. K., 
member of Schley Court of 
Inquiry, 281. 

Benton, Mississippi River union 
gunboat, described, 197. 

Beresford, Capt. J. P., captures 
Wasp, 90. 

"Berlin Decree," 64, 65. 



INDEX 



311 



Bethlehem Steel Co., and the 
new Navy, 256. 

Biddle, Capt. James, captures 
Penguin, 132. 

Biddle, Nicholas, captain of An- 
drew Doria, 6; in battle be- 
tween frigate Randolph and 
British line - of - battle ship 
Yarmouth, 26; death of, 27; 
as type of naval officer, 296. 

Bienville, U. S. gunboat, at capt- 
m-e of Port Royal, 180. 

Bingham, Capt. Arthur B., meets 
the President, 99. 

Black Rock, N. Y., fight at, 112. 

Bladensburg, Md., battle at, 125, 
126. 

Blakely, Capt. Johnston, work 
of, with Wasp, 126 et seq. 

Blockade, Union, of Confederate 
ports, 167 et seq; runners of, 
169 et seq.; character of run- 
ners of, 170; success of run- 
ners of, 171 et seq. 

Blockades, paper, first British, 
64; "Orders in Council" on, 
66; extended, 70; object of, 
declared by British officials, 
70, 71. 

"Blood is thicker than water," 
originof expression, 179; Brit- 
ish show appreciation of, 279. 

Blyth, Capt. Samuel, loses Boxer, 
125. 

Boggs, Commander C. S., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Bomford, Col. George, work of, 
in developing guns, 161. 

Bonhomme Richard, converted 
merchant ship, mentioned, 7; 
described, 16; in battle with 
Serapis, 18 et seq. 

Bonne Citoyenne, British sloop, 
blockaded by Hornet, 94. 

Boston, U. S. cruiser, built, 256; 
with Dewey at Manilla, 275. 

Boxer, British brig, captured, 
125. 



Boyce, Lieut. C, attacked by 
Peacock, 133. 

Bragg, Confederate general, un- 
able to get navy men for ships, 
166. 

Bragg, Confederate ram, in bat- 
tle at Fort Pillow, 202. 

Brainer, Captain, mentioned, 128. 

Breeze, Capt. K. R., at capture 
of Fort Fisher, 252. 

Broke, Capt. P. B. V., command- 
ing Shannon, in chase of Con- 
stitution, 80; captures Chesa- 
peake, 104 et seq.; honored by 
British nation, 107. 

Brooke, Commander John M., 
work of, in developing iron- 
clads, 182 et seq. 

Brooklyn, U. S. cruiser (ar- 
mored), mentioned, 261; 22 
miles south of Santiago, 285; 
log of, quoted, 285; coal sup- 
ply of. May 27, 286; in battle 
of Santiago, 291 et seq.; stern 
to the enemy, 293; approach 
to the Texas, 294; overhauls 
Colon, 296; compared with 
North Carolina, 306. 

Brooklyn, U. S. S., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212; at 
Mobile Bay, 245 et seq.; stopped 
through fear of torpedoes, 247. 

Brown, Commander Isaac N., 
gallant work with Arkansas, 
235. 

Brown, Gen. Jacob, defense of 
Sacket Harbor, 113. 

Buchanan, Flag Officer Franklin, 
work of, with Merrimac, 186 
et seq.; wounded, 190; Ad- 
miral, in command of Con- 
federate naval forces at battle 
of Mobile Bay, 244 et seq.; 
wounded, 249, 250. 

Budd, Lieut. George, in Chesa- 
peake-Shannon battle, 103, 
106. 

Budd, Lt.-Com. T. A., at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 180. 



312 



INDEX 



Buenaventura, Spanish merchant 
ship, captured by Nashville, 
273. 

Bullock, Commander J. D., Con- 
federate agent in England, 
work of, 221; contracts for 
Alabama, 224. 

Burden, G., captain of Drake, 
14; killed, 15. 

Burgoyne, way for surrender of, 
at Saratoga prepared, 12. 

Bumside, Gen. A. E., in -com- 
mand of soldiers at Roanoke 
Island, 176 et seq. 

Burrows, Lieut. William, capt- 
ures Boxer, 125. 

Bush, Lieut. William, killed in 
Constitution - Guerriere fight. 
84. ^ ' 

Bushnell, David, submarine boat 

inventor, 237. 
Butler, Gen. Ben. F., at Hat- 

teras, 175; work of, at Fort 

Fisher, 251. 

Cabot, converted merchant brig, 

Cairo, U. S. gunboat, destroyed 

by torpedo, 238. 
Caldwell, Lieut. C. H. B., with 

Farragut at New Orleans, 211 

et seq. 

Caledonia, British war brig, men- 
tioned, 111; captured, 112; 
taken to Erie, 113; under 
Perry, 117; in battle of Lake 
Erie, 120 et seq. 

Canada, first invasion of, 8; in 
War of 1812, Chapter XII. 

Canning, British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, on Chesa- 
peake affair, 69. 

Cape Hatteras, Union Navy at, 
175. ^ ' 

Carden, Capt. John Surman, in 
command of Macedonian when 
captured by United States, 91. 

Cardenas, Cuba, blockaded, 272. 



Carleton, Gov. Guy, in Quebec, 
8; abandons invasion of colo- 
nies, 12. 

Carleton, war schooner, on Lake 
Champlain, 10. 

Carlyle, Thomas, quoted, 22. 

Carondelet, U. S. gunboat, at 

Island No. 10, 199, 200. 
Cassin, Capt. John, with Mac- 

donough on Lake Champlain. 

151, 152. ' 

Castillian, British sloop-of-war, 
mentioned, 128. 

Cayuga, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 211, 213. 

Central America, threat of war 
over rival claims in, 159. 

"Century of American Diplo- 
macy," quoted, 159, 219. 

Cerf, French war cutter, under 
John Paul Jones, 16. 

Cervera, Admiral, in command of 
Spanish squadron, at Cape de 
Verdes, Martinique, and San- 
tiago, 281 et seq.; effect of de- 
struction of squadron of, 297. 

Chads, Lieut. H. D., in battle 
between Constitution and Java, 
95. 

Chadwick, Capt. F. E., investi- 
gates destruction of Maine, 
208; describes Admiral Samp- 
son, 290. 

Champlain, Arnold's battle on, 
8 et seq.; Macdonough's vic- 
tory on, 144 et seq.; impor- 
tance of, 145; effect of Mac- 
donough's victory on, 153. 

Charleston, Confederate use of 
torpedoes at, 239 et seq.; 
"Quaker" torpedoes effective 
at, 240. 

Charleston, U. S. cruiser, foreign 

plans for, 256. 
Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 

work of, on Lake Ontario, 111 

et seq.; lacked enterprise, 114 

et seq. 



INDEX 



313 



Cherbourg, battle between Kear- 
sarge and Alabama off, 227 et 
seq. 

Chernock, naval architect and 
author, quoted, 26, 40. 

Cherub, British 8loop-of-war,bat- 
tle with the Essex, 137 et seq. 

Chesapeake, U. S. frigate, British 
attack upon, 66 et seq.; British 
views of attack upon, 69; capt- 
ured by the Shannon, 101 et 
seq.; effect of capture of, on 
British, 106, 107; mentioned, 
141. 

Chickasaw, U. S. monitor, with 
Farragut at Mobile Bay, 245, 
248, 249. 

Chickasaw Bluff, mentioned, 200. 

China, " spheres of influence " in, 
302. 

Chippawa, British schooner, in 
battle of Lake Erie, 120. 

Chivalry in war, illustrations of, 
141. 

Christie, Gabriel, M. C, view of 
Navy, 41. 

Chubb, British sloop, on Lake 
Champlain, 145 et seq. 

Cienfuegos, Cuba, blockaded, 
272; "Flying Squadron" at, 
282 et seq. 

Cincinnati, U. S. gunboat, in 
battle at Fort Pillow, 202. 

Civil War, mentioned, 153, 155; 
beginning of, 164 et seq.; tor- 
pedoes in, 237; ships and guns 
of, mentioned, 253; swift 
shipbuilding in, 257; effect of, 
considered, 308. 

Clarence, Confederate cruiser, 
work of, 223. 

Clark, Capt. Charles E., in com- 
mand of Oregon at battle of 
Santiago, 294; 296. 

Cleveland, President, and war 
with Spain, 266. 

Cockburn, Rear-Admiral, burns 
Washington, 125, 126. 



Coghlan, Capt. J. B., with Dewey 
at Manila, 275. 

Collier, Sir Ralph, in chase of 
Constitution, 130; kills him- 
self, 131. 

Collins, Lt.-Com. N., at capture 

of Port Royal, 180. 
Colorado, U. S. S. frigate, with 

Farragut at New Orleans, 205, 

208. 

Colt, Col. Samuel, and the tor- 
pedo, 237. 

Colton, Capt. C. S., with Schley 
on south coast of Cuba, 284. 

Columbus, converted merchant 
ship, 5. 

Concord, U. S. cruiser, with 
Dewey at Manila, 275. 

"Confederate States Navy," 
quoted, 218, 232. 

Confiance, British flagship, on 
Champlain, 145 et seq. 

Congress, The, ridicules idea of 
Navy, 1; work of building 
navy, 2 et seq.; first fleet or- 
dered, built by, 4; promotes 
John Paul Jones, 13; adopts 
Stars and Stripes, 13; pro- 
vides for privateers, 29 ; agrees 
to pay tribute to pirates, 36, 
37; decides to build new navy, 
38; discusses building of a 
navy, 40 et seq.; decides to 
fight, 42, 43; limits enlist- 
ment period of sailors, 47; 
considers Chesapeake affair 
and British aggressions, 67 et 
seq.; deceived the people, 72; 
forced to fight, 73; builds two 
war brigs, 75; votes sword to 
Decatur, 78; views of.changed, 
100, 154; authorizes building 
of steam navy, 157; steam 
frigates ordered by, 160; and 
the evolution of ironclads, 
184; makes Farragut a rear- 
admiral, 235; neglects the 
navy, 253; builds worthless 
ram, 254; begins a new navy, 
255; appropriates money for 



314 



INDEX 



war with Spain, 270; resolves 
that Cubans are free, 272; and 
the Navy, 306. 

Congress, Confederate, attitude 
toward naval power, 166; pro- 
vides for defence of Mississippi 
River, 197; gave $2,000,000 
for worthless river rams, $160,- 
000 for armored ships, 201, 
202; sends agent to England 
to secure warships, 221; en- 
couraging use of torpedoes, 
238. 

Congress, U. S. frigate, des- 
troyed by Merrimac, 187 et 
seq. 

Congress, war galley, 9, 10. 

Conrad, Surgeon, describes 
slaughter on Tennessee at 
Mobile Bay, 250. 

Constellation, U. S. frigate, de- 
scribed, 39-40; battle with 
Insurgent, 44 et seq.; at St. 
Kitt's, 47; in battle with 
French frigate Vengence, 47 et 
seq.; effect of work of, 52. 

Constitution, U. S. frigate, or- 
dered built, 38; described, 39, 
40; eludes British fleet, 1812, 
80; compared with Guerriere, 
84; effect of victory of, upon 
American people, 85 et seq.; 
battle with Java, 94 et seq.; 
in peril of storm, 128; capt- 
ures Cyane and Levant, 129; 
race with three British frig- 
ates, 130; mentioned, 156, 
256, 258. 

Cook, Capt. F. A., in command 
of Brooklyn at battle of San- 
tiago, 293 et seq. 

Cooper, F., quoted, 47. 

Corinth, evacuated, 202. 

Corneck, Lieut. H. D., account 
of battle between Java and 
Constitution, 96. 

Cotton, in connection with Civil 
War, 108 et seq. 

Countess of Scarborough, British 



war sloop, at battle of Bon- 
homme Richard and Serapis, 
17. 

"Court of Inquiry," Schley asks 
for, 281; "Facts" found by, 
quoted, 287; final decision of, 
298. 

Cox, Mid. W. S., in Chesapeake- 
Shannon battle, 103, 105. 

Crampton, John F. F., British 
Minister to United States, in- 
sulting acts of, 159. 

Craney Island, Merrimac de- 
stroyed at, 195. 

Craven, Capt. T. A. M., men- 
tioned, 241; gallant work and 
death at battle of Mobile Bay, 
245-247. 

Craven, Capt. T. T., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212; re- 
fuses to fight Confederate iron- 
clad Stonewall, 232. 

Crimean War, ironclads in, 182. 

Cristobal Colon, Spanish cruiser 
at Santiago, 280; at anchor at 
entrance to Santiago, 287; 
when Schley fired at, 288; in 
battle of Santiago, 293 et seq.; 
destroyed, 296. 

Croker, John Wilson, view of 
capture of Chesapeake, 106, 
107. 

Crosby, Lieut. Pierce, with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 211 
et seq. 

Cuba, struggle for liberty, 265 et 
seq.; blockade of ports of, 272. 

Cumberland, U. S. sloop-of-war, 
destroyed by Merrimac, 187 et 
seq. 

Cumberland Head, point over- 
looking Macdonough's victory, 
147, 148; enthusiastic spec- 
tators on, 152. 

Curlew, Confederate steamer, 
sunk, 177. 

Curlew, U. S. gunboat, at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 180. 



INDEX 



315 



Gushing, Lieut. W. B., gallant 
attack on Albemarle, 242; as 
type of naval officer, 296. 

Customs officials, British view 
of, 57. 

Cyane, British frigate, captured 
by Constitution, 129; escapes 
British fleet, 130. 

Dacres, Capt. James Richard, 
in command of Guerriere, in 
chase of Constitution, 80; bat- 
tle with Constitution, 82 et seq. 

Dahlgren, Lieut. John A., de- 
velops new gun, 162; in com- 
mand before Charleston, 241. 

Daiquira, Cuba, United States 
soldiers land at, 291. 

Dale, Richard, Lieutenant on 
Bonhomme Richard, 17, 20, 22, 
23. 

Dauphin, merchant ship, capt- 
ured by pirates, 34. 

Davis, Capt. C. H., in command 
of U. S. force on Mississippi 
River, 202; in battle at Mem- 
phis, 202 et seq.; at Vicksburg, 
204, 234. 

Davis, Jefferson, President of 
Confederacy, 105; attitude 
toward naval power, 165, 
166; recommends ships for 
"defence," 197, 198; com- 
missions privateers, 217. 

Dean, Silas, plan for "a new 
construction " of warships, 28- 
29, 39. 

Deane, privateer, 29. 

De Camp, Commander J., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Decatur, S., Sr., captain of sloop- 
of-war Delaware, captures 
French privateer, 44. 

Decatur, Stephen, Jr., destroys 
frigate Philadelphia, 76 et 
seq.; promoted, 78; in com- 
mand of United States, cap- 
tures Macedonian, 90 et seq.; 
surrenders President, 131. 



" Declaration of Paris " (against 
privateering), mentioned, 217, 
220. 

"Deeds that Won the Empire," 
mentioned, 107. 

Deerhound, British yacht, saves 
part of crew of Alabama, 228. 

"Defence of Charleston" (John- 
son's), quoted, 241. 

Delaware, U. S. war sloop, capt- 
ures French privateer, 44. 

Demologos, see Fulton the First. 

Denmark, fate of her navy as 
warning to America, 68. 

Detroit, mentioned, 85, 111, 118. 

Detroit, British sloop-of-war, 
built, 118; in battle of Lake 
Erie, 120 et seq. 

Detroit, British war brig, men- 
tioned, 111; destroyed, 112. 

Dewey, Commodore George, in 
command on Asiatic station, 
270; orders to, from Washing- 
ton, 274; work at Manila de- 
scribed, 279; Admiral, a mem- 
ber of Schley Court of Inquiry, 
281, 298, 299; conduct of, in 
connection with Rear-Admiral 
Sampson, 299, 300. 

Dickerson, Secretary of Navy 
Mahlon, orders steam war- 
ships built, 157. 

Dickinson, Capt. James, sur- 
renders Penguin, 132. 

" Dixie," Confederate song, when 
the British cheered, 221. 

Dixon, Lieut. George E., death 
of, in torpedo attack on Housa- 
tonic, 239. 

Dolphin, U. S. despatch boat, 
built, 256. 

Donaldson, Lt.-Com. E., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Doubloon, Confederate steamer, 
in defence of New Orleans, 213. 

Douglas, Sir Howard, quoted, 
101; describes steam frigate 
Merrimac, 162. 



316 



INDEX 



Douglass, Hon. George, sur- 
renders the Levant, 129. 

Downie, commanding British 
forces on Lake Champlain, 146 
et seq.; plan of battle, 148, 
149; error of, 150; killed, 151. 

Drake, British war sloop, captured 
by John Paul Jones, 14 et seq. 

Drayton, Commander Percival, 
at capture of Port Royal, 181; 
ties Farragut to shrouds, 246. 

Drayton, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F., 
defence of Port Royal, 179. 

Dreadnaught, British battleship, 
described, 305. 

Dufais, Lieut., on Lake Cham- 
plain, 11. 

Duneau, Gen. J. K., in defence 
of New Orleans, 206; sur- 
render of, 215. 

Du Pont, Flag Officer S. F., capt- 
ures Port Royal, 178 et seq.; 
before Charleston, 240 et seq.; 
work of, compafed with Farra- 
gut's, 245. 

Dyer, Lieut. G. L., work of, in 
Madrid, 270. 

Dyer, Capt. N. M., with Dewey 
at Manila, 275. 

Eads, Capt. Jas. B., and the 
river gunboats, 196, 197. 

Eagle, converted yacht, with 
Schley on Cuban coast, 284. 

Eagle, U. S. brig, with Mac- 
donough on Champlain, 145 et 
seq.; driven from position in 
line, 151. 

Earl of GaUoway, views on Brit- 
ish seamen, 60. 

Eaton, biography of General, 
quoted, 36. 

Edward, British sloop, taken by 

Lexington, 27. 

Effingham, American frigate, 
burned, 28. 

Elizabeth City, Confederate 
naval force retreats to, 177. 



EUet, Col. A. W., in battle at 
Memphis, 203. 

EUet, Col. Chas., Jr. in battle at 
Memphis, 203. 

Elliott, Lieut. Jesse D., in battle 
at Buffalo, 112; in battle of 
Lake Erie, 120 et seq.; failure 
to do duty, 122, 123. 

Embargo, first act of, 69; last 
act of, 72, 73. 

Endymion, British frigate, dis- 
m'antled by President, 131; 
attack on privateer defeated, 
134. 

Enterprise, U. S. schooner, work 
of, in quasi war with France, 
50; in war with African pi- 
rates, 75; as a brig, captures 
Boxer, 125. 

Epervier, British sloop-of-war, 
captured by Peacock, 125. 

Erebus, British warship, attacks 
American gunboat in time of 
peace, 133. 

Ericsson, John, develops screw 
propeller, 158; and the Mon- 
itor, 184 et seq. 

Erie, Pa., mentioned. 111; Per- 
ry's work, and ships built at, 
116 et seq. 

Erie, Lake, highway on ice of, 
116; war upon, '116 et seq.; 
battle of, 120 et seq.; effect of 
battle of, 124. 

Essex, U. S. frigate, mentioned, 
75, 91, 94; captures the 
Alert, 99; loss of, 136 et seq. 

Essex, U. S. ironclad gunboat, 
disabled, 198. 

Evans, Capt. R. D., on north 
coast of Cuba, follows Schley 
to Cienfuegos, 282; and signal 
lights seen at, Cienfuegos, 283. 

Experiment, British 50-gun ship, 
in chase of frigate Raleigh, 28. 

Experiment, U. S. schooner, 
work of, in quasi war with 
France, 50-51. 



INDEX 



317 



Falcon, Capt. Gordon T., sur- 
renders Cyane, 129. 

Falmouth (Portland), Me., de- 
stroyed, 1. 

Fanning, Nathaniel, midship- 
man on Bonhomme Richard, 
23. 

Farragut, David Glasgow, view 
of Porter and the Essex at 
Valparaiso, 138; needed at 
Hampton Roads, 194; at 
Vicksburg, 204; in New Or- 
leans expedition, 205 et seq.; 
orders to, quoted, 206; enters 
Mississippi River, 208; orders 
to fleet, 210; position in battle 
line, 212; passing the forts 
below New Orleans, 212 et seq.; 
effect of work at New Orleans, 
216; work in Mississippi above 
New Orleans, 234 et seq.; pro- 
moted to rank of rear-admiral, 
235; passes Port Hudson, 236 
et seq.; memorable words of, 
236; needed at Charleston, 
241; at Mobile Bay, 243 et 
seq.; lashed to the mast, 246; 
"Damn the torpedoes," 248; 
work of Mobile described, 250; 
ill-health of, 251; wisdom of, 
justified, 279, 297; type of 
naval officer, 296. 

Faunce, Capt. John, at Hat- 
teras, 175. 

Fayal Harbor, battle in, 134. 

Fee, Capt. F. D., and sub- 
marines, 240. 

"Fertility of the Land" (Rob- 
erts), quoted, 257. 

Finch, British sloop, on Lake 
Champlain, 145 et seq.; sur- 
rendered, 150. 

Flag, first used on American war- 
ship, 3. 

"Flag Officer," title of, created, 
175. 

Flambeau, French war brig, capt- 
ured by Enterprise, 50. 

Flamborough Head, battle of 



Bonhomme Richard and Se- 
rapis, off, 17. 

Florida, Confederate cruiser, 
work of, 222 et seq.; destroyed, 

Floyd, Secretary of War, orders 
national muskets to southern 
States, 164. 

Fly, war schooner, 6. 

"Flying Squadron" (Schley's) 
ordered to Key West, 281 
ordered to Cienfuegos, 282 
ordered to Key West, 285 
coal supply of, on May 27, 286 

"Follow the flag," signal dis- 
played in battle of Santiago, 
293. 

Foote, Capt. A. H., in command 
in Mississippi VaUey, 198. 

Foraker, Senator from Ohio, 
quoted, 266. 

Fort Beauregard, in defence of 
Port Royal, 179. 

Fort Donelson, capture of, 198. 

Fort Erie, mentioned, 111. 

Fort Fisher, capture of, 251 et 
seq. 

Fort Gaines, at Mobile, men- 
tioned, 243; surrendered, 250. 

Fort George, captured, 113. 

Fort Henry, capture of, 198. 

Fort Jackson, in defence of New 
Orleans, 206; uninjured by 
mortar fire, 209; surrendered, 
215. 

Fort Morgan, at Mobile, men- 
tioned, 222; described, 243; 
when Farragut passed, 246 et 
seq. 

Fort Pillow, Union forces at, 
200; naval battle at, 202, 203; 
evacuated, 202. 

Fort Powell, at Mobile, men- 
tioned, 243; surrendered, 250. 

Fort St. Philip, in defence of 
New Orleans, 206; surren- 
dered, 215. 



318 



INDEX 



Fort Sumter, attack on, 167. 

Fort Walker, at Port Royal, de- 
fence of, 178 et seq. 

Fortress Monroe, mentioned, 
187. 

"Forty-five Years Under the 
Flag" (Schley), quoted, 281 
et seq., 287. 

"Forum," quoted, 266. 

Foster, John W., describes Brit- 
ish attitude toward United 
States, 219. 

Fox, Gustavus V., Asst. Sec. of 
Navy, work of, 166. 

France, quasi war with, 44 et 
seq. 

Franklin, Benjamin, work in 
Congress for Navy, 6; views 
of privateers, 29. 

Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Liver- 
pool agents Confederate Gov- 
ernment, work of, 171 et seq.; 
221, 222. 

" Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, 
slogan of War of 1812, 56. 

Frolic, British sloop-of-war, capt- 
ured by Wasp, 88 et seq. 

Fulton, Robert, designed first 
steam warship, 156; and sub- 
marine boats, 237. 

Fulton the First, first steam war- 
ship of the world, 186. 

Furor, Spanish torpedo-boat- 
destroyer, at Santiago, 280; 
destroyed by Wainwright in 
battle of Santiago, 295. 

Gallatin, Albert, opposed 
building a navy, 41. 

Gaspe, schooner, destroyed, 1. 

General Armstrong, privateer 
schooner, battle of, at Fayal, 
134, 135. 

General Pike, U. S. warship, 
built, 112; set on fire, 113; 
in battle on Lake Ontario, 115. 

George Washington, U. S. war- 
ship, in service of Algiers, 74. 



Gillis, Commander J. P., at Hat- 
teras, 175; at capture of Port 
Royal, 178. 

Gloire, first French ironclad 
frigate, 182. 

Gloucester, British brig, capt- 
ured, 112; set on fire, 113. 

Gloucester, British cruiser, fight 
on Lake Ontario, 111. 

Gloucester, U. S. converted yacht, 
in battle of Santiago, 291 et 
seq., 295, 296, 297. 

Godon, Commander S. W., at 
capture of Port Royal, 179 et 
seq. 

Goldsborough, Flag Officer L. 
M., in North Carolina sounds, 
176 et seq. 

Goodrich, Capt. C. F., gallantry 
under the guns at Santiago, 
289. 

Grant, Gen. U. S., early work of, 
in Mississippi Valley, 198; at 
Vicksburg, 235 et seq. 

Great Western, steamship, men- 
tioned, 157. 

Greene, Capt. Pitt Barnaby, in 
command of Bonne Citoyenne, 
94. 

Greene, Lieut. S. Dana, execu- 
tive officer. Monitor, 186; 
description of Monitor-Merri- 
mac fight, 194. 

Greenpoint, Brooklyn, Monitor 
built at, 185. 

Gridley, Capt. C. V., with Dewey 
at Manila, 275. 

Guantanamo, Cuba, occupied by 
U. S. Navy, 291. 

Guerriere, British frigate, in 
chase of Constitution, 80; bat- 
tle with Constitution, 82 et 
seq.; compared with Con- 
stitution, 84; mentioned, 93, 
98, 140. 

Gulf Stream, fighting in, to be 
prohibited by Jefferson, 63. 



INDEX 



319 



Gunboats, steam, considered, 
178; Mississippi River style 
described, 197. 

Guns, old and new, compared, 
263, 306. 

Hadden, Lieut., "Journal," 

quoted, 9, 11. 
Hagerty, Commander F. S., at 

capture of Port Royal, 180. 

"Hail Columbia" svmg by cow- 
ards, 41. 

Hale, Capt. Basil, R. N., de- 
scribes British methods when 
blockading New York, 1806, 
56. 

Halifax, mentioned, 56. 

Hamilton, Lieut. Archibald, car- 
ries news of battle between 
United States and Macedonian 
to Washington, 93. 

Harriet Lane, U. S. Revenue 
Cutter, at Hatteras, 175. 

Harrison, Lt.-Com. H., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 211 
et seq. 

Hartford, U. S. steam sloop, 
mentioned, 163; Farragut's 
flagship in New Orleans ex- 
pedition, 205 et seq.; position 
in battle line at New Orleans, 
212; passing forts below New 
Orleans, 212 et seq.; at Port 
Hudson, 236; at Mobile Bay, 
245 et seq.; influence of, 302. 

Harvard, U. S. converted mer- 
chantman, off south coast of 
Cuba, 284. 

Haswell, Charles H., first engi- 
neer in United States Navy, 
157. 

Hatteras, U. S. S., sunk by Ala- 
bama, 226. 

Havana, blockade runners at, in 
Civil War, 170; virulent at- 
tack of newspapers of, on 
American people, 266; block- 
aded, 272. 

Hawes, Capt. J. C, New Bed- 



ford whaler, captured by 
Shena7idoah, 230. 

Heilner, Lieut. Lewis C, de- 
scribes position of Texas and 
Brooklyn in battle of Santiago. 
294. 

Hetzel, Union steamer, sunk, 
177. 

Higgins, Col. E., in defence of 
New Orleans, 206. 

Higginson, Capt. F. J., with 
Schley off south coast of Cuba, 
288. 

Hillyar, Capt. James, attempts 
to trap the Essex, 137; de- 
clines a fair fight, 137; re- 
fuses to keep promise, 138; 
battle with Essex, 138 et seq. 

Hobson, Naval Constructor R. 
P., brave but unsuccessful 
work at Santiago, 291. 

Hodgson, Lieut. A. C, treat- 
ment of, by Rear-Admiral 
Schley, 298. 

Hollins, Capt. Geo. N., in com- 
mand of Confederate forces on 
Mississippi River, 200; at 
court-martial of Tattnal, 209. 

Hope, Lieut. David, on Mace- 
donian in battle with United 
States, 91. 

Hope, Capt. Henry, attack on 
Prince de Neuchatel, 133, 134. 

Hopkins, Esek, Commander-in- 
Chief Colonial Navy, 5; men- 
tioned, 7. 

Hopkins, John Burroughs, cap- 
tain of Cabot, 6. 

Hornet, U. S. sloop-of-war, men- 
tioned, 94; captures Peacock, 
97, 98; captures Penguin, 132. 

Hornet, U. S. war sloop, 6. 

Hotchkiss guns, mentioned, 258. 

Housatonic, U. S. S., torpedo at- 
tack upon, 239. 

Howe, British general, plan for 
cutting asunder the colonies, 



320 



INDEX 



Huger, Commander Thomas B., 
death of, 215. 

Hull, Capt. Isaac, commands 
Constitution, and eludes Brit- 
ish fleet, 80 et seq.; moral 
courage of, 82; battle with 
Guerriere, 82 et seq. 

Hull, Gen. William, defeat of, 

85. 

Humphreys, Col. David, Amer- 
ican Minister to Portugal, on 
need of a navy, 38. 

Humphreys, Joshua, designer of 

Constitution, 39, 40. 
Hunter, British brig, in battle 

of Lake Erie, 120. 
Huntington, Col. R. W., and 

Spanish troops at Guantan- 

amo, 291. 

Immortalite, captain of, cheered 
Dewey leaving Hong Kong, 
274. 

Impressment, British custom of, 
56 et seq.; treatment of Amer- 
ican seamen under, 58 et seq.; 
number of Americans en- 
slaved under, 59; part of, in 
Chesapeake affair, 66, 67; 
effect of, in battle between 
Constitution and Guerriere, 
183. 

Indiana, U. S. battleship, men- 
tioned, 261; at Key West, 
291; in battle of Santiago, 
293 et seq. 

Indians, at battle of Lake Cham- 
plain, 10; work of, in Ohio 
ended by Perry's victory, 124. 

Indien, frigate, 6. 

Inflexible, British battleship, de- 
scribed, 255. 

Inflexible, British warship, 8, 10. 

Ingram, Lieut. William, killed 
at Valparaiso, 141. 

Insurgent, French frigate, battle 

with Constellation, 44 et seq. 
Intrepid, U. S. ketch, 76-78. 



Iowa, U. S. battleship, men- 
tioned, 261; with Schley at 
Cienfuegos and Santiago, 282 
et seq.; in battle of Santiago, 
291 et seq.; close to Oregon 
and Texas, 294. 

Ironclad warships, evolution of, 
182 et seq. 

Iroquois, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212; gallant 
record of, 214; in chase of 
Sumter, 218. 

Isla de Cuba, Spanish cruiser, at 
Manila, 277. 

Island No. 10. capture of, 199. 

Isle of St. Mary, John Paul 
Jones at, 14. 

Israel, Midshipman Joseph, gal- 
lantry of, 78. 

Itaska, U. S. gunboat, with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 211. 

Japan, transformation of, from 
"heathen'- to "giant," 302. 

Java, British frigate, captured 
by Constitution, 94 et seq.; 
effect of capture of, on Amer- 
ican people, 96, 97. 

Jefferson, Thomas, view of pay- 
ing tribute to pirates, 36; and 
the sphingurinoe, 42; early 
views of navy, 61; policy of 
"peaceful coercion," 61 e^ seq.; 
to lay up naval ships in dry- 
dock, 63; to control Gulf 
stream region, 63; work of, 
in Chesapeake affair, 67. 

Jewell, Capt. T. F., off south 
coast of Cuba, 284. 

Johnson, Bishop John, and the 
Confederate torpedo service, 
240. 

Jones, Capt. Jacob, command- 
ing Wasp in battle with Frolic, 
88 et seq. 

Jones, John Paul, lieutenant of 
Alfred, 6; mentioned, 7; pro- 
moted and ordered to Ranger, 
13; on British coast, 14; bat- 



INDEX 



321 



tie with Drake, 15 et seq.; envy 
of, in France, 16; work with 
Bonhomme Richard, 16 et seq.; 
" I have not- yet begun to 
fight," 19; honored in France 
and America, 25; mentioned, 
30; compared with Decatur, 
131; as type of naval officer, 
296. 

Jones, Lieut. Thomas Catesby 
ap R., as executive officer of 
Merrimac, 186 et seq.; in com- 
mand of Merrimac, 190. 

Jouett, Lt.-Com. J. E., with 
Farragut at Mobile, 46 et seq. 

Joseph, merchant brig, captured 
by Confederate privateer, 217. 

Jungen, Lieut. C. W., gallant 
work under guns at Santiago, 
289. 

Katahdin, U. S. S., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212. 

Kearsarge, U. S. battleship, con- 
sidered, 303. 

Kearsarge, U. vS. S., destroys the 
Alabama, 227 et seq. 

Kennebec, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Kennon, Capt. Beverly, in de- 
fence of New Orleans, 207; 
gallant work of, 213-214. 

Kentucky, desire for open navi- 
gation on Mississippi River, 
196. 

Kerr, Capt. Robert, in chase of 
Constitution, 130. 

Key, Francis S., wrote "Star 
Spangled Banner," 126. 

Key West, rendezvous of United 
States fleet in war with Spain, 
271; "Flying Squadron" or- 
dered to, 285. 

Kineo, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Knowles, Quartermaster, ties 
Farragut to the shrouds at 
Mobile, 246. 



Lady Prevost, British schooner, 
in battle of Lake Erie, 120. 

Laird, Member of Parliament, 
boasts of building Confederate 
cruiser, in violation of British 
law, 224; and Confederate 
ironclads, 231. 

Lambert, Capt. Henry, in com- 
mand of Java, in battle with 
Constitution, 94 et seq. 

Landais, Pierre, captain of Alli- 
ance, under John Paul Jones, 
16; at battle between Bon- 
homme Richard and Serapis, 
17, 21 et seq. 

Lardner, Capt. J. L., at capture 
of Port Royal, 179 et seq. 

Laugharne, Capt. T. L. O., meets 
the Esse.x, 99. 

Lawrence, James, lieutenant in 
war with Algerian pirates, 76; 
mentioned, 94; captures Pea- 
cock, 97, 98; in battle with the 
Shannon, 101 et seq.; death of, 
106. 

Lawrence, U. S. brig, built, 116; 
taken across the Erie bar, 117; 
in battle of Lake Erie, 120 et 
seq. 

Le Croyable, U. S. warship, capt- 
ured by French, 52. 

Leander, British frigate, block- 
ading New York, 56; murder 
of American by, 64. 

Leander, British frigate, in chase 
of Constitution, 130. 

Lee, Consul-General, leaves Ha- 
vana, 272. 

Lee, Capt. S. P., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Lee, cruiser, 3. 

Lemly, Capt. S. C, Judge-Advo- 
cate, Schley Court of Inquiry 
281. 

Leopard, British frigate, attack 
on Chesapeake, 66 et seq.; 
mentioned, 108. 



322 



INDEX 



Levant, British sloop -of -war, 
captured by Constitution, 129 ; 
recaptured, 130. 

Lexington, war brig, 6; captures 
British sloop Edward, 27. 

Life-saving stations, stripped of 

boats for Hatteras expedition, 

175. 
Lincoln, President, blockading 

proclamations of, mentioned, 

167, 219, 220. 

Linnet, British brig, on Lake 
Champlain, 145 et seq. 

Little Belt, British sloop-of-war, 
and the President, 98, 99; 
mentioned, 140. 

Little Belt, British sloop, in bat- 
tle of Lake Erie, 120. 

Little Rebel, in battle at Mem- 
phis, 204. 

Lloyd, Captain, mentioned, 104. 

Logan, Dr., a peacemaker, Jef- 
ferson's letter to, 62. 

Logie, Charles, British agent at 
Algiers, plans raid on Amer- 
ican commerce, 37. 

London " Spectator, "quoted, 60. 

Long, Sec. of Navy John D., de- 
scribes navy in 1897, 260; 
book of, quoted, 268, 271, 278. 

Longfellow, Lieut. Henry, gal- 
lantry of, 78. 

Lord Cecil, see Marquis of Salis- 
bury, 225. 

Lord Nelson, British battleship, 
described, 304. 

Louisiana, Confederate ironclad, 
in defence of New Orleans, 
207, 208; destroyed, 216. 

Louisiana class of battleships, 
effect of, 303, 304. 

Loup Cervier, name given Wasp 
when taken by British, 90. 

Lovell, Confederate ram, in battle 
at Memphis, 203. 

Lovell, Gen. Mansfield, at New 
Orleans, 201, 206. 



Ludlow, Lieut. H. C, in battle 
between Chesapeake and Shan- 
non, 103. 

Lyons, Lord, British Minister at 
Washington, secret communi- 
cation to Confederate Govern- 
ment, 220. 

Lynch, Flag Officer W. F., com- 
manding Confederate naval 
forces at Roanoke Island, 177 
et seq. 

McCalla, Capt. Bowman, with 
Schley off Cienfuegos, 283. 

McClay, E. S., book of, quoted, 
133. 

McElroy, Engineer G. W., kept 
Gloucester ready in battle of 
Santiago, 295. 

McKinley, President, and war 
with Cuba, 266. 

McRae, Confederate converted 
merchantman, in defence of 
New Orleans, 207, 213; de- 
stroyed, 215. 

McDonough, Thomas, Midship- 
man, in war with African pi- 
rates, 76; forces of, on Lake 
Champlain, 145; tactics of, 
147; victory, 148 et seq.; 
prayer before battle, 149; ef- 
fect of victory of, 153; good 
work of, mentioned, 257. 

Macedonian,Britiah frigate, capt- 
ured by frigate United' iStates, 
90 et seq.; U. S. practice ship, 
94. 

Macomb, Brig.-Gen. Alexander, 
force of, at Plattsburg, 145. 

Madison, James, opposes a navy, 
38; as Secretary of State re- 
ports number of impressed 
American seamen, 5-9; as Presi- 
dent, takes action for war with 
British,73; backbone stiffened, 
80; mentioned, 98. 

Madison, U. S. sloop-of-war, on 
Lake Ontario, 111; in battle 
at Toronto, 112. 



INDEX 



323 



Maffett, Capt. J. N., work of, 
with Confederate cruiser Flor- 
ida, 222 et seq. 

Mahan, Capt. A. T., work of, 
quoted, 17; view of British 
practice of impressing Amer- 
icans, 59; London "Spec- 
tator's " opinion of, 60; quoted 
200, 215. 

Maine, U. S. battleship, de- 
scribed, 258; ordered to Ha- 
vana, 267; destroyed, 268; 
effect of destruction of, on war 
with Spain, 270; remembered, 
in the battle of Santiago, 295. 

Maine, U. S. battleship (1898), 
described, 303. 

Maley, Lieut.-Com., in command 
of U. S. schooner Experiment, 
50-51. 

Malia, Guimer Patrick, fired first 
shot of war with Spain, 272. 

Mallory, S. R., Secretary of 
Confederate Navy, 166; and 
the evolution of ironclads, 182 
et seq.; planned cruise for 
Merrimac, 191. 

Manassas, Confederate ironclad 
ram, in defence of New Or- 
leans, 207, 209, 213; de- 
stroyed, 214. 

Manhattan, U. S. monitor, with 
Farragut at Mobile Bay, 245 et 
seq.; attack on Tennessee 249. 

Manila, Spanish fleet at, men- 
tioned, 270; battle at, 274 et 
seq. 

Manly, Capt. John, on cruiser 
sent to sea by Washington, 3. 

Manners, Capt. William, de- 
feated by Wasp, 126, 127. 

Maples, Capt. John Fordyce, 
captures the Argus, 108, 109. 

Marblehead, U. S. cruiser, with 
Schley off Cienfuegos, 283. 

Margaret and Jessie, successful 
blockade runner, 172. 

Margaretta, war schooner, des- 
troyed, 1. 



Maria, merchant schooner, capt- 
ured by African pirates, 34. 

Maria, war schooner, on Lake 
Champlain, 10. 

Maria Teresa, Spanish cruiser, 
at Santiago, 280 et seq.; in 
battle of Santiago, 292 et seq.; 
driven ashore, 294. 

Marix, Lt.-Com. Adolph, inves- 
tigates destruction of Maine, 
268. 

Marquis of Salisbury, explains 
British hostility towardUnited 
States, 225. 

Marston, Capt. John, moral 
courage of, 192. 

Massachusetts, U. S. battleship, 
mentioned, 261; Schley shifts 
flag to, 288. 

Matamoras, Mex., a blockade 
runners' resort, 172, 235. 

Maury, Gen. D. H., report 
quoted, 244. 

Maury, Capt. M. F., and Con- 
federate torpedo service, 238. 

Maynerd, Capt. W., captures 
Spanish merchantman, 272. 

Mayrant, John, acting-lieuten- 
ant on Bonhomme Richard, 23. 

Memphis, Confederate ship 
built at, 197; evacuated, 202. 

Mercer, Capt. Samuel, at Hat- 
teras, 175. 

Merrimac, collier, with Schley 
on Cuban coast, 284 et seq.; 
sunk in entrance to Santiago, 
291. 

Merrimac, U. S. steam frigate, 
sent to England to preserve 
peace, 162, 163, 302; con- 
verted into Confederate iron- 
clad, 183 et seq.; attack on 
shipping in Hampton Roads, 
186 et seq.; battle with Mon- 
itor, 192, 193; end of, 194. 

Mersey, British frigate, with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 209. 



324 



INDEX 



Metacomet, U. S. S., with Farra- 
gut at Mobile, 246 et seq.; in 
chase of Selina, 249. 

Milligan, Chief Engineer R. W., 
work of, in battle of Santiago, 
294, 296. 

Milo, New Bedford whaleship, 
captured by Shenandoah, 230. 

Minneapolis, U. S. cruiser, off 
south coast of Cuba, 284. 

Minnesota, U. S. S., at Hatter as 
Inlet, 175; when the Merri- 
mac came to Hampton Roads, 
187. 

Mississippi, Confederate iron- 
clad, in defence of New Or- 
leans, 208; burned, 215. 

Mississippi, U. S. steamer, built, 
157, 158; with Farragut at 
New Orleans, 212, 213; burned 
at Port Hudson, 236. 

Mississippi River, war on upper, 
196 et seq. 

Missouri, U. S. steamer, 157, 
158. 

Mobile, torpedoes at, 238; battle 
off, 243 et seq. 

Mohican, U. S. S., at capture 
of Port Royal, 179 Tet seq. 

Moira, British cruiser, fight on 
Lake Ontario, 111. 

Moore, Confederate converted 
merchantman, in defence of 
New Orleans, 213. 

Monarch, U. S. ram, ill battle of 
Memphis, 203. 

Monitor, U. S. ironclad, de- 
scribed, 184 et.seq.; on way to 
Chesapeake, 186; battle with 
Merrimac, 192, 193; end of, 195. 

Monongahela, U. S. S., with 
Farragut at Port Hudson, 236; 
at Mobile Bay, 249. 

Monroe Doctrine, absurd in 
European eyes, 159; to be 
upheld, 301. 

Montauk, monitor, hurt by tor- 
pedo, 238. 



Montgomery, Captain, inventor 
of Confederate river ram fleet, 
201. 

Monticello, U. S. S., at Hat- 
teras, 175. 

Montojo, Admiral, in command 
of Spanish at Manila, gallant 
action of, 277. 

Moore, Engineer J. W., method 
of concealing ships, 210 

Moravian Town, battle at, 124. 

Morgan, Confederate gunboat, 
escape of, at Mobile, 249. 

Morocco, disgraceful treaty with, 
36, 37. 

Morris, Lieut. Charles, on Con- 
stitution when eluding British 
fleet, 81 ; in battle with Guer- 
riere, 83; wounded, 84. 

Morris, Lieut. Geo. N., executive 
officer Cumberland, 188; 
"Never! I'll sink alongside," 
189; as type of naval officer, 
296. 

Morris, Capt. H. W., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212. 

Morris, Robt., work for colonial 
navy, 6. 

Mosher, Confederate tug, gallant 
attack on Farragut at New 
Orleans, 213. 

Mosquito Territory, British 
claim on, 159. 

Nancy, transport, prize in Revo- 
lutionary War, 3; news of 
capture in Congress, 3-4. 

Napier, description of British 
soldiers, quoted, 144. 

Napoleon, effect of American 
fighting upon, 52; in war with 
British, 54, 59; Berlin De- 
cree, 64; false statement by, 
73; crushed, 125. 

Napoleon III, hostility toward 
United States checked, 216. 

Nashville, Confederate cruiser, 
destroyed, 238. 



INDEX 



325 



Nashville, U. S. gunboat, at Key- 
West, 271; fires first gun of 
war, 272. 

Nautilus, British cruiser, at- 
tacked by Peacock, 133. 

Nautilus, U. S. schooner, de- 
scribed, 75. 

Naval Academy, mentioned, 94. 
"Naval Annual," Brassey's, 
quoted, 307. 

Naval Committees, work of, 4 et 
seq. 

"Naval Submarine Battery Ser- 
vice," established by Con- 
federates, 238. 

"Navies of the World" (Busk), 
quoted, 231. 

Navy, our, first legislation for, 
2-3; first rules for, 3; end of 
last ship of War of Revolution, 
33; ships for, ordered, 38; ex- 
tent of, 1798, 43; extent of, 
in war with African pirates, 
75; force of, compared with 
British, War of 1812, 101, 102; 
force of, at beginning of Civil 
War, 166 et seq.; officers of, 
not inventors, 184; effect of 
powerful, 231; effect of lack 
of, 253 et seq.; effect of build- 
ing new, upon American peo- 
ple, 257; strength of Amer- 
ican, in 1897, 260; type of 
ships needed in, 302; second 
among navies of world, 307. 

Navy Department, Confederate, 
established, 166. 

Navy Department established, 
42; Perry's despatch to, 124; 
sends expedition to Port Roy- 
al, 178; and ironclads, 184; 
plans for Mississippi River, 
196, 234; investigates de- 
struction of Maine, 268; "in 
sea of ignorance," 280; cor- 
respondence with Schley on 
Cuban coast, 283 et seq. 

" Navy in the Civil War," quoted 
200. 



Neilds, Acting Ensign H. C, gal- 
lant action at Mobile Bay, 248. 

Nelson, Lord, method of fight- 
ing mentioned, 89, 120, 140; 
work of, compared with 
Broke's capture of Chesa- 
peake, 107. 

"Neutrality of Great Britain," 
quoted, 168, 171 

Nevis Island, mentioned, 44. 
"New American Navy," quoted, 
268. 

Newcastle, British frigate, in 
chase of Constitution, 130. 

New Ironsides, U. S. ironclad, 
attack by torpedo, 240; kept 
out of range in attack on Fort 
Sumter, 241. 

New Madrid, seized by Union 
forces, 199. 

New Orleans, British attack on, 
mentioned, 145; captured, 215. 

New Orleans, Confederate work 
at, 201, 202; Farragut's ex- 
pedition to, 208 et seq.; capt- 
ured, 215. 

NewOrleans (ex-Amazonas), U.S. 
cruiser (purchased), 271. 

New York, blockade of, by Brit- 
ish, 56, 63. 

New York, U. S. cruiser, de- 
scribed, 258; mentioned, 261; 
at Key West, 271; on block- 
ade off Santiago, 290 et seq.; 
in battle of Santiago, 291, 292, 
297 et seq.; position of, con- 
sidered, 297. 

Newport News, battle off, 186 et 
seq. 

Niagara, U. S. brig, built, 116; 
taken across Erie bar, 118; 
in battle of Lake Erie, 120 et 
seq. 

Niagara, U. S. steam frigate, in 
England, 162; and Confeder- 
ate ironclad Stonewall, 232. 

Nichols, Lt.-Com. E. T., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 



326 



INDEX 



Nicholson, Commander J. W. A., 
with Farragut at Mobile Bay, 
245. ^ 

Nicolai I, first blockade runner 

captured, 171. 
Niles's "Register," quoted, 96. 
Nixon, Lieut. Lewis, designs 

Oregon, 260. 

"Non-intercourse," first act for, 
63. 

Norfolk, navy yard surrendered 
to Confederates, 165; threat- 
ened in rear, 178; captured, 
194. 

North Carolina, U. S. armored 
cruiser, described, 306. 

"Northern Gateway," see Cham- 
plain. 

O'Brien, Capt. Richard, capt- 
ured by African pirates, 34; 
quoted, 36, 37. 

"Old Ironsides," see Constituiton. 

Olympia, U. S. cruiser, men- 
tioned, 261; flagship at Ma- 
nila, 275. 

Omar, the Mohammedan, com- 
pared with Admiral Cock- 
burn, 126. 

Oneida, U. S. sloop-of-war, de- 
scribed, 110; work of, III etseq. 

Oneida, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212 et seq. 

Ontario, Lake, war upon, 110 et 
seq. 

Oquendo, Spanish cruiser, at 
Santiago, 280 et seq.; destroyed 
in battle of Santiago, 295. 

Ordronaux, Capt. J., gallant bat- 
tle of, 133, 134. 

Oregon, U. S. battleship, de- 
scribed, 260; mentioned, 261; 
leaves San Francisco for Key 
West, 270; in battle of San- 
tiago, 291 et seq.; had steam 
up ready for enemy, 294; 
work in stokehole of, and over- 
hauls Colo7i, 296; mentioned. 
303. 



Oreto, see Florida. 

Ottawa, U. S. S., at capture of 
Port Royal, 180. 

Paducah seized by Union forces, 
198. 

Page, John, M. C, view of navy, 
41. ^' 

Page, Gen. R. L., in command of 
Fort Morgan, 244, 250. 

Page, Capt. T. J., in command 
of Confederate ironclad Stone- 
wall, 232. 

Paine, Thomas, Jefferson's let- 
ter to, 61. 

Pallas, French frigate, under 

John Paul Jones, 16. 
Palmer, Capt. J. S., in chase of 

Sumter, 219. 

Panama, protected by United 
States, 301. 

Panama Canal, to be defended 
by United States, 301. 

Parker, Foxhall A., work of, 
quoted, 250. 

Parker, Capt. W. H., command- 
ing Confederate steamer Beau- 
fort, 177; "Recollections," 
quoted, 187. 

Parrott, Commander E. S., at 
capture of Port Royal, 180. 

Pausch, "Journal, "quoted, 9, 11. 

Pawnee, U. S. S., at Hatteras, 
175; at capture of Port Royal, 
180. ^ 

Payne, Lieutenant, and the sub- 
marines, 239. 

"Peaceable coercion," Jeffer- 
son's policy of, considered, 61 
et seq.; effect of, seen in Chesa- 
peake affair, 67; British and 
French views of, 71, 72; last 
act of, 72. 

Peacock, British sloop-of-war, 
captured by Hornet, 97, 98. 

Peacock, U. S. sloop-of-war, capt- 
ures Epervier, 125; attack on 
Nautilus, 133. 



n 



INDEX 



327 



Pearson, Capt. Richard com- 
manding the Serapis, 18. 

Pechell, Capt. G. R., insolence 
of, 98. 

Pelican, British sloop-of-war, 
captm-es Argus, 108, 109. 

Pembina, U. S. S., at capture 
of Port Royal, 180. 

Pendergrast, Capt. E. J., peace 
mission to England, 162. 

Penguin, British sloop-of-war, 
captured by Hornet, 132. 

Penguin, U. S. gunboat, at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 180. 

Penobscot, Me., occupied by 
British, 145. 

Pensaeola, navy yard at, seized 
by Confederate forces, 165. 

Pensaeola, U. S. S., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 211, 213. 

Perkins, Lieut. G. H., with 
Farragut at Mobile, 245; gal- 
lantry in action, 247, 248, 249. 

Perry, Captain Oliver Hazard, 
at capture of Fort George, 113; 
mentioned, 115; work of, on 
Lake Erie, 116 et seq.; gets 
fleet out of Erie harbor, 117, 
118; his force compared with 
that of British, 118, 119; "To 
windward or to leeward, they 
shall fight to-day," 119; victory 
over British, 120 et seq.; effect 
of victory of, on nation, 124; 
gallantry of, mentioned, 277. 

Perry, Capt. M. C, superintends 
building a war steamer, 157; 
in Japan, 158. 

Perry, U. S. brig, captures Sa- 
vannah, 218. 

Petrel, U. S. gunboat, with 
Dewey at Manila, 275; "Baby 
Battleship," 278. 

Philadelphia, U. S. frigate, men- 
tioned, 75; lost, 75; destroyed 
in pirate harbor, 76 et seq. 

Philadelphia, war galley, on 
Lake Champlain, 10. 



Philip, Capt. John W., view of 
Brooklyn in battle of Santiago, 
294. 

Philippines, U. S. colony, 301. 
Phoebe, British frigate, and the 
Essex in Valparaiso, 137. 

Pike, Gen. Zebulon, killed at 
Toronto, 112. 

Pim, Capt. Bedford, hostility of, 
toward Americans, 229. 

Pinola, U. S. gunboat, with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 211 
et seq. 

Pirates, African, work of, 34 et 
seq.; tribute paid to, by Euro- 
pean nations, 35; American ef- 
forts to conciliate, 36; amount 
of blackmail paid to, 38, 39; 
payment of blackmail to, men- 
tioned, 62; war with, 74 et 
seq.; second disgraceful peace 
with, 79; sent by British to 
hunt U. S. merchantmen, 35, 
36, 219. 

Pirates, West India, 41; in 
fight with U. S. schooner Ex- 
periment, 51; extent of work 
of, 53; work of, 155. 

Pitot, captain of French frigate 
Vengence, 49. 

Plantagenet, British line-of-bat- 
tleship, fled from President, 
104. 

Plattsburg, town overlooking 
scene of Macdonough's vic- 
tory, 145, 147. 

Pluton, Spanish torpedo-boat 
destroyer, at Santiago, 280; 
destroyed by Wainwright in 
battle of Santiago, 295. 

Pocahontas, U. S. S., at capture 
of Port Royal, 181. 

Poictiers, British line-of-battle- 
ship, captures Wasp, 90. 

Pomone, British frigate, assists 
in capture of President, 131. 

Pope, Gen. John, work along the 
Mississippi River, 199. 



328 



INDEX 



Porcupine, U. S. gunboat, well- 
named, 116; in battle of Lake 
Erie, 120. 

Port Hudson, mentioned, 158; 
capture of, 235, 237. 

Port Royal, capture of, 178 et 
seq.; results of capture of, 181. 

Porter, David, work of, as mid- 
shipman on Constellation, 45, 
46; mentioned, 94; captures 
the Alert, 99; and the Essex 
in the Pacific, 136; as "pink 
of chivalry," 137; battle with 
Phcebe and Cherub, 138 et seq.; 
commands first war steamer, 
157. 

Porter, Commander D. D., and 
New Orleans expedition, 205 
et seq.; work with mortar 
flotilla, 212; acting rear-ad- 
miral in charge of tJ. S. fleet 
before Vicksburg, 235 et seq.; 
Rear-Admiral, at capture of 
Fort Fisher, 251. 

Porter, Naval Constructor John 
L., and the ironclad Merrimac, 
183. 

Porter, U. S. torpedo-boat, de- 
scribed, 261. 

Portland, Me., invaded by Con- 
federates, 223. 

■Porto Pray a. Constitution at, 130. 

Porto Rico, U. S. colony, 301. 

Portsmouth, N. H., Ranger built 
at, 13; Wasp built at, 126. 

Portsmouth, U. S. sloop-of-war, 
with Farragut at New Orleans, 
205. 

Portuguese Government, pro- 
tects American commerce, 37. 

Potomac River, torpedoes in, 
237. 

Potter, Lt.-Com. W. E., investi- 
gates destruction of Maine, 
268. 

Preble, Lt.-Com. G. H., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Preble, U. S. sloop, with Mac- 



donough on Champlain, 145 et 
seq.; driven out of fight, 150. 

Preedy, British naval captain, 
effort to hinder Farragut at 
New Orleans, 209. 

President, U. S. frigate, men- 
tioned, 75; encounters the 
Little Belt, 98; captured by 
British fleet, 131. 

Prevost, Sir George, attack on 
Sacket Harbor, 113; at Mac- 
donough's victory, 145 et seq.; 
frightened away, 152. 

Price, Confederate ram, in battle 
at Memphis, 203. 

Prince de Neuchatel, fight of, 133, 
134. 

Pring, Captain, in battle on Lake 
Champlain, 149. 

Privateers, work of, in Revolu- 
tion described, 29 et seq.; esti- 
mate of number, 30 ; evil work 
of, 31-32; work of. War of 
1812, 133 et seq.; system of, 
denounced by Powers of Eu- 
rope, 217; work of Confeder- 
ate, 217; British Government 
favors Confederate, 220. 

" Protections," papers for identi- 
fying American seamen, 57 et 
seq. 

Puritan, harbor defence monitor, 
261. 

Put-in-Bay, Perry's rendezvous, 
118. 

Quebec, American forces driven 
from, 8. 

Queen Charlotte, British ship, in 
battle of Lake Erie, 120 et seq. 

Queen of the West, U. S. ram, in 
battle at Memphis, 202. 

Quincy, Josiah, expresses opin- 
ion of Congress, 68. 

Raleigh, American frigate, chased 
by two British warships, 28. 



INDEX 



329 



Raleigh, Confederate gunboat, 
with Merrimac at Hampton 
Roads, 187. 

Raleigh, U. S. cruiser, with 
Dewey at Manila, 275. 

Rams, fleet of Conf ederate,built, 
201, 202; battle with U. S. 
gunboats, 202-204; end of, 
215. 

Ramsey, Rear-Admiral F. M., 
member of Schley Court of 
Inquiry, 281. 

Randall, Vol. Master William P., 
gallantry of, 189. 

Randolph, John, view of "non- 
intercourse," 64; view of 
navy, 68; mentioned, 79. 

Randolph, frigate, mentioned, 7; 
battle with Yarmouth, 26-27. 

Ranger, American war sloop, de- 
scribed, 13; displays Stars and 
Stripes in Europe, 14; on 
British coast, 14; battle with 
Drake, \5 et seq. 

Ransom, Lt.-Com. G. M., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Read, Lieut. C. W., work of, 
with Confederate cruisers, 223. 

"Record of Proceedings of a 
Court of Inquiry in the case of 
Rear-Admiral Winfield S. 
Schley," quoted, 281 et seq. 

Red River, use of, by Confeder- 
ates, 237. 

Reid, Capt. Samuel, gallant de- 
fence of privateer Armstrong, 
134, 135. 

Reina Christina, Spanish cruiser, 
in battle at Manila, 277. 

Reindeer, British sloop-of-war, 
captured by Wasp, 126. 

Reprisal, war brig, 6. 

Restormel, British cargo ship, 
captured off Santiago, 285. 

Retaliation, French privateer, 
converted into U. S. man-o'- 
war, 44. 

Rhode Island, calls for a navy, 1. 



Richmond; U. S. S., with Farra- 
gut at New Orleans, 212; at 
Port Hudson, 236. 

Richmond "Despatch," quoted 
on blockade running, 172. 

Rio Grande do Sul, to be pro- 
tected by United States, 301. 

Roach, John, and the new naw, 
256. 

Roanoke, U. S. S. frigate, at bat- 
tle in Hampton Roads, 187. 

Roanoke Island, Confederate 
forces at, 176; battle at, 177. 

Rodgers, Commander C. P. R., 
at capture of Port Royal, 179. 

Rodgers, Capt. John, work of in 
Mississippi Valley, 196 et seq.; 
and "Quaker" torpedoes at 
Charleston, 240; as admiral, 
building of new navy, 254. 

Rodgers, Commodore John, men- 
tioned, 85; encounters Little 
Belt, 98, 99. 

Rogers, John, lieutenant on Con- 
stellation after fight with In- 
surgent, 46. 

Roosevelt, Theodore (" Naval 
War of 1812"), quoted, 114, 
153; Asst. Sec. of Navy, work 
of, in war with Spain, 271; 
work of, for navy when Presi- 
dent, 304. 

Ross, Major - General, burns 
Washington, 125, 126. 

Rossie, success of, as a privateer, 
133. 

Royal George, British warship, 
beaten on Lake Ontario, 111; 
in battle on Lake Ontario, 115. 

Roijal Savage, converted mer- 
chant schooner, on Lake 
Champlain, 10. 

Russell, Lord John, hostility of, 
toward United States, 220 et 
seq.; 231; connives in sailing 
of Confederate cruiser, 224; 
warns British merchants not 
to charter U. S. merchantmen, 



330 



INDEX 



224, 225; American com- 
merce driven from ocean by 
policy of, 232, 233. 
Russell, Lt.-Com. J. H., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Sacket Harbor, mentioned, 
110; attack on, 113 et seq. 

Sacramento, U. S. S., mentioned, 
232. 

St. John's, post near Champlain, 
8. 

St. Kitts, U. S. frigate Constel- 
lation at, 47. 

St. Lawrence, U. S. frigate, at 
battle of Hampton Roads, 187. 

St. Louis, U. S. converted mer- 
chantman, under guns at San- 
tiago, 289. 

St. Paul, converted merchant- 
man, on Cuban coast, 284. 

Ship Island, Farragut at, 205. 

Saltonstall, Dudley, captain of 
Alfred, 5. 

Sampson, Capt. W. T., inves- 
tigates destruction of Maine, 
268; Rear-Admiral, in com- 
mand of U. S. fleet for block- 
ade of Cuba, 272; on north 
coast of Cuba, 281 ; on block- 
ade at Santiago, 290 et seq.; 
position in battle of Santiago, 
297, 298; and the Schley 
"Court of Inquiry," 299, 300. 

San Juan, Porto Rico, bom- 
barded, unguarded, 281, 282. 

San Juan del Norte, seized by 
British, 159. 

San Salvader (Bahia), Brazil, 
battle off, 94 et seq. 

Sandusky, Ohio, mentioned, 118. 

Sandy Hook, British blockading 
fleet at, 56. 

Santiago de Cuba, murder of 
American citizens, 254; Schley 
off, 284 et seq.; blockaded by 
Sampson, 290 et seq.; naval 
battle of, 291 et seq.; effect of 
battle, 301. 



Saranac River, mentioned, 147. 

Saratoga, Macdonough's flag- 
ship, 145 et seq.; "mascot" 
rooster on, 149. 

Savannah, Confederate privateer, 
work of, 217, 218. 

Schley, Rear-Admiral Winfield 
S., asks for Court of Inquiry, 
281; at Key West, 283; off 
Cienfuegos, 283 et seq.; leaves 
Cienfuegos for Santiago, 284; 
orders Flying Squadron to 
Key West, 285; report of, to 
Navy Department, 286; to 
Massachusetts "to pot the 
Colon," 288; in battle of San- 
tiago, 291 et seq.; decision of 
Court of Inquiry, regarding, 
298; Dewey's opinion of, 229. 

Scorpion, U. S. gunboat, built, 
116. 

Scott, Col. Winfield, in attack on 
Fort George, 113. 

"Scribner's Magazine," quoted, 
59. 

Seagull, first U. S. war steamer 
to see service, 155. 

Sciote, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Selkirk, Earl of, loss of silver- 
ware, 14. 

Selma, Confederate gunboat, 
captured, 249. 

Seminole, U. S. S., at capture of 
Port Royal, 179. 

Semmes, Commander Raphael, 
early work of, for Confed- 
eracy, 165; in command of 
Sumter, 218, 219; at Cape of 
Good Hope, 226; gallant 
fight with Kearsarge, 227 et 
seq. 

Seneca, U. S. gunboat, at capture 
of Port Royal, 180. 

Serapis, British line-of-battle- 
ship, in battle with Bonhomme 
Richard, 17 et seq. 

Shannon, British frigate in chase 



INDEX 



331 



of Constitution, 80; captures 
the Chesapeake, 101 et seq.; 
mentioned, 141. 
Shaw, John, Lt.-Com., in com- 
mand of U. S. schooner Enter- 
prise, 50. 

Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser, 
career of, 230e€t seq. 

Sherman, Gen. T. W., in Port 
Royal expedition, 178. 

Shubrick, Lieut. Wilham, gal- 
lantry of, 128. 

Sibyl, British frigate, chased by 
Alliance, 28. 

Sigsbee, Capt. C. D., in com- 
mand of Maine at Havana, 
267; in command of St. Paul 
on Cuban coast, 284 et seq. 

Siren, U. S. brig, described, 75. 

Slavery, influence of, on work of 
Confederate forces, 200. 

Sleeper, Lieut. H. J., on the 
Metacomet in Mobile Bay, 249. 

Smith, Lt.-Com. A. N., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Smith, Prof. Goldwin, opinion 
of British hostility toward 
United States, 225, 226. 

Smith, Commodore Joseph, 
touching story of, 192. 

Smith, Lieut. Joseph B., execu- 
tive officer Congress, 188; 
killed, 190; character of, 192. 

Smith, Capt. M., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Somers, converted merchant 
schooner, on Lake Erie, 117; 
in battle of Lake Erie, 120. 

Somers, Master Commandant 
Richard, gallantry of, 78. 

Split Rock Point, fighting near, 
11. 

"Star Spangled Banner," origin 
of, 126; played by British at 
Hong Kong to encourage 
Dewey, 274. 

Stars and Stripes, flag, adopted, 
13; at battle between Boii- 



homme Richard and Serapis, 
24; on frigate Randolph, 27; 
triumphant on Lake Cham- 
plain, 152. 

Steedman, Commander Charles, 
at capture of Port Royal, 180. 

Stephens, James, quoted, 54. 

Stephenson, Capt. Isaac, capt- 
ured by African pirates, 34. 

Sterrett, Lieut. Andrew, gal- 
lantry of, 75. 

Stevens, Robt. L., work of, in 
developing ironclads, 182. 

Stevens, Lt.-Com. T. H., at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 180; com- 
mander, with Farragut at 
Mobile Bay, 246; gallantry of, 
247. 

Stewart, Charles, lieutenant in 
command of Experiment, work 
of, 51; visits President Madi- 
son, 80; as captain, captures 
Cyane and Levant, 129; es- 
capes three British frigates, 
130. 

Stockton, Capt. Robert F., 
brings Ericsson to America, 
158. 

Stonewall, Confederate ironclad, 
career of, 232. 

Stonewall Jackson, Confederate 
ram, mentioned, 215. 

Stoney, T. D., and submarines, 
240. 

Stringham, Flag Officer S. H., 
at Hatteras Inlet, 175. 

Stuart, Captain Lord George, in 
chase of Constitution, 130. 

Submarine torpedo boats, early, 
237; gallant use of, at Charles- 
ton, 239; Congress appro- 
priates $3,000,000 for, 306. 

Sumter, Confederate cruiser, 
work of, 218, 219; end of 
career, 219. 

Sunda, Strait of, Peacock in, 132. 

Susquehanna, U. S. S., at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 179 et seq. 



332 



INDEX 



Swanwick, John, M. C, afraid of 
exasperating West India pi- 
rates, 41. 

Tacony, Confederate cruiser, 
work of, 223. 

Tampa, Fla., United States sol- 
diers sail from, 291. 

Tartarus, British sloop-of-war, 
mentioned, 28. 

Tattnall, Flag Officer Josiah, de- 
fence of Port Royal, 179 et 
seq.; in command of Merri- 
mac, 194; ability of, stated, 
195; court-martialled, 209. 

Taylor, Thomas E., a type of 
blockade runner, 170. 

Tecumseh, death of, 124. 

Tecumseh, U. S. monitor, with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 244, 
246; sunk, 247. 

"Ten Years' War" in Cuba, con- 
sidered, 265. 

Tenedos, British frigate, assists 
in capture of President, 131. 

Tennessee, Confederate ironclad, 
at Mobile, described, 244; in 
battle with Farragut, 247, 
249 et seq. 

Tennessee, Confederate river iron- 
clad, burned at Memphis, 204. 

Terror, Spanish torpedo-boat- 
destroyer, at Santiago, 280. 

Terry, Gen. A. H., at capture of 
Fort Fisher, 251, 252. 

Texas, U. S. battleship, foreign 
plans for, 256; with "Flying 
Squadron" off Cuba, 282; fills 
bunkers at sea, 287; in battle 
of Santiago, 291 et seq.; as to 
proximity to Brooklyn, 294. 

"The Battle of Mobile Bay" 
(Parker), quoted, 250. 

"The Blockade and Cruisers," 
quoted, 189. 

" The Case of the United States 
to Be Laid Before the Tribunal 
of Arbitration," quoted, 221. 



Ticonderoga, U. S. schooner, with 
Macdonough on Champlain, 
lAiOetseq.; ably defended, 151. 

Tigre Island, Honduras, seized 
by British, 159. 

Tigress, converted merchant 
schooner, on Lake Erie, 117; 
in battle of Lake Erie, 120. 

Timby, Theodore R., inventor 
of revolving armored turret, 
185. 

Toronto, captured, 112. 

Torpedoes, early, 237; used by 
Confederates, 238 et seq.; 
"Quaker" effective, 240; Fed- 
eral use of, 241; at Mobile, 
244, 247, 248; in war with 
Spain, 261; moral effect of, 
in battle of Santiago, 293. 

Toucey, Secretary of Navy, work 
of, before Civil War, 154. 

Townsend, Captain, and the 
Confederate river ram fleet, 
201. 

Tracy, Sec. of Navy Benj. F., 
and the new navy, 260. 

Trent, British merchantman, 
capture of, by U. S. S. San 
Jacinto, considered, 220, 221; 
mentioned, 231. 

Tripoli, declares war on U. S., 
74, 75; mentioned, 153. 

Trippe, converted merchant 
sloop, on Lake Erie, 117; in 
battle of Lake Erie, 120. 

"Trochas" in Cuba described, 
266. 

Truxton, Thomas, captain of 
Constellation, captures Insur- 
gent, 44 et seq.; in battle with 
French frigate Vengence, 47 
et seq. 

Tucker, Capt. T. T., in battle 
with Essex, 137 et seq. 

Tunis, Dey of, threatens war on 
U. S., 74. 

Tuscaloosa, Confederate cruiser, 
account of, 226, 227. 



INDEX 



333 



Tycoon, last prize of Alabama, 
227. 

Unadilla, U. S. S., at capture 
of Port Royal, 179. 

Unicorn, British frigate, in chase 
of frigate Raleigh, 28. 

United States, frigate, victory 
over Macedonian, 90 et seq.; 
effect of victory of, ujion 
Washington society, 93; men- 
tioned, i08; lost, 131. 

Valcour Island, American fleet 
at, 9; battle at, 10 et seq. 

Valparaiso, battle of, 138 et seq. 

Van Brunt, Capt. G. J., at Hat- 
teras, 175; mentioned, 194. 

Van Dorn, Confederate ram, in 
battle at Memphis, 204. 

Vandalia, U. S. sloop-of-war, at 
capture of Port Royal, 180. 

Varuna, U. S. converted mer- 
chantman, with Farragut at 
New Orleans, 205; 212 et seq.; 
destroyed, 214. 

Venezuela, when threatened, 
302. 

Vengence, French frigate, battle 
with Constellation, 47 et seq. 

Vengence, French war brig, under 
John Paul Jones, 16. 

Vicksburg, U. S. fleets at, 204; 
Confederate works at, 234; 
U. S. expedition to, a failure, 
235; capture of, 237. 

Virginia, Confederate ironclad 
(see Merriina£). 

Virginia, U. S. battleship, de- 
scribed, 303. 

Virginius affair, 254. 

Vixen, U. S. converted yacht, 
in battle of Santiago, 291. 

Vixen, U. S. schooner, described, 
75. 

Vizcaya, Spanish cruiser, at San- 
tiago, 280 et seq.; in battle of 
Santiago, 293 et seq. 



Wabash, V. S. S., at Hatteras, 
175; at Port Royal, 179 et seq. 

Wainwright, Commander R., 
captain of Hartford at New 
Orleans, 212. 

Wainwright, Lt. Com. Richard, 
fight with torpedo-destroyers 
in battle of Santiago, 295; as 
type of naval officer, 296. 

Wales, Capt. R. W., loses Eper- 
vier, 125. 

Walke, Commander Henry, gal- 
lant work at Island No. 10, 
199, 200; work of, mentioned, 
210. 

Walker, Admiral Sir Baldwin, 
and a Confederate cruiser, 226. 

Walker, Capt. A., with Dewey at 
Manila, 275. 

War of 1812, origin of, con- 
sidered, 53 et seq.; decisive 
battle of. 80; effect of, 308. 

"War in Disguise," quoted, 54. 

War with Mexico, 155. 

War with Spain, cause of, 265 et 
seq.; result of, considered,308. 

Warley, Lieut. A. F., in defence 
of New Orleans, 207. 

Warren, Admiral, commanding 
at Halifax, 101. 

Warrior, first British ironclad 
frigate, 182. 

Warrington, Capt. L., captures 
Epervier, 125; attack on 
Nautilus, 133. 

Washington, General, first use of 
naval power, 1; reports de- 
struction of Falmouth, 2; as 
President, urges building of 
navy, 40; foresight of Presi- 
dent, mentioned, 53. 

Washington, D. C, burned by 
the British, 125, 126; men- 
tioned, 144; panic at, when 
Merrimac came to Hampton 
Roads, 191. 

Washington, war galley, sur- 
rendered, 12. 



334 



INDEX 



Wasp, privateer, 29. 

Wasp, U. S. sloop-of-war, built 
to replace one that captured 
Frolic, captures Reindeer, 126; 
destroys Avon, 127; disap- 
pears, 128. 

Wasp, U. S. sloop-of-war, victory- 
over Frolic, 88 et seq.; gunnery 
on, 89. 

Wasp, war schooner, 6. 

Watmough, Commander P. G., 
at capture of Port Royal, 180. 

Wayne, "Mad Anthony," men- 
tioned, 28, 76. 

Weitzel, Lieut. G., describes 
Fort Jackson, 209. 

Wellington, opinion of British 
soldiers, quoted, 144. 

Welles, Gideon, Secretary of 
Navy, work of, 166; men- 
tioned, 192. 

Wells, Lieut. Henry, work of, on 
Lake Ontario, 111. 

Wharton, author " Diplomatic 
Correspondence of American 
Revolution," quoted, 28. 

Whinyates, Capt. Thomas, com- 
manding Frolic in battle with 
Wasp, 88. 

Whipple, Capt. Abraham, at 
Gaspe affair, 1; captain of 
Columbus, 5. 

"White Squadron," building of, 
253 et seq. 

Whitehaven, John Paul Jones at, 
14. 

Whitney, W. C, Secretary of 
Navy, work of, on new navy, 
256, 258. 

Wickes, Lambert, captain of 
Reprisal, 6. 

Wildes, Capt. F., with Dewey at 
Manila, 275. 

Will-o'-the-Wisp, blockade run- 
ner, 170. 



Willcock, work on international 
law quoted 220. 

Williamson, Chief Eng., W. P., 
andthe ironclad ikfemmac, 183. 

Wilmington, N. C, last naval 
work at, 251 et seq. 

Winona, U. S. S., with Farragut 
at New Orleans, 212. 

Winnebego, U. S. monitor, with 
Farragut at Mobile Bay, 245. 

Winslow, Capt. John A., de- 
stroys Alabama, 227 et seq. 

Wise, Capt. W. C, acts of, on 
Cuban coast, 284 et seq. 

Wissahickon, U. S. S., with 
Farragut at New Orleans, 212. 

Wolfe, British sloop-of-war, at- 
tack on Sacket Harbor, 113; 
in battle on Lake Ontario, 115. 

Wompatuck, U. S. tug, at cable- 
cutting under guns at Santiago 
289. 

Wood, Lieut. John Taylor, de- 
scription of Monitor-Merrimac 
battle, 194. 

Woodford, Gen. Stewart L., 
American Minister to Madrid, 
in war with Spain, 267; leaves 
Madrid, 272. 

Woolsey, Lieut. M. T., work of, 
110. 

Worden, Lieut. John L., in com- 
mand of Monitor, 186; wound- 
ed, 193; as captain, destroys 
Confederate cruiser Nashville, 
238. 

Wyman, Lt.-Com. R. H., at capt- 
ure of Port Royal, 180. 

Yale, converted merchantman, 
on coast of Cuba, 284. 

Yarmouth, British line-of-battle- 
ship, fight with frigate Rarir- 
dolph, 26-27. 

Yeo, Capt. Sir James Lucas, at- 
tack on Sacket Harbor, 113; 
not anxious to fight, 115. 



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